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'Books and magazines contain generalised notions and only sketch the course of events
in the world as best they can: they can never let you have an immediate direct, animated
sense of the lives of Tom, Dick or Harry. If you are not able to understand real
individuals, you are not able to understand what is universal and general'.
(Antonio Gramsci)
'There is surely no-one in Spain today whose pride in their life exceeds my own; there is
no-one less repentant what was their life, the life of a prisoner and convict. This is no
surprise in our country! Our country was an open prison. We were all prisoners - there
were a few principal gaolers who were never detained, whom I never saw when passing
from gaol to gaol, prison to prison. Never did these gaolers - the bishops, the generals,
the millionares, nor any of the rabble that has risen up against popular and proletarian
Spain - ever go to prison. Yet the rest of us have all been in gaols and prisons. What was
inevitable has happened; the prison, the gaol and the prisoner have risen up against their
incarcerators, against those who throughout the course of time have oppressed and
judged us. And what has happened will also inevitably follow: that the Spain of the
prisoners will defeat the Spain of the gaolers, just as in '93 Republican France defeated
the France of the monarchy and the gaolers, with the France of liberties triumphant'.
(Juan Garcia Oliver)
'Macia has tried to make a little Catalonia, whilst we would have made Barcelona the
spiritual capital of the world'.
(Buenaventura Durruti)
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Glossary of Organisations
ACR	 Acció Catalana Republicana - bourgeois Republican party allied to ERC
BOC	 Bloc Obrer i Camperol - anti-Stalinist communist party
CADCI	 Centre Autonomista de Dependents del Comerc i de la Indüstria -
autonomous Catalaniste white collar and shop workers' union
CDE	 ComisiOn de Defensa Económica - CNT-organised body devoted to
raising working class living standards
CEDA	 Confederación Espafiola de Derechas Autónomas - main rightist party in
the 1930s, of quasi-fascist persuasion
CNT	 Confederación Nacional del Trabajo - anarcho-syndicalist union
COPUB	 Cámara Oficial de la Propiedad Urbana de Barcelona - major urban
property owners' organisation
CSR	 Comités Sindicalistas Revolucionarias - pro-Bolshevik cells in the CNT
ERC	 Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya - middle class Republicans
FM	 Federación Anarquista Ibérica - anarchist secret society
FIJL	 Federación Ibérica de Juventudes Libertarias - FM youth movement
GABOC	 Grupos de acción del BOC - BOC self-defence groups
ICE	 Izquierda Comunista de Espafia - small Trotskyist grouping
IWA	 International Workingmens' Association - world organisation of
anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist groups
OSR	 Oposición Sindical Revolucionaria - reformed CSR in 1930-193 1
PCE	 Partido Comunista de Espana - official pro-Stalinist communist party
PNRE	 Partit Nacionalista Republicà d'Esquerra - left-wing Catalan
Republicans
POUM	 Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista - party formed from the fusion
of the BOC and the ICE in 1935
PSOE	 Partido Socialista Obrero Espaflol - the Spanish social-democratic party
PSUC	 Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya - Catalan Communist Party
UGT	 Union General de Trabaj adores - Socialist trade union movement
USC	 UmO Socialista de Catalunya - tiny Fabian-socialist party, close to ERC
U. de R.	 Unió de Rabassaires - Catalan tenant farmers' union
A note on foreign terms.
Throughout this thesis I have preferred Catalan to Castilian wherever it has been
appropriate (eg street names, etc.). Similarly, the people of Barcelona are described
collectively as the Barcelonins rather than as the Barcelonese. However, I have not
attempted to Catalanise that which is commonly described in Spanish. Thus, while the
defacto Catalan party the BOC, is referred to as the Bloc, the CNT, a truly Spanish
trade union, is described as the ConfederaciOn.
Introduction
What follows is a social and cultural study of the Barcelona proletariat during
the Spanish Second Republic (193 1-1936). Unlike many historical and organisational
studies of working class groups and labour organisations, this study looks beyond the
formal aspects of politics to locate praxis firmly within the wider socio-economic fabric
of everyday life. In doing so, the emphasis moves away from an explanation of the
opposition of the CNT-FAI to the Republic in terms of a fixed set of ideological
shibboleths and the traditional anarchist opposition to authority. Instead, this study
assesses the attitude of the CNT towards the Republic in terms of the failure of the
authorities to eradicate the traditional patterns of social exclusion and their inability to
satisfy the predominantly unskilled and unemployed supporters of the CNT-FAI in
Barcelona. Particular emphasis is placed on patterns of social and urban exclusion and
working class culture.
I have set out to retrieve the historic experience of a specific sector of the
Barcelona working class: the much-maligned unskilled, itinerant and immigrant
labourers who, quite literally, built modern Catalonia. International economic collapse
and internal political stability inside Spain during the late 1920s and the early 1930s
meant that increasing numbers of these workers were unemployed. The experience of
unemployment, its impact on the culture of the jobless and their everyday resistance to
poverty, form the core of this study. This provides a starting point for a social history of
crime and punishment in 1930s Barcelona. Particular attention is given to the anarchist
attitude to crime and the way in which the FM encouraged illegal methods of internal
funding.
This study relies on mainly qualitative, rather than quantitative, analysis. While
statistics are not entirely banished, the analysis is premised on the view that the plight of
the unemployed cannot be adequately expressed numerically. Consequently, this work
is overwhelmingly based on a rea1ing of the press from the 1930s. This aversion to
hard-boiled empiricism is only in part justified by the practical reason that Spanish
statistics, whether collated by the authorities or the labour movement, were notoriously
unreliable. The methodological level of enquiry is also conditioned by an overriding
concern with the revolutionary culture of the proletarian masses of Barcelona and the
social processes that shaped this. By its very nature, such an object of study is not
quantifiable, a point that is well reinforced by the classic studies by E.P. Thompson and
the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies on the English proletariat
and policing and the more recent work by Dai Smith on the cultural universe of Welsh
labour.' Following from these works, this study relies heavily on press reports,
biography and oral sources in a bid to recuperate the social and cultural dimensions of
popular consciousness. The epistemological essence of this approach has been
presciently grasped by Paul Thompson, who observes that:
'social statistics, in short, no more represent absolute facts than
newspaper reports, private letters, or published biographies. Like
recorded interview material, they all represent, either from
individual standpoints or aggregated, the social perception of facts;
and are all in addition subject to social pressures from the context in
which they are obtained. With these forms of evidence, what we
receive is social meaning, and it is this which must be evaluated'.2
Social history has been criticised in the past for 'ignoring' politics. 3 Because the
193 Os was an era of intense political change and ideological conflict in Spain this study
has been forced to transcend this shortcoming. This research places the social history of
the unemployed at the centre of the political history of the CNT during the Republic. An
example of this is the way in which the historic tensions between the CNT and the rival
UGT are expressed through the conflict between the essentially unemployed and
unskilled membership of the Barcelona CNT and the predominantly employed and
skilled supporters of the UGT in the Catalan capital.
This fusion of social and political analysis is also central to a full understanding
of the experience of the Republic in Barcelona. This work is especially concerned with
the extent to which the Republic represented a change for the Barcelona working class,
not just in a political sense, but in social and economic terms. Clearly, the Republic
1 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, London, 1963 and Customs in Common,
Harmondsworth, 1993; Stuart Hall, ci. a!., Policing the Crisis: Mugging. the State. and Law and Order,
London, 1978; Dai Smith, Aneurin Bevan and the World of South Wales, Cardiff, 1994
2 Paul Thompson The Voice of the Past, London, 1978, p.96
Geoff Eley and Keith Nield, 'Why does social history ignore politics?, Social History, 5, 2, 1980,
pp.249-271
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established a set of constitutional and democratic guarantees that had rarely existed in
the past. However, the primary concern here is with how the advent of the new régime
affected the lives of the workers of Barcelona and to what extent it altered the previous
patterns of social exclusion and oppression.
While this study covers the period from the birth of the Second Republic in
April 1931 to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, the focus of the
narrative and analysis is concentrated heavily on 1931. This is justifiable because this
was the key period for the future of the Republic. It was 'Republican Year Zero', a time
of disproportionate importance, in which the newly-ensconced Republican authorities
sought to establish a new political and social order capable of embracing those classes
and social strata which had been excluded from previous regimes. Thus, 1931 was the
year in which the Republican project of integrating the Barcelona working class would
either succeed or fail. Equally, the concentration on the blend of social and political
variables at play in 1931 is also valid as it facilitates a more sophisticated understanding
of the complex trajectory of the CNT during the Republic. By assessing the real and
shifting aspirations and hopes of the union rank-and-file, we supersede the caricatured
image of the CNT and its supporters as robots who were guided by exclusively
ideological and doctrinal concerns.4
Finally, because this study is not a political history of the convoluted
institutional relationship between Catalonia and Spain in the 1930s, attention is paid to
the often complex and shifting configuration of power in a quasi-federal state only
insofar as it intersects the main area of study.
4 An example of this one-sided view of the rationale of the CNT and its membership can be found, for
instance, in Stanley Payne, The Spanish Revolution, London, 1970 and, by the same author, Spain's First
Democracy. The Second Republic. 193 1-1936, Madison, 1993
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Chapter 1: Barcelona before the Republic
1.1. The Making of the Barcelona Working Class
From the advent of industrialisation in Catalonia right up until the 193 Os,
employers had more or less continuously enjoyed the upper hand in labour issues. By
1930 many sections of the Barcelona proletariat had never succeeded in establishing
either an improvement in working conditions or collective labour contracts with their
employers. In one part, bourgeois supremacy reflected the support of successive
monarchist governments. However, capitalist power was also derived from the under-
capitalised nature of Catalan industry, which was based on the hyper-exploitation of a
largely unskilled working class. This hyper-exploitation was facilitated by a substantial
number of unemployed proletarians, the 'reserve army of labour' described by Karl
Marx, whose willingness to work was a perennial obstacle to rebellion.'
The presence of a pocket of unemployed, unskilled proletarians enabled
industries to run on a casualised basis, with only a limited number of permanent
employees. It was customary for legions of workers to mill around allotted places in the
hope that they would be contracted for the day. A variety of factors made this system
immensely attractive for employers. Firstly, this casualised pattern of work meant that
employers were relieved of all responsibility for the workers other than on the odd days
when they were hired. Secondly, the informal pattern of hiring allowed for favouritism
and, conversely, the elimination of 'unfavoured' workers, especially union militants,
from the workplace. Thirdly, casualisation was an important downward push on wages.
While, for instance, it was possible to earn 15 pesetas for a days work on the docks,
hands might be hired only two or three times in any given week, thus earning a far from
satisfactory wage. Finally, the existence of a mass of pauperised workers who were
normally denied a regular role within the labour force tended to reinforce the 'sweated'
nature of the industrial structure, as well as serving as a useful reminder to workers of
the fate that awaited them if they broke the discipline imposed by employers.
Backward forms of 'sweated' labour were the most characteristic feature of the
1 Karl Marx, Capital, London, 1961, vol.1, p.632; Maria José Sirera Oliag, Obreros en Barcelona. 1900-
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Barcelona University, 1959, p.33
Barcelona economy. The textile industry, a sector normally associated with the first
spurt of capitalist development, was paradigmatic. Based predominantly on casualised
labour, the textile sector had only minuscule pockets of skilled workers and was one of
Barcelona's biggest employers right into the 1930s. Other industrial sectors shared many
of the characteristics of the textile industry. The docks, construction and woodworking
all provide examples of industries based on a vicious combination of 'sweated' and
casual labour. Similarly, the metal and transport industries, both of which were new
additions to the local economy in the 1920s, remained anchored in unskilled and, more
often than not, 'sweated' labour. Even traditionally privileged sectors of the workforce
like printers faced wretched working conditions in Barcelona. Overall, therefore, the
workers in the Catalan capital comprised a thoroughly unstable force, yet, at the same
time, this unskilled, impoverished proletariat was a vital complement to the archaic and
under-capitalised industries of Catalan capitalism.2
Another key feature of the Barcelona economy was its heavy reliance on child
labour. The conditions facing child workers were abysmal and according to one working
class commentator, 'men ceased being children at the age of eight, they were adults at
fifteen and old at forty'. At the turn of the century, it was commonplace for young
children to work a 12 hour day. Children experienced few benefits from their early
baptism in the world of industry and it was not uncommon for them to undergo an initial
contractual period, sometimes lasting a full year, in which they were unpaid but were
still required to fulfil the dirtiest and most dangerous tasks in the factory. Young
operatives were subjected to harsh labour discipline by foremen, who were known to
beat those children who failed to keep up with work rates. Despite these drawbacks, the
prospect of even the slightest improvement in the common economy of proletarian
families guaranteed that a steady flow of children as young as six entered the workplace.
When the employer-friendly monarchical state finally introduced legislation to protect
the worst excesses of child exploitation at the turn of the century, capitalists
2 Christopher EaLham, "Anarcocapitalistes", "Lumpenburgesia" and the Origins of Anarchism in
Catalonia',	 7, 1, 1994, pp.50-55
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circumvented the law by contracting children as 'apprentices', although in practice there
was no technical preparation or training, just the 'sweated' labour of the past.
Meanwhile, many employers felt neither loyalty or compassion towards their operatives
and in many workshops it was common for management to record the date of birth of
child workers so that they could be sacked before their 16th birthday to save the extra
wages paid to adult labourers.3
The working life of adult operatives was barely more auspicious. In 1927 around
50% of the workforce in Barcelona laboured in small enterprises and the overall
employer-worker ratio was 1:15. It was common for workshops to be located in poorly
converted, insalubrious 'sweat-shops', with little natural sunlight or ventilation. These
ill-maintained factories with few safety standards ensured that Barcelona province
enjoyed the dark accolade of topping the Spanish league table for labour accidents
throughout the thirty-six year period running from the turn of the century up until the
Civil War.4
These same uncompetitive industries, with their slim profit levels and insecure
markets, generated a highly authoritarian bourgeois class consciousness. Catalan
capitalists evinced a Hobbesian sense of manifest destiny that elevated the naked pursuit
of profit and their own class interests over those of the rest of the population. Working
class demands, whether individual or collective, were bitterly resented as an impudent
threat to profits. Similarly, cuts in the duration of the working week, seen in much of
Europe as a necessary philanthropic measure to heighten the well-being of workers,
were regarded by Catalan industrialists as a mortal threat to production levels. The
arrogance of this bourgeois philosophy was cruelly apparent in the 'theory of
Aivaro Soto Carmona, El trabajo industrial en Ia Espafla contemporánea, Barcelona, 1989, p.700; José
Peiró, Juan Peiró: teôrico y militante anarcosindicalista espafiol, Barcelona, 1978, pp.9-10; José Peirats,
Figuras del movimiento libertario Español, Barcelona, 1978, p.227; César Lorenzo, Los anarguistas
espafloles y el poder. Paris, 1972, p44, n.5; Joaquim Ferrer and Simô Piera, Simó Piera: Perfil d'un
sindicalista. Records I experiències d'un dirigent de La CNT, Barcelona, 1975, pp.17-25; Susanna Tavera
and Enric Ucelay da Cal, 'Conversa amb Sebastiã, un lider cenetiste català', L'Avenc, 6, 1977, p.1; Joan
Llarch, Los dlas rojinegros. Memorias de un niflo libertario. 1936, Barcelona, 1977, p.22
' Pere Gabriel, 'La Barcelona obrera y proletaria', in Alejandro Sanchez (ed.), Barcelona. 1888-1929.
Modernidad. ambición y conflictos de una ciudad sofiada, Madrid, 1994, p.1 04; Soto Carmona, El
trabajo, pp.613-634, 662
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professional danger', a calculating industrial doctrine that postulated 'free labourers' had
to bear the full consequences of industrial work. Clearly, this perspective was well
suited to the rickety structure of industrial production in Catalonia: it conveniently
relieved employers of all responsibility for accidents at work and it served as a raison
d'etre for reducing wages to subsistence levels. Antoni Jutglar correctly described this
shared set of bourgeois idiosyncrasies as 'class egoism'.5
The hard realities of industrial life were largely ignored by the monarchical
authorities. There are several reasons why the welfare and social functions of the state
were highly restricted. Firstly, the under-capitalised industries of Catalonia were a poor
basis for the collection of taxes necessary to sustain a welfare state. Secondly, even
when the state promulgated reforms in favour of the working masses, as in the case of
the restriction of child labour, these laws tended to exist only on paper as the authorities
lacked the power to impose them against the recalcitrant opposition of the economic
oligarchy. Contrary to the trend in most of secular Europe, where public bodies took
over social and welfare functions, the Church remained an integral part of the Spanish
monarchical state. In Barcelona, friars and nuns accounted for the bulk of hospital
nurses. They also ran orphanages, the main psychiatric hospital in the city and the Cases
de treball ifeina, the workhouses that functioned as business enterprises for the Church.
Authoritarian religious thinking permeated all of these welfare institutions, while the
Catholic bourgeoisie reted the clergy as a useful tool of social control, particularly
within the education system. Relations between the urban masses and the clergy were,
therefore, frequently poisonous, and the bulk of the working class looked on the Church
as a parasitic, repressive force.6 By way of self-defence, the Church employed a
catastrophic rhetoric, reflected in the prophecy of Archbishop Tones i Bages, that
Antoni Jutglar, Historia crftica de Ia burguesfa en Catalufia, Barcelona, 1984, pp.322-323, 333-336
6 Fernando Alvarez-Uria, 'Veils i nous pobres. Rodarnons I pobres vàlids a Ia hum de les ciències socials i
politiques', Acàcia, 3, 1993, pp.78-83; El Escándoio, 6 February, 16 September 1926; Frances Lannon,
'The Socio-Political Role of the Spanish Church - A Case Study', Journal of Contemporary History, 14,
1979, 193-210; Joan Connelly Uliman, The Tragic Week. A Study of Anticlericaiism in Spain. 1875-
.1912, Cambridge, Mass., 1968, pp.27-58, 322-332
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'Catalonia will be Christian, or it will cease to be'.7
Catalan industrialists held a similarly apocalyptic philosophy about the 'social
question'. A consistent advocate of strong government, the Catalan bourgeoisie accepted
the protection offered by the Restoration constitutional democracy which, far from
democratic or constitutional, was based on widespread electoral falsification. For all the
stability brought to capitalism by the state, Catalan employers never felt secure.
According to Jordi Casassas Ymbert capitalists were marked by 'a generalised sensation
of being unprotected by the authorities'. Indicative of this unease, at the turn of the
century Guillermo Graell, the secretary of the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, the main
Catalan employers' association, complained of the 'shameful social indiscipline that
prevails, of the disorder and licentiousness of customs in the streets'.8
Bourgeois fears were based on the assumption that crime and illegality were
exclusively proletarian preserves. Of particular alarm were street gangs composed of
'hobos' (trinxeraires) and 'runaway children' who rebelled against autocratic family life.
Another cause for concern were the 'TB gangs', composed of immiserated youths whose
abysmal social conditions had exposed them to a disease which rendered them
unemployable in the eyes of most employers. 9 Bourgeois disquiet was given a new edge
through the overlap between the rough street antics of working class youth and the
anarchist movement. This confluence was epitomised in the antics of 'The Sons of
Bitches' ('Els Fills de Puta'), a gang ofjuvemle anarchists which roamed the rough,
tough streets, bars and cafés of downtown Barcelona.'0
With the emergence of the organised labour movement, bourgeois criminologists
and psychologists asserted connections between physical illness and degeneration and
Cited in Victor Alba, Catalufia de tamaflo natural, Barcelona, 1975, p.'94
8 Jordi Casassas Ymbert, 'Batallas y ambigtledades del catalanismo', in Sanchez (ed.), p.130; Graell cited
in Pere Lopez Sanchez, Un verano con mit julios y otras estaciones. Barcelona: de Ia Reforma Interior a
la RevoluciOn de Julio de 1909, Madrid, 1993, p.80
J. Juderl as, Lajuventud delincuente. Leyes e instituciones gue tienden a su regeneraciOn, Madrid, 1912,
p.8; José Elias de Molins, La obrera en Cataluña. en Ia ciudad yen el campo, Barcelona, 1915, p.53; Juli
Vallmitjana, Criminalitat tipica local, Barcelona, 1910, p.8; Manuel Gil Maestre, La criminalidad en
Barcelona y en las grandes poblaciones, Barcelona, 1886, pp.23-3 1
10 Baliasar Porcet, La revuelta permanente, Barcelona, 1978, p.54; Emili Salut, Vivers de revolucionaris.
Apunts histôrics del Districte Cinguè, Barcelona, 1938, pp.147-'48
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the 'madness' (locura) or 'cancer' of collective protest. The assumed links between
proletarian militancy and deviancy and physical disease saw the invention of new
misdemeanours, such as the 'collective crimes' of organised dissent. On a preventive
level, the authorities became committed to the internment of 'errant' youths in borstals in
the hope that they would not become perverted by 'wayward ideologies'. Thus, in 1890
the Asil Durán was founded by the local authorities for the clergy to re-educate the
'rebel', 'disobedient' and 'non-conformist' youth of Barcelona with the therapy of hard
labour."
However, the spectre of social discipline remained a living obsession for Catalan
capitalists. This was reflected in their desire to extend their control beyond the
workplace, into all spheres of social life. Bourgeois dreams of social harmony were
expressed through urbanism. Emic Prat de la Riba, one of the leading early voices of
Catalanisme, had a vision of an 'imperial Barcelona', which presupposed extinguishing
the latent social war and pacifying the internal proletarian enemy within the confines of
the metropolis. This project was reflected in city's most imaginative architect, Antoni
GaudI i Comet, a highly anti-democratic thinker, who had close ties to bourgeois
circles. GaudI's plan for La Sagrada FamIlia reflected his conviction that the godless
proletariat of Barcelona was in desperate need of new places of worship. GaudI typified
bourgeois hopes that 'christianisation' would instil urbanity and civic responsibility in
workers, demobilise the proletariat and obscure the prevailing material inequality in the
city.'2
The absence of public resources and the already pronounced sense of separation
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1994, pp.1-19
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Essays, London, 1980, pp.1-32
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between the main classes in Catalan society meant that bourgeois urbanistic and
ideological projects aimed at integrating the subaltern classes did not come to fruition.
Increasingly, repression seemed the easiest option available to the upper classes. Joan
Maragall, the national poet of Catalonia, wrote of the need 'to purify (depurar) the mass,
expelling bad people, rendering them incapable of committing evil, watching them,
impeding also criminal propaganda'. The Lliga Regionalista, the main political party of
the Catalan bourgeoisie formed at the beginning of this century, embodied the neurosis
of industrialists. This overwhelming sense of social insecurity in the face of the 'internal
enemy' grew after the 1909 Setmana Tràgica, when the workers of Barcelona first
revealed their ability to capture the streets of the city from the police. The traditional
bourgeois yearning for 'social discipline' now crystallised around the need for
repression. The Lliga developed law-and-order panics as its stock-in-trade and it
demanded a greater political voice so that it could increase the grip of the state over
society and protect bourgeois civilisation from its proletarian enemies. The ultra-
reactionary Lliga continually berated the Madrid authorities for leaving the 'respectable
classes' at the mercy of a 'criminal population' and selling Catalonia short in the war
against criminality. Prat de la Riba contended that all social violence in Barcelona was
due to the failings of the Spanish authorities to provide an effective police force in the
city) 3 Ironically, alongside this ideology of order, the dividing line between legal and
illegal business practises in Cataloma was perhaps finer than anywhere else in Europe at
the turn of the century. Moreover, this was a growing trend, particularly among those
capitalists who enriched themselves during World War One, many of whom behaved in
a thoroughly illegal way and it was widely believed that apart from ignoring labour
legislation, many companies kept two sets of books, regularly falsified accounts and
cheated on tax payments. As one social observer of the 1920s reflected, 'the classic
swindle (timo) and the cloudy business deal were the order of the day'.'4
13 Lopez Sanchez, Un verano, p.85; Josep Benet, Maragall i Ia Setmana Tràgica, Barcelona, 1965;
Guillem Graell, La cuestiOn catalana, Barcelona, 1902, passim.; Jordi Solé-Tura, Catalanismo y
revoluciOn burguesa. La sintesis de Prat de la Riba, Madrid, 1970, pp.249, 256, 258
14 José Luis Vila-San-Juan, La vida cotidiana en Espafla durante Ia dictadura de Primo de Rivera,
19
Although the Catalan bourgeoisie was in no immediate danger of being toppled,
its fears were not completely unfounded. José Maria Macarro Vera has spoken of the
'preventive inefficiency of the state' in Spain. In Barcelona, there was traditionally a
very high police-inhabitant ratio which, due to deficient public spending and population
growth, tended to rise throughout the first part of the twentieth century.' 5 In qualitative
terms, the inefficiency of the Catalan police was legend. Police work was widely seen as
low-status employment which, according to one former Barcelona Chief of Police, was
'the quick solution to a family catastrophe') 6 However, police work was poorly
remunerated. A visiting French police commissioner was staggered to discover that the
Barcelona Chief of Police had dual employment to make ends meet. Bad pay bred
corruption. By the turn of the century La policla espafiola, the professional journal of the
Spanish constabulary, recognised that the Barcelona police force had become deeply
involved in the sale of arms, extortion, protection rackets, prostitution, illegal gaming,
as well as the widespread framing of innocent citizens. La policla espafiola ironically
concluded that if the authorities were committed to ending crime in the Catalan capital,
they would have to commence by incarcerating the entire police force in Barcelona.
The shadowy pursuits of the Barcelona police grew during World War One,
when the city became a haven for the secret services of the belligerent powers. During
these years the Barcelona Chief of Police, Bravo Portillo, supplemented his salary by
Barcelona, 1984, p.64; Salvador Cánovas Cervantes, Apuntes históricas de "Solidaridad Obrera",
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1986
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becoming a German agent. Amid considerable intrigue and with so many rich pickings
in the 'black economy', the poorly trained police progressively devoted less time to
regular police work. This produced a dearth of intelligence that was exacerbated by the
habit of agents to take their archives, records and papers with them when they left the
force. To overcome this weakness, the police relied on a network of confidants.
However, this brought its own problems as confidants frequently impeded police work
by giving false information, either as part of their own criminal extortion or as a means
of emphasising their importance to their paymasters. The ill-informed activities of the
police and their often unjustified arrests meant that many Barcelonins ceased to regard
the force as their protectors, viewing them instead as their mortal enemies.'7
The police compensated for its preventive and investigative shortcomings
through its reactive capacity to meet threats to public order, that is to say, its purely
repressive capacity. The force distinguished itself by its 'preventive brutality' and the
violence it directed against both criminals and, later on, those suspected of trade union
activities. To satisfy the craving for order of the authorities and the 'respectable classes',
workers were policed disproportionately on the grounds of their assumed civic
irresponsibility. All police stereotypes of the criminal were abstracted from images of
the proletarian. By contrast, if accused, the propertied classes were simply investigated
by the police, and even then, not always. For example, the police regularly ignored
instances where employers illegally contravened labour or safety legislation, even
though this often resulted in the loss of life. No such leniency was extended to the lower
classes and officialdom reacted sharply to even the most petty act of theft by workers.
Charges were often invented fiction and convictions were obtained through the brutal
interrogation known as the 'third degree'. Police brutality was abetted by the civil
authorities who allowed the police to detain 'suspects' without trial (presos
gubernativos). This form of illegal detention was known colloquially as the quintzenes,
17 Porcel, La revuelta, p.139; Lopez Sanchez, Un verano, pp.99, 100-103; La policla espaflola cited in
Pedro Trinidad Fernández, La defensa de Ia sociedad. Cárcel y delincuencia en Espafia (siglos XVIII-
XX), Madrid, 1991, pp.298-309; Mola, Memorias, vol.1, p.47; Angel Pestafia, Terrorismo en Barcelona
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as it allowed police 15 days to extract a 'confession'. If this proved impossible, pliant
authorities could, if they chose, subject the quintzenaris indefinitely to internment
without trial, the duration of which depended on the whim of the Civil Governor. It was
not uncommon for these detainees to face new beatings, particularly in the form of the
dreaded 'pasillo', a corridor through which detainees were punched, kicked and coshed
by two lines of police and jailors, before arriving at underground cells that resembled
medieval dungeons, insalubrious dens of disease, sometimes replete with rats.
While exemplary state cruelty was intended to show real and potential enemies
of the law the errors of their errant ways, it was also instrumental in creating crime,
through the absence of mechanisms whereby the 'offender' could be re-incorporated into
social life. Instead, a vindictive blend of conservative social attitudes, employer
blacklists and the stigma of conviction often made it impossible for ex-convicts to find
work, particularly as many employed required letters of 'good conduct' from prospective
workers and frequently refused to contract employees without a fixed abode.
Consequently, the prospects of crime and recidivism were guarantied by the very
functions and limitations ofjustice. However, this state of affairs was very much in
keeping with the exclusive structures of the monarchical authorities and their project to
create a consensus around the 'goodness' of Christian and labouring values, while
separating dangerous 'evil-doers' from the honourable sectors of society.'8
As mass unions rendered traditional employer punishments like the blacklisting
of 'unreliable' workers and the 'hunger accord' (elpacto del hambre) ineffective,
'preventive brutality' became more prominent. This was spearheaded by the political
police, the Brigada Policial especializada en Anarquismo y Sindicalismo. The files of
the political police on trade unionists and labour militants carried precise annotated
instructions to agents such as 'keep this one under constant watch' or 'make life
impossible for this one'. This advice was acted upon and the police pursued leading
labour militants relentlessly, sometimes to the point of forcing them to move town.
18 Pedro Trinidad Fernández, 'La configuraciO histôrica del subjecte delinquent', Acàcia, 3, 1993, pp.70-
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Intimidation ranged from petty acts of harassment, such as house searches, which could
come at any time of the day or the night and were often acts of simple destruction. There
were many cases of the police detaining labour activists on a routine basis, even getting
the worker sacked, by telling employers that the worker had committed a petty crime.
This latter strategy was sometimes part of a plan to recruit police informers and there
were many reported cases where agents threatened to 'frame' militants unless they
worked for the authorities. Meanwhile, during times of real unrest the authorities
resorted to a crude form of internal deportation ('conducción ordinaria'), whereby labour
militants were detained without trial and escorted on foot to a distant jail by Guardia
Civil cavalrymen)9
The police also funded provocateurs to infiltrate the labour movement. It even
sponsored assassinations against key labour militants. On occasions, plain-clothed
officers provoked union demonstrators in order to incite violence. Thereafter, the para-
military Civil Guard, known as 'la Benemérita' to its admirers, would order the
demonstration to disperse. If its regulation three warning bursts of a trumpet went
unheeded, the Civil Guard, armed with its traditional sables and Mauser rifles, either
charged the demonstrators or opened fire. This violence had the aim of reclaiming the
streets for the authorities by breaking the spirit of resistance of the masses and creating a
social climate that favoured placing labour organisations outside the law.2°
When nascent labour organisations refused to buckle under the weight of
repression, monarchical justice became even more arbitrary, including the imposition of
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the death penalty. This was infamously reflected in the concept of 'moral guilt' which
allowed the authorities to punish and execute radical intellectuals or syndicalist leaders,
even if they had played no part in the events, like the notorious execution of the
anarchist educationalist Francesc Ferrer i Guardia in 1909. Meanwhile, in the absence of
evidence, the security forces sometimes avoided the technicalities of the judicial process
with the ignominious 'ley de fugas', whereby detainees were 'shot while trying to
escape'.2'
Although these repressive practices fulfilled the short-term purpose of quashing
social protest, in the long run, they served only to further highlight the separation of the
proletariat from both the state and the bourgeoisie. Many workers regarded laws as
inherently political and anti-proletarian, as the guarantors of bourgeois inequality.
Similarly, the endemic violence and torture of the police ensured that there was a near-
generalised hatred for the force among the proletariat of Barcelona. Known popularly as
'the cops' (la bofia) in Catalan or 'the fuzz' (laspasmas) in Castilian, the security force
were seen by the workers of Barcelona as little more than the gendarmerie of the
propertied classes, bent on maintaining the existing balance of power in the city. In
proletarian neighbourhoods the police were seen as an alien army of occupation that
imposed itself on the streets by force. This led to strong popular traditions of opposition
to the police and attacks on the security forces were celebrated by the community. In
tough proletarian neighbourhoods like the Barn xino social life for many young workers
revolved around daily conflicts with the police, in what one inhabitant of the area
described as 'the continual battle for life'. This was accentuated by the collision of the
aggressive street culture of working class youth and the pursuit of 'order' by the local
constabulary.22
These rebellious customs reflected the weak social order in a city that was
characterised by a fragile consensus, where authority lacked legitimacy and where stable
21 Vincent Robert, "La Protesta Universal" contra Ia ejecuciôn de Ferrer: las manifestaciones de octubre
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governance was unthinkable due to the degree of socio-political alienation felt by a
large part of the proletariat. Under these volatile conditions, minor gestures of social
protest were easily transformed into full-scale social war, as seen in the 1909 Setmana
Tràgica and in the sporadic street violence between 1918 and 1923. In such times when
the tenuous social truce completely broke down, the authorities responded with martial
law (estado de guerra), bringing the army into the fray in a bid to keep the lid on social
tensions.23
While repression brought nothing but discredit on the monarchist state in the
eyes of the masses, it assuaged many of the criticisms of the illiberal capitalists of
Barcelona, who obstinately refused to recognise collective bargaining. Instead, the
employers preferred individual negotiation with workers because, with capital on their
side, they enjoyed the right to hire and fire any worker and had free reign to determine
working conditions. The readiness of the bourgeoisie to exploit the weak position of its
predominantly unskilled workers in order to keep them unorganised meant that the
struggle for union recognition was highly protracted. Bourgeois attitudes hardened after
World War One, with the emergence of nouveaux riches capitalists, who revealed all the
characteristics of the adventurer, in relation to both business and industrial relations.
Embittered by what they saw as attempts by trade unions to usurp their new-found
fortunes, these new capitalists were even more aggressive towards workers than their
predecessors.24
It was within this virulent post-war context that the mass unions of the
Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) emerged. From its birth in Catalonia in
1910, the CNT had become embroiled in a violent class struggle. Industrial relations
quickly became radicalised and struggles with employers who rejected the right of
23 Lopez Sanchez, Un verano, p.95; Joaquin Romero Maura, "La rosa de fuego". El obrerismo barcelonés
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workers to unionise were ipso facto accompanied by robust and aggressive measures.
CNT pickets were so fearsome that there were reported cases of 'scabs' crossing picket
lines dressed as women. The bourgeoisie rose to the challenge of labour and in order to
crush the unions the regular state security forces were augmented by the middle-class
militia-men of the Sometent. When the CNT-organised 'defence squads' matched the
force of the Sometent, the employers of Barcelona funded the extra-legal terror of the
Sindicatos Libres to terrorise the growing legions of organised labour. In connivance
with the Barcelona police, the capitalist-sponsored gunmen of the Sindicatos Libres set
about eliminating a generation of trade union activists in the Catalan capital, even
torturing syndicalists to the extent of permanent disfigurement.25
The anti-union terror of the Libres succeeded only in raising the stakes on the
street. A pattern was established whereby whenever repression forced Confederal
institutions underground and blocked the initiatives of the largely moderate CNT
leadership, the ascendency of the radical anarchists was assured. Firstly, clandestinity
favoured the most radical anarchist tendencies, whose emphasis on individualism and
the merits of clandestinity were, in the view of José Alvarez Junco, 'making a virtue out
of a necessity'.26 Secondly, growing state violence confirmed the prognosis of the
radical anarchists like Arturo Parera, who favoured 'permanent and systematic terror'. In
other words, by converting the streets into a contested area and prescribing mass protest,
the authorities guarantied the irruption of the advocates of militant resistance, elements
who were prepared to defend their right to the streets by force of arms and who were
willing to stand face-to-face with the gunmen of the Libres.
The readiness of the militant anarchist grupos de afinidad ('affinity groups') to
pick up the gauntlet thrown down by the bourgeoisie and the Libres converted the
Catalan capital into a violent inferno. Recruited from the growing numbers of
25 Manuel Sastre, Las huelgas en Barcelona y sus resultados durante el aflo 1907, Barcelona, 1908, p.12;
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unemployed in the city, the grupistas operated in guerrilla-style clandestinity and
illegality, periodically emerging to meet the repression from above in kind. These
struggles reaffirmed the revolutionary bohemian reputation of Barcelona, which became
an epic theatre for struggle with the class enemy, serving as a point of attraction for
anarchists from all over the Spanish state.27
The descent into violence and the spread of what employers' groups termed
'social crime' sharpened the ever-present obsessions of the economic oligarchy with
'social indiscipline' and 'industrial harmony'. The elimination of representative,
workplace organisations became the central demand of the Catalan bourgeoisie. Finally,
in 1923 the property-owners of the Cámara Oficial de la Propiedad Urbana de Barcelona
(COPUB), the Lliga and the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional embraced the 'organic
democracy' of General Primo de Rivera's dictatorship as a corrective to 'terror and crime'
on the streets. The prevailing attitude of the oligarchy was summed up by the Fomento
del Trabajo Nacional, who reflected that 'when social order is not compatible with
freedom, we prefer the former'. The Catalan economic elites found their knight-
protector in a Spanish general.28
1.2. Urban Development, Social Change and Popular Culture
Although Barcelona industry remained undercapitalised, between 1914 and 1930
the Catalan capital became an increasingly modern industrial centre. By 1930 a new
working class was born and the Catalan capital was home to over 300,000 proletarians,
who comprised around 35% of the entire population of the city. The re-creation of the
working class gathered pace in the 1 920s and the on-going demand for unskilled labour
generated by the expansion of the urban transport system and the building programme
27 Alba, Dos revolucionarios, p.77; Angel Pestafta, Lo gue aprendi en Ia vida, (4th edition) Bilbao, 1973,
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for the 1929 World Exhibition made the city a major pole of attraction for the miserable
rural proletariat from the Spanish state. In the words of one anarchist, 'the disinherited
of the south flowed en masse into the Catalan California'. This odyssey was marked by
the 'serial' or 'chain immigration' of large groups from the same town or province,
sometimes entire villages, who converged on the Catalan capital in search of work. By
the late 1920s around 35% of the overall population of Barcelona city were non-Catalan.
The majority of these immigrants came from neighbouring Valencia and Aragon, with a
large part of the remainder hailing from the southern areas of Murcia and Andalusia.
The growth in the population of the Catalan capital was vertiginous. Between 1920 and
1930 the overall number of inhabitants of Barcelona grew by an astounding 295,230, a
demographic increase which outstripped that of industrial giants like Milan and
Sheffield and which made the city the most populated city in the Spanish state. By 1930
Barcelona entered the select band of millionaire cities and was established as a major
European centre which, although smaller than Paris and London, was an immense urban
sprawl by Spanish standards, as testified by the 573% extension of its municipal
boundary between 1867 and 1933. Graphically, the population of industrial districts like
Sants and Sant MartI exceeded that of many Spanish towns and cities.29
The physiognomy of the city was changed irrevocably. Urban growth and the
creation of a new proletariat increased the zonal segregation of classes within the city,
exacerbating what Pere Lopez Sanchez identified as a 'dual city' or 'two cities in one'.
While in Gràcia and in some parts of the Eixample there remained a certain
geographical proximity between the working class and the middle class, these districts
were increasingly the exception to the norm as class divisions were reflected in
geographical terms. Between 1920 and 1930 the population of proletarian Sants grew by
25,838, an increase of over 30%. Similarly, in other worker-districts, like Sant MartI
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and Sant Andreu, there were growth rates of 40.26% and 47.45% respectively.
Meanwhile, during the same ten year period, the population of the essentially petit
bourgeois residential Eixample increased by a mere 26%. Moreover, this rise was due to
the gravitation of the middle classes towards the Eixample from other districts of
Barcelona, something that further underlined the growing segregation of classes in the
city.3°
The segregation of classes was even more pronounced in the rapidly developed
urban and industrial hinterland of Barcelona, where the population had doubled during
in the 1920s due to the establishment of bigger plants on the outskirts of the city.
Surrounding industrial satellites, like Granollers, Mataró, Terrassa and Sabadell, saw
considerable population growth, as did Badalona, a city to the North of Barcelona, who
population increased by over 50%. The strain of the population increase also fell on
areas that lacked industry but yet provided space for urban growth. Santa Coloma de
Gramanet and Sant Adnà del Besôs, two small towns between Barcelona and Badalona,
had population growth of 373% and 507% respectively between 1920 and 1930.
Meanwhile, to the South of Barcelona, l'Hospitalet became the major receptacle for
immigrant workers. Overall l'Hospitalet grew by over 200% between 1920 and 1930,
while the La Torrassa-Collblanc district, the most populated area of the city, grew by
456%. With nearly 40,000 inhabitants in 1930, the population of l'Hospitalet outstripped
that of Girona, Lleida and Tarragona, the three provincial Catalan capitals, and
Barcelona's neighbour established itself as the second biggest city in Catalonia, right on
the doorstep of the capital.3'
Nick Rider has demonstrated that the Catalan bourgeoisie was incapable of
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providing a coherent plan for the development of Barcelona and its hinterland. In
keeping with the widespread fragmentation of Catalan industry, the construction sector
was divided into small units of capital and proved unable to meet the new demands
placed on the housing market. According to Xavier Tafunell, the houses built in
Barcelona during the inter-war period only met around two-thirds of the market
demand. With the existing deficient housing stock quickly exhausted, and in the absence
of any coordinated public housing policy from either the state or the municipal
authorities, there was an acute housing shortage in the 1 920s.32
Many of the single immigrant itinerant labourers unable to procure fixed
accommodation found rooms in the array of cheap pensions and 'doss houses' (casas de
dormir) in the Barn xino, where beds were rented by the day or the hour. However, this
was unrealistic for immigrant families, who were subjected to numerous abuses by the
landlord class. Organised in the COPUB and with close links to local networks of
power, the landlords had a complete disregard for tenants' rights and the scant housing
legislation passed during the monarchy. This meant that even the most squalid hovel
could bring in a lucrative rent. In the Barn xino housing shortages led to the subdivision
of existing housing stock into a series of 'beehives', often with four or more families in a
flat originally intended for one and by 1930, there were over 100,000 subtenants in
Barcelona. Because of the acute shortages within an unregulated market, houses were
thrown up in the ghettos of Barcelona and l'Hospitalet with little concern for the living
conditions of their residents.33
The instability of the local economy and the twin threat of inflation and
unemployment made it difficult for newcomers to pay the hefty deposits and rents
demanded by landlords. The dearth of affordable housing stock for the unemployed and
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the unskilled led to the emergence of shanties (barracas) throughout Barcelona, of
which there were over 6,000 by 1927. Built from cardboard, metal sheeting and even
household rubbish, the shanties lacked even the most rudimentary drainage and
sanitation, they were highly vulnerable to the extremities of heat and rain and brought
the constant danger of disease. In the run up to the 1929 World Exhibition the number
of shanties soared, as whole districts of make-shift dwellings were constructed by
immigrant workers, particularly in Sants, Poble Sec and I'Hospitalet. According to one
estimate, 10% of Barcelonins were forced to live in shanties. However, while the
majority of the shanties were rent-free, whenever possible, landowners imposed rents on
shanty-dwellers, sometimes even above the market rate for a flat.34
As the housing situation deteriorated, the dictatorial authorities were finally
compelled to launch a public housing initiative towards the end of the 1 920s. However,
this project was far removed from the bourgeois-utopian plans to regulate urban growth
and construct an 'imperial Barcelona'. Instead, the authorities acted in a cosmetic way,
initiating rudimentary slum clearance to eliminate the mass of shanties before the arrival
of foreign visitors for the 1929 Exhibition. The result was the construction of the so-
called Cases Barates ('Cheap Houses'), a series of council-owned dwellings under the
administration of the Patronat de l'Habitació, a newly formed municipal housing trust.
From the outset, the Cases Barates project was undermined by the same
speculation that affected the private housing sector. In keeping with the untrammelled
corruption of the dictatorship, Patronat members formed their own construction
company which, predictably, won the contract to build the Cases Barates. Due to the
consequent graft, the initial plan for six groups of Cases Barates was abandoned when
the funds for the project ran out prematurely. The four groups of dwellings that were
built, totalling 2,900 units, were billed as affordable municipal housing. However, the
name 'Cheap Houses' was doubly a misnomer. Firstly, the accommodation was far from
cheap and rents were not dissimilar to many of those in the privately rented sector.
Canne Massana and Francesc Roca, 'Vicis privats, iniciativa püblica: Barcelona: 1901-1939', L'Avenc,
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Secondly, it stretches the imagination to describe the accommodation as 'houses'. The
2,900 units in the four groups of Cases Barates were organised in blocks of terraced
'houses' and from the air they appeared like the barrack buildings of army camps. The
group of Cases Barates built in the waterfront area of Can Tunis, between Montjuic and
l'Hospitalet consisted of over 50 blocks and resembled a jerry-built concentration camp.
Inhabitants of the Cases Barates were disadvantaged in more than just aesthetic terms.
Built on unused farm land on the periphery of Barcelona, the Cases Barates were
separated from the city by a cordon of fields, beyond the services of the metropolitan
transport system. The groups near Santa Coloma and Horta were most isolated,
seemingly gorged out of the rural landscape. Even residents in Can Tunis, potentially
the best located for access to the city, still faced a 50 minute walk into Barcelona across
dirt tracks or unfinished roads. Because workers were forced to get up early to walk to
the end of tram lines, before commencing the journey into work, the hidden costs of
living in the Cases Barates outweighed the negligible advantages. The geographical
discomfort was even greater for the unemployed, who were forced to walk into the city
centre in search ofjobs. Meanwhile, working class women had to travel substantial
distances to shop for basic foodstuffs in other areas.35
The Cases Barates were the clearest indicator of the growth in geographical and
social segregation of classes. They underlined the fact that increasingly there were two
distinct Barcelonas: that of the proletariat and that of the bourgeoisie. If the Barcelona
of GaudI and modernisme underlined the distinct cultural identity of the Catalan
bourgeoisie from Spain, the new proletarian ghettos, the shanties and the Cases Barates
all testified to the separation of the immigrant proletariat from bourgeois Barcelona. The
grandiose avenues, like Passeig de Gràcia and Rambla de Catalunya, which made their
way from the city centre to Alt Barcelona and the exclusively bourgeois areas of the city
such as Sant Gervasi, Sarrià and Vailvidrera, stood in stark contrast to the ghettos of
proletarian Barcelona, where the urban immigrant proletariat was socially and
Rider, Anarchism, p1 97; Canovas Cervantes, Apuntes, p.233; Massana and Roca, 'Vicis privats,
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geographically marginalised on the outskirts of the city in rapidly developed urban
spaces like Santa Coloma, l'Hospitalet and the Cases Barates. It was this segregation
that led a foreign observer of the city to conclude that 'Barcelona is constructed like a
colonial city, where the city of the whites is strictly separate from the natives. ..Its
inhabitants are two races that live in complete opposition to one another'.36
Rapid urban expansion and the establishment of new ghettos in the periphery of
the city also created new social gradations within the Catalan proletariat. For instance,
the gulf between the semi-skilled, provincial Catalan workers and the essentially
unskilled, predominantly immigrant operatives of Barcelona was heightened. The
relatively more stable conditions of employment of the provincial working class, which
enjoyed a higher degree ofjob security, contrasted sharply with the largely unskilled
proletarians of Barcelona, many of whom lacked clearly defined occupations and whose
jobs were perpetually threatened by the unemployed. The social wage of the Barcelona
proletariat was also inferior to that of the provinces and the unskilled immigrant
working class of recent rural origin did not even experience the limited gains that befell
labour during and after World War One.
Inside the Barcelona working class there were similar gadations.
Geographically, immigrant workers were ghettoised in much the same was as the
unskilled, black working class is today dotted around Johannesburg in 'settler camps'.
Even within the older unplanned industrial suburbs of Barcelona city, like Poblenou,
Sant Marti and Sants, the more established working class sectors were better off,
however slightly, in terms of housing, wages, working conditions and transport
facilities. Equally, in traditional proletarian areas like Gràcia, and to a lesser degree
Sants, significant sections of the working class led a relatively stable existence.
However, by 1930, these areas were the exceptions to the rule, as the influx of
immigrants, both qualitatively and quantitatively, had altered the composition of the
working class.
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Within this increasingly divided city the most noticeable tensions remained
those between unskilled workers and the urban petit bourgeoisie, particularly in the
rapidly expanded ghettos where, apart from bar owners and restauranteurs, there was
little contact between workers and the middle classes. This isolation made for strong
class and community allegiances among the workers, leading to the emergence of what
Lopez Sanchez has described as a proletarian 'para-society' or 'counter-society'. These
loyalties were further enhanced by the nature of 'serial' immigration. l'his meant that in
certain parts of Barcelona there were districts in which Valencians, the largest single
group of newcomers to the Catalan capital, outnumbered Andalusians and Murcians by
three-to-one. Meanwhile, in neighbouring l'Hospitalet, which had the largest
concentration of immigrants from southern Spain, the situation was reversed, and in the
La Torrassa-Coliblanc district Andalusians and Murcians outnumbered Valencians by
two-to-one. While the old city centre of l'Hospitalet remained largely populated by
Catalans, the district of La Torrassa-Collblanc became known as 'Little Murcia' ('Murcia
chica'), with southern immigrants accounting for over one-quarter of the entire
population. In some parts, there were whole streets populated by Murcians, intersected
by a road occupied almost exclusively by Valencians. These patterns served to provide
an inner strength for what were unambiguously proletarian communities.37
The increase in the specific weight of the proletariat in Catalan society during
the 1 920s, especially in Barcelona and its industrial hinterland, meant that the urban
working class became a decisive actor on the social stage. Equally, the mass arrival of
unskilled immigrants augmented the already significant number of seasonal workers and
structurally unemployed who had few roots in the city, who lacked regular contact with
the workplace and who were outside the control of any single employer. The presence of
legions of the unemployed in the city undermined the viability of existing structures of
social control based on electoral falsification, the family, the Church and periodic
repression. This was obvious in the hostile and anonymous new urban environment of
LOpez Sanchez, Un verano, p.40; Roca Cladera and DIaz Perera, 'La Torrassa', p.64
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the uprooted and socially-marginalised immigrant workers who, ignorant of the
bourgeois rules of civic urbanity, displayed what Lopez Sanchez has quite appropriately
described as 'ungovernability'. This 'ungovernability' was one of the most salient aspects
of the ghettos in the city. Indeed, as an English observer noted, 'at the best of times, the
sprawling suburbs are sinister... [revealing] a crude intensity of living, a menacing
activity, a human energy which quite plainly gets little or nothing of what civilisation
gives as a reward - an overpowering sense of something about to explode'. 38 For the
time being, however, the dictatorship denied the new working class the chance to form
any real associational or organisational links inside the city; the new proletariat was,
therefore, waiting in the wings, an unknown quantity, whose aspirations and power
could not yet be truly felt.
The bourgeoisie, nevertheless, was highly fearful of the latent threat of the
poorly integrated immigrant workers. Traditional bourgeois fears of the masses were
sharpened by the knowledge that entire areas were populated by an immigrant working
class with a distinct identity, loyalties and, in many cases, a different language. That
said, neither the bourgeoisie nor the local authorities made any positive effort to ease the
arrival of the immigrants in their new urban environment, just as they made no real
attempt to integrate them into the fabric of Catalan life.
Bourgeois disquiet was increasingly expressed through a repulsion of the
cultural, social and moral practices that demarcated the proletariat from the 'good
citizens of Barcelona'. In particular, bourgeois moralists reacted against the effects of
the revolution in leisure patterns that from World War One onwards had converted
Barcelona into 'the Paris of the south'. This spread of leisure reinforced popular
traditions of café life, which attracted workers both as a forum for sociability and as an
escape from poor housing conditions. Cafés were the 'living rooms of the poor', offering
camaraderie for the newly arrived immigrants from southern Spain and the Catalan
provinces, as well as providing a respite from the mental and physical strains of the
38 Sirera Uliag, Obreros, p.33; Lopez Sanchez, Un verano, p.13; John Langdon-Davis, Behind the
Spanish Barricades, New York, 1936, pp.1 17-118
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working day. In the wake of mass immigration, the number of bars, cabarets, cafés and
dance-halls in the city mushroomed, particularly the flamenco bars in the Barn xino.
Alongside the Barn xino was El Paral.lel, 'the poor man's Rambles' according to
Maragall, a wide avenue running from the port that bisected some of the most desperate
streets of tenement Barcelona. By the 1930s El Paral.lel had assimilated wider European
and American influences, becoming the 'Broadway of Barcelona', the unrivalled centre
of proletarian nocturnal revelry, housing cabarets, bars and dance-halls, drawing in
aficionados of the recently arrived jazz and tango. The increasingly sophisticated social
scene on El Paral.lel underlined the relative modernity of Barcelona and simultaneously
challenged the traditional work ethic subscribed to by the Catalan bourgeoisie. In the
words of Alvarez Junco, 'the district was paradigmatic of the most intense urban life in
Spain at the time...nothing clashed more directly with the cultural world of the old
régime'.39
This collision was accentuated by the overlap between mass leisure and
organised politics. Firstly, the concern of sections of the Barcelona proletariat for the
virtues of repose fostered demands for 'the three eights' (los tres ochos): an eight hour
working day, eight hours for sleep and eight free hours for leisure and amusement.
Secondly, the wonderful delights of the Barn xino and El Paral.lel attracted an
essentially working class clientele, including a healthy smattering of proletarian activists
and middle-class bohemians. For example, the café-concerts of El Paral.lel were a
democratic, alternative to theatre, without any formal dress restrictions, that reinforced
community and class identities by propagating a genuinely anti-bourgeois, popular
culture through radical productions of an anti-clerical or leftist persuasion, such as Fola
Iguibides' El Cristo moderno and El Sol de la Humanidad. The proletarian bohemia of
the anarchists led to the establishment of countless bar and café tertálias, where activists
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met to discuss events. Meanwhile, during times when repression put the streets out of
bounds for organised protest, proletarian militants relied more heavily on cafés as fora
for discussion and clandestine meeting places, away from the reach of the security
forces.4°
Ever-suspicious of changes in proletarian attitudes and behaviour, the
bourgeoisie regarded the new-found craving for repose of its operatives in a negative
light. The morality campaigns and temperance crusades of bourgeois reformers
stigmatised working class leisure patterns as the source of all vice and the harbinger of
harmful passions. The raw pleasures offered by the cabarets, brothels and music-bars of
the Barn xino and El Paral.lel were portrayed as a 'Dantesque inferno', a dangerous
'crime zone', that were the precursors of subversion and degeneracy. Increasingly, the
upper classes expressed the consequences of social and environmental collapse as the
outcome of moral laxity. Bourgeois commentators believed that the moral decay
engendered by the musical bars, cafés cantants and other 'dens of prostitution' produced
an array of social and medical ills, ranging from alcoholism, syphilis and the collapse in
the institution of Christian marriage, right across to tuberculosis, cancer and even
death.4 ' By contrast, bourgeois ideologues legitimated the hierarchy of capitalist society
and, in an attempt to control the working class outside the factory, they maintained that
diligent labour and sobriety were the origin of all virtue. An integral component of these
attempts to 'moralise' the proletariat was the concept of the 'good worker', the image of
the operative as a paragon of docility and respectability, formed in the image of a pious
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bourgeoisie.42
Another way in which bourgeois social reformers expressed their fear of masses
was through a discourse that emphasised the alienating and degenerating force of the
modem city. Again, the rowdy streets in the area around El Paral.lel and the Barn xino
were the major source of alarm. These panics fused with long-standing bourgeois law-
and-order scares about the volatility of the dank proletarian streets of the city centre. To
be sure, since the 1909 Setmana, Tragica the 'men of order' perceived the Barn xino as a
potential flash-point for social discontent, in which the urban landscape of its
labyrinthine streets favoured insurrectionaries. Although, after the riots of 1909, most of
the wealthy chose to evacuate the downtown area of Barcelona for the security of
bourgeois havens like Sarrià, Sant Gervasi and Vailvidrera, the Barn xino continued to
bring panic to the 'lovers of order'. This cannot be dissociated from the dangerous
proximity of this most rebellious district to the bourgeois financial and political centres
in the city. For example, the Civil Governor, Madrid's representative in Barcelona, was
officially housed at the Placa de Palau, on the intersection between the Gothic Quarter
(Ciutat Vella) and the port. To the West lay VIa Laietana, the Americanised business
avenue that had been carved out of an area that included some of the poorest streets in
the city. Symbolising the concern for order of the bourgeoisie, the Fomento del Trabajo
Nacional offices on VIa Laietana were opposite the main city police station. Meanwhile,
just along from VIa Laietana was the Placa de Sant Jaume, the main administrative
centre of the city and site of the City Hall (Ajuntament), the Provincial Council
Chambers (Diputació) and the Palau de la Generalitat, the residence of the old head of
the Catalan government. Thus, these important symbols of power in the city all fell
within the heart of the Gothic Quarter, just a few minutes walk from the Barn xino.
Alarm that these official centres might be devoured by the surrounding streets saw the
widening of Carrer de Ferran, the main approach road to the Placa de Sant Jaume, in the
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last century, in the hope that this would allow the easy passage of the security forces
from Les Rambles, the main thoroughfare and vertebral column of the city. Finally,
epitomising the fragility of the position of the upper classes in the city, the Liceu, the
Barcelona opera house and the cultural citadel of the bourgeoisie on Les Rambles,
backed onto some of the meanest streets of the Barn xino.43
By the late 1920s traditional anxieties that the Barn xino was the haunt of the
'perishing classes' were now exacerbated by the bourgeois orthodoxy that the
uncontrolled expansion of leisure, including that of a carnal variety, had loosened the
grip of Christian morality over the area. For the occupants of the moral high ground the
Barn xino was a twilight zone populated by sexual deviants and drug dealers; a
'criminal zone', full of the underworld lairs of the lawless classes, a haven of immorality
that emphasised the independence of the 'dangerous classes' from the values of civilised
society.
These moral fears were far from consistent. In fact, they reflected the
contradictions of the capitalist city, a refraction of the acute social isolation felt by the
bourgeoisie and its concern at the breakdown of traditional social solidarities and moral
norms in the wake of industrialisation. Similarly, these panics underlined the alarm of
the bourgeoisie at the consequences of the unregulated nature of its own economic
system and the mass immigration that had multiplied the marginalised social sectors in
the city and enhanced the 'ungovernability' of the proletariat. Although the bourgeoisie
had its Barcelona in the modernisme of GaudI, the Eixample and the sleepy villas of
Sarria, it had failed to construct an integrated city, what Maragall described as an
'imperial Barcelona'. Bourgeois dreams had mutated into nightmares; capitalist
Barcelona had generated an array of urban tensions and another city, a proletarian city, a
city that instilled the bourgeoisie with mortal fear, but yet without which its city could
not survive. Its Barcelona was threatened by their city, 'the city of bombs', 'the anarchic
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Sanchez (ed.), pp.80-87
39
city' and the sprawling new ghettos on the edge of the metropolis.
1.3. The Open Wounds of Proletarian Barcelona
The key difference between Catalan workers during the first third of the
twentieth century and their predecessors was provided by their syndical and cultural
organisations. Many labour leaders were either auto-didacts or educated through the
union-funded Ateneu system. The Ateneus produced a distinctly proletarian culture that
provided tremendous support for the mass unions of the CNT and added to the
separation of classes.45 However, the real popularity of the CNT unions was bound up
with its success in imposing restraint over their rapacious industrial masters.
Once the CNT was driven underground by the dictatorship in the 1 920s, the
employers were allowed carte blanche in the factory. Though liberated from the unions,
Catalan capitalists remained shackled by the historic under-capitalisation of their
industries. By 1931 Catalonia had 1,804 listed companies with total capital of 3,144
million pesetas, averaging 1.17 million pesetas capital per company. This level of
capitalisation was well below that in the Basque Country, where 447 companies
amassed a total capital of 1,600 million pesetas, averaging 3.6 million pesetas per
company. The well-being of operatives continued to be sacrificed to the profit margins
of their employers.
The undercapitalised building sites of the construction industry, often the first
point of employment for unskilled immigrant labourers, provided a harsh initiation in
the ways of the city. While on-the-job falls were commonplace, employers rarely
provided on-site medical facilities and there were cases of injured builders waiting a full
hour to receive treatment. Not surprisingly, therefore, of 30,056 industrial accidents in
Barcelona province in 1930, 4,988, over one-in-six, were in the building industry.
Deaths of builders were appallingly regular. Second place in the industrial accidents
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league was occupied by the metal industry. Like the construction sector, metal plants
also employed large numbers of unskilled operatives, and they were discernibly
undercapitalised and in the most advanced workshops, like the Casa Girona, there were
very poor safety standards and deaths were not uncommon. Even La Vanguardia, a
bourgeois daily not known for its concern with workers' rights, was sometimes moved
to condemn the years of neglect and dreadful conditions in certain workplaces.46
Terms of employment deteriorated substantially during the dictatorship. For
instance, following the defeat of their 1923 claim for wage rises and a 10-hour day, the
cart-drivers figured among the poorest paid sectors of the Barcelona proletariat in 1930,
working a gruelling 12-hour day. Despite the claims of the dictatorship to be a régime
based on 'law-and-order', employers took advantage of the benevolence of the
authorities to increase the number of children in the workforce, in flagrant contravention
of the legislation that prescribed such practices. In many industrial sectors insouciant
employers reintroduced piece-work to intensify production not only in those industries
that yielded low profits but also in some of the most advanced metalworks. For the
workers, the return to denigrating forms of 'payment by results' signalled the end of
fixed wages, a rise in the exploitation, a rapid deterioration in working conditions and
an increase in unemployment. 47 According to state-wide figures from the Ministerio de
Trabajo, wages fell much more swiftly in Barcelona than elsewhere in the Spanish state.
This was especially marked among younger operatives and the unskilled in Barcelona,
who lost ground to both their more skilled counterparts in the city and their equivalents
elsewhere in the country.48
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Workplace resistance was comprehensively curtailed through the consolidation
of capitalist control inside the workplace. The powers of foremen were enhanced and in
an attempt to guarantee rigorous production line discipline, employers tied the wages of
supervisors to the output of the workers. Overseers were allowed to fme 'bad' workers
and 'slackers' and these disciplinary powers were often augmented with straightforward
bullying. This hard approach came easily to the foremen who were often promoted from
the mass of workers often because of their personal authoritarianism. Meanwhile, those
who reneged on the solidarities of life on the shopfloor were despised as 'agents of the
bosses' by those they left behind, a hatred which was fuelled in the textile sector by
frequent allegations of sexual harassment from the predominantly young, female
workforce.49
Outside the workplace operatives were disadvantaged by the rising cost of
living. Since World War One the labour movement had expressed concern about soaring
living standards and despite a limited stabilisation during the middle years of the
dictatorship, prices began to rise sharply again from 1929, affecting meat, fish,
vegetables and dairy produce in a particularly bad way. In February 1931 this
culminated in inflation unseen in Barcelona since the post-war period, a curse that
further aggravated the lot of proletarians whose static or falling wages trailed way
behind the price index.50
Additional strains were placed on proletarian living conditions due to a sharp
increase in rents throughout the 192 Os, which rose by one-third between 1923 and 1929,
as landlords exploited the housing crisis in Barcelona. Estimates of the proportion of
workers' wages that went to landlords ranged from one to two-thirds. The burden of rent
payments, therefore, ate up a substantial part of working class budgets and created a
unskilled wages in the textile industry was double the differential in the iron sector. Meanwhile,
employers exacerbated the occupational divisions within the working class by introducing artificial skill
gradations as a means of deskilling and cutting wages. Soto Carmona, El trabajo, pp.554, 560; Manuel
Tuflón de Lara, El movimiento obrero en la historia de Espafia, Madrid, 1972, pp.754-765; La Batalla, 29
June 1930
Soto Carmona, El trabajo, pp.92, 703-707; Solidaridad Obrera, 29 December 1931
50 Anuario Estadistico de Espafia de 1931, Madrid 1932, pp.53 I, 541; Soto Carmona, El trabajo, p.568
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simmering hatred among large sectors of the Barcelona proletariat towards the landlord
class. In housing, as in work, it was the unskilled and predominantly immigrant working
class that felt most discomfort. This was exemplified in the Barn xino, Barcelona's most
overpopulated district, which housed almost one-tenth of the city's inhabitants.
Although the population density of the Barn xino exceeded 1,000 people per square
kilometre, 10 times greater than the overall average for the city, rents exceeded the
monthly average of 50 pesetas. As well as the sheer number of sub-divided buildings
vying for space in the narrow streets of the Barn xino, problems worsened through the
phenomena of 'roof-top shanties' (barraquisme vertical), whereby illegal flats built on
the top of existing tenement slums. These practices became so extensive that by 1930
there was on average 41.2 residents per building in the Barn xino, twice the Barcelona
average. Amid grinding poverty, and with numerous families sharing a single bathroom,
diseases like cholera, meningitis and tuberculosis, all of a thoroughly preventable nature
and linked with the deficiencies of diet and housing, were a constant danger for workers.
Meanwhile, avaricious landlords taxed any possible advantages in the living conditions
of their tenants. An example of this can be seen the average rent of 60 pesetas, well over
the city average, charged in the potentially healthier seaside district of Barceloneta.5'
Only in the outlying ghettos was it possible for unskilled workers to enjoy lower
rents. In Santa Coloma de Gramanet the average monthly rent was a mere 30 pesetas, at
least half that in most areas of proletarian Barcelona. Nevertheless, the possible
advantages stemming from cheaper rents in the peripheral ghettos were outweighed by
the barbaric social conditions in these rapidly developed areas. L'Hospitalet had the
disadvantage of being the dumping ground for the haulage companies who left the
untreated refuse of Barcelona to putrefy in its fields. Moreover, the housing stock in the
ghettos was crude. In l'Hospitalet there were cases of 'houses' built without adequate
Tafunell in GarcIa Delgado (ed.), p.15; Aiguader i MirO, El problema, p.14; Jaume Artigues I Vidal,
Francesc Mas i Palau and Xavier Sunyol i Ferrer, El Raval. Histôria d'un ban-i servidor d'una ciutat,
Barcelona, 1980, pp.53-54; José Peirô, Pir, p.'15; Massana, lndüstnia, pp.22, 126-130; Lluis Claramunt i
Furest, Problemes d'urbanisme, Barcelona, 1934, pp.14-18; Solidaridad Obrera, 26 January, 5-7, 13
August, 25 September, 10, 17 October 1931
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foundations being blown away by the wind and, while the authorities deemed much
housing stock to be a 'health risk', in the absence of cheap alternatives it was incapable
of remedying this sad state of affairs. Another problem was the absence of any real
infrastructure in the peripheral ghettos. The absence of basic modem amenities such as
electricity, paved streets, drains and adequate sanitation explain the elevated incidence
of typhoid in the city, reflected by figures that revealed Barcelona workers 38 times
more likely to contract the disease than those in London. The same insalubrious zones
inhabited by the immigrant working class were also blighted by glaucoma and
trachoma. Equally, despite the construction of the various groups of Cases Barates, the
unskilled and the unemployed still inhabited thousands of barely habitable shanties
scattered around the city. Even a monarchist Council spokesperson was forced to
describe the health situation in the l920s as 'lamentable'.52
Given the condition of the Barcelona proletariat at the end of the 1920s, it is
difficult to see how it corresponded with the dictator's definition of the Spanish malaise
of people who 'eat much and work little' (se come mucho y se trabajapoco). 53 This is
confirmed by a study of the monthly budget of a working class couple with two children
in the typical proletarian district of Poblenou. In 1930 the monthly living expenses -
rent, food, clothing, etc. - for a family of four was about 385 pesetas. That same year, a
male textile worker earned between 7 and 10 pesetas hourly, depending on skill level.
Assuming an average 26 working days per month and a 9 hour working day, the
monthly income of the main breadwinner would have fallen between 182 and 260
pesetas. Of the two figures, both of which stand well below the monthly expenditure,
the lower figure can be taken as the best indicator because the textile sector in Poblenou
was based on unskilled labour. Under these circumstances, there were irresistible
52 La Vanguardia, 30 August 1931; L'Obra, 26 September 1931. Barcelona workers were also 22 times
more likely to catch typhoid than their Berlin counterparts: Dr. Liuls Claramunt i Furest, La pests en el
pla de Barcelona, Barcelona, 1933, pp.6-8 and La Lluita contra la Fibra Tif?idea a Catalunya, Barcelona,
1933, pp.189-200, 205-206; VIctor Alba and Maria Casasüs, Diàlegs a Barcelona, Barcelona, 1990, p.15;
Rider, Anarchism, p.1 52. According to Aiguader i Miró there were nearly 1,500 shanties in 1932:
rob1ema, p.6; Adelante, 10 January 1934
Vila-San-Juan, La vida cotidiana, p.95
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pressures within the proletarian family for both women and children to enter the
workplace to enhance the family economy. 54 For such families sick days were an
unaffordable luxuiy; family members were forced to risk injuly by working when ill,
and there was little possibility of saving against the danger of future unemployment, as
workers were advised by rational bourgeois thinkers. Thus even in a proletarian family
where both adults worked, there was a very low standard of living and contrary to the
prejudiced beliefs of the upper classes, workers often ate poorly, with bread remaining
the fundamental component of proletarian diets right through the 1920s.55
All of these hardships were aggravated at the beginning of the 1930s by a new
and growing curse for the Barcelona proletariat: mass unemployment. After the 1929
Exhibition the economy faltered due to the slack in the building programme. Matters
worsened later that year in the wake of the first impact of the world recession in Spain,
which led to the fall of the dictator, the sudden end of his public works programme and
a crisis in the construction sector. Economic collapse exacerbated the historic inability
of Barcelona industry to provide stable employment and the traditional 'reserve army of
labour' became swollen. Meanwhile, the degree of structural unemployment grew due to
both the legacy of mass immigration and because labour supply always outstripped the
demand generated by the sluggish Catalan economy. This huge growth in joblessness
undermined the popular adage that 'the unemployed could always find work on the
docks'.56
Nevertheless, because Spanish capitalism was poorly integrated within the
international capitalist system, the repercussions of the Wall Street Crash were muted.
Moreover, the relatively backward Spanish industry had not seen the introduction of the
same techniques of rationalised and mechanised production that had been implemented
in other parts of Europe. It is also true that at no point during the inter-war years did the
calculations are based on figures in Manel Arranz, Nicasi Camps, et. al., El Poblenou: 150 anvs
d'histôria, Barcelona, 1991, p.56 and Tufión de Lara, El movimiento obrero, pp.763-764
Tierra y Libertad, 5 June 193156 Batalla, 20 June 1930; Comercio y Navegación, July 1931; Juan Hernández Andreu, Espafla 'i Ia
crisis de 1929, Madrid, 1986, pp.115-118; 'La indüstria de la construcciô a Barcelona' in ButiletI de
l'Institut d'Investigacions Econômigues, 13, 1933, p.4
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Spanish working class suffer from the same mass unemployment as their counterparts in
Germany. However, the experience ofjoblessness and its ramifications in Spain are not
best gauged in absolute terms. Certainly, as Mercedes Cabrera has argued, just because
the incidence of unemployment was lower in Spain it does not mean that its effects were
less.57 This is particularly relevant because unlike in Britain and Germany, where there
were long-standing welfare traditions, the Spanish state played a minor social function
and there was not even a slowly developing corpus of welfare legislation to build on.
Similar reasoning can be employed when considering the impact of
unemployment. While official statistics suggest that joblessness in Cataloma was lower
than in Andalusia, Castile and the Basque Country, it is difficult to make meaningful
comparisons about regional unemployment rates. Firstly, official statistics were highly
unreliable. For instance, in 1930 the authorities claimed that there were 16,901
unemployed workers in the industrial cities of Barcelona province. Yet, official figures
referred only to those workers who were completely out of work, thereby ignoring the
rising number of semi-unemployed workers in Catalonia who mustered no more than a
few days work each week. Secondly, the repressive nature of the state discouraged many
immigrant workers in Catalonia from registering with official bodies. Consequently,
official unemployment figures were heavily deflated and so underestimated the problem
ofjoblessness in Catalonia. The case of Badalona is an interesting example of these
problems. While official figures indicated under 2,000 unemployed workers in Badalona
in 1930, in fact, misery extended into hundreds more working class homes where the
major bread-winners were employed for only two or three days a week.58
For all their inconsistencies, government statistics could not obscure the sharp
rise in joblessness. The crisis in the construction sector had disastrous effects on
associated industries and meant that joblessness rose quickly in the important cement-
Mercedes Cabrera, La patronal ante la II Repübiica. Organizaciones y estrategia. 1931-1936, Madrid,
1983, pp.82-83; Soto Carmona, El trabajo, p.344
58 Balcells, çrj i, p.35; Nuria Vail i Serra, La II Repüblica a Badalona (1931-1936). Una població
industrial en crisi, unpublished MA thesis, Barcelona University, 1987, pp.75-84; Joan Manent i Pesas,
Records d'un sindicalista ilibertari català. 1916-1943, Paris, 1976, p.153
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producing towns of provincial Catalonia. The official unemployment figure for
Barcelona province in 1930 revealed that the total number ofjobless had double since
1928. The impact of the building crisis was especially dramatic in Barcelona city, where
the enormous construction sector entered a sharp decline. By the end of 1930, around
80% of the total unemployed in Catalonia were concentrated in the capital. This trend
continued into 1931 as the number of unemployed in Barcelona continued to soar,
augmented by the return of immigrant workers from European nations already blighted
by the economic crisis. Matters worsened as Barcelona employers responded to the
uncertain economic climate with mass redundancies. At Casa Girona, the city's largest
metaiworks, 2,000 proletarians were dismissed on a single day in the spring of 193
Despite the slowing down of the economy, the predominantly unskilled basis of
industiy in Barcelona continued to serve as a magnet for the hungry refugees fleeing the
endemic underemployment in rural Spain. The alternative to migration - starvation in
the villages of southern Spain - was hardly likely to dissuade the rural unemployed from
trying their luck in the industrial north.
By 1930, therefore, the bulk of the Barcelona proletariat was in a state of
desperation. The creeping impact of the recession, the absence of independent union
organisations and rising prices converged to erode living standards, signifying a slow
death for working class families. The limited poor relief available through either state or
municipal bodies proved wholly insufficient. Emblematic of the poorly established
welfare agenda of the Spanish state, the Instituto Nacional de Prevision, formed in 1927
to counteract unemployment, was totally overwhelmed. At the same time, the growth in
numbers of what the upper classes regarded as the 'sunken classes' heightened
competition for both the charity provided by philanthropic Church bodies and the
munificence of the 'good citizens' of Barcelona in the streets. By 1931 it was estimated
that unemployment affected 30,000 families in Barcelona, while 75% of all deaths in the
59 Soto Carmona, Eltrabajo, p.344; Comercio y NavegaciOn, June 1935; La Batalla, 12 March 1931;
Balcells, Crisis económica, p.17
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city were attributed to the hunger and poor diet.6°
While this burgeoning 'reserve army of labour' could be seen throughout the
worker districts of Barcelona, it was overwhelmingly concentrated in the shanties and
the lowest grade housing stock, particularly in the Barn xino, the La Torrassa and
Coliblanc districts of l'Hospitalet and in the three groups of 'Cheap Houses' scattered
around the periphery of the city. It was in these areas where the economic crisis merged
with the pronounced urban crisis of Barcelona to generate incalculable misery and an
enormous cauldron of discontent.
The political system was also in decline. At best, the dictatorship had induced an
artificial social peace, a false equilibrium imposed over the virulent social context that
erupted into civil war between 1918 and 1923. Meanwhile, this context had been
exacerbated by the economic policies of the 1 920s that created a new and despairing
proletariat, based largely on immigrant workers of recent peasant origin. The new
proletariat first made its collective presence felt in the city during a strike of CNT
building workers in September 1930 that paralysed the entire sector. This impressive
debut was followed in January 1931 by a number of clashes between police and
unemployed workers as the latter attempted to march on the city centre. Emilio Mola,
the head of security, conceded that 'Barcelona is the heart of the CNT'. 6 ' As social
protest returned to the streets, it was evident that despite recourse to the death penalty
and the censor, the dictatorship had ultimately failed to curb the armed robberies and
assuage the security concerns of the 'lovers of order'. 62 The security forces were in a
dreadful state: they were poorly funded, ill-informed, riddled with internal rivalries and
corruption; they were also seriously strained by the new challenges presented by the
tensions that had developed inside the city. 63 This was particularly true in the Cases
60 Jnstituto Nacional de Prevision, Oué es el INP?, Madrid, 1927; Solidaridad Obrera, 25 March 1931;
Tierra y Libertad, 5 June 1931
61 Dámaso Berenguer, Dc la Dictadura ala RepUblica, Madrid, 1931, pp.160, 200,205; Sanz, El
sindicalismo espaflol, pp.214-244; El Diluvio, 31 January 1931
62 Las Noticias, 21 September 1923; Comercio y NavegaciOn, September, December 1923, January,
February 1924; Vila-San-Juan, La vida cotidiana, pp.249-262
63 Emilio Mola, Memorias. El derrumbamiento de Ia monargula, Madrid n.d., vol.3, pp.127-135
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Barates, the Bath xino and l'Hospitalet, the heartlands of the unemployed, where the
state of anguish and social ferment was reflected in the growing criminality and illegal
self-help stategies of the jobless.TM
The recrudescence of 'social crime' spread new alarm among capitalists, who
blamed the newly arrived immigrant workers for infringing 'the sacred rights of
property'. Although the industrialists profited from the toil of the immigrants, the
apparent immunity of the new operatives to traditional methods of social control drove
terror into the 'captains of industry'. Bourgeois sectors viewed the coincidence between
sharpening class struggle and the arrival of the newcomers as evidence that the
immigrants lacked the traditional 'understanding' (seny) of Catalans. The estrangement
of the bourgeoisie towards its largely immigrant operatives resurrected interest in some
kind of repatriation of the 'outsiders' (forasters) who had made Barcelona their 'refuge'.
These sentiments were heightened by the collapse of industry after 1929 and the new
stress this placed on an already fragile social equilibrium.65
The traditional model of social control based on family and religious values, and
kinship and natural hierarchies was incapable of cementing a social system in which the
bourgeoisie offered workers little more than low wages and spiritual salvation for those
who accepted their lot and abided by the law. Bourgeois opinion came to see the newly
developed ghettos as terrifying 'crime zones' and looked to the Civil Guard as its saviour
from those workers who did not let threats of eternal damnation prevent them from
breaking the law.66 These anxieties were especially acute in l'Hospitalet, where the
bourgeoisie was alarmed that policing had failed to keep pace with phenomenal urban
growth and security forces often had to be called to the city from Barcelona.
Consequently, during the 'soft dictatorship' (Dictablanda) of General Dámaso
Berenguer which followed Primo de Rivera, the self-confessed 'lovers of order' among
the l'Hospitalet bourgeoisie petitioned the authorities for the construction of a Civil
64 Las Noticias, 3,6, 14-20, 31 January, 8 February, 7,21 March, 4-5 and 9-11 April 1931
65 Graell, La cuestión, p.39; M.Rossell i Vilar, La raca, Barcelona, 1930; Comercio 'i Navegación, May
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66 El Dia Gráfico, 27 November 1931; Las Noticias, 14-20 January, 11, 30 June 1931
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Guard barracks and 'a fixed police service in the district' to protect 'right-thinking
individuals' from the machinations of'evil-doers' (maleantes).67
However, political authoritarianism was discredited in the eyes of the Catalan
bourgeoisie and their support for the 'iron surgery' of Primo de Rivera in 1923 dissipated
due to his repression of Catalanisme and his Madrid-based centralism. While the
Catalan bourgeoisie shed few tears for the ignominious fall of Primo de Rivera, the
disappearance of the dictator opened up a far from certain political future and presented
capitalists with an enormous dilemma. By 1931, these dilemmas were largely articulated
by the Lliga, the traditional party of Catalan big business which retained its commitment
to a firm policy of law-and-order. This was combined with a call from the Lliga for a
more consensual system of governance, a kind of conservative democratic opening,
rooted in the paternal authority of the monarch but yet which could re-legitimise the
damaged credibility of the state. 68 Yet, while the Lliga correctly interpreted the popular
desire for democracy, its political programme ignored one key reality: the connivance
between the King and the dictator in 1923 effectively precluded the return to a
constitutional monarchy in the 1930s.
67 Letter from the President of the Gremio de Ultramarinos y Similares de l'Hospitalet to the Mayor of
I'I-Iospitalet, April 1930, Arxiu Historic de I'Hospitalet de Liobregat (AHLL)
68 Bernat Muniesa, La burguesfa catalana ante la II Repüblica espafiola. 'Ii Trovatore' frente a Wotan,
Barcelona, 1985, vol.!, pp.125-171
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Chapter 2: Republican Barcelona
2.1. The Catalan Republican-Populist Option
The dominant political force in 1930s Barcelona was the Esquerra Republicana
de Catalunya (ERC). The ERC was formed in March 1931 as an electoral coalition of
the myriad small radical Catalan and Republican groups which developed in 1 920s
Catalonia on the wave of a groundswell of Republican and national sentiments. 1 The
most important constituent parts of the ERC were the Estat Català of Francesc Macia i
Llussà, the Partit Republicà Catalã of Liuls Companys and the 'LiuhIns', the supporters
of Joan LiuhI i Vallescà, who were organised around the L'Opinió newspaper. In
structural terms, the higher level of economic development and the larger urban middle
class in Catalonia meant that the popular Republicanism of the ERC was largely
specific to the region. Meanwhile, in conjunctural terms, the emergence of a middle
class nationalist party was facilitated by the 'capitulation' of the bourgeois nationalism
of the Lliga and its acceptance of the protection of the Spanish military in 1923. For
many Catalan nationalists, 1923 revealed the central contradiction of the nationalism of
the Lliga: its readiness to subjugate national demands to the 'social question'. The
opprobrium directed at the Lliga after 1923 was instrumental in the rise of the ERC.2
The replacement of the Lliga by the ERC was not a foregone conclusion,
however. The Partido Republicano Radical, known popularly as the Radicals, claimed
the mantle of historic republicanism in Barcelona. Moreover, key members of the
Radicals were well placed within local power structures, especially Joan Pich i Pon, the
President of the COPUB, the main property owners' association in the city. However,
Joan Culla i Clara, El catalanisme d'esguerra (1928-1936). Del grup de L'Opinió a! Partit Nacionalista
Republica d'Esguerra, Barcelona, 1977; Felix Cucurull, Catalunya. republicana i autônoma (1931-1936),
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1936), Montserrat, 1989, vol.1, pp.75-463, vol.2, pp.9-219; José Antonio Gonzalez Casanova,
Federalismo y autonomla. Catalufia v el Estado espaflol. 1868-1936, Barcelona, 1979, pp.248-354. For
the ERC leaders see Manuel Cruells, Francesc Macia, Barcelona, 1971; LIuls Aymaml i Baudina, Macia,
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during their long years in opposition the Radicals had shown themselves to be a
thoroughly opportunist party, combining an inflammatory anti-clericalism with their
thinly disguised anti-Catalaniste agenda. Consequently, by 1930, traditional
Republicanism appeared tactically and ideologically bankrupt, incapable of attracting
widespread support among the workers of the city.3
Another rival to the ERC was the Acció Catalana Republicana (ACR). A liberal-
bourgeois republican split from the Lliga, the ACR, like the ERC, rose up against the
historic compromise of the Lliga in 1923. The ACR was bolstered by its ties with
Madrid Republicanism and its support from prestigious Catalan Republicans such as
Liuls Nicolau d'Olwer, the lawyer Amadeu Hurtado and La Publicitat, an influential
daily newspaper in Barcelona. However, the ACR was known disparagingly by its
enemies as 'the mini-Lliga' (la Lligueta') and its appeal was limited due to the inability
of its leadership to distance itself completely from its conservative past inside the Lliga.
Additionally, the obsession of the ACR with the 'catalanisation' of Catalonia, above any
broader social concerns, meant that the party was never likely to have real electoral
appeal among the thousands of immigrant voters in Barcelona city.4
By contrast, the ERC averred grandiosely that it was 'the true anti-dynastic force
in Catalonia' and enjoyed the backing of'the great majority of the population'. 5 Though
dubbed a 'political cocktail' by a communist critic, the Esquerra was united by a
common hatred of the dictatorship and an acute awareness of the need to break the grip
imposed on Catalonia by the Spanish state. Moreover, the Esquerra coalition gained a
certain cohesion from its network of district organisations and grass-roots nationalist
clubs in Barcelona.6
The Esquerra has been described by Maria Dolors Ivern i Salvà as an 'inter-
classist' or populist party. This definition is frequently combined with an assumption
that the ERC drew support from all sectors of society. According to Ivem i Salvà, the
Octavio RuIz Manjôn, El Partido Republicano Radical. 1908-1936, Madrid, 1976,passim., Alvarez
Junco, El Emperador, passim., Romero Maura, "La Rosa de Fuego", passim.; Connelly Ullman, Ib&
Tragic Week, pp.85-lO2,ll4-ll6; Andreu Nm, Los problemas de Ia revolución espafiola, Barcelona,
1977, pp.127-130
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6 La Batalla, 26 March 1931
52
Esquerra 'did not defend any single social class nor any specific social interests'.
Nevertheless, certain generalisations can be made about the supporters of the ERC.
Firstly, the view of the ERC as a truly 'inter-classist' party is undermined by the fact that
a lowly 3% of the party leadership was of proletarian origin. Instead, the party
leadership was firmly rooted in the urban nationalist intelligentsia, especially among
lawyers, who outnumbered workers 6-to-i, and by doctors and the liberal professions.
That the Esquerra was not a representative formation is, in fact, illustrated by the
leadership profile provided by Ivem i Salvà, which reveals that of the 132 activists that
constituted the elite of the party, 130 (98.5%) were male, of whom nearly 20% were
lawyers. In the cities, the Esquerra had a stable base of support among the immediate
social superiors of the working class: the commercial urban middle class of small
property owners and shopkeepers, extending across to businessmen and small-scale
factory-owners. Overall, some 10% of the ERC leadership was made up of small
businessmen.7
The other key social foundation of the Esquerra was the staunchly nationalistic
tenant farmers or rabassaires and their union, the Umó de Rabassaires (U. de R.).8
Companys, who helped organise the U. de R. in the 1920s, enjoyed a decisive influence
over the farmers. Meanwhile, the farmers saw the Esquerra as a crucial counter-balance
against the Lliga and the Institut AgrIcola de Sant Isidre, the main representative of
large-scale agricultural interests. The celebration by the Esquerra of the values of the
thrift and hard work of the tenant farmers, along with their general concern for the
'small man', suited the mentality of the rabassaires. Equally, the mystification by the
ERC of the countryside as the spiritual backbone of the nation was a powerful motif for
the tenant farmers. Alongside the modernising features of Catalanisme, therefore, a
Ivern I Salvà, Esguerra, vol.1, pp.78-80, vol.2, pp.288, 29 1-294, 299. A window on the Esquerra was
provided by its slate for the April 1931 municipal elections in Barn xino, where the Esquerra fielded two
journalists, a lawyer and a small industrialist. Meanwhile, of the 33 ERC candidates in Barcelona city
there were eight lawyers, five journalists, three small manufacturers, five small traders, four doctors, two
engineers and a university professor.
8 The name rabassaires came from the rabassa morta (literally translated as 'dead stump'), the pattern of
land tillage that was largely specific to Catalonia. According to this system, tenancy contracts were valid
for the lifetime of the vines. Thus, when the vines died, new contracts had to be negociated between
landowners and tenants. See Albert Balcells, El problema agrari a Catalunya. La guestiO rabassaire
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strong rural content remained within the political ideology of the ERC. This same rustic
theme was evident in 'Els Segadors', the Catalan national anthem, that lauded the sickle,
the characteristic agricultural tool of the relatively well-off rabassaires. To be sure, 'Els
Segadors' offered no celebration of the tools common to the trades of the industrial
proletariat. In fact, while the Esquerra had an established presence in some of the more
traditional working class districts like Gràcia and apart from support from the CADCI, a
cultural-professional body hegemonic among the 150,000 white-collar and shop
workers, the party had no coherent source of support within the organised proletariat.
The ERC did enjoy close contacts with the Unió Socialista de Catalunya, a moderate
Fabian-socialist split from the Partido Socialista Obrera Espaflol (PSOE), however, the
Unió Socialista de Catalunya (USC) was a tiny, elitist party, with no real influence in
the industrial working class of Barcelona.9
Due to the specific gravity of the proletariat in Catalan society, the ERC was
eager to enlist the support of the 700,000-strong industrial workers for its plan for
political modernisation. The middle class nationalists were obsessed with visions of a
socially harmonious democracy and they believed that the success or failure of their
political project depended on the extent to which the trade unions could be integrated
within the democratic fabric of the new Catalonia. L'OpiniO was convinced that only
with the civilisation of political life would it be possible to 'make Catalonia a European
nation' within the wider community of nations. More specifically, the radical nationalist
petit bourgeoisie and their social-democratic allies in the USC viewed the problem of
industrial violence as one of the historic barriers to the evolution of a rich civic
culture.'°
In order to integrate the proletariat within their new democratic project the ERC
coalition issued a series of promises to the working class. These included a new judicial
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movimiento obrero en Espafla (1900-1936), Valencia, 1977, pp.283-329; Ricard Alcaraz I Gonzalez, La
UniO Socialista de Catalunya, Barcelona, 1987; Miquel Caminal, Joan Coinorera. Catalanisme I
Socialisme (1913-1936), Barcelona, 1984, 2 vols.; Josep Liuls Martfn i Ramos, Els Origens del Partit
Socialista Unificat de Catalunva (1930-1936), Barcelona, 1977
10 ButlietI Trimestral de la Conselleria d'Economia, 2, January 1937, p.44; L'Opinió, 9 June 1928, 14
November 1930,27 August 1931; Justicia Social, 16,30 January, 6,20 February 1926
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deal for the masses, such as 'the recognition of unrestricted individual and collective
freedoms' and 'equality before the law s, both of which had been long-ignored by past
regimes. Similarly, the ERC 'Programme of Government' offered a range of civil
liberties, including press freedoms 'without subjection to prior censorship', 'the right to
free and obligatory education', 'the freedom of travel and choice of abode', 'the
inviolability of residence', 'the rights of petition, meeting, association, demonstration
and strike' and 'equality before the law'. This was to be accompanied by 'the
humanisation of the penal system' and the transformation ofjails from places of torture
into 'true reformatories where the criminal is converted into a useful citizen for
humanity'."
Unlike the monarchists, the Republicans believed that illegality was linked to
social questions and they attributed its increase in the early part of 1931 to 'a general
state of economic misery' which, they claimed, underlined the need for rapid socio-
economic change. The Republicans also broke with the traditional orthodoxy that crime
was the pursuit of a single class. When L'Opinió spoke of the 'gangsters of Barcelona', it
referred to monarchist politicians who raised corruption in municipal life to Chicago
levels by profiting and speculating in the Council during the dictatorship. Pledges were
made that once in power the Republicans would initiate a thorough reform of the police,
whose abusive practices had been condemned in the Republican press for years. The
Esquerra even pledged to create a 'civic guard' to guarantee public security and end the
system of policing based on informers. Meanwhile, the Republican daily El Pals
denounced the 'vicious' and 'infamous' quintzenes system of intermnent without trial as
'governmental terrorism', while LOpinió concluded its survey of monarchist policing by
noting the 'misfortune' that traditionally the security forces were 'regularly directed
against honourable people'. L'Opinió also attacked the 'third degree' as 'illegal pressure'
by a police force which 'believes that its mission is not to detain the guilty parties, but to
prove the guilt of their detainees'.'2
L'OpiniO, 2 April, 13 March, 29 August 1931; El Escándolo, 15 July 1926
12 Las Noticias, 3,6, 14-20, 31 January, 8 February, 7,21 March, 4-5 and 9-11 April 1931; L'Opinió, 8
April, 30 October, 26 June 1931; Decree of the Comité Revolucionari de I'Hospitalet, 14 April 1931
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For the 'LiuhIns', the left-wing of the ERC coalition, legal change was a
necessary prerequisite for the realignment of the labour movement. The 'Liuhins' hoped
that the years of dictatorship would pacify the spirits of the most revolutionary sectors
of the proletariat, thereby creating the basis for a coalition between the progressive
middle classes and the organised labour movement. This hope was based on the
stereotype of an inherently dignified worker who, it was believed, rejected extremist
solutions in favour of 'good sense' ('seny'). Linked to this belief was the assumption that
extremist ideologies - especially anarchism - had hitherto impeded the emergence of a
truly progressive Catalonia. Obsessed with the British pattern of labour politics, the
'LluhIns' dreamt of the formation of a new political party capable of establishing a
relationship with the CNT parallel to that of the Labour Party and the British Trades
Union Congress which would herald a new type of 'workerism' ('obrerisme'). To this
end, LDpinió called on Republicans to show a clear commitment to reformist elements
within the CNT.'3
'Workerism' had a high profile in the statutes of the Esquerra, which identified
the duty of the state 'to legislate especially for the working class' to produce 'a better and
more rational organisation of work and production'. The rejection of the revolutionary
traditions of the labour movement was an important common denominator within the
various elements of the ERC coalition. Unlike past politicians, however, the Esquerra
envisaged that revolution would be transcended not by the repression of the organised
working class but, through the full recognition of legitimate proletarian aspirations.
Jaume Aiguader i Miró, a leading figure from Estat Catalã faction of the ERC and later
the first mayor of Republican Barcelona, regularly invoked 'workerism' and praised the
virtues of working class demands. He also believed that the English model of labour
organisation could be emulated within a democratic Catalonia, under the guidance of
the 'collectivist and class organisation' of Estat Català. Other Estat Català militants even
spoke out in favour of'workers' democracy'.'4
13 L'Opinió, 9 June 1928, 15 August, 12 December 1930; Culla i Clara, El catalanisme, pp.13-60; Joan
Culla i Clara, 'Joan LiuhI i Vallesca o la frustraciô d'un Laborisme', Serra d'Or, February, 1978, pp.14!-
145
14 Jaume Aiguader I Mirô, Catalun ya i la RevoluciO, Barcelona, 1931, pp.148-149; L'OpInió, 30 January,
13 February 1931
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Despite asseverations by the L'Opinió group that 'the majority of its supporters'
hailed from the labour movement, the ERC was not universally 'workerist'. Although
there was a consensus among the components of the ERC coalition that labour deserved
a 'new deal', the aspirations of most shades of Catalan Republican opinion did not
extend as far as the 'LiuhIns'. In fact, the right-wing and the centre of the ERC coalition
had little difficulty blocking attempts by the 'LiuhIns' to define the populist-nationalist
coalition as a 'class' or 'socialist' party, just as they neutralised attempts at adopting a
more radical social policy.' 5
 Yet 'workerism' and the promises of broad social change
were central to attracting working class votes. Aware that the proletariat had
traditionally associated Catalanisme with the bourgeois Lliga, the Esquerra stressed the
importance of 'harmonising the idea of Catalonia with the repair of social injustices' and
insisted that 'the sacrifices made for the freedom of our land would be hapless if it does
not also accompany justice for its people'. For this reason, Macia added, 'we are
sincerely workerist and catalanist'. Just a month before the April 1931 municipal
elections, L'Opinió resounded with an ideology of social justice and promises of
'deliverance' and 'liberation' from the historic oppression of the Catalan people. Macia
meanwhile inveighed against successive monarchical regimes, under which 'democracy
and freedom have never been real' and promised to redress the decades of abuses of
power. In contrast, the Esquerra leader declared, 'we stand for all civil rights for
Catalonia: full democratic and press freedoms, the repeal of special powers, trial by
jury, the separation of church from state'. Finally, Macia pledged himself 'to change the
organisation of society to value labour as the highest rank.. .socialising production and
the means of creating and making property unique to the collectivity'.'6
Given their growing economic hardships, workers could not fail to be impressed
by Esquerra promises to enact anti-inflation measures and tie wages to the cost of
living. The new party advocated fundamental legal advances for workers like the
establishment of a minimum wage and health legislation. Although suggestions by the
L'Opinió group that the party statutes include a commitment to full unemployment
5 L'Opinió, 13 February, 29 August 1931
16 L'Opinió, 13 March 1931
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insurance came to nothing, the Esquerra did advocate restrictions on the length of the
working day and publicly accepted the desirability of establishing the 6 hour day in
those industries worst affected by the recession. Moreover, the ERC electoral
programme, which promised workers 'the right to live with complete security and
dignity' and enjoy 'the fruits of that labour', was widely interpreted as a commitment to
unemployment benefit and/or a public works programme. The Esquerra also displayed a
concern for cultural as well as the economic aspects of proletarian life and vowed to
introduce 'a reduction in the working day' for the 'greater moral and economic
independence of the workers, thereby allowing them to develop intellectually'. In
similar vein, Llibertat, the Estat Català newspaper in l'Hospitalet, declared it was 'ready
to do anything' for the proletariat. Many ERC figures took an active interest in working
class living conditions. Aiguader i Miró, a doctor by profession and known as 'the
people's physician', penned a series of pamphlets on a range of issues facing the
proletariat, including the impact of housing conditions on ill-health. Meanwhile, Macia
had already issued his famous pledge to provide the workers with 'houses and gardens'
('Ia caseta i l'hortet').' 7 Tout court, ERC propaganda aroused enormous expectations
among broad sectors of the working class that a vote for the Republicans would at best
be the prelude to a new era and at least bring sweeping advances in their living
standards.
The colourful rhetoric of the various components of the ERC reveals how the
party meant different things to its different factions. The 'Lluhins' sometimes saw the
ERC as a 'class party', while the more moderate elements saw it as 'a party of pure and
genuine liberal ideology'. Although the ERC is best defined as populist, rather than
'workerist', it can also be seen how the Esquerra responded to the concrete aspirations of
the radicalised petit bourgeoisie. This was recognised at the time by Jordi Arquer, a
prominent Marxist critic of the ERC, who defined it as 'a class party: of the vacillating
17 L'Opiniô, 13 March, 29 August, 3, 11 December 1931; Llibertat, 20 February, 20 March 1931; Jaume
Aiguader I Miro, El problema, La lleialtat a I'epoca, Barcelona, 1929 and La fatiga obrera, Barcelona,
1929; AIba, Catalufia, p.lI7; Cruells, Macia, p.159
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middle class, doubtful, undefined, more on the side of the bourgeoisie, however, than of
the people'.'8
There is little doubt that the politics of the ERC were infused with the typical
idealism of the nationalist middle class intelligentsia of their day. An example of this
can be seen in the blind faith the Esquerra placed in the recuperative properties of
national self-determination. This was matched with the utopian expectation that
independence would lead ipso facto to the end of both national and class oppression.
Yet under close scrutiny, the emphasis on the national question far outstripped the
social reformism of the ERC. In substantive terms, this new Republicanism did not
extend radically beyond the strategy for modemisation and national reconstruction of
the bourgeois-nationalist Lliga.' 9 What was distinct, was the populist rhetoric of the
Esquerra, which reflected a desire to integrate the working class into a flexible
bourgeois democracy based on a market economy. Thus, within the liberal variant of
Catalanisme of the nationalist middle classes there was an implicit attempt to arbitrate
between the two main classes of society and integrate the whole of society in a new
political system, thereby avoiding the social polarisation that had engulfed society in the
past.
It was the attempt by the Esquerra to combine the yearning for prosperity of the
middle class with the desire for order of the bourgeoisie and the sentiments of equality
associated with the working class that produced the considerable contradictions in the
policy documents and propaganda of the new party. The founding statutes of the ERC
were equally vague. For instance, normally the ERC espoused a basic bourgeois-
democratic political programme, based on the same 'separation of powers' which it
believed underpinned the American Revolution. However, the Esquerra sometimes
combined this with a rhetoric borrowed from the Russian Revolution, as evinced by its
commitment to 'the progressive transformation of the existing system of private
property' in order to make 'the economic exploitation of man by man impossible'.
Mixing historical metaphors even further, ten days before the April Council elections
IS L'Opinió, 3 April 1931; L'Hora, 1 April 1931; La Batalla, 26 March 1931. Arquer also described the
Esquerra as a disparate party of the 'maladjusted, sceptics, failures and snobs.'
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the ERC defined itself injacobin fashion as 'the party of the revolution', that would
initiate 'the liberation of the nation, not only from the interference of the Church, but
also from capitalist control'. However, as the ERC made clear on another occasion, the
party did not seek 'the destruction of capitalism' but, full bourgeois-democratic
freedoms and the construction of a welfare state from above, based on 'the popular will
of the people, from below'.20
Out of power, the lack of coherence in the ERC ideological project, not to
mention its ill-defined commitment to reform, was a source of strength. Certainly, in the
April 1931 municipal elections the ability of the ERC to mean different things to
different people drew in electoral support from diverse, and antagonistic social sectors.
Another reason for the appeal of the Esquerra was the sheer prestige of its
leader. At first sight it appears anachronistic that the septuagenarian Macia,
affectionately known to many of his fellow Catalans as 'L'Avi' ('The Grandfather'),
should be at the helm of a modernisation programme aimed at ushering in the
renaixenca of Catalonia. From a conservative, landowner background, Macia reached
the rank of Colonel in the Spanish army, before his celebrated resignation from the
armed forces in protest at anti-Catalan sentiment among the army officers' corps.
Thereafter, Macia proudly laid claim to a record of militant, sometimes armed,
opposition to both the monarchy and the dictatorship. The sustained attacks launched
against Macia by conservative socio-political forces tended to reaffirm his credibility,
suggesting that he was the harbinger of real change. This image was consolidated by
Macia's direct form of oratory that conveyed an image of trustworthiness that the
masses had rarely seen in past politicians. Consequently, by the first part of 1931 Macia
veritably encapsulated the rejection of Madrid centralism by the Catalan masses. At the
same time, he embodied the confused and inchoate aspirations for change of a majority
of Catalans during the years of the monarchy, exemplified in his own combination of
'workerist' overtures with traditional nationalist demands.2'
20 L'OpiniO, 29 August, 2 April, 13 March 1931
21 Cruells, Macia, pp.17-32. See also AymamI I Baudina, Macià,passim.; JardI, Macià,passim.
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Most significantly of all, the muddled hopes articulated by Macia found an echo
inside the CNT. The Jacobin rhetoric periodically employed by Macia and his
demagogic knack of deflecting popular discontent with the pace of change through
blood-curdling rhetorical interventions was almost certainly a magnet for many
elements from inside the CNT. This verbal maximalism was heard before the April
elections when Macia announced his readiness for a separatist solution if the electorate
from the rest of the Spanish state chose a government that was inconsistent with the will
of the Catalan masses. Similarly, while Macia was clearly committed to the peaceful,
electoral road and, despite his boasts to the contrary, had proved capable of only token
military opposition to the monarchy, he nevertheless issued a manifesto in March 1931
declaring that 'the freedom of Catalonia must come from a profound convulsion
(capgirament) to eliminate all hostile forces: monarchy, conservative institutions and
reactionary organisations'. On a different occasion he cried that 'we are ready to
conspire (confabular-nos) with the rebels against oppression and tyranny.. .but never
will we accept a deal or contact with oppressors and despots'. Solidaridad Obrera, the
Barcelona-based daily newspaper of the CNT, spoke of its 'admiration' for Macia's
'idealism', describing him as a 'great man', a living 'apostle of Catalan freedom'. At the
founding congress of the ERC in March 1931 Macia ostentatiously embraced the
correspondent of Solidaridad Obrera.22
Other ERC leaders also carried influence over the CNT. The experience of
political exclusion from the institutions of the constitutional monarchy and the
repression under the dictatorship, had thrown many Republicans, radical separatists and
labour militants together, as their struggles overlapped against their common enemy.
Many of the radical middle-class lawyers, like Companys, had provided legal
representation for the CNT in the 1 920s, and shared a background of suffering with the
cenetistas during the years of arbitrary justice, deportations and terror by the Sindicatos
Libres. Like Companys, Joan Casanoves, another leading Esquerra activist and a former
22 L'Opinió, 13 March 1931; Solidaridad Obrera, 11, 19-20 March, 25-26 April 1931
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CNT lawyer, was widely respected for his eloquent defence of trade union rights.23
Finally, during the period immediately preceding the birth of the Republic, the various
opponents of the régime had been thrown together in exile, in Paris and Brussels, the
two centres of Catalan resistance to the dictatorship, and in jail, where cenetistas and
radical Catalanistes engaged in long polemics about how they would defeat their
immediate enemies and arrived at a certain level of understanding. The CNT press
remembered Aiguader i Miró as a 'distinguished' individual from the era when he flirted
with anarchism and from the dictatorship, when his Sants surgery served as a
clandestine meeting place for Republicans and cenetistas alike.24
The standing of the ERC was enhanced further by a current within the CNT
which felt that the impasse in which the union found itself before the 1923 coup d'etat
could only be overcome by a new reformist strategy. Many of these disaffected CNT
activists viewed the ERC as a suitable vehicle for this reformist path. A small group of
veteran cenetistas headed by Pere Foix and MartI Barrera, though quite insignificant in
numerical terms, joined the Esquerra and continued to enjoy the respect of both the
Confederal rank-and-file and many non-affiliated workers. Another feather in the
'workerist' cap of the Esquerra was the support it received from Hel.lenI SeguI, the
daughter of Salvador Segul, the most popular CNT leader ever, who had been murdered
by members of the Sindicatos Libre in 1923.25
Even among the more class-conscious workers, who were more sceptical about
the reforming zeal of the ERC, it is likely that the repeated declarations in favour of
broad new freedoms fostered the conviction that a Republican triumph at the poiis
would ensure legal conditions that would favour the expansion of real proletarian
organisation and syndical mobilisation. Put another way, even if the ERC were to prove
23 Cruells, gjJ, pp.141-144; Joaquim Ferrer, Un lider socialista: Lavret (1880-1920), Barcelona, 1973,
pp.199-226; Manuel Buenacasa, El movimiento obrero espaflol. 1886-1926. Historia y critica, (2nd
edition) Madrid, 1977, pp.78-8 1
24 Solidaridad Obrera, 2 July 1931; Maximiano GarcIa Venero, Historia del nacionalismo catalán (1793-
1936), Madrid, 1944, pp.466-467; Juan Garcia Oliver, El eco de los pasos. El anarcosindicalismo...en Ia
calle...en el Comité de Milicias...en el gobierno...en el exilio, Barcelona, 1978, p.98; Aiguader I Miro,
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25 L'OpiniO, 10 March 1933. The CNT was irked by these 'defections', especially that of Seguis'
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incapable of changing the lot of the working class, it was believed that it would at least
guarantee the necessary civil rights to allow trade unionists to pursue collective
struggles towards that same end. In the light of ERC policy statements, this was not an
unreasonable expectation. To be sure, consistent with the ERC hope of attaining a
modus vivendi with organised labour, the party had stated unequivocally that the trade
union was 'the most powerful and effective instrument upon which the proletariat can
rely for the attainment of its economic demands'. This formal recognition of the role of
trade unions, hitherto so bitterly combated by the authorities, was matched with a desire
to allow 'effective legal protection', including 'the union freedom and right to strike'.
Moreover, in a forthright overture to the CNT, the ERC advocated support for 'the free
play in the economic struggle' and vowed to dismantle the hated Comités paritarios, the
arbitration courts established by the dictatorship to oversee industrial relations. 26 Given
the implacable hostility of the anarcho-syndicalist CNT to all types of corporatism and
its public rejection of all state intervention in industrial relations, the ERC had
effectively met one of the major demands of the sleeping-giant of Catalan trade
unionism, something that was highly convenient in terms of attracting votes from
cenetistas.
2.2. The fault lines of the CNT
It would be wrong to suggest that the CNT rank-and-file was simply deceived
by ERC demagogy. Instead, the attraction of the middle class Esquerra for the anarcho-
syndicalist CNT raises a series of fundamental questions about the nature of cenetismo.
In 1931 there were three main factions inside the Catalan CNT. The largest of
these was the anarcho-syndicalists. Having emerged as a discernible trend in the labour
movement around the turn of the century, the anarcho-syndicalists reflected an attempt
to find a way out of the ghetto into which the anarchist movement had been led by
acolytes of'propaganda of the deed'. In essence, anarcho-syndicalism aimed to
transcend the fatal isolation of the libertarian movement from the masses or, in the
words of French anarcho-syndicalist Pierre Monatte, it 'recalled anarchism to the
26 L'OpiniO, 29 August 1931
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awareness of its working class origins'. 27 Highly popular with trade unionists and rank-
and-file workers, the anarcho-syndicalists very quickly outnumbered the traditional
anarchists and waves of emigration and exile saw anarcho-syndicalist movements
emerge in all the Latin American Republics, especially Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay.
This allowed for a regular exchange of ideas among émigrés and endowed anarcho-
syndicalism with a pan-Iberian outlook.
The two most prominent anarcho-syndicalists at this time were Joan Peiró and
Angel Pestafia, two battle-hardened cenetistas, both of whom had been anarchist
énragés in their younger days. Of the two, Pestafia was the most able organiser, while
Peiró was unquestionably the most sophisticated anarcho-syndicalist theoretician in
Spain.28 Peiró was acutely aware of the tactical limitations of the CNT in the past,
especially before the 1923 coup d'etat, when the unions failed to offer clear alternatives.
Even though he regarded the ultimate goal of the CNT as 'anarchist communism', Peiró
was highly critical of the anarchist gunmen who believed that violence was enough to
bring the revolution. Instead, as a classical anarcho-syndicalist, he saw the revolution as
an essentially constructive exercise, organising stable workplace committees that would
lay the basis for the post-revolutionary economy. He was also critical of the attitude of
many anarchists towards the CNT, accusing them of seeking to impose their
'dictatorship' over the Confederation. These concerns were amplified by Pestafia, who
maintained that the unions should be free from interference by outside political bodies
and he called on the anarchists to respect the sovereignty of the unions by working
inside the CNT on an individual basis, rather than in organised groups.29
The majority of the anarcho-syndicalist leaders were, like Peiró and Pestaña,
older militants, the very activists who in psychological terms had been most affected by
the anti-Confederal repression launched by the Sindicatos Libres and the dictatorship in
the 1920s. In fact, most of their number had figured, at one time or another, on Libre
death-lists and some, such as Pestaña and Pere Massoni, carried bullet scars from failed
27 Cited in James J011, The Anarchists, London, 1979, p.187
28 José Peiré, Fjr.,passim.; Joan Peiró, Escrits. 19 17-1939, Barcelona, 1975; Pestafla, Lo gue aprendf,
passim.; Angel Maria de Lera, Angel Pestafla: retrato de un anarguista, Barcelona, 1978, passim.
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assassination attempts. Moreover, while many anarchists went into exile in 1923, the
bulk of the anarcho-syndicalists remained in Catalonia with the union rank-and-file to
face the music during the wilderness years of the dictatorship, witnessing the near
complete disarticulation of the CNT and the expansion of the Libres under the
protection of the dictator. Organisers like PeirO were the veritable engine of the CNT,
putting in seven or eight hours at the union office, after a day in the workshop.
Unbowed by the threat of imprisonment, PeirO ran the daily gauntlet of the police to
keep the organisation alive. He headed the clandestine Catalan Regional Federation of
the CNT which, due to the disarticulation of all other directive union bodies, operated as
the defacto National Committee.3°
Following its relegalisation in 1930, the resuscitation of the CNT in many parts
of Barcelona was the work of the 'Solidaridad' ('Solidarity') group, made up of anarcho-
syndicalists militants of national standing like Peiró and Pestafia, and activists like Juan
Lopez, PeirO's closest ally, Francesc Arm, Progreso Alfarache and Pere 'Delaville'
Foix.31 When Solidaridad Obrera reappeared in April 1930 members of'Solidaridad'
dominated the editorial board: the auto-didact PeirO was editor, assisted by Foix,
Sebastià Clara and Massoni. Meanwhile, the 'Solidaridad' group and its supporters also
enjoyed a majority on the CNT National Committee, the Catalan Regional Committee
and the Barcelona Local Federation.32
The experience of navigating a path through the restricted freedoms open to the
CNT between 1930-193 1 convinced many of the anarcho-syndicalists that a wide
degree of institutional democracy was a necessary guarantee for union freedom. This
view was further underlined by international events and the emergence of authoritarian
regimes in Italy, Argentina and much of Eastern Europe confirmed to the anarcho-
syndicalists the need to have friends in the democratic camp. It was the combination of
these domestic and international contexts that predisposed the anarcho-syndicalists
towards the ERC in 1931. While the prescriptions of their apolitical ideology dissuaded
30 José Peiró, Fir, pp.18, 40-4731 Eulàlia Vega i Massana, El Trentisme a Catalunya. Divergències ideolôgigues en la CNT (1930-1933),
Barcelona, 1980, pp.46-53
32 Acción,12 July 1930
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the CNT leadership from directly counselling a course of electoral action, they argued
that the issue should be left to the discretion of individual workers. In practice,
however, the anarcho-syndicalist CNT leadership created a climate that favoured the
ERC. This took place in a number of diverse ways. Firstly, the CNT was involved with
the anti-monarchical opposition and adhered to a series ofjoint manifestos and amnesty
rallies. Secondly, the position of the ERC was strengthened by the press campaigns of
Solidaridad Obrera, who launched a virulent tirade against the 'fascist' Lliga, focussing
on Cambó's nefarious capitulation to Madrid and his role as 'the father of the terrorists
of the Sindicato Libre'. More openly, Solidaridad Obrera described the ERC as
collectively 'the most distinguished men of Catalan democracy'. Finally, leading
representatives from the anarcho-syndicalists publicly declared their respect for Macia.
Juan Lopez, a leading member of the 'Solidaridad' group, described him as 'honourable'
and 'dignified', with a 'clean political history'. Some CNT leaders openly endorsed
electoral politics at mass meetings with ERC and Republican speakers and in the
prelude to the elections Esquerra meetings were advertised in the 'Gacetilla', the
classified section of the CNT daily.33
The support lent to a political party by the CNT leadership was discordant with
the abstentionist rituals and the class conscious motifs of anarcho-syndicalism.
Nevertheless, as the April 1931 municipal elections approached, an amnesty for its
imprisoned supporters and the practical need to end the dictatorship to allow for the full
expansion of syndicalist practice were the overriding concerns of the Confederation.34
Under these circumstances, the maintenance of their ideological purity and a policy of
electoral abstention were unacceptable as they would leave the dictatorial right in power
and the prisoners in jail. The only possibility open to the CNT leaders, therefore,
however difficult to accept, was to vote for the Republic as a 'lesser evil'. This had
already been recognised at the CNT National Plenum in Blanes in April 1930, where a
Accion, 5 July 1930; Solidaridad Obrera, 11-12, 19-21,26 March, 1,25-26 April, 22 May 1931
Solidaridad Obrera, 20, 26-27 February, 18, 25-27 March 1931
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resolution was adopted which accepted limited collaboration between the unions and
the Republicans.35
The stance of the anarcho-syndicalists was not immune to criticism, however,
and opposition came from the anarchists within the CNT. The anarchists conceived of
revolution as an essentially spontaneous act, which did not require the intervention of
the trade unions, which were feared as the harbingers of bureaucracy. This aversion to
trade unions also reflected the desire of the anarchists to liberate the whole of humanity,
not just the proletarian part that so interested the anarcho-syndicalists. Consequently,
the anarchist quest for liberation meant a campaign against all social conventions,
prejudices and morals that enslaved humanity in the broadest sense, not just the
economic forces that oppressed workers. At the same time, anarchism was also a
reaction to the system that spawned industrial workers. Many anarchists accepted a
philosophy that looked longingly backwards at an idyllic, pre-capitalist, rural past, like
the advocates of a 'return to the countryside' in Imperial Russia.36
The centre for anarchist revolutionary activity was the grupo de afinidad. The
origins of these grupos lie in the anarchist discussion groups designed to heighten
libertarian consciousness. Bound together on the basis of personal affinity and mutual
loyalty, the grupistas pledged to live life according to libertarian principles, irrespective
of the restrictions imposed by capitalist society. The grupos reaffirmed the separation of
the proletariat from the bourgeoisie, and prized the attributes of individual rebellion,
generating a strong culture of resistance to the daily rituals of capitalist society. This
was reflected in the names of grupos like 'Los Desheredados' ('The Disinherited'), 'Los
Indomables' ('The Uncontrollables') and 'Els Fills de Puta' ('The Bastards'). Although it
is unlikely that the number of anarchist grupistas in Barcelona in the 1920s ever
exceeded 200, they acquired tremendous influence in the CNT due to the importance of
Solidaridad Obrera, 22 January 1931; Bemat Pou and Jaume Magrifiá, Un au g de conspiración (antes
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their syndical self-defence functions. It was this growing voice that raised the spectre of
the 'dictatorship' of the grupistas which so alarmed the anarcho-syndicalists.
The most important of the grupos from the 1920s was 'Los Solidarios'.
Constituted by Buenaventura Durruti, Francisco and Domingo Ascaso, Aurelio
Fernández, Gregorio 'El Torinto' Suberbiela, Alfonso Miguel, Marcelino del Campo,
Miguel GarcIa Vivancos, Ricardo Sanz GarcIa, Juan GarcIa Oliver and Ramón Torres
EscartIn, all the component parts of 'Los Solidarios' described themselves as committed,
'pure' anarchists. 37 Nevertheless, 'Los Solidarios' were also known as 'anarcho-
bolsheviks' due to their obsession with the 'seizure of power' by a 'revolutionaiy army',
their belief in the living reality of revolution and their unshakable conviction that
capitalism was 'ready' for social transformation. Guided by a military-technical
conception of the revolution, 'Los Solidarios' were sometimes attacked by other
anarchist groups as 'authoritarians' or 'anarcho-Bolsheviks', descriptions which should
not be taken to infer the slightest tolerance towards the 'communist-syndicalists' or the
Russian Revolution, both of which they regarded with abhorrence.38
'Los Solidarios' were typical of the new, unskilled working class that grew up in
Barcelona during and after World War One. In 1920 all the members of 'Los Solidarios'
were between 19 and 25 years of age and all were from unskilled sectors of the labour
market, characterised by a near complete absence ofjob security and poor working
conditions. Garcia Vivancos periodically worked as a docker, a painter and a driver,
while Durruti, Suberbiela and Fernández were all mechanics. Meanwhile, Gregorio
Jover was a woodworker and Francisco Ascaso and Garcia Oliver were both waiters. At
one time or another, all had been victimised by employers for their enthusiastic
interventions in social struggles. After one particularly bitter strike in his native Leon,
Durruti was sacked by his employers and expelled by the UGT for committing acts of
sabotage, doubly disciplined by management and union alike for his radicalism.
See Rai Ferrer, Durruti. 1896-1936, Barcelona, 1985, pp.'18-68; Abel Paz, Durruti,passim.; Garcia
Oliver, El eco, passim.; Ricardo Sanz, El sindicalismo y la poiltica. Los "solidarios" y "nosotros",
Toulouse, 1966, passim. and El sindicalismo espaflol, passim.
38 Lorenzo, Los anarguistas, pp.45-48. Curiously, 'Los Solidarios' were also sometimes known as 'Los
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68
Formed within a despairing social milieu that offered little promise of gradual
change, the militant anarchists were intensely critical of the anarcho-syndicalist wing of
the CNT, whom they regarded as 'reformists'. Instead, 'Los Solidarios' believed that any
freedom had to be fought for, gun in hand and that the starting-point for anarchist
activity was not the theoretical consciousness-raising measures that occupied so many
other grupos but practical action to incite the revolution. Accordingly, 'Los Solidarios'
developed a strategy of ajusticiamienro ('bringing to justice'), that they directed at both
Libres and leading political personalities associated with the repression of the
proletariat. Anchored in violent group action, rather than mass trade union mobilisation,
this tactic mirrored their status as unskilled workers with poor bargaining power.39
The limitations of grupismo were, however, starkly revealed by the 1923 coup
d'etat. Although the grupistas were courageous enough to confront employer-paid
thugs, it was the struggle of an elite whose esprit de corps and conditions of struggle
kept it relatively aloof from the bulk of the organised proletariat. Similarly, the
grupistas were devoid of any kind of political strategy capable of attracting large
numbers of workers and transcending the cycle of violence. Consequently, while
grupismo removed a few intransigent bosses or hated politicians, it was never going to
transform the existing socio-economic and political system, just as it was a wholly
inappropriate form of resistance to a modem state. Indeed, the imposition of what was,
on balance, a far from tyrannical dictatorship, proved a powerful enough wind to scatter
the unorganised and diffuse anarchist cells.
In 1927 the anarchists gave organisational expression to the array of grupos
throughout the Spain and Portugal by creating the Federación Anarquista Ibérica
(FAI).4° Formed clandestinely, the FM was clearly reminiscent of the Bakuninist sects
of the nineteenth century and signified the resurrection of a purely anarchist secret
society. Yet the FM was not based on an exclusively nostalgic mission and one of the
resolutions passed by the hundred or so libertarians at its founding conference was that
Paz, Durruti, pp.17-22, 67; Sanz, El sindicalismo espaflol, pp.51-77, 95-118; La Revista Blanca, 1
April 1924
40 José Peirats, Anarchists in the Spanish Revolution, (2nd edition) London, 1990, p.55; Juan Gómez
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the new body devote itself'to return the labour movement to anarchism'. 4 ' Predicated on
a series of negatives - anti-politicism, anti-communism, anti-socialism - the aims of the
FM were essentially two-fold: firstly, it was to inject anarchist purity into the CNT and
thereby guarantee the future of Iberian anarchism; secondly, in keeping with the
'anarcho-Boishevism' of 'Los Solidarios', it was to serve as the exclusive committee of
the revolution.
The FM was determined to prevent the emergence of what it saw as 'politicism'
within the CNT, the dangers of which, the anarchists believed, were eloquently revealed
by the links between the UGT and the PSOE. According to the libertarians, the socialist
unions had ceased to be class organisations, becoming instead 'bossified' and
'domesticated' semi-statal bodies under the control of the socialist party bureaucracy.
The FM was also to guard against any incursions of other workers' groups into the
CNT, particularly the dissident communists. Their defensive brief was undoubtedly
conditioned by the experiences of anarchist militants of exile in the 1920s, particularly
in Paris and Brussels, where they were alarmed by the throng of fellow anarchist
émigrés, ranging from Italians, displaced by the newly imposed fascist dictatorship,
across to the Russians recently defeated by the Red Army. The visceral anti-
communism of 'Los Solidarios' was reinforced by meetings between Durruti, Francisco
Ascaso and Nestor Makhno, the renowned anti-Bolshevik, anarchist guerrilla. These
sentiments were heightened by the fact that in France, the birthplace of anarchist
theoreticians like Pierre-Jean Proudhon and Sebastian Faure and the cradle of anarcho-
syndicalism, the grupistas witnessed firsthand the ascendency of communists within the
unions and the expansion of a mass pro-Bolshevik party. 42 In fact, the global trend from
the Ukraine to Montevideo seemed to confirm the retreat and defeat of anarchism. It
was this drift that the FM set out to halt.
The self-proclaimed role of the FM as custodian of the interests of the CNT was
given a new impetus by developments across the Atlantic, through the writings of the
Spaniard Diego Abad de Santillán and his Argentinian associate, Emilio Lopez Arango.
Gómez Casas, 1-listoria de Ia FAI, p.120
42 See Edouard Dolléans, Histoire du Mouvement Ouvrier. 187 1-1936, Paris, 1946, vol.2
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Through their militancy in the Federación Obrera de la Region Argentina (FORA),
LOpez Arango and Abad de Santillán developed the concept of trabazón. Signifying
'bond' or 'fusion', trabazón guarantied the connection between the unions and the
anarchist movement through the formation ofjoint committees, such as prisoners'
welfare groups, geared to enhance the profile of the anarchists in the unions. Thereafter,
the anarchists were to work tirelessly to win the leadership of the unions. 43 Believing
that the open nature of the French syndicalist unions had made them easy prey for
'communist infiltrators', the FORA opposed working class unity and the traditional
anarcho-syndicalist view. Instead, the supporters of trabazón felt that the ideological
diversity of the proletariat heralded a Darwinian type struggle, whereby the strongest or
most intransigent faction would emerge victorious. Given the significance of this
struggle and the importance of anarchist unity over proletarian unity, it was, in the
words of one of the FORA's organs, 'a mistake to pledge oneself to halt the
disintegration of the labour movement' and even though the supporters of the anarchists
might be few, it was better to divide and split the unions and separate from their
enemies, rather than sink in 'a sea of contradictions' which characterised mass
syndicalism. This was precisely what happened, as trabazón stimulated rampant
sectarianism against both revolutionary syndicalists and Bolsheviks, alienating
thousands of non-anarchist workers from the FORA and precipitating a collapse in its
membership in the late 1 92Os.
Blinded to the disastrous ramifications of trabazón in Argentina by their anti-
communism, the FAI seized on what it viewed as a recipe for libertarian supremacy
inside the labour movement that would guarantee anarchist control over the CNT and
forestall any 'communist take-over', as had occurred with the French CGT. The aims of
the FM placed it in a highly contradictory situation, both within the labour movement
as a whole and within the CNT. Firstly, despite its anarchist orthodoxy, the FM saw
itself as a vanguard body in relation to the labour movement. This position was
3 Emilio Lopez Arango and Diego Abad de Santillan, El anarguismo en el movimiento obrero, Buenos
Aires, 1925; Ronaldo Munck, Ricardo Falcon and Bemardo Galitelli, Argentina: From Anarchism to
Peronism. Workers. Unions and Politics. 1855-1985, London, 1987, pp.49-105
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reflected in the paternal concern of the anarchists towards the CNT trade unions that it
regarded almost as its errant children. Secondly, for a creed that pledged apoliticism, the
drive for anarchist purity was highly 'political'. Not only was anarchism itself a
'political' doctrine but the FM, in pursuing trabazón, was fulfilling a thoroughly
political role in the unions. Lastly, out of all the factions in or around the CNT, the
commitment of the FM to the unions was almost certainly the least constructive. For
while the anarcho-syndicalists and the communists both viewed the unions as
indispensable instruments en route to the revolution, many within the FM saw the
unions as little more than a forum for revolutionary agitation and the rank-and-file
syndicalists as the foot soldiers of the insurrection. Some anarchists were blatantly anti-
syndical, regarding sindicatos as a kind of counter-revolutionary force, which sought to
'prolong the class system'. Moreover, the daily round of syndical organisation was
barely concordant with the messianic attitudes of the 'revolutionary idealists' of the FM
and their manifest intolerance towards 'reformist' short-term gains and strikes designed
to win what one faIsta pilloried as 'miserable (mezquino) wage rises'.45
In 1930 the FAI was very distant from attaining its aim of replacing the existing
union leadership. With many of its potential anarchist supporters still in exile in France,
Belgium and Latin America, the FAI consisted of no more than a few dozen militants
scattered around Barcelona, who were little concern to the authorities. 'Los Solidarios',
the most active of all the grupos, had been totally disrupted by the authorities. Some of
its members had been killed in gunfights with the security forces in 1924, while some
were executed. Durruti, Francisco Ascaso and Jover were abroad in exile, Garcia Oliver
was in jail and Torres was in an asylum. 46 When the FM showed its hand at a
clandestine CNT plenum held in Madrid in 1928 its proposal for trabazón was rejected
by a crushing anarcho-syndicalist majority. The following year the FM publicly
revealed its existence, although it continued to develop very slowly. It suffered a
setback, however, in 1930 when José Elizalde, the secretary of the FM Peninsular
Tierra y Libertad, 29 November 1930; Sanz, El sindicalismo 'i Ia politica, p.223
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Committee, the brain of the anarchist organisation, was removed on the suspicion that
he was a police informant. His replacement, Juan Manuel 'Juanel' Molina, recently
returned from exile, was shocked to find out that the Barcelona organisation did not
even have a typewriter to its name. Yet under 'Juanel', the FM slowly began to raise its
profile, particularly through its weekly paper, Tierra y Libertad and in June 1930 Jaume
Magriná and Manuel Sirvent became the first faIstas to be represented on the CNT
Catalan and National Committees. Nevertheless, with the notable exception of the
Builders' Union, led by Ricardo Sanz, a 'Los Solidarios' veteran, all the Barcelona
unions were under the hegemony of the anarcho-syndicalists. Undeterred, the FM
doggedly set about gaining influence within the Prisoners' Support Committee (Comité
Pro-Presos), the CNT-organised groups that were responsible for the welfare ofjailed
cenetistas and their families. ''
Though a separate organisation from the CNT, the overwhelming majority of
faIstas were, nevertheless, cenetistas. This was a confluence that the FM was prone to
reiterate. Equally important, was the appeal of the FM to youth and those elements
within the CNT who had been schooled in the bitter post-war struggles, which endowed
it with a strong esprir de corps. Since adolescence many of these younger militants had
known nothing but jail, police brutality and illegality, they were imbued with an
unquestioning faith in libertarian communism and they rejected compromise as the
harbinger of defeat.
Interestingly, for all their doctrinal differences between the 'pure' or militant
anarchists and the anarcho-syndicalists, there was little difference between the two
factions in the spring of 1931 when it came to the coming elections. Firstly, like the
anarcho-syndicalist CNT leadership, many radical anarchists felt a lingering respect for
Macia following his armed plots against the dictatorship. Even the 'Los Solidarios'
veteran Garcia Oliver admitted a certain 'sympathy' towards Macia from the days of
their exile in Paris in the 1 920s. Similarly, his comrade in arms, Durruti, praised the
'inherent goodness' and the 'purity and integrity' of the ERC leader. Secondly, it was not
' Berenguer, De Ia Dictadura, p.53; Gómez Casas, Historia de Ia FAT, pp.118-119; Jaume Fabre and
Josep Maria Huertas, 'Juanel i Lola Iturbe, una vida d'amor i d'anarquia. D'un temps, d'una FAT',
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uncommon for leading faIstas like Josep Alberola, Felipe AlaIz, Magrifia and Libertad
Ródenas to appear on the same platform as Esquerra and even Acció figures to protest
against governmental repression. Finally, many militant libertarians fuily accepted the
necessity of some kind of cooperation with the•Republicans and made no attempt to
follow an abstentionist line in the elections. The mood of both the anarchists and the
anarcho-syndicalists was summed up by José Vilaverde, a leading cenetista from
Galicia, who stated that 'the ranks of the CNT are prepared to intervene directly in
events [i.e. elections] which will guarantee the establishment of this new judicial
order'.48
It was the remaining tendency within the CNT, the dissident communists of the
Bloc Obrer i Camperol (BOC), which rallied against what they saw as the pro-
Republican illusions of both the anarcho-syndicalist CNT leadership and the anarchists.
The development of communism in Catalonia and in Spain was far slower than
in the neighbouring Gallic country. This retardation was inextricably linked with the
twists and turns of the power struggle in the Soviet Union, during which Catalan and
Spanish communists became intensely divided, both from each other and among
themselves. The 'official' party, the Partido Comunista de Espafia (PCE), which was
firmly rooted in the ultra-sectarian 'Third Period' orthodoxy of the Communist
International, proved highly unpopular with the Iberian labour movement. This
opprobrium largely stemmed from the divisive nature of PCE syndical policy which,
via, its mis-named Comité de la Reconstrucción de la CNT, was geared towards
splitting the CNT. Such a policy was despised by anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists and
anti-Stalinist communists alike, because it served to weaken what the most important
self-defence organisation of the Ibenan proletariat. 49
 Apart from winning a power base
in a number of CNT unions in Seville city, this schismatic policy brought the Stalinists
nothing but scorn. Consequently, by January 1931 the PCE had no more than 50
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members in Catalonia, the most important pocket of industrialisation in the whole of
Iberia. Instead, the BOC, the majority pro-Bolshevik organisation, which qualitatively
and quantitatively accounted for the cream of the Iberian communist movement, was
'dissident' to the official communism of the Soviet leadership.5°
Despite the best efforts of their enemies inside the CNT to portray the BOC as
Marxist upstarts intent on 'seizing power' within the Confederation, the supporters of
the Russian Revolution represented a long-standing tendency in the unions. Since 1917-
1918 the 'communist-syndicalists' had occupied a specific space within the CNT
through Comités Sindicalistas Revolucionarias (CSR's), the pro-Bolshevik cells by
which they stressed the applicability of Russian lessons for the Iberian revolutionary
movement and hoped to lead the CNT away from the quagmire of apoliticism. Enthused
by what they believed was a Europe-wide shift from anarchism to revolutionary
communism, the 'communist-syndicalists' warned that the organisations of the Catalan
proletariat were doomed to obsolescence unless they jettisoned the traditional anarcho-
syndicalist leadership and adopted a line more suitable to the complexities of post-war
class struggle. However, the supporters of the CSR's were largely isolated in the CNT
by their libertarian rivals who, ironically, resorted to perfunctory bureaucratic methods
to trample on the very traditions of proletarian democracy they claimed to be defending.
Nevertheless, the prognosis of the dissident communists was in part verified by the
ignominious collapse of the CNT after the 1923 coup d'etat.5'
Opposition to the growing stranglehold of the anarchists over the unions in the
early twenties conditioned the syndical strategy of the 'communist-syndicalists', who
maintained that 'the CNT must not be an anarchist party, but a class organisation which
all workers with a revolutionary spirit can form a part whatever their ideological make-
50 Manuel Tuñón de Lara, Luchas obreras y cainpesinas en Ia Andalucia del siglo XX. Jaén (1917-1920).
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up'. This continued into the 1930s and provided the BOC with its central axiom that
only by avoiding a fixed and determinate ideological position could the unions create
the broad unity of the proletariat necessary to extract concessions from the recalcitrant
Catalan bourgeoisie. 52 Tactically this was very similar to the anarcho-syndicalist Carte
d'Amiens and there were clear points of contact between the anarcho-syndicalists and
the dissident communists, such as the need to bolster syndical organisation and their
critique of the blind anarchist faith in spontaneity. This confluence between the
'communist-syndicalists' and the orthodox anarcho-syndicalists was largely derived
from their Sorelian origins and their advocacy of 'collective revolutionary violence', a
legacy that they never fully broke with.53
What made the bloquistas unique within the CNT, however, was their insistence
on the need to struggle, like the Bolsheviks, on the political plane. The BOC felt that the
sindicatos should work in tandem with a new revolutionary political party of the
Catalan proletariat. Until the anarchists and the anarcho-syndicalists accepted the reality
that the proletarian victory presupposes a struggle for political power, the communists
mused that they would still be waiting for their libertarian communist revolution in the
thirtieth century. Consequently, in the prelude to the April 1931 elections this position
was repeatedly voiced by the Bloc, who reiterated that the proletariat was dangerously
underrepresented on a political level due to its retarded political culture and the
inheritance of years of anarcho-syndicalist apoliticism. In the view of La Batalla, 'what
the proletariat wants is a doctrine, a method and a tactic that would be effective in its
struggle against capitalism'.54
Although the bloquistas were outnumbered by the anarchists and anarcho-
syndicalists in the unions, they still enjoyed much influence in the CNT and the bulk of
its militants were seasoned cenetistas. With the resurrection of the CNT in 1930 the
dissident communists began to reorganise their supporters as the Oposición Sindical
52 Lucha Social, 24 June, 22 July 1922. As La Batalla explained, 'under a bourgeois régime only a single
"interest" and a single "end" can group all the workers: class interest and the abolition of capitalism; a
common end produces a common action': La Batalla, 6 June 1930
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Revolucionaria (OSR). Rooted in issues of practical trade union organisation and
incessant criticism of the tactical misconceptions of the anarchist and anarcho-
syndicalist leadership, the OSR was very influential in reorganising the printers and
shopworkers' unions in Barcelona in 1930, as well as a number of CNT unions outside
Barcelona province, particularly in Lleida, the birthplace of the BOC leader Joaquim
MaurIn and known among the anarchists as 'Mauringrad'.55
The inveterate anti-communism of the anarchists meant that an alliance between
the bloquistas and the faIsras to remove the moderate anarcho-syndicalist CNT
leadership was out of the question. As in the 1 920s, the anarchists and the anarcho-
syndicalists resented the influence of the communists in the CNT and both conspired to
halt the advance of the bloquIstas. In reply, the OSR tenaciously fought for a platform
of union democracy and the right to form factions inside the CNT. Drawing on their
unitarian faith, the dissident communists attacked the CNT leadership for wanting to
monopolise the reconstruction of the Confederation, reminding them that 'the unions are
not anarchist organisations, nor are they either socialist or communist: they are the
organisations created by workers for their own self-defence, whose origins predate the
existence of anarchists, socialists and communists'. Meanwhile, pointing to the
contradictions of the anarcho-syndicalists and the anarchists public defence of a
politically-neutrality labour movement and their underhand efforts to imbue it with an
anarchic content, the dissident communists accused the other tendencies in the CNT of
being afraid of internal freedom, a liberty that La Batalla sustained 'is absolutely crucial
in the union organisations so that the working masses can assess, through the experience
of its own action and that of others, which tendency is best placed to lead the proletariat
towards victory in its struggle against capitalism'.56
The 'communist-syndicalists' were confident that if the free competition of
political ideas was guaranteed in the CNT they could succeed in winning the leadership
of the labour movement. This optimism was informed by their unshakable belief that in
Jaume Barrull i Pelegri, El Bloc Obrer i Camperol (Lleid& 1919-1937), Lleida, 1990; Porcel, La
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Europe and in Catalonia, the twin impact of the Russian Revolution and the economic
expansion of World War One had tilted the balance against the libertarians, creating
conditions that would erode the basis of anarchism and, like in France, lay the
foundations for a mass communist movement. 57 Indeed, what many saw as the strong
anarchist traditions among the Catalan proletariat were dismissed by the 'communist-
syndicalists' as a mirage. MaurIn maintained that the masses were never anarchist and
that they followed the CNT not out of loyalty to the ideology of the union leadership of
the day but by virtue of the combative strength of the Confederation. This belief led
MaurIn to assert that 'the Catalan proletariat is not anarchist' and that 'Barcelona has
never been anarchist'. 58 Thus the bloquistas believed that their crossing of the Rubicon
from anarchism to communism was an example that the rest of the proletariat was set to
emulate.
The central project of the BOC was to forge a coherent proletarian political party
that could compliment the existing syndical organisation of the working class. This task
was all the more urgent because the BOC theorists reasoned that a revolutionary crisis
was imminent in Spain and that the creation of an exclusively class party was, therefore,
vital if the proletariat was to be liberated from capitalist oppression.59
Like the Esquerra, the BOC contested the April 1931 elections on a pro-amnesty
platform. Also like the ERC, the BOC promised to renounce the huge, potentially
debilitating, municipal debt that was accrued by successive corrupt administrations
during the monarchy. Following the extravagant 1929 World Exhibition municipal debt
assumed mammoth proportions as the dictatorial authorities had allowed municipal
funds to be pillaged by well-placed industrialists, 'the thieves of the Exhibition' to the
majority of Barcelonins. It was axiomatic that any municipal administration which
reneged upon the debts would be immensely popular with the people of Barcelona.
Conversely, it followed that any administration which accepted the bills of the pre-
Republican era would immediately see its ability to undertake structural reform
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impeded, a scenario that carried the evident danger of a clash between the rulers and the
ruled.
What distinguished the proletarian Bloc from the petit bourgeois Esquerra was
that the dissident communists had a revolutionary social programme. The BOC
proposed a 'proletarian front' and the independent political representation of the working
class, alleging that the Republicans were incapable of resolving the social question.
Unlike the anarchists and the anarcho-syndicalists, the Bloc penetrated the demagogic
veil with which the ERC enshrouded itself and advanced a highly trenchant class
analysis of the Esquerra and what it regarded as its inherently petit bourgeois essence.
Moreover, the BOC expounded that the project of a bourgeois-democratic republic was
an impossible dream, particularly during a time of economic crisis, when the
bourgeoisie, both nationally and internationally, tended towards the added protection
offered to its system by fascist dictatorship.6°
The BOC also developed a municipal plan, not that dissimilar from the civic
initiatives developed in Vienna during the inter-war years. Accordingly, the BOC
manifesto pledged to redirect Council funds to the most impoverished neighbourhoods
of Barcelona in a bid to regenerate the ghettos and provide affordable housing for the
workers of the city. This was combined with a blue-print for infrastructural planning in
the newly developed districts that had emerged in an unregulated manner in the 192 Os,
an ambitious plan that carried the additional advantage of widespread job creation.6'
Encouraged by the coherence of their own ideas and the apparent confusion of
those of their opponents, the BOC was confident that it would attract large numbers of
working class votes. Indeed, not only were the majority of the bloquistas also
cenetistas, and therefore exclusively proletarian, but a vote for the BOC also promised
to bring the long-awaited amnesty.
Yet the plans of the BOC were thwarted by the dalliance of the CNT leadership
with the petit bourgeois Esquerra. The anarchists and the anarcho-syndicalists inside the
CNT baulked at endorsing the candidature of an exclusively workers' party like the Bloc
60 L'Hora,21 January, 11 February 1931;LaBatalla,5, 16,26March 1931
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as they feared that they would be strengthening the position of their rivals within the
labour movement as a whole, not to mention enhancing the position of the bloquistas
within the CNT. However, the march of events led them to express themselves through
a second (political) party, which was representative of an exogenous social class. Thus
if the force of circumstances compelled the anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists to break
with their apolitical shibboleths and commit the heresy of voting in the 'electoral farce',
the libertarians preferred the double heresy of voting for a petit bourgeois party like the
Esquerra.
The tolerance of the anarcho-syndicalists and the anarchists towards the ERC
during the elections was not seen by the BOC as an aberration but, rather, as evidence
of the very crisis of their tactics of libertarian apoliticism. The abandonment of the
political struggle was publicly recognised by Solidaridad Obrera just weeks before the
fall of the monarchy, when it admitted that 'today nobody wants power'. 62 Seizing on
potential dangers of isolating the huge economic power of the CNT from broader
political issues, the communists saw the general ideological poverty of the Iberian left
clearly reflected in the cardinal error of the anarchists in ignoring the dual - economic
and political - oppression of the proletariat and their tendency to divorce the quest for
power into two separate spheres. As La Batalla explained, 'in the struggle against
capitalist society it is impossible to separate economic action from politics.. .there is no
evolution or revolution without political intervention in the class struggle'.63
The BOC weekly also inveighed against the 'Republican degeneration' of the
CNT leadership who, it believed, had become 'an appendage of the small bourgeoisie'.
However, the alarm call of the bloquisras was muted as their newly formed party had a
limited influence. This situation was exacerbated by Solidaridad Obrera, which
doggedly refused to advertise BOC meetings as they were 'political', even though
equally political gatherings of the petit bourgeois ERC received full coverage in the
pages of the CNT daily. This was combined with a campaign of defamation against the
dissident communist BOC. For instance, although Peiró advocated an alliance with all
62 Solidaridad Obrera, 24 March 1931
63 La Batalla, 23 May, 8 August 1930
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anti-dictatorial political parties against the monarchy, he revealed his hatred for
communists, alleging that they were sold to Russian gold. Such rigid and unwavering
anti-communism was even more evident inside the unions, where anarchists and
anarcho-syndicalists alike resorted to undemocratic procedures to marginalise the
advocates of independent proletarian politics. Bloquistas and members of the OSR were
impeded from addressing union meetings even though the leaders of the Confederation
alleged that its ranks were open to all workers. Finally, in the prelude to the elections
this labour of sabotage saw the CNT leadership organise joint rallies with Republicans
to coincide with those of the dissident communists. This lends support to the claim of
the BOC leader MaurIn reflected that 'in their everyday action they [the CNT leaders]
were the docile and blind instruments of the left Republicans'.M
Nevertheless, from their own perspectives, the stance of the anarcho-syndicalists
and the anarchists made sense. A vote for the ERC held out the promise of releasing the
prisoners, while also checking the advance of their dissident communist rivals in the
workers' movement. It did not, however, enter into the calculations of the CNT
leadership that in their determination to block the BOC they were emasculating the
proletariat politically. Similarly, they also ignored the fact that they were handing the
initiative to middle class politicians and bringing the danger that the proletariat might be
politically integrated within the bourgeois democracy. This, however, was soon to
change.
2.3. The New Republican Dawn
On 14 April 1931 the Spanish monarchy collapsed and the Second Republic
was proclaimed. Two days earlier nationwide municipal elections revealed that in those
areas where the vote had not been rigged, an overwhelming majority of the population
favoured a Republic. When the commanders of both the army and the Civil Guard
informed the monarch that they lacked the resolve to defend the Crown against the
popular will, the King decided to go into exile, leaving Spain and his ungrateful former
64 La Noche, 30 March 1931; Solidaridad Obrera, 31 March 1931; La Batalla, 23 May, 15 August 1930,
2, 14 April 1931; JoaquIn Maurmn, RevoluciOn y contrarrevolución en Espafla, (2nd edition) Paris, 1966,
p.93; L'Hora, 4 March 1931
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subjects behind him. After centuries of monarchical rule Spain was on the brink of a
new Republican era. It also seemed that the strait-jacket that the conservative right had
placed around society was on the verge of being removed.
Popular hopes of a new dawn were reinforced by the ambivalence of the military
towards the departure of the monarch. Traditionally, the military had been the arbiter of
Spanish politics, a pro-monarchical praetorian guard. In the nineteenth century the army
intervened in the political arena to destroy the First Republic. Thereafter, the
conservative officer elite of the armed forces had been largely hostile towards projects
for political modernisation. 65 In this context, the bloodless arrival of a Republic was
remarkable.
The equanimity that characterised the birth of the 'immaculate Republic' was
highlighted by the peaceful nature of the political transition in the Catalan capital.
Despite Barcelona's awesome reputation in bourgeois circles for anarchist violence, the
company of legionnaires billeted in the city to maintain order during the elections had
no reason to leave their barracks. Events on April 12 inferred a break with both the
long-standing popular indifference of Barcelonins towards the rigged elections of the
monarchy, as the urban masses took to the streets to vote in their droves for the
Republic. According to Las Noticias there was 'extraordinary animation' around polling
stations in the Barn xino. Elsewhere in the city, a large turn-out of voters was
reported.66
The April municipal elections in Barcelona city saw the election of 38
Republican councillors, as opposed to a mere 12 monarchists. The Esquerra cruised to
victory, winning 47% of the vote. This figure was five times larger than the votes polled
by the Lliga and over double the figure normally polled by victorious parties among the
indifferent electorate of Barcelona city. On the day of the vote Macia, the ERC leader,
65 For the role of the military see Bailbé, Orden publico; Gabriel Cardona, El problema militar en
Espafla, Madrid, 1990 and Joaquim Lleixà, Cien altos de militarismo en Espafta. Funciones estatales
confiadas al Ejército en la Restauración y el Franguismo, Barcelona, 1986
66 José Borrás, Espafia. 1900-1939. Las causas de la guerra civil, Madrid, 1993, p.90; Solidaridad
Obrera, 12 April 1931; Las Noticias, 14 April 1931; La Vanguardia, 14 April 1931; La Veu de
Catalunva, 17-19 April 1931
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received a spontaneous ovation from a crowd gathered on Les Rambles. In the nearby
Barn xino the ERC triumph was emphatic.67
In Madrid, the political centre of the Spanish state, news of the vote percolated
through to the authorities on April 14. By lunchtime, events took a decisive turn, when
General José Sanjurjo Sacanell, the Director-General of the Civil Guard, informed
Niceto Alcalá Zamora, a well-known figure in Madrid Republican circles, that the King
was preparing to leave the country. When Sanjurjo placed himself at the orders of the
Republican Revolutionary Committee, the birth of the Republic was assured.68
Despite the incontrovertibility of their electoral triumph, the members of the
Republican Revolutionary Committee were uncertain about how to take advantage of
their victory and they refrained from immediately proclaiming the Republic. In stark
contrast to the quietism of the hesitant Republican politicians, the people took to the
streets to celebrate the imminent departure of the King and his coterie. In Madrid
delirious crowds paraded through the streets, singing 'We've kicked them out!' 69 Yet
according to one Republican, 'the general excitement was greatest in Catalonia'. In
Barcelona the noise of the streets was even most intense of all and a wave of
spontaneous pro-Republican demonstrations, largely made up of workers, converged on
Barcelona city centre. Chants of'Visca Macia! Mon CambO!' resounded in the streets,
underlining the mass enthusiasm for the Republican Esquerra and the opprobrium felt
for the monarchist-conservative Lliga.7°
By taking to the streets, the people displayed none of the reservations of the
Republican politicians, revealing instead a decisive feeling that the Republic must
come. As the clamour from the streets of Barcelona grew, and mindful of the
consequences should they lose the initiative, the Republicans decided to act. At 1 PM,
while the historic meeting between Sanjurjo and Alcalá Zamora was taking place in
67 Bueso, Recuerdos, vol.!, p.329; Alba, Catalufia, p.234; Solidaridad Obrera and Las Noticias, 14 April
1931
68 Cánovas Cervantes, Apuntes, pp.78-8!; Miguel Maura, AsI cavô Alfonso XIII, Mexico, 1962, pp.165-
166; Francisco Largo Caballero, Mis recuerdos, Mexico, 1976, p.'08
69 Cánovas Cervantes, Apuntes, p.82
70 ClaudI Ametllã, Memories polltigues (1918-1936), Barcelona, 1979, p.69; Francesc Madrid, ELI.4
d'Abril, Barcelona, 1977, passim.; Ferran Soldevila, HistOria de Ia proclamació de Ia Republica a
Catalunva, Barcelona, 1977, passim.; Joan B. Culla i Clara, 'L'altra cara del 14 d'Abril', L'Avenc, 26,
1980, pp.56-61; Bueso, Recuerdos, vol.!, p.344
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Madrid, an Esquerra delegation headed by Companys entered the Council building in
Placa de Sant Jaume and took the dramatic step of declaring the Republic in Catalonia.
This historic declaration was shortly followed by the appearance of Macia on the
balcony of the Generalitat Palace, directly opposite the City Hall, where he proclaimed
the 'Catalan Republic within the Spanish Federal Republic' and promised 'to die' for the
Catalan Republic.71
The widespread popular joy suggested that such a sacrifice was far from
necessary. After over 50 years of monarchist epilogue to the abortive First Republic, the
Republic had now been proclaimed, peacefully, twice in an hour in the Catalan
capital. 72 Although the Spanish Republic was still to be proclaimed in Madrid, a mass
celebration took over the streets of Barcelona. In Placa de Sant Jaume, soon to be re-
named Placa de la Repüblica, a lone trumpeter played 'The Marseillaise'. Meanwhile,
when Macia re-appeared the crowd broke into its own rendition of the anthem of the
French Republic and collective euphoria gripped the multitude in the square.73
The street celebrations of April 14 drew in the popular masses in the broadest
sense, characterised by the inter-mingling of the middle and working classes. As one
anarchist observed, 'all the humble people of Spain launched themselves to the streets,
delirious with happiness...Spain was in fiesta'.74 At the foot of Les Rambles crowds of
workers waved red flags and sang 'The International', mixing freely with groups
carrying Republican flags singing 'The Marseillaise'. In a new spirit of liberty and
fraternity bus and tram conductors refused to charge revellers as they travelled around
the city celebrating the departure of the King. More significantly still, the discipline of
the security forces was broken and members of the police and cavalry detachments
71 Cucurull, Catalunva, p.53
72 The peaceful way in which the monarchy toppled is poignantly evoked by an incident following
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joined in the street celebrations as the popular party continued into the early hours of
the morning of April
The coming of the Republic in Barcelona was made easier by the welcoming
attitude of the CNT. The spontaneous approval from the streets captivated many
cenetistas and at a meeting of activists in the Builders' Union offices on Carrer
Mercaders there was a strong consensus that the birth of the Republic had to be assisted.
On the very day of the birth of the new régime Solidaridad Obrera expounded that it
would welcome the creation of a Republic as it signified the defeat of the traditional
enemies of the proletariat and because it was consistent with 'the most hallowed
aspirations of freedom and justice'. Swept along by the intoxicating atmosphere of
change, Solidaridad Obrera announced candidly that 'the triumph of the Republicans has
demonstrated the will of the people'. The CNT leadership converted these words into
deeds, declaring a general strike to ease the transition of powers to the new Republican
authorities. At the same time, the Catalan Regional Federation and the Barcelona Local
Federation of the CNT issued a joint manifesto warning of the danger of an anti-
democratic military action and calling for an amnesty of social and political prisoners.76
The dynamics of mass mobilisation unleashed on the streets, combined with the
collapse in the traditional centres of authority, allowed for the speedy release of the
jailed opponents of the monarchy. Soon after the Republic was proclaimed CNT
militants moved to secure the release of their comrades from the Model Jail, Barcelona's
main prison, and oversee the burning of their prison records. Given the fractured
structures of the old authority, it is striking that the release of prisoners was conducted
in an orderly manner, lasting almost two hours, and guaranteeing that only social and
political prisoners were freed. This was followed by the release of the women prisoners
from the jail on Carrer d'Amàlia, in the heart of Barn xino which, in keeping with the
popular mood, was achieved peacefully. Typical of the spirit of fiesta, the liberation of
the prisoners was followed by yet another street celebration involving demonstrators,
newly freed prisoners and members of the public. However, events in the streets had
' Bueso, Recuerdos, vol.1, p.345; Solidaridad Obrera, 14 April 1931
76 Bueso, Recuerdos, vol.!, p.337; Solidaridad Obrera, 14-15 April 1931
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overwhelmed the nascent Republican authorities and although a few hours later Macia
ordered the full release of all social and political prisoners, he was only giving official
recognition to what was, in most of Barcelona, an established fact.77
The contribution of the CNT and its supporters to the birth of the Republic
cannot be underplayed. The scale of the electoral triumph of the ERC leaves no room
for doubt that large numbers of working class votes were cast in favour of the party,
both in Barcelona city and throughout Catalonia. Peiró, then secretary of the Catalan
CNT recognised that on April 12 the bulk of the Catalan proletariat voted for the ERC
because 'the masses felt an irresistible urge to change the political decor of the
state. ..We never told the workers to vote, but neither did we tell them to abstain'.
Aiguader i Miró, the first Republican Mayor of Barcelona, recognised that the CNT was
at this time 'the strongest resistance with which Catalonia has opposed Castilian
domination'.78
Nor was the intervention of the Confederal masses restricted to the electoral
sphere. Their role on the streets served as a point of pressure on the diffident
Republican politicians. In Santa Coloma de Gramanet, on the outskirts of Barcelona, it
fell to a cenetista to raise the Republican flag over the Council building in the absence
of any willing Republicans. The action of the CNT was most decisive in its main sphere
of influence in the Catalan capital. Ricardo Sanz, the anarchist president of the
Barcelona Builders' Union, whose offices were the centre of activity on the day of the
proclamation of the Republic, recalled that 'the men of the CNT were in the street. This
was especially so in Barcelona, where they carried the initiative.. .The CNT was
everywhere'. The CNT also imposed its own political preferences on the Republican
transition in Barcelona. This was vividly witnessed on April 14 after an armed group of
Radicals took advantage of the confusion to establish themselves in the Civil
Bueso, Recuerdos, vol.1, pp.330-350; de Lera, Pestafla, pp.263-T16; LaNau, 15 April 1931;
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Governor's building in the Placa de Palau. When word reached CNT militants in the
'Café Espanyol' on El Paral.lel, a group of cenetistas set off for the Placa de Palau
where, after a show of arms and the threat of force, the Radicals were 'invited to leave'
and Companys was left in power as the first Civil Governor of the Republic.79
The birth of the Republic in Barcelona clearly revealed the power wielded by the
CNT in the city. The ERC won the elections thanks to working class and cenetista
votes, and the Republicans of Barcelona were driven on to proclaim the Republic by the
pressure from the streets. Moreover, as seen by events in the Civil Governor's office, the
mere threat of force from the CNT was sufficient to allow the ERC to replace the
Radicals in power. It should also not be forgotten that the Republic was born in
Barcelona under the cover of a CNT general strike.
In a bid to undercut the psychological effects of the general strike, Companys
gave official recognition to what was afait accompli and declared April 15 a public
holiday in Cataloma. Whether a national holiday or a general strike, only essential food
and transport services ran in Barcelona and official largesse allowed the citizenry to
continue to enjoy free travel on the buses and trams. The fiesta that began with the birth
of the Republic continued. Symbolic of a new spirit of concord, a crowd on Les
Rambles applauded as members of the security forces marched behind a Republican
flag.8°
Yet the aspirations for change that had accumulated within the people of
Barcelona during the dark years of the monarchy were also in evidence in the two days
that followed the birth of the Republic. The new age of post-monarchical freedom
impelled the 'common' prisoners at the Model jail to launch a protest against their
continuing incarceration and their appeals for freedom prompted an unsuccessful
attempt from the streets to storm the jail and release them. Elsewhere in the city,
workers ransacked the offices of a number of far-right groups that had supported the
recently defunct dictatorship. Meanwhile, on consecutive days the Civil Guard was
José Berruezo, Por el sendero de mis recuerdos (1920-1939), Santa Coloma de Grainanet, 1987, p.42;
Sanz, Elsindicalismo y la politica, pp.197-199; Bueso, Recuerdos, vol.!, pp.345-348; Vega i Massana,
El trentisme, p.64. A few days later, the Madrid central government ratified the choice of Companys as
Civil Governor.
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called upon to protect the archives of the Barcelona law courts from crowds bent on
destroying records of the arbitrary sentences dealt out by the monarchical authorities.
However, these incidents produced no injuries and the rejoicing was unsullied, even
when members of the Brigada Policial especializada en Anarquismo y Sindicalismo, the
monarchical political police, fired shots on a hostile crowd gathered outside its
headquarters.8'
Just as the incoming Republican authorities benefited from the CNT-inspired
general strike on April 14, so two days later the leadership of the Confederation called
on workers to return to work. The CNT leadership was keen to stabilise the new régime
and embark on what it heralded as a 'new era'. Encouraged by the manifestly favourable
stance of the Confederation towards the fledgling Republic, on April 15 Macia tried
unsuccessfully to convince Pestana, from the anarcho-syndicalist leadership of the
CNT, to accept the ministerial position for public works in his first cabinet. While this
was a collaborative nettle that the anarcho-syndicalists were unwilling to grasp, a
Plenum of the Catalan CNT Regional Committee agreed to send Pestafia and Sanmartin,
a leading activist from the Barcelona Woodworkers' Union, to liaise between the
Confederal organisation and the new government.82
The first government of the nascent Catalan Republic was intended to be a
cabinet of national reconstruction. This meant that while the ERC was the
unquestionable victor in the April 1931 elections, the party was prepared to allow
limited cabinet representation to the other more moderate Republican groupings.
Despite the rebuttal of the CNT, some representatives of the labour movement were
prepared to enter the cabinet. Joan Casanovas and Manuel Serra i Moret, both from the
tiny USC, became ministers, the latter occupying the all-important post for Economy
and Labour. Meanwhile, Salvador Vidal i Rossell from the socialist UGT entered the
ministry for Public Works, the post that had been destined for Pestafia.83
81 Cries of 'We are thieves, but we want freedom too' (' Somos ladrones pero queremos Ia libertad
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In spite of the absence of the CNT from government, it seemed that the two
main popular powers in Catalonia - the Esquerra and the CNT - were moving in the
same direction. The dramatic triumph of the ERC in the April elections appeared,
therefore, to herald the possibility of a full-scale modemisation of Catalan society
through an alliance between the popular classes. However, as we will see, this depended
on the continuing support of the CNT for the Republic.
2.4. The CNT and the Republic
The CNT view of the political dynamics of the Republican moment was flimsy
in the extreme. We have already seen how both the anarchists and the anarcho-
syndicalists accepted the heroic legend of Macia and effectively passed the political
initiative to the Esquerra. However, in strict theoretical terms there was no reason why
either the libertarians or the anarcho-syndicalists should have felt an affinity with a
bourgeois Republican régime that was prepared to co-exist with the state and the
capitalist economy, the two most dreaded enemies of cenetismo.
Yet if CNT policy towards the Republic was not one of support, nor was it one
of hostility. A week after the fall of the monarchy Solidaridad Obrera summed up the
mood of popular satisfaction, announcing that 'the revolution of the 14th has put Spain
at the head of all the countries of Europe'. Meanwhile, the CNT National Committee
declared it would be 'pacifically-disposed' towards the Republic all the while there was
no return to 'dictatorial and reactionary conditions'. The Republic was regarded as 'the
point of departure' for future CNT actions. Underlying this stance was an assumption,
largely inspired by the smooth transition from monarchy to Republic, that 'under a
regime of liberty, the bloodless revolution is still more possible, still easier than under
the monarchy'. Nevertheless, however much as the CNT leaders regarded the Republic
as a suitable arena within which to organise the libertarian communist society, this was
a task that lay a long way ahead in the future. As one moderate anarcho-syndicalist later
explained, there was 'a certain moral agreement with the left-wing political parties,
especially with the ERC', that amounted to 'an understanding' (sobreentendido) with the
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CNT, 'an armistice between two powers - the political and the syndical - to allow the
Republic to overcome the its initial difficulties and consolidate itself.M
The moderate anarcho-syndicalists were essentially pleased with developments:
they already felt that their strategy of support for the Esquerra had paid dividends
insofar as the jails had been emptied of all social and political prisoners after the birth of
the Republic. Peiró was satisfied that the new régime would break with the anti-labour
policies of past monarchical administrations and guarantee trade union freedoms which,
he believed, would allow the CNT the opportunity to recapture the strength it acquired
prior to the dictatorship. As for Pestafia, although he still called himself an anarchist and
refused to enter the Generalitat cabinet, he had long awaited the birth of a régime that
would allow the CNT to work 'in the light of day'. In the words of his biographer, the
arrival of the Republic represented for Pestaña 'the conclusion (remate), almost
fantastic, of a long effort'.85
The dominant reformism of the CNT leadership was exemplified by an editorial
published in Solidaridad Obrera just four days after the birth of the Republic. Entitled
'Camino adelante' ('The Road Ahead') the article expressed the view that the social
legislation of an autonomous Catalonia could 'in part, satisf' the desires of the
revolutionary proletariat'. 86 In keeping with this stance, the CNT directed a series of
demands at the new authorities, many of which were nothing more than a call for the
very democratic freedoms that had already been promised by the Republicans. The CNT
also demanded the renunciation of the municipal debts from the monarchist era, the
guarantee of all rights to strike, the introduction of some kind of agrarian reform in the
countryside, the implementation of a number of measures against unemployment and
general demands that the authorities provide 'bread, work and culture'.87
The CNT was equally concerned with issues of civil liberties, justice and
policing. Solidaridad Obrera advocated that the amnesty given to 'social' prisoners be
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extended to those convicted of 'common' crimes that were inspired by poverty and
unemployment. The Confederation also demanded that the 'social' files of the
monarchical police be destroyed as a gesture that the new authorities were prepared to
end the arbitrary practices of the past. This was augmented by new calls for the
dissolution of those branches of the security forces most involved in the repression of
yesteryear, particularly the paramilitary Civil Guard and the Sometent, an armed
bourgeois militia used against workers during strikes. Predictably, the despised political
police, that had already fired on the people on April 15 and which was widely seen to be
incompatible with democratic rule, was also singled out for disbandment. Finally, the
Confederation demanded the abolition of the Mossos d'Escuadra, a specifically Catalan
police force whose origins lay in the battle against medieval banditry but which had
played a policing role in the cities of Catalonia.88
Many of the anarcho-syndicalists feared the possible ramifications of a split
between the new authorities and the Confederation. Juan Lopez, a close ally of Peiró,
warned that if the demands of the workers were left unheard by the new authorities the
immense hopes invested in the Republic could easily turn into resentment. The concerns
were shared by the doleful Pestafia from the very beginning of the Republic. It seems
that the burning fear of Pestaña was that the new régime might be disrupted by the
anarchists, a pessimistic vision that apparently left him in a highly melancholic state on
the night of April 14, while the rest of Barcelona rejoiced.89
Pestafia's despondency in April 1931 was, however, largely ill-placed. The
prevailing atmosphere remained one of popular optimism, marked by a significant
amount of unfulfilled expectations in a régime which many believed would sweep aside
the props of the old state. Moreover, the Republican intoxication of the anarcho-
syndicalists was shared by many anarchists, who stressed the need for the working class
to be prepared to defend the Republic in the eventuality of any attempt at monarchical
restoration. El Luchador, the weekly voice of the Montseny family, the self-styled
purveyors of anarchist propriety, continued to praise President Macia and displayed an
88 Solidaridad Obrera, 16,25,29 April 1931
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unexpected degree of hope in the Republic. Puente, another leading theoretician of
traditional anarchism, went even further, arguing in favour of 'the consolidation of what
has been already conquered'.90
However, opinion inside the FAI was far from monolithic and just as some
anarchists were swept along by the surge of optimism accompanying the proclamation
of the Republic, others were more circumspect. This was most evidently the case with
the remnants of 'Los Solidarios', who reformed in 1931 under the name 'Nosotros'. For
all the admiration the members of 'Nosotros' felt for Macia, they were convinced that
the Republic fell a long way short of their ultimate goals. Years later this was summed
up by Ricardo Sanz, who observed that with the coming of the Republic 'nothing had
changed. The capitalist régime, and therefore socio-economic inequality, existed just as
before, as did all privileges'.9'
The tactical perspectives of the 'anarcho-Bolsheviks' of the 'Nosotros' group
were rooted in the assumption that the Spanish state was in a condition of acute internal
crisis. This, 'Nosotros' maintained, was evinced by the collapse of the constitutional
monarchy and the military coup d'etat of 1923, the disintegration of the dictatorship in
1930 and the birth of the Republic in 1931. They therefore viewed the Republic as yet
another reflection of this historic crisis. Under these circumstances, 'Nosotros' reasoned
that it was the task of anarchists to hasten the destruction of the state, not stabilise the
latest democratic attempt to stave off its impending disintegration. Aware that the new
authorities had a tenuous grip on power, 'Nosotros' stressed that this bourgeois political
order had to be transcended by the introduction of libertarian communism. According to
Garcia Oliver, this could be best attained by preventing the consolidation of the
Republic through 'insurrectionary pendulum actions', mobilisations that would aid the
masses to 'overcome the complex of fear they felt towards repressive state forces, the
army and the police, through the systematisation of insurrectionary actions, the
implementation of revolutionary gymnastics'. By the same token, these 'revolutionary
gymnastics' were intended to provoke violence from the state and the right, which in
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turn would engender protest actions that would attract ever-larger sections of the
masses, until the Republic collapsed ignominiously like its predecessors. At this point,
GarcIa Oliver calculated, the masses would have grasped the superfluous nature of the
state and anarchist society could be established.92
The promise of action in 'insurrectionary pendulum actions' appealed to a
number of younger militants in both the CNT and the FM who, having seen monarchy,
dictatorship and Republic rapidly succeed one another in the space of a few years,
believed real change to be quite easy. Similarly, many of the anarchists who had spent
the years of the dictatorship either in exile or in jail, removed from the realities of
clandestine organisation, also seized on this recipe for immediate revolutionary action.
Most of all, however, it was the veterans of the armed grupos, many of whom were
highly influenced by Curzio Malaparte's Technique du coup d'Etat, who responded to
the logic of 'revolutionary gymnastics' with greatest fervour. 93 Often blacklisted, and
accustomed to life on the margins of society, these grupistas faced the new Republican
period and the possibility of a truce between the state and the masses with the same
unease that war veterans look towards life after armistice.
If the FM was going to prepare for combat, it needed to stock up its arsenal. To
this end, vNosotros advocated the creation of Confederal Defence Committees (Comités
de Defensa Confederal), joint CNT-FAI para-military formations which, it was
intended, would be on a permanent war-footing, ready to respond to aggression from
either the employers or the state. The proposal to construct the Confederal Defence
Committees was accepted at the Madrid CNT National Plenum at the end of April
193 The adoption of Confederal Defence Committees also provided the FM with an
organisational space within which it could gain influence and place pressure on the
CNT leadership. This opened up new vistas for the on-going FM goal of trabazón,
particularly as the revolutionary optimism of the faIstas and their demands for
insurrectionary activism were shared by a minority of cenetistas, a reality that could be
92 GarcIa Oliver, El eco de los pasos, p.1 1593 Curzio Malaparte, Technique du coup d'Etat, Paris, 1931; Fidel Miro, Catalufia. los trabajadores y el
problema de las nacionalidades, Mexico City, 1967, p.54
9 Solidaridad Obrera, 25 April 1931
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expected to continue all the while the new régime remained untainted in the collective
consciousness of the Barcelona proletariat.
The last of the three factions inside the CNT, the dissident communist BOC, was
aghast at the continuing confusion of the political line of both the anarchists and the
anarcho-syndicalist leadership of the Confederation. For the bloquistas, the majority of
whom had emerged from within the traditions of the CNT before coming under the
influence of the Bolshevik model, the Republican transition had furnished new evidence
that anarchism was 'fossilised, submerged in the past' and an inappropriate response to
the problems facing workers in a modem capitalist society.95
Yet the results of the April 1931 elections provided an early indication that
events were not following the script written by the Bloc strategists. The party
recognised that because of the apoliticism of the CNT leadership the working class had
immense illusions in the ERC and the new régime. Consequently, the BOC felt it
necessary to wait out 'Republican fever' before advancing to the creation of a
'revolutionary democracy' based on 'worker-peasant juntas'. Displaying a level of class
analysis absent among the other factions inside the CNT, the Bloc maintained that
having sensed that 'the barbarians had arrived at the gates of Rome' during the latter
stages of the monarchy, the bourgeoisie now sought to protect itself within the new
political structures of the Republic. Devoid of the Republican illusions that
characterised the CNT leadership, the bloquistas expected no benevolence from the new
régime. As one OSR manifesto put it, 'the Republican government can never be on the
side of the workers, nor can it be neutral. It is a bourgeois government and, as such, it
must forcefully defend the bourgeoisie against the proletariat'.
The new freedoms promised by the Republic and the different reactions to it,
exacerbated what was a growing struggle between the three main tendencies within the
CNT. As early as April 1930, the FM attempted to cause a 'scrap' (bronca) in the hope
that it might prevent Peiró from addressing a Barcelona CNT Local Federation meeting.
By 1931 the disruptive tactics of the FM had increased and Solidaridad Obrera
La Batalla, 18 July 1930
96 La Batalla, 12 March,18 April, 14 May 1931
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condemned the 'violent and stormy interventions of a tiny (Infimo) minority' relying on
'the violent phrase, invective and sometimes the insult, as guiding arguments'. These
interventions from faIstas had already led to the postponement of union meetings. 97 In
the face of a deteriorating internal situation within the unions, Juan Lopez, PeirOs' able
lieutenant, issued a call for the respect of minorities inside the CNT, arguing that the
wide unity of workers of all political persuasions in the unions was a prelude to a
protracted assault on the bastions of capitalist privilege. Indicative of this apparently
non-sectarian approach, AcciOn, the weekly paper of the PeirO-Pestaña faction, was for
a while a wide forum for debate, and included articles from both orthodox anarchists
like Puente and dissident communists such as Jordi Arquer.98
Yet the CNT leadership was playing an increasingly duplicitous role. Firstly, the
unity call of the anarcho-syndicalists was opportunistic, as it reaffirmed their position at
the head of the Confederation. Secondly, for all its promises of unity, the CNT
leadership impeded the activities of the dissident communists, both politically and
organisationally inside the Confederation. There was a growing tendency on the part of
the anarcho-syndicalists to smother the criticisms of the faIstas by appealing for unity
within the 'anarchist family', raising the spectre of the 'communist peril' to galvanise
opinion behind the existing CNT leadership. This presaged an upsurge in attacks on the
right of the 'communist-syndicalists' to operate within the CNT and complaints by
bloquIstas that anarchists were behaving in a 'brutal manner' at union meetings,
intimidating dissident communist activists with threats of violence. Eventually, this
harassment culminated in outbreaks of violence at meetings betweenfaIstas and OSR
militants in the metal sector, part of what La Batalla denounced the 'odious intolerance'
of the libertarians and their goal of'the dictatorship of the anarchists in the unions'.
As the drive against the OSR's assumed the characteristics of a sectarian witch-
hunt, the dissident communists accused the illiberal libertarians of installing an
ideological 'cordon sanitaire' around unions to prevent any 'heresy' against 'the
sacrosanct principles of libertarian communism'. Meanwhile, considering the defacto
José Peirô,	 p.55; Solidaridad Obrera, 15 January 1931; La Batalla, 4 July, 15 August 1930
98 Acción, 21 March 1931
Acciôn Social Obrera, 6 July 1929; Acción, 14 June 1930,4 April 1931; La Batalla, 23,30 May 1930
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anti-communist alliance between the anarchists and the anarcho-syndicalists, the
dissident communists began lumping their opponents together and with more than a
little irreverence La Batalla recognised that 'the anarchists of all tendencies - pure, less
pure and impure - have formed a united front against the communists and the
revolutionary workers'. This anti-communist 'united front' was so pronounced that the
OSR platform at the July 1930 Catalan CNT Regional Conference, which included
proposals for the democratisation of the CNT and Solidaridad Obrera to reflect all
shades of opinion within the unions, not just that of anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists,
was rejected amid a hysterical wave of anti-communism. Meanwhile, on a grass-roots
level, intent on asserting their control of the unions at all costs, the anarchists resorted to
undemocratic procedures, fabricating majorities by filling union assemblies with anti-
communist workers from different industries, irrespective of the cost in terms of union
reorganisation and morale.1°°
Despite the growth in tension between the heterogeneous tendencies inside the
CNT, the Confederation was still capable of unity in action. This was witnessed during
the hectic events on the day of the proclamation of the Republic, when the cenetistas
who freed the prisoners and installed Companys as Civil Governor were a mix of all
three tendencies.'°' However, the birth of the Republic meant that the various
tendencies were no longer absorbed by the struggle against a common enemy, like in
the days of the dictatorship. This meant that the profound theoretical, tactical and
organisational divisions inside the CNT tended towards a protracted struggle for power
within the unions. Moreover, not only were the tendencies divided over the nature of the
Republican moment, but each tendency had its own vision of how the CNT should
approach the new political context provided by the Republic. Therefore, the outcome of
the factional rivalry within the Confederation possessed an importance beyond the
organisational confines of its unions.
Despite the growing internal struggle within the CNT and the malpractices of
some of the faIstas, the union remained true to its heterogeneous traditions: there was a
La Batalla, 6, 27 June, 4, 11 July, 15 August 1930
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significant level of grass-roots democracy and the communists remained inside the
Confederation. However, the unstable modus vivendi within the CNT in the spring of
1931 was a lull before a storm, for unlike the past, the anarchists of the FAI, inspired by
the inexorable logic of trabazón, were on the verge of bringing a new poison into the
CNT, a miasma that would not only devour the unions but also the Republic.
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Chapter 3: 'The Republic of Order'
3.1. The End of the Catalan Republic
The moderate anarcho-syndicalist leadership of the CNT was a guarantee that the
flirtatious relationship between the Catalan unions and the new authorities would
continue. As the first Republican Civil Governor of Barcelona, Companys realised that
the best attitude towards the Confederation was to allow its unions space to operate,
thereby securing the position of'valuable elements' within those within the existing CNT
leadership, like Pestafla and Peiró, whose sense of'understanding' he commended. This
attitude was shared by liberal elements within the military, who saw that the moderate
cenetista leaders were 'men of excellent moral condition, cultured and intelligent'.'
Keen to prolong the honeymoon between the ERC and the CNT, Companys
recognised his debt to the cenetistas from April 14-15 by responding favourably to a
number of CNT demands on civil liberties and policing, including the destruction of old
monarchical police records and the disbandment of the Sometent. However the greatest
overture to the CNT, was unquestionably the drive by Companys against the Sindicatos
Libres, the arch-enemies of the Confederation from the 1920s. Libre gunmen had reacted
to the fall of Primo de Rivera in 1929 with a campaign of bloodletting throughout
Barcelona province. Their response to the relegalisation of the CNT in April 1930 was
similarly aggressive and they bitterly resented the competition offered by the
Confederation in the workplace. By the end of 1930 the jealousy of the Libres for a
revitalised CNT was reflected in a series of gun attacks on cenetistas throughout
Barcelona province. The Libre press also issued death threats against Companys and
Pestaña, both of whom were informed that they would be put in the same place as SeguI!
Finally, when the monarchy fell, the fury of the virulently anti-Republican and anti-
Catalaniste Libres seemed set to overflow. According to one insider, Ramon Sales, the
leader of the Libres, greeted the coming of the Republic with a personal pledge to kill
Maclà and Companys. In reply to suspicions that the Libres were planning a violent
attack on leading Republicans, the day after the birth of the Republic Companys ordered
1 Solidaridad Obrera, 9 June 1931; DIaz Sandino, Dc la conspiración, p.18
the police to raid their offices, where a collection of bombs and firearms was found. The
discovery of this arms cache provided the authorities with a pretext to dissolve the union
and arrest its leading militants, although Sales, the eminence gris of the organisation, had
apparently already escaped for France by this time.2
Elements from inside the CNT chose to settle their own scores with these right-
wing gunmen. The memory of the comrades murdered by libreños in the 1920s, mixed
with bitterness at the manner in which the Libres had exploited the years of the
dictatorship to usurp the position of the CNT as the main organisation of the Catalan
proletariat, meant that many cenetistas supported decisive action. However, the main
protagonists in the campaign against the Libres were the grupistas, the very individuals
whose sense of'confederal dignity' had been affi-onted most by the challenge of the
'yellow' union.
The first serious clashes between libreños and cenetistas during the Republic
occurred on April 15, the day the police raided the offices of the Libres in Barcelona.
While it is not easy to say who initiated the skirmishes, the casualty list of three dead
Libres and a further eight wounded showed that the rightists came off worse. In the
Gràcia district of Barcelona and in Badalona, renowned Libre gunmen were shot dead by
what the press described as 'persons unknown', although there is little doubt that the
perpetrators were pro-CNT grupistas. Also on April 15, there was a running gun battle
between rival armed gangs in the Barn xino, a skirmish that was apparently provoked by
the libreños. Meanwhile, on April 16, again in the Barn xino, the scene of some of the
most violent street battles from the 1 920s, there was another clash between libreños and
cenetistas, although without any fatalities. The violence did not cease, however, and
days later a top Libre official was shot dead in Barcelona.3
At first Solidaridad Obrera vilified the Libres as 'legalised criminals, an army of
traitors and cowards' and encouraged retribution by publishing notes informing readers
2 Solidaridad Obrera, 5-6 September, 2 November 1930, 16, 25, 29 April 1931; La Nau. 15 April 1931;
La Vanguardia, 16-19, 25 April 1931; Umón Obrera, 28 November 1930; Cohn Winston, La clase
trabajadora y la derecha en España, 1900-1936. Madrid, 1989, pp.277-278
Las Noticias, 16, 21 April 1931; La Nau, 17 April 1931
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of the names and addresses of libreños, as well as practical information such as whether
they were likely to be armed or not. However, fearful that the clashes between cenetistas
and libreflos could harm the Republic the Barcelona CNT counselled caution, alerting
workers that they had not just left the 'prison of the monarchy' to enter into a cycle of
violence that might culminate in a new dictatorship. There were also warnings for
workers to be aware of the danger of provocations from the Libres, 'whose only mission
is to serve reaction and assassinate workers'. Finally, on April 22, Solidaridad Obrera
carried a stern editorial condemnation of revenge attacks on the Libres. Entitled Es hora
de terminar' ('It's Time To Stop'), the article censured armed tactics and declared the
methods of the unions to be 'absolutely opposed to a return to the individual attacks, a
procedure that is completely inefficient in the material order and in the moral order
renders abhorrent those who resort to such tactics'. 4
 The editorial, which was a
forthright rejection of the methods of many of the grupistas veterans from the 1920s,
could only have served to anger the radicals who were involved in the anti-Libre
violence. Meanwhile, as far as the anarcho-syndicalists were concerned, the Libres were
on the run, they had been officially dissolved, their power was already non-existent and
they were little threat to the CNT. Most of all, the attitude of the CNT leaders was
informed by their belief that the Esquerra would adequately respond to proletarian
demands.
Yet the authorities still had to deliver on the generous promises contracted to the
Barcelona proletariat in the prelude to the April 1931 elections and promulgate measures
capable of binding the loyalty of workers to the new régime. In practical terms, this
meant the Esquerra taking advantage of its crushing mandate and initiating immediate
measures to alleviate the extreme socio-economic discomfort experienced by broad
sectors of the Catalan proletariat. However, this quickly became an impossibility.
The Madrid Republican-Socialist coalition was angry at the way in which Macia
and the Esquerra had superseded the programme of the anti-monarchist by proclaiming a
Solidaridad Obrera, 5, 16, 22-23 April, 1, 17 May 1931
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separate Catalan Republic. The day after the fall of the monarchy, a governmental
delegation made up of the erudite Andalusian socialist, Fernando de los RIos, and two
Catalans, Marcel.lI Domingo and Nicolau d'Olwer, left Madrid for Barcelona in great
haste, in the hope of persuading Macia to renounce the Catalan Republic. Despite his
recent pledge to lay day his life for the Catalan Republic, Macia was overcome by the
reasoning of the Madrid delegation. During two days of meetings between the
representatives of the central state and Catalan politicians from all the major political
parties, Macia was subdued and barely spoke. Finally, after very little persuasion, Macia
backed down on the question of the Catalan Republic. Yet 'L'Avi' still had to come away
with a compromise solution if he was to maintain his credibility after his voile face. The
solution was provided by the wily Andalusian de los Rios. De los RIos had an extensive
knowledge of Catalan history and he suggested that the rift between Madrid and
Barcelona could be overcome if Macia and the Esquerra revived the Generalitat, the old
medieval Catalan government. Apart from being flattered by hearing an Andalusian
speak on Catalan history with such sensitivity, the option proposed by de los Rios had
enormous appeal for Macia, as it held out the possibility of maintaining favourable
relations with Republican Madrid. Macia himself celebrated the compromise as proof of
'Republican solidarity'. Meanwhile, the solution also appeared to be an honourable
retreat from the separatist declaration of April 14. Thus, on April 21 the new Generalitat
was officially recognised: the ephemeral Catalan Republic had lasted a mere three days.5
Not everyone was happy with the rapid demise of the Catalan Republic. From
within the Esquerra coalition the separatist maximalists placed Macia's nationalist
credentials under close scrutiny. Meanwhile, the BOC press castigated Maclà as a
'counter-revolutionary' who had 'sold the freedom of Catalonia to the politicians of
Madrid' by allowing an independent Catalonia to pass back under the Spanish yoke.6
Cucurull, Catalunva, pp.58-59; Alba, Catalufla, p.239
6 L'Opinió. 13 June 1931; LaBatalla, 16 July 1931, 14 January 1932; JaumeMiravitiles, Ha traIt
Macia?, Barcelona, 1932, passim.
101
The ERC still controlled the Civil Governorship of Barcelona, where Companys
had been placed by the power of the CNT on April 14. Although 'unconstitutional', in the
opinion of the Madrid government, the central authorities were prepared to allow
Companys to remain in office as 'the first Civil Governor of the people', a testament to
the 'popular will'. At first sight it seemed that Companys could compensate for the
Esquerra's lack of institutional power. For instance, as Civil Governor Companys
enjoyed day-to-day responsibility for policing and jurisdiction over labour affairs. These
were two crucial areas through which the attitudes of the working class and the CNT
towards the new régime could be influenced. Equally, to many Barcelonins the figure of
Companys was a guarantee that radical change would be forthcoming. However, in a
bizarre disavowal of political power, Companys resigned as Civil Governor in June, in
order to organise the ERC faction in the Madrid Cortes. In doing so, the Esquerra
renounced a crucial position of authority in the city and allowed responsibility for
appointing a new Civil Governor to pass to the Interior Ministry in Madrid.7
Macia's capitulation to Madrid in April and Companys' resignation in June had a
terrific impact on the likelihood of success for the populist-Republican project and,
ultimately, the standing of the Republic in Catalonia. The decision by the ERC to let
Madrid determine the dimensions of Catalan autonomy within the Spanish parliament
denied the Generalitat any real power until some unspecified point in the future when an
Autonomy Statute had been ratified by both the Catalan people and the Republican
parliament (Cortes). While this schema may have been in harmony with the initial
Republican programme, the absence of specifically Catalan institutional mechanisms
capable of solidif'ing a relationship with the masses who had voted for the Esquerra in
the April elections was a severe impediment to overall aspirations for change,
particularly as the elections of April 1931 indicated that some kind of federalist solution
was the most fitting political settlement. As it was, the shift in power away from
Catalonia towards Madrid was a retreat from the spirit of democracy, not least because
El MatI, 6-7 June 1931; Las Noticias, 14 June 1931
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the political forces then hegemonic in the Spanish capital had vety little support in
Catalonia. For example, while the PSOE was well represented in the central government
and also participated in the Generalitat coalition, the socialists were a highly unpopular
grouping in Catalonia, sometimes attracting audiences as low as 16 at their public
meetings. Meanwhile, at a time when Catalaniste sentiments where flourishing, the
notoriously anti-Catalan Madrid-based PSOE endorsed campaigns in Barcelona with a
marked españolista, even rightist flavour.8
The enhancement of the power of the Madrid Republicans, who were far more
conservative than the pseudo-Jacobin Esquerra, was a further brake on the pace of
reform. The speed with which the Madrid Republican-Socialist coalition had responded
to the Catalan Republic reflected their circumspect desire for a formula that would not
allow the military, the traditional guarantor of national unity, to associate the coming of
the Republic with the secession of Catalonia. This concern was entirely consistent with
the vacillating nature of the Republicans, whose failure to take advantage of the
immediate collapse of Primo in 1929 resulted in the continuation of dictatorial rule until
the April 1931 elections and provided a respite for the traditional economic oligarchy
from swift political transformation. 9 It also increased the control of conservative forces,
particularly the army, over the process of political transition. While the flight of Cambô
on the day of the proclamation of the Republic revealed the depth of alarm within the
monied classes at the fall of the monarchy, the change in régime was ultimately a defeat
for the Crown and not the privileged classes, whose socio-economic power remained
intact. Thus, the bourgeoisie undertook a tactical retreat under the protective cover of
the military. Certainly, as we have seen, even after the Republican electoral victory, the
Madrid Republicans did not take an independent lead and it was General Sanjuijo as
head of the Civil Guard who finally guaranteed the Republic. While these behind-the-
scenes manoeuvres were largely obscured by the triumphant irruption of the masses onto
8 La Batalla, 17 December 1931; Balcells, Marxismo, pp.26-40. In January 1932 Manuel Cordero, an
Andalusian socialist, addressed a meeting of espanolista University students opposed to tuition in
Catalan: La Batalla, 14 January 1932.
Maurin, Los hombres, pp.228-230
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the streets in April 1931, as one cenetista observed, it was 'the indiscipline of the army',
not the Socialists and the Republicans or the masses in the streets, which converted
Berenguer and Sanjurjo into the 'true midwifes of the Republic'.'0
While the physiognomy of political power in Madrid was far less populist than in
Catalonia, the Republican-Socialist coalition had, nevertheless, aroused mass
expectations with their historic programme for equality before the law, the end of the
death penalty, the right of association and an end to corruption. The Republicans had
also made a series of highly public manifesto promises. For instance, the 1930 manifesto
of the Republican-Socialist provisional government pledged that the Republic would
usher in 'the Spain of the future.. .a new Law, anointed by aspirations of economic
equality and of social justice'. Additionally, the Republican-Socialist coalition promised
to repeal unfavourable labour contracts introduced during the dictatorship and talked of
widespread confiscation of rural property, as well as the nationalisation of banks. These
commitments were publicly endorsed by Niceto Alcalá Zamora, Lerroux, de los Rios,
d'Olwer, Manuel Azaña, Indalecio Prieto, Miguel Maura, Francisco Largo Caballero and
Diego Martinez Barrio, all of whom went on to occupy cabinet positions."
Like the Esquerra, the Madrid Republicans hoped to balance between the
warring classes of Spanish society, end the blatant favouritism of the authorities towards
the economic oligarchy and attend to the most pressing needs of the lower classes. The
Republicans believed that the failure of the monarchical state to be even-handed and its
dominant police role over civil society were the greatest causes for its loss of prestige of
among the poor. This reliance of the monarchical state on relations of force for its
survival, once seen as its greatest strength, mutated into its most glaring weakness after
World War One and cast society into the unmediated struggle for naked class interest,
simultaneously endangering the long-term survival of the state. For the Republicans, all
of whom had lived through the violent struggles of the 1920s, it was of paramount
importance to end the historic battle between civil society and the state by democratising
o Sanz, El sindicalismo via politica, pp.198-199; Borrás, Espafia, pp.91-93
Maura, Mi cayó, p.98; Borrás, Espaa, p.78
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the state, endowing it with a rational authority and re-negotiating its legitimacy among
the masses. This meant that the old partiality of the state could no longer be seen to exist
and that all conflicts within civil society were to be judged by the Republican state
without prejudice, in accordance with established legal practices, irrespective of the class
interests involved. The Republicans hoped, therefore, that for the first time in Spain a
formally liberal political and constitutional doctrine would keep the propertied classes in
check through the application of the full weight of the 'rule of law'.
Republican judicial perspectives were dominated by this central problem of state
legitimacy and the need to introduce the system of checks and balances of a legally
functioning modern democracy in order to narrow the historic gulf between the Spanish
state and the people.' 2 The concern to end the negative perception of authority was
reflected in both the ERC electoral programme and Articles 28 and 29 of the Republican
Constitution, which made a formal commitment to wide-raging legal freedoms, including
trial by jury. This project was embodied in the watchword of La Calle, a Barcelona
Republican paper: 'Republic, law, justice'. Finally, the Republicans hoped that once civil
society was subject to the due processes of law, a new consensus would generate the
stable political conditions for a programme of structural reform that would allow the
neutral Republican state to administer justice to all. Accordingly, the Republic would sire
a democratic legislature and legal apparatus to make peaceful change a reality,
invalidating revolution and inducing the harmonious co-existence between social classes
for the ultimate benefit of all. This was famously recognised in Article 1 of the
Republican Constitution, and its claim that 'Spain is a democratic Republic of workers
from all classes'.'3
12 For a general discussion of this question see Roberto Bergalli, Estado democrático y cuestión judicial,
Buenos Aires, 1984, passim.
13 L'Opinió, 13 March, 25 September 1931; La Calle, 11 February 1931
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3.2. The Bourgeoisie and the Republic
The Madrid monarchist right and business sectors reacted with alarm at the
coming of a régime that they feared, and some perhaps hoped, would end in chaos.
Traumatised by the disappearance of the symbol of unyielding authority which the
Crown represented, the bourgeoisie responded by exporting capital and closing factories,
proof of which was evinced by the fall in business on the stock exchange and the huge
withdrawal of savings from current accounts in first 5 months of Republic. Meanwhile,
with immense hypocrisy, the Lliga absurdly blamed the economic crisis on the political
transition to the Republic. International financial institutions were also wary of the new
régime and the US Morgan bank refused to underwrite a $60 million loan to the Banco
de España.'4
The traditional economic elites were placed in a dilemma by the coming of the
Republic: they were suspicious of the new rulers but yet they had to deal with them. This
produced a janus-faced response from the propertied classes and despite their obvious
hostility, the most important Catalan employers' associations pledged their cooperation
to the nascent régime. The Fomento del Trabajo Nacional explained that it was
apolitical, 'always pro-government, on the side of order'. Bourgeois pressure groups
quickly made their agendas known to the new Republican authorities. In keeping with its
continual craving for order, the bourgeoisie hoped that the Republic would provide what
the monarchy could no longer deliver: a stable political consensus based on the respect
for private property and the rule of law. However, bourgeois opinion was evidently
concerned that by breaking with the patterns of socio-political exclusion of previous
regimes, the Republic might leave the economic elites vulnerable to attack by the masses.
With this in mind, the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional reminded the new authorities that
2 May 1931; Generalitat de Catalunya, Butlieti Mensual d'Estadistica, April 1935; Comercio v
Navegación, March 1932; Joan Ventosa i Calvell, La situacion politica y los problemas económicos de
Espana, Barcelona, 1932, pp.19-22; Various, La Se gunda Repáblica: una esperanza frustrada, Valencia,
1987, p.19. Taking 1925 as the base year (100), trading on the Barcelona Stock Exchange fell radically
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they must act on the 'social problem', as well as enforcing the necessary respect for
private property, 'the most basic guarantee of a well organised civilisation'.'5
In an attempt to curb the reformist thrust of the new authorities, the demand for
'legality and order', the traditional cry of the Catalan bourgeoisie, became the leitmotif of
the bourgeoisie from the very beginning of the Republic. For instance, the Fomento del
Trabajo Nacional warned that if the new democratic liberties were left unguarded they
might culminate in 'anarchy and freedom'. Therefore, employers demanded that the
Republican authorities strengthen what they called the 'principle of authonty', eschewing
any 'absurd tolerance' that would make the new régime 'the protector of all
excesses... synonymous with disorder and licence'. Similar tones were employed by k
Vanguardia, which took the civil insecurity of the bourgeoisie to the level of neurosis,
warning of 'civil intolerance' and 'irreverence' which, it implied, without the same
'inflexible toughness' and 'the old implacable severity', might return society to a state of
primitive barbarism.'6
3.3. Power in the Republic
According to Eduardo de Guzmán, an anarchist journalist who experienced the
Republican transition, the dilemma facing Spain in 1931 was whether 'to make the
revolution or to legalise it'. To be sure, the Provisional Government could have
proceeded in two ways: either legislate by decree, forcing the pace of change and then
later gaining ratification from a fijture Cortes or, await the convocation of a Republican
parliament and the approval of a new Constitution before legally initiating the reform
process. The Republicans opted for the latter, more gradualist path. Accordingly, new
parliamentary elections were called for the end of June, thereby bringing further respite
to the economic oligarchies. Coming just two months after the birth of the Republic, the
15 Comercio y Navegación, April, May 1931; El Trabajo Nacional, April, June 1931; La Veu de
Catalunya, 18 April 1931; Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, Memoria de la Junta Directiva
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results from the June elections confirmed the April vote with another crushing
Republican triumph. In Catalonia the Esquerra returned 36 deputies to the 2 of the Lliga,
the main party of Catalan big business. Overall, the Republican-Socialist bloc returned
over 400 deputies to the Madrid Cortes, alongside the 51 parliamentarians of the right.'7
It quickly became apparent that the Republican-Socialist Revolutionary
Committee, now converted into the government of the Second Republic, wished to
preside over a very slow rate of change. The new authorities were obsessed with legality
and had the upmost concern to guarantee the peaceful transferral of powers. The
pressure of big business had an undeniable impact on government thinking and the
Republicans accepted the baggage of the law-and-order lobby. In fact, many Republicans
believed that because the new régime was creating representative institutions which
allowed for the peaceful resolution of social conflicts, any attack on the Republic was
illegal. Such thinking was most certainly a reflection of the multitude of lawyers in the
first Republican government.18
The Republican government promulgated an array of decrees designed to channel
the revolution and defuse potential conflicts. These ranged from providing legal
recognition for that which was already a fail accompli, such as the amnesty of socio-
political prisoners, to legislating on long-standing historical struggles, such as the
agrarian and Catalan questions. This was central to the project of legalising the
Republican transition, leaving existing socio-economic structures and privileges intact
and forestalling any danger of revolution in the street.'9
Alcalá Zamora, the first President of the Republic, embodied the moderate nature
of the new régime. One-time political secretary to the Count of Romanones, AIcalá
Zamora had been Minister of War in the last government of the constitutional monarchy,
a post from which he was forced to resign due to the failure of Spanish colonial
17 Eduardo de Guzmán, La Se gunda Repáblica fue asi, Barcelona, 1977, pp.53-'7l; Borrás, Espafla,
p.95; Javier Tusell, Las Constituventes del 1931: unas elecciones de transición, Madrid, 1982, p.128
18 Santos Julia DIaz, De revolución popular a revolución obrera', ilistoria Social, 1, 1988, p.34. Of the
first Republican cabinet Alcalá Zamora, Alvaro de Albornoz, Azafa, Maura and Santiago Casares
Quiroga were all from legal backgrounds
t9 Borrás, Espafla, p.9!; Cinovas Cervantes, A puntes, p.2&3; de Guzniá.n, La Segunda Reyüblica, p.53
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adventures in Morocco. As well as serving the monarchy, Alcalá Zamora also embodied
many of the values of traditional Spain: he came from a southern landowning family and
was a fervent Catholic who attended mass on a daily basis. Having announced his
Republican 'conversion' a year before entering the Provisional Republican Government,
this erstwhile monarchist brought something of the old state to the new régime and he
regarded his presidency as 'a duty imposed by his conscience as a Spaniard and as a
Catholic'. For his detractors, the presence of Alcalá Zamora in government evoked
comparisons with the French Republican Adoiphe Thiers, the 'butcher of the Commune',
whose famous aphorism that 'the Republic will be conservative, or it will not be' might
have been coined by Alcalá Zamora.2°
There were many other monarchist 'converts' to the Republican cause. The
climate of the day was summed up by another neophyte, Angel Ossono y Gallardo, who
announced that even his cat had become Republican. These ex-monarchists openly
admitted that they backed the Republic so to forestall the social revolution. 2 ' This
counter-revolutionary project represented the guiding fixation of another 'convert',
Maura, the Republican Interior Minister, whose father was notorious as the architect of
the repression after the 1909 Setmana Tràgica. According to one hostile critic, Maura
was 'of limited intelligence, unpredictable, superficial, the prototype of what is known in
Madrid as a "flashy rich kid" (señorito chub)'. A close associate of Alcalá Zamora, just a
year before the departure of the King, Maura had publicly delivered a strong speech in
defence of the monarch. However, alarmed at what he saw as the 'pre-revolutionaiy
ambience' and the 'popular rage' against the monarchy and fully aware of the 'dangerous
alternative' presented by the revolutionary left, Maura switched to the Republican camp.
As he explained years later, 'our problem [i.e. in 1930-1931] was as follows: the
monarchy had committed suicide, and so we had to join the nascent revolution to defend
20 Cánovas Cervantes, Apuntes, pp. 17-18, 40, 47, 119
21 Christopher Ealhaxn, 'In Search of the Republic', The Historical Journal, 38, 1, 1995, pp.216-217;
Borrás, Espafla. 1900-1939, p.94. In the opinion of Andreu Nm, Alcalá Zamora, and those of his ilk,
abandoned the monarchy 'like rats leaving a sinking ship', before the boat when down with their
privileges on board: Nm, Los problemas, pp.53-56
109
within it legitimate conservative principles'. In doing so, Maura was determined to halt
the revolution and control the path of the Republic, a task for which he considered
himself more than suitable. He had already sought to curtail the celebrations that
accompanied the proclamation of the Republic, ordering the army to move on the Placa
de Sant Jaume when he found out that cenetistas had entered the Barcelona Civil
Governor's building. Tired of the popular revelling, he told journalists on April 16 that if
he had his way the authorities would not allow 'the din (bullicio) in the streets to
continue for an hour longer. The people are taking too much pleasure! Everything has
degenerated into an unacceptable plebeian row (escándalo populachero) ! '22
The first Republican government contained a number of ministers whose
presence served as a guarantee that the pace of reform would not seriously compromise
bourgeois interests. Maura, apart from his hard man image and his readiness to confront
'unruly elements' in the labour movement, was linked to the world of business through
his wife, the daughter of the Count of Calatrava, the ex-manager of the Banco de
Castilla. Other members of the Cabinet were also tied to business interests. Lerroux, the
former Republican firebrand and Foreign Affairs Minister, had accrued considerable
financial interests, while d'Olwer, the Minister for the Economy, was highly respected by
sections of the Catalan bourgeoisie. All of these actors were undoubtedly interested in
fashioning a conservative, almost reactionary Republic.
Even the most radical of the Madrid Republicans, like Azafla, the 'revelation of
the Republic', though supportive of a thorough modernisation of Spanish socio-political
life, did not place emphasis on socio-economic justice. Similarly, the reformist socialists
in the cabinet, Pneto, de los RIos and Largo Caballero, were hardly likely to drive terror
in the hearts of industrialists, particularly as the PSOE triumvirate viewed the Republic
as part of a wider bourgeois revolution which had to run its course before the advent of
socialism at an unspecified time in the future. Moreover, Prieto, the Finance Minister,
had important contacts with Basque finance capital, while Largo Caballero, the veteran
22 Cánovas Cervantes, Apuntes, pp.87-88; Maura, AsI cayó, pp.48, 182-183
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UGT bureaucrat, had for years defined himself by his opposition to CNT radicalism and
had recently proven his opportunism by collaborating in the bureaucratic machinery of
the dictatorship. Meanwhile, de los Bios, the PSOE Justice Minister, was a humanist
Fabian. The loyalty of the PSOE ministers to the Republic was unquestionable and even
though they knew that bourgeois Republic could not liberate the working class, they
were convinced it could introduce important social gains, just as they were prepared to
doggedly defend the new régime from premature attempts at revolution. If this refonnist
panorama was not enough to assuage the fears of the propertied sectors, the socialists
also accepted that their historic role required them to be constrained by the Republicans
and make a number of concessions to the right.23
Trapped within their gradualistic ideology, the cautious Republican government
shied away from promulgating radical measures to modernise the outmoded structures of
Spanish society. The army, an immense burden on state spending because of its
disproportionately large Officer Corps, was in desperate need of reform to bring it into
line with Spain's diminished overseas interests. Moreover, a sharp cut in state
expenditure on the military could have seen money re-directed to the most needy sectors
of society. However, fears of the extreme right and anti-Republican officers meant that
Azaña's 1931 Ley de retiros was relatively mild. Indeed, not only did the Ley de retiros
merely invite generals to retire but, in an attempt to prevent rancour, the reform
provided retiring officers with a salary and other privileges, including free train travel.
Not surprisingly, the Ley de retiros has been described by one commentator as an
'expensive way' of reducing the size of the anny, the cost of which ran into tens of
millions of pesetas.24
23 El Socialista, 20 and 23 April 1931; Cánovas Cervantes, Apuntes, pp.88, 107; La Batalla, 5 March
1931; Nm, Los problemas, p.56; Felix Gordon Ords, Mi politica en España, Mexico, 1961, vol.1,
pp.258, 286; Paul Heywood, Marxism and the Failure of Organised Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936.
Cambridge, 1990, pp.1 10-145; Paul Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War. Reform. Reaction
and Revolution in the Second Republic. London, 1978, pp.5 1-91
24 La Batalla, 14 May 1931; Paul Preston, Franco, London, 1993, p.75. A full discussion of the Azafla
reforms can be found in Michael Alpert, La reforma militar de Azafla (193 1-1933), Madrid 1982 and
Preston, Franco, pp.73-76
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The budgetary weaknesses of the Azaña laws were compounded by their inability
to address the praetorian nature of the Spanish army, for although the military had given
its assent to the new régime, the question was, how long would this remain so? As
shown by the 1923 coup d'etat, the Spanish military was a classic pronunciamiento
army: it was a thoroughly unconstitutional force that had risen against every reformist
government that had come to power in Spain during the previous one hundred years and
it excelled only at internal actions, as an auxiliary to the security forces when the state
was under threat from the people. Moreover, under the terms of the Ley de retiros not
only did the most reactionary officers remain at their posts, but their more talented
colleagues, including many Republicans, left the military in search of a profession away
from the asphyxiating rigidity of service life. Worse still for the Republicans, those
monarchists who chose to stand down from the army used the generous sum they
received from official coffers to plot against democracy.25
The Republican-Socialist government response to the equally pressing issue of
agrarian reform was also marred by the all-pervasive timid legalism of the Republicans.
This long overdue measure was vital to the modernisation of the country and, just like in
the case of the military, it was essential to curb the power of the latfundistas, the large
landowners who were a bulwark of the old monarchy and whose opposition to
democracy was legend. However, the agrarian reform bill was not made law until
September 1932, a year-and-a-half into the Republic and, even then, it was another
example of a false compromise by the Republicans, offering enormous indemnifications
to the landowner class. Moreover, because of the long-standing tax fraud of landowners
who lied about the true size and value of their property during the years of the
monarchy, many large estates were not actually liable to be divided among the land-
25 Cánovas Cervantes, Apuntes, pp.22-24, 154, 165; Lleixà, Cien años, passim.; Bailbé, Orden páblico,
passim.; Paul Preston, The Politics of Reven ge. Fascism and the Military in Twentieth Century Spain,
London, 1990, pp.3-29
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hungry rural poor. Lastly, the agrarian reform ignored the power of the landowners to
boycott the measure.26
From the point of view of the landless labourers, the agrarian law was also
unsatisfactory. The painfully gradualistic agrarian reform offered no swift solution to the
centuries-old yearning of the rural populace for land, just as it did nothing to alter
property relations in the countryside. Instead, the reform bill was a carrot to pacify the
peasantry and forestall any significant mobilisations on the land. MaurIn, the BOC leader,
saw the law as little more than a 'legal dyke' against revolution. A typical product of
Republican jurists, Gabriel Jackson reflected that 'one would have thought that the law
was written for an association of unemployed lawyers who wished to assure not only
theirs own, but their sons' futures, rather than a law written for the peasants of Spain'.
Another critic, Eduardo Barriobero, himself a lawyer, described the law as a piece of
'nonsense worthy of the enlightened despots of the eighteenth century'.27
This same gradualism meant that no rapid measures were taken to assist the
unemployed. At the end of 1931 the first Republican budget revealed that Prieto, the
socialist Minister for the Economy, was a highly orthodox minister. In order to receive
foreign credits, Prieto pledged the Republic to honour all the debts of previous regimes,
including the loans owing from the monarchist militaiy adventures in Morocco and the
public works programmes of the dictatorship. To do otherwise, and refuse to recognise
the immense accumulated debts of previous monarchist administrations, would have
meant the confiscation of bank capital, a measure that would only infuriate the
bourgeoisie. This was, in Prieto's terms, a 'double-edged sword' (anna de dos fl/os)
which he had no intention of wielding, as it would deny the Republic the aid of the
financial classes. Ironically, and irrespective of Pneto's efforts to balance the budget, the
26 Kaminski, Los de Barcelona, pp.165-166. For a full survey of the agrarian reform see Edward
Malefakis, Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution, New Haven, 1970
27 Maunn, Revolucion y contrarrevolución, p.57; Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil
War. 193 1-1939, New Jersey, 1965, p.94; Barriobero cited in Peirats, Anarchists, pp.76-77
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commitment of the government to subsidise retired army officers and indemnify
landowners ensured that the public debt actually grew during the Republic.28
While Prieto deftly handling journalists in his witty manner, he did little to endear
himself to the unemployed: he failed to develop any kind of anti-unemployment plan, he
introduced no systematic unemployment relief nor even a programme for new public
works initiatives. As Albert Balcells noted, the Madrid Republican government was
'obsessed with budgetary balance [and], did not want to take on the burden of social
insurance'. Consequently, by February 1933, nearly two full years after the birth of the
Republic, a mere 2.4% of the unemployed received any kind of state benefit, and even
then, the subsidy expired after a fixed period. Equally, the democratic government failed
to formulate a plan to make monied sectors accept responsibility for the unemployed, not
even in those cases where there was evidence that capitalists had enriched themselves
from the public purse. Moreover, to the added chagrin of the left, the Republican-
Socialist government remained impassive as capitalists and financiers, including the
notorious 'bandits of the Exhibition', made their way across the border with the small
fortunes they had accumulated in the 1920s.29
3.4. The 'Principle of Authority' and the 'Republic of Order'
The revolution of Republican reason over monarchist irrationality appeared to be
a coherent political project but the Republican juridico-economic settlement carried a
series of contradictions at its very centre. Firstly, contrary to the belief of many
Republicans, the state was not a neutral organ, just as it was not independent of social
classes. While the birth of the Republic represented the shift of the economically
dominant bloc away from the reins of political power, the propertied classes still
represented a huge economic power that held an enduring influence over the state that
was far more real than the intellectual control which the Republicans hoped to exert.
28 Cánovas Cervantes, Apuntes, pp. i52-!58; La Batalla, 22 December 1932; Cabrera, La patronal,
p.137
29 Balcells, Crisis, pp. i26-!27; Solidaridad Obrera, 18 April 1931
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Secondly, the Republicans were unaware that the continuation of an economic system
based on private property would convert the new authorities into its guarantors, the
representatives of a state power that enforced the separation of the proletariat from the
privileges of the possessing classes. Thirdly, despite the political unreliability of the
economic elites and their traditional hostility towards democracy, the Republicans set
out to gain the acceptance of the bourgeoisie for its project for socio-political
modernisation. The gradualism of the Republicans towards those who had built
fortifications against change since the middle of the last century, seemed out of step with
the historical record which implied that any attempt at modernisation required a sharp
confrontation with the forces of reaction.
In practical terms, the Republican authorities were ineluctably drawn towards a
quid pro quo to appease the bourgeoisie within the new political order. This entailed
responding to the ever-present security fears of the bourgeoisie, a process that
culminated in the so-called 'Republic of Order'. Far from a rhetorical overture towards
conservative sectors, the 'Republic of Order' was a firm reality, as demonstrated by a rise
in expenditure on law-and-order in the first two years of the new régime, the bulk of
which was used to strengthen the police. 30 Given that the authorities showed little
largesse towards the unemployed, the spending on law-and-order indicates one of the
major priorities of the first Republican government, whose members must have been
aware that by leaving the open wound of unemployment on the body of the proletariat,
the prospect of social conflict was very strong. To be sure, as a leading Spanish
sociologist has observed, it is axiomatic that 'the greater the fear and insecurity, the more
need there will be for judges, Civil Guards and police'.3'
The attitude of the Republicans towards law-and-order and civil rights was
consistent with their highly equivocal attitude towards reform. From the birth of the new
régime the right to association was never fully extended to anarchists and communists
and although closed meetings were initially tolerated, this was conditional on the
30 Balcells, Crisis, pp.132-133
31 Trinidad Fernández, 'La configuració histônca del subjecte delinquent', 7'
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goodwill of the authorities. In a clear case of discrimination, the Republicans betrayed
their promises by repeatedly circumscribing the rallies by the revolutionary left. Equally,
the Constitution drafted under a committee presided over by Luis Jiménez de Asüa, a
leading PSOE jurist, carried a clause that allowed for the suspension of civil rights.
Illustrative of the conservative drift of the Republican frame of mind, the restrictions on
civil liberties were endorsed by an overwhelming majority in the Cortes. Even on a clear-
cut issue like the repeal of the death penalty, a measure that had been an ever-present
Republican manifesto pledge since the nineteenth century, the new government arrived at
a meek compromise and although capital punishment was abrogated in 1932, the
authorities continued to pay the salaries of all the provincial executioners in Spain just in
case'. 32
A similar retreat occurred with the Civil Guard. Before coming to power the
Republicans had developed the image of their ideal state as a rational authority.
Consequently, they had promised to move away from the traditional reliance on the
hated Civil Guard, particularly as many workers' groups made it clear that the
disbandment of the force would be interpreted as a sign of good intent on the part of the
new authorities. However, once in power the survival of this traditionally anti-
democratic and highly elitist body was not viewed by Republican politicians as a serious
threat to the wider goal of enhancing the legitimacy of the state and it was accepted that
the Civil Guard could serve as a useful prop for the new institutions. Julián Besteiro, a
leading PSOE ideologue, looked on the Civil Guard as 'an admirable machine [which]
should not be suppressed but made to work in our favour'. This coincided with the
opinion of Maura who, as Interior Minister, welcomed 'authority' and 'discipline' and
described himself as a 'fervent supporter' of the Civil Guard. Maura 'categorically
refused' to dissolve the force, nor reform it 'in such a way that it would give the
impression that it had been dissolved', nor change 'even a comma of its famous order'.
Not only did the military structure and leadership of the Civil Guard remain unchanged,
32 Balibé, Orden yáblico, pp.318, 337, n.35; Eslava, Verdugos, p.308
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but Maura also rejected suggestions that the force change its image by altering its unique
three-cornered hat, the graphic symbol of repression in much of Spain. When more
radically inclined cabinet members opposed the attitude of Maura he responded by
offering his resignation, whereupon he was assuaged by being given full control of law-
and-order.33
Maura, nevertheless, accepted the need to re-deploy the Civil Guard. Along with
Angel Galarza, the socialist Chief of Security, Maura believed that the force was no
longer suited to deal with the potential threats to public order posed by Spain's
increasingly complex urban centres, particularly the protest movements inspired by a
modem labour movement. Both Maura and Galarza were alarmed that the traditional
reliance of the Civil Guard on the Mauser rifle produced large numbers of casualties and
generated a level of violence that was likely to broaden protest rather than curb it.
Consequently, the Republican authorities resolved to deploy the bulk of the Civil Guard
in the countryside, utilising them as an auxiliary force in urban centres only when public
order was placed under severe strain. Barcelona was viewed as a special case by the
authorities, however, and the Catalan capital was to have Civil Guard stations and
barracks within its municipal boundaries.
In a bid to fill the partial vacuum left by the Civil Guard in the cities the
government created the Guardias de asalto. The Asallos were conceived as a new
Republican police force which would assume responsibility for public order and defend
the new democratic institutions. The task of recruiting and training the Asaltos was the
work of Maura and Galarza, who drew from the ranks of the socialist and Republican
parties. The Asaltos were portrayed as the flagship of the new legality which, unlike the
old police or the Civil Guard, were lauded by the authorities as a thoroughly democratic
force.
Madrid, Ocho meses, pp.156-157; La Batalla, 15 April, 1 May 1931; Solidaridad Obrera, 15 April, 1
May 1931; Besteiro cited in Manuel Azaña, Obras completas. El transito de tin mundo histórico,
Mexico, 1967, vol.3, p.294; Maura, MI cayó. p.206; Borrás, Espaila, pp.109-110
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There was, however, a fundamental contradiction with the new force, for while
Maura and Galarza hoped to fashion what they intended to be a truly democratic force,
they refused to break with monarchist traditions of recruiting military chiefs to train the
police. Thus, the Asaltos were headed by Lieutenant-Colonel AgustIn Muñoz Grandes
and, like the Civil Guard, had an elitist, unaccountable military command. 34 Muñoz
Grandes imposed military values on the new force and discipline inside the Asaltos was
said to be 'extraordinarily rigid'. In the view of Manuel Balibé, 'other than their name and
uniform', little differentiated the Asaltos from the Civil Guard.35
Maura could not hide the pride that he felt for his new creation and he eulogised
the six-foot plus Asaltos as 'a perfect force', characterised by 'a truly exceptional physical
constitution'. Motorised, and highly mobile, the Asaltos were specifically designed to
meet the challenged posed to public order by street convulsions. Thereafter the Asaltos
would neutralise the disturbance, make any necessary arrests, and retreat with the peace
re-established, leaving no casualties behind them other than among those who dared
cross the frontier of legality. To avoid the 'excesses' of past essays in urban social
control, the conventional arms of the Asaltos were the revolver and a two-and-a-half
foot long truncheon, weaponry which unlike the long-range armament of the Civil
Guard, encouraged the new force to move into the thick of the fray and reimpose public
order not with terror but by singling out 'ringleaders'. The Asaltos were, however, fully
militarised, and, in the event of a serious challenge to public order, they were equipped
with heavier weaponly, such as machine guns. This made the force the veritable shock
troops of the Republican state on the streets.36
The recruitment of the Asaltos began in June 1931 and they made their first
appearance on the streets of Barcelona at the end of July. From the beginning material
realities revealed the limitations of Republican will, and the recruitment of a new, and
34 The expertise of Mufioz Grandes was later deployed in his position as chief of the fascist Division
Azul, the Spanish volunteers who fought on the Russian Front during World War Two: Preston, j]
Politics of Revenge, pp. 147-149, 152-153.
Maura, Asi cayO, pp.274-275; Bailbd, Orden páblico, p.339
36 Maura, Asi cavO, pp.27'1-275; Juan-Siméon Vidarte, Las Cortes Constituventes de 1931-1933.
Testimomo del primer secretario del Con greso de los Diputados, Barcelona, 1976, p.293
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exclusively Republican security force was restricted by budgetary problems. These
financial difficulties placed definite limitations on the reformist, modernising project of
the Republicans and in the absence of sufficient numbers of Asaltos, the authorities
continued to rely on the notorious 'Benemérita'.
The case of Barcelona exemplifies what Bailbé has described as the 'timid
renovation' of the police and the absence of any concrete Republican blue-print for the
democratisation and reform of the security forces. During his tenure as Civil Governor
Companys dragged his heels on a number of important matters and despite the manifest
unpopularity of the Brigada Policial especializada en Anarquismo y Sindicalismo and the
widespread belief that the force was a hot-bed of monarchist reaction, at the end of April
there were still no plans for the abolition of the force. Similarly, it was evident that
Companys had no intention of dissolving the Mossos d'Escuadra.37
The piece-meal attitude of both the Madrid and Barcelona authorities towards
police reform was ftilly highlighted by a trip of Galarza to the Catalan capital at the end
of May 1931. During a number of press conferences both Galarza and Companys were
unanimous that the Barcelona police was 'absolutely lacking in efficiency', a 'completely
useless organisation' that was in immediate need of 'a complete and total reorganisation'.
However, they also asserted that the force could become 'a more efficient instrument'
simply by removing a few !bad eggs'. Having shelved their earlier plans for an ambitious
modernisation of the security forces, the Republicans preferred to place trusted figures in
important command positions within the police to oversee the removal of high profile
monarchists from the force. Accordingly, the austere Arturo Menéndez became Chief of
Police in Barcelona. Described by an admirer as an 'important figure in the Spanish
Revolution', Menéndez was a veteran of the Provisional Republican Revolutionary
Committee and he had accompanied Azafla to assume control of the Ministry of War in
Solidaridad Obrera, 16, 25, 29 April 1931
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Madrid on the night of April 14. He also had a severe personality, which was indelibly
marked by his military background as an army artillery captain.38
Now that the Republicans had called the revolution to a halt, Menéndez was
briefed to prepare the police for the conservation of the post-monarchical political order.
In organisational terms, Menéndez continued the strategy of removing the most
disreputable monarchists from the Barcelona police force. However, because anti-
Republican sentiments were so great, it was evident the consistent application of this
policy carried the danger that the force would be bereft of officers. Instead, the
programme of Menéndez for 'Republicanising' the security forces centred on buying the
loyalty of unreliable elements by increasing morale through a system of wage and
pension increases. By such an improvement in the status and pay of the police it was
hoped that the old causes of corruption within the force would be eroded, while the
loyalty of those officers who disliked the Republic might also be won over. However, the
substance of the Barcelona police actually changed very little. The notoriously pro-
monarchist Barcelona police remained largely unpurged, while the Brigada Policial
especializada en Anarquismo y Sindicalismo, the despised political police of the
monarchy, underwent little more than a token name change to become the Brigada de
Investigación Social, the political police of the Republic. Equally, many figures
associated with Spain's authoritarian past remained within the Barcelona judiciary.
Consequently, when Catalan Republicans claimed in June 1931 that 'a new order in the
rule of law' was about to begin, they failed to mention that this would be enforced by
yesterdays' police and bureaucracy.39
This represented a fundamental weakness in the Republican project, because if
the legal processes were to be reformed to provide equality before the law, the same also
had to hold true for the undemocratic police who in the decades before the Republic had
38 Bailbé, Orden pthlico, p.336; Las Noticias, 23 May 1931; Madrid, Ocho meses, pp.156-158; Manuel
Azafla, Obras completas. Memorias PolIticas y de Guerra, Mexico, 1968, vol.4, p.284
The details of the reorganisation of the police are taken from the daily press for 1931, especially j
Noticias, 23 May 1931 and L'Oiinió, 9 June 1931
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revealed an institutionalised hatred of the working class. 40 Herein, the separation of
political policing from everyday policing and the end to the involvement of civil police in
the class struggle, was a fundamental necessity. Equally pressing was a break in the
traditional interpretation of social protest as a simple question of public order. It is
difficult to say that either were effected.
The experience of the Catalan capital also revealed the failure of the new
authorities to revise police selection processes, even though Menéndez had earlier
recognised that these changes were a vital prerequisite to both professionalise the force
and to end the clientelism that had pervaded the police during the years of monarchy.4'
However, despite the best democratic intentions, the corrupt practice of recruiting police
from the clientele of the governing powers continued, even if the clientele changed. This
can be seen in the manner in which the Asaltos were drawn from among the Republican
and Socialist parties, a favouritism that always promised to generate patronage when it
came to the allocation of what were not always well paid jobs but which were,
nevertheless, pensioned.
Political patronage and partisanship outweighed professional criterion in the
appointments to the Policia Municipal, the Council-organised police force. Throughout
the Republican period applicants for posts in the Policia Municipal in neighbouring
l'Hospitalet emphasised their 'long-standing Republican sympathies' or 'Republican spirit'
far more than any practical or professional skills that might equip them for a lifetime's
service in the police. In other circumstances, rather than dwell on their human resources,
candidates opportunistically mentioned their 'established acquaintance' with a leading
local Republican or, their simple 'desire to serve the Republic'. Requests to the
Republican mayor for recommendations for the Asaltos were of a similarly sycophantic
nature, suggesting that the police had not become professionalised and that the force
remained an escape route from unemployment or even the last option before the
workhouse. Equally, many of the declarations of'Republican integrity' by applicants
" See Chapter 1.1
41 Trinidad Fernández, La defensa, p.304
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were often immediately accompanied by moving words of reassurance that 'as a Father
of four and currently unemployed' the applicant would work 'diligently and honourably in
the persecution of police tasks'. Other applications for the police also indicated that
aspirant agents were motivated less by the a professional desire to serve as a policeman
than by the absence of more acceptable work. Moreover, these questionable recruitment
procedures meant that some applicants who were evidently unsuitable for the force were
still admitted. In one telling case, the Barcelona Police authority refused to grant a gun
licence to a newly recruited Municipal Guard in l'Hospitalet because, according to police
archives, the newly appointed agent in question had a record for 'the crime of assault on
several occasions'.42
3.5. The 'Republic of Order' in the Workplace
The labour legislation developed by Largo Caballero from the Labour Ministry
was the concomitant of the 'Republic of Order' in the industrial relations sphere. 43 The
labour reforms of the 193 Os signified an acceleration of the wider European process
whereby from the turn of the century onwards state intervention was deployed to
arbitrate and channel the conflicts between capital and labour. This process offered some
benefits to organised labour, such as the guarantees it gave for permanent trade union
representation in the workplace. Yet by maintaining the existing power relations inside
the factories in the face of a strong and organised labour movement, state
interventionism also served the interests of employers.
The reforms of the first Republican-Socialist administration represented a
stronger centralisation of the powers of the Labour Ministry to police the workplace and
guarantee the existing frontiers of control. The new Ley de contratos de trabajo defined
the duties of workers, which included the need to work diligently, to loyally follow the
42 Correspondência de l'Ajuntanient de l'Hospitalet. 1931-1936 (AHLL); Jefatura Superior de Barcelona
to the Mayor of l'Hospitalet, 5 December 1933 (AHLL)
In keeping with the predominantly urban object of this study, my discussion of Largo Caballero's
legislation focuses exclusively on its urban and industrial signifance. For an appraisal of the impact of
Largo Caballero's reforms in a rural context see Malefakis, Agrarian Reform, passim., Preston, Th
Coming of the Spanish Civil War. pp. 56-59, 75-76.
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instructions of management, to cede the product of their labour to the employer and to
comply with all social laws. As for the other side of production, the employers were
required to 'respect the dignity of labour', maintain the workplace and machineiy 'in
proper condition' and pay wages promptly. Meanwhile, in the eventuality that the labour
contract was terminated, to avoid favouritism and blacklisting, employers were asked to
provide the worker with a certificate of employment, outlining their labour skills,
without making any reference to the qualities of the worker nor their political attitudes
or syndical affinities. In recognition of the dire conditions facing labour, Largo Caballero
also introduced a number of palliatives in a bid to enhance the image of the state in the
minds of workers, including a decree that employers should pay wages to those
operatives who were absent on the 'national fiesta' of April 14-15. More enduringly, on
May Day the Republic adhered to the International Labour Organisation of the League
of Nations and the convention establishing the eight hour day. This was followed by the
Ley de la Repñblica, which made the eight hour working day part of Spanish law, a vital
measure, given that most industrial accidents occurred in the last hour of work. Largo
Caballero hoped that by making concessions to organised labour the industrial working
class would see that it could peacefully pursue its objectives through the state, thereby
allowing the Republic to cement its new institutions.
The centre-piece of the new labour legislation was the Ley de jurados mixtos.
This law created 'mixed juries', state-regulated arbitration courts channels which, it was
believed, would facilitate the peaceful resolution of collective workplace bargaining
within a stable system of industrial relations. The Ley de jurados mixtos specified that
the 'mixed juries' were to be informed of all industrial disputes and that there should be
an opportunity for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. If trade unions called a strike
before attempts at arbitration had been exhausted, the Labour Ministry would declare the
stoppage illegal. Thereafter the semi-judicial Jurados, made up of six worker
Soto Carmona, El trabalo, pp.259, 331-333. For the legislation see Ministerlo de Trabajo y Prevision
Social, Labor realizada desde la proclamaciOn de la Repüblica hasta el 8 de septiembre de 1932. Madrid
n.d., passim.
123
representatives and six employer delegates, along with a president and a vice-president
nominated by Largo Caballero, would arbitrate. In the eventuality of a hung decision or
a lack of consensus, the government-appointed president would cast a deciding vote, the
result of which would be legally binding on both parties. By transferring jurisdiction over
wages, conditions and redundancies to the neutral Jurados, workplace relations would
therefore become pacified, with naked industrial conflicts a thing of the past.
Echoing the reasoning of the Republicans on the issue of public order, it was
implicit in Largo Caballero's legislation that old style syndical struggles were obsolete.
According to the Labour Minister, because the Jurados allowed for the betterment of
workers on the basis of discipline and transigence, there could be 'no strikes, nor
complaints nor protests. The first thing now is to consolidate the régime'. This was an
eloquent reflexion of Largo Caballero's overriding obsession with the need to maintain
'authority' and 'discipline' in industrial affairs. Indeed, the Jurados were based on the
Comités paritarios, the corporate structures of the dictatorship and they were, as Nick
Rider notes, 'an extension of the traditional authoritarian interventionism of the state,
carrying out its customary role of maintaining order'.45
The endeavours of Largo Caballero to renovate the attitudes of workers towards
the state through these reforms were highly contradictory. Firstly, at a time when the
number ofjobless was increasing, the reforms offered help only to the declining number
of those in work. Hence, the swelling ranks of the jobless were effectively left to their
own devices.
Secondly, the new legislation limiting the working day carried opt-clauses
designed for those sectors where production had to rise to meet demand. This was the
case in the Barcelona textile industry where the maximum legal working week was 66
hours during the years 1931 and 1933. Like all the Republican laws, the legislation on
the working day required the goodwill of the employers to pay the extra hours as
overtime, something that was far from certain. Similarly, by dividing additional work
El So!, 19 December 1931; Rider, Anarchism, p.625
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among existing workers, the labour legislation fostered new divisions within working
conditions, because there was no attempt to bring the out of work back into the factory,
thereby increasing the gulf between the employed and the unemployed grew wider.
Thirdly, while the Jurados offered some solace to skilled sections of the
workforce, their ponderous procedures were ill-suited to the uncertain context facing the
unskilled. In the case of Barcelona, not only did the Jurados clash with the local
practices of the labour movement, but they seemed of little relevance to the
predominantly unskilled proletariat of a city where temporary contracts abounded in the
wake of desperate social conditions.
Lastly, by restricting the right to strike of workers, Largo Caballero's reform
package undermined the potency of the industrial stoppage, the most important weapon
available to workers in their dealings with employers. This reflected the mistaken belief
that capitalists and proletarians could endure a period of arbitration with equal ease, a
premise that, in keeping with so much Republican thought, ignored material realities and
assumed that legal equality between labour and capital was a real possibility.
The substance of the new labour laws was thoroughly in keeping with the
reformist and corporatist syndical tradition of the UGT, whose predominantly semi-
skilled and skilled members favoured class collaboration to mobilisation and were
prepared to submit their professional claims to arbitration. By the same token, the
Jurados were poorly suited to industrial conditions in Catalonia, where the employers
had always rejected the presence of independent workplace unions, where the unions had
never enjoyed any kind of stable existence and where change seemed to require more
than piece-meal reform. Moreover, the gradualism of the labour courts was the complete
antithesis of the traditions of direct action prevalent among the bulk of the Barcelona
proletariat, which were commonly seen as the only means of extracting concessions from
an aggressive bourgeoisie. Predictably, given the suspicions and rivalries between the
two unions, the CNT dubbed the Jurados as a 'social and judicial monstrosity [designed]
to trap the proletariat'. Presaging a confrontation between the new authorities and the
unions, the Barcelona CNT Local Federation and the Catalan Regional Committee both
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resolved to reject the Jurados. Nevertheless, showing a singular lack of flexibility, Largo
Caballero made it known that the Jurados were to be imposed throughout the Spanish
state, thereby criminalising long-standing CNT practises, such as active picketing. Given
that their methods were common knowledge, the CNT leasership interpreted the
intransigence of Largo Caballero as a deliberate provocation of the CNT.
Largo Caballero's insistence that all unions comply with the Jurados was part of
a deliberate plan to use his position within the Republican government to gain a legal
advantage for the UGT and, simultaneously, strengthen his standing as Secretary-
General of the socialist union federation. According to Victor Alba, the 'organisational
patriotism' of Largo Caballero was bound up with the desire of the socialist union
leadership to re-establish an organised presence in Catalonia, particularly Barcelona, the
industrial and revolutionaiy capital of Spain and the historic birthplace of the UGT, the
very city the union bureaucracy had earlier left for the calmer, bureaucratic ambience of
Madrid. It was this quest of the socialist bureaucracy to outdo the CNT that had already
led it to collaborate with the Pnmo de Rivera dictatorship, an ill-fated opportunist
exercise that compromised both the UGT and the PSOE in Catalonia. This discredit was
reflected in the membership of the Catalan socialist movement: in 1929 the PSOE had a
mere 230 members in Catalonia, while the UGT had grown to only 16,683 members.
These puny socialist groups were dwarfed by the 40,000 members claimed by the
Barcelona CNT Builders' Union alone.47
The re-legalisation of the CNT in April 1930 and its subsequent resurgence, saw
the end to any possibility that the UGT might acquire a monopoly of trade union activity.
After the proclamation of the Republic, the CNT expanded even more rapidly, both in
Spain and in Catalonia, as its unions became the receptacle for thousands of expectant
workers. In May 1931 the Catalan CNT admitted 100,000 new members in a single
Acción, 29 March 1930; Solidaridad Obrera, 8-9, 22, 30 May, 13 June, 4, 10 July 1931
' Alba, Els problemes, p.90; Manuel Perez Ledesma, 'La primera etapa de la Union General de
Trabajadores (1888-1917). Planteainiento sindical yformas de organizaciOn' in Balcells (ed.), Teorla,
pp.115-171; Pere Gabriel Sirvent, 'Sindicalismoy sindicatos socialistas en Catalufia. La UGT, 1888-
1938', Histona Social, 8, 1990, pp.'I7-7l; Balcells, Marxismo, p.15
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month and by August the Confederation accounted for over half of the organised
Spanish working class, claiming 400,000 affiliates in Catalonia alone. Meanwhile, the
Barcelona CNT had managed to organise a staggering 58% of the most rebellious
sections of the city's proletariat.48
The UGT leadership was intensely jealous of the growth of its rivals and Largo
Caballero was concerned to contain the CNT in its Catalan bastion. To this end, the
UGT began a new weekly trade union publication, La Internacional in June 1931. Two
months later the PSOE launched a daily newspaper in Barcelona, La Tnbuna Socialista.
However, despite both the patronage of their socialist allies in Madrid and the financial
stability provided by the essentially skilled and employed workers of the Catalan UGT,
the weak roots of the Catalan socialist movement could not sustain a vibrant movement.
La Tribuna Socialista collapsed after two months, while La Internacional managed a
lowly 28 issues, staggering on until December 193
These disheartening circumstances led the UGT bureaucracy to rely on the labour
courts in an attempt to gain a legal advantage over the CNT and expand ugetismo in
Catalonia. Josep Jover Sarroca, the president of the Catalan UGT, was appointed by
Largo Caballero as head of the Jurados, where he was supported by an army of state
bureaucrats and socialist party functionaries. Increasingly, Largo Caballero drove the
Catalan CNT leadership into a corner on the question of the Jurados. Implicit in all this
was an apparent assumption that the CNT would be either forced to break with their
traditions and accept the Jurados and, therefore, become like the UGT, or that it would
reject the Jurados and clash with the state, thereby provoking a debilitating membership
crisis in the Confederation, whose rank-and-file would at last appreciate the superiority
of socialist methods.
48 Vega i Massana, El Trentisme, p.105, n. 1; CRT, Memorias de los comicios de la regional catalana
celebrados los dIas 31 de mayo y 1 de iunio. y 2, 3 y 4 de agosto de 1931, Barcelona 1931, pp.50-56;
Balcells, Crisis, p.192
49 La Tribuna Socialista ran from 12 August-il October 1931, while La Internacional ran from 13
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Largo Caballero's strategy of using the institutions of Republic to foster the UGT
and attack CNT was a highly dangerous, potentially explosive game. By using his
position as Labour Minister to pursue what cenetistas believed were his long-standing
sectarian goals of organisational aggrandisement and syndical imperialism, Largo
Caballero was making some unions freer than others and clashing with the promises of
syndical freedom made to the CNT during the opposition to the monarchy.
Consequently, Largo Caballero, far more than anyone else, was creating the conditions
for a wholesale rupture between the Confederation and the new regime.50
Conflict between the CNT and the UGT in Barcelona was further ensured by the
social base of ugetismo in the Catalan capital. While it would be a mistake to suggest
that the followers of the disbanded Sindicatos Libres simply entered the Catalan UGT
after the birth of the Republic, particularly as there were numerous cases of nght-wing
unions entering the CNT, Rider provides considerable evidence that between 1930-1931
of workers switching to the Barcelona UGT from the Libres. According to Cohn
Winston, 'in many cases' ex-libreños 'occupied leadership positions' in the Catalan UGT.
Thus, the mish-mash of skilled and conservative workers who came to rest inside the
socialist union in Catalonia during the early stages of the Republic was united by a
virulent hatred for the Confederation and its aggressive methods of class struggle. This
was especially true of the professional groups of private security guards, a notoriously
right-wing sector, who entered the Catalan UGT after the fall of the dictatorship. The
most skilled groups of construction workers passed directly from the Libres into the
UGT, along with other skilled sectors like pastry chefs and piano makers. It was no
surprise, therefore, that the service industries, a traditional source of Libre strength, was
the occupational sector where the Catalan UGT enjoyed significant growth between
1930-193 1. Meanwhile, in the wood sector, the UGT accepted artisans and even the
50 La Publicitat, 24 July 1931
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self-employed, sectors that the anarchists viewed as 'the aristocrats within the working
class'.5'
Cenetistas were not the only ones alarmed at Largo Caballero's labour laws. In
the late 1 920s the conviction of Catalan capitalists that they alone should control the
workplace had already led bourgeois pressure groups to recoil against the corporatist
experiments of Primo de Rivera. Similar convictions led the Catalan bourgeoisie to
oppose the Jurados. Moreover, employers also regarded Largo Caballero as a 'socialist'
and a 'partial' figure in industrial affairs. However, the political context in 1931 presented
Catalan industrialists with some complex dilemmas; capitalists were, in the words of
Eulàlia Vega i Massana, 'caught between two fires': they were shaken by the sudden
demise of the monarchy, but they were also unsettled by the resurgence of CNT unions
that were clearly hungry for action. Under these circumstances, Catalan entrepreneurs
were, at least for the time being, prepared to accept the Jurados as they promised to
uphold 'the principle of authority' in industrial affairs against the threat of 'indiscipline'
posed by the CNT. 52 Accordingly, while the Catalan bourgeoisie was not necessarily
content to see the PSOE in government, it at least identified with Largo Caballero's
emphasis on order and legality in the workplace and alongside the extravagant promises
of Macia and the CNT, their historic bête noire, the Republican Minister for Labour was
seen as a 'lesser evil'.
This tactical move was reflected in an editorial in the conservative La Nau,
advising capitalists 'loyally to back the progressive implantation of social reforms that
will profoundly transform the relations between capital and labour'. In return, La Nau
was confident that the Republican-Socialist government would be 'the guarantor of
public order'. In similar vein, La Vanguardia maintained that the 'health of Spain'
Bueso, Recuerdos, vol.!, pp. 103-109; Rider, Anarchism, Ch.l1; Winston, La clase trabajadora,
p.281; Solidaridad Obrera, 4-6 June 1931; El Luchador, 14 August 1931
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required labour reform and the conservative daily celebrated the responsible role of the
UGT and the PSOE as 'enemies of Bolshevism and anarchism'. Highlighting the concord
between conservative opinion and the Republican government, La Vanguardia argued
that there was no justification for violence in a truly democratic régime, because 'the
principle of freedom and justice for all' relegates the demands of the unions to second
place. Similarly, the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional counselled respect for the law and
grudgingly accepted the place of the Jurados as 'a good instrument' for 'conciliation and
arbitration, which avoid the violence of social conflicts', while simultaneously
maintaining 'the principle of authority'.53
The support of employers for 'authority' and 'legality' did not, however, guarantee
their compliance with the new legislation. The limitations of the reformist PSOE strategy
were rapidly illustrated by the intransigent obduracy of the Catalan bourgeoisie, whose
recidivistic attitude provoked a number of industrial disputes early on in the Republic.
For example, many employers refused to pay wages to those workers who were absent
celebrating the arrival of the new régime in the streets on April 14-15. Some capitalists
defiantly responded to these wage claims, advising their workers: 'let the Republic feed
you!' Meanwhile, in a bid to maintain profit margins, the Umón Industrial Metalürgica,
the largest employers' federation in the metal sector, illegally maintained a 70 hour week
and successfully implored capitalists in all branches of the industry to refuse overtime
payments and, generally, to ignore the new laws governing the length of the working
day. Employers needed little encouragement and they continued to ignore legislation
regulating child labour and workplace health and safety. There were numerous cases of
employers refusing to pay statutory holidays for their operatives and, in an attempt to
avoid their legal responsibility for proletarian leisure, some entrepreneurs sacked their
workers before holiday time. Moreover, employers periodically victimised those union
militants who demanded the implementation of the new laws, telling activists: 'Let the
Republic give you work!' Despite the sackings, the bourgeoisie denied unemployment
La Nau, 24 April 1931; La Vanguardia. 4, 25 July 1931; Fomento del Trabajo Nacional,
Memona...de 1931. p.119
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was a problem and joblessness was conveniently attributed to a crisis that it opined was
the outcome of social agitation. Meanwhile, capitalists were unanimous that
unemployment benefit on an obligatory, institutional level would be both economically
ruinous for industry and the state and encourage indolence and vice among the
workers.
The CNT picked up the gauntlet laid down by the employers and embarked on a
series of industrial actions to enforce Republican legislation and ensure that industrialists
complied with the new working hours. The defensive struggle to impose labour laws on
the employers served as a bridge to a new syndical offensive, as in the case of the
striking CNT land labourers, whose demands for a legal 8-hour day were augmented
with new wage demands. The landworkers stoppage spread quickly around the fields
and estates surrounding industrial Barcelona, YHospitalet and Badalona and intensified
further when fishermen and market workers joined them on strike.55
The CNT was committed to blocking the untrammelled right of management to
sack workers byfiat and to reintegrating the unemployed in the workplace through the
abolition of intensive forms of labour like piece-work. In July and August, this
culminated in a veritable explosion of conflicts that affected individual workshops, as
well as entire industries. In response to continuing provocations and redundancies, 1,100
workers downed tools at the end of July at La Seda de Barcelona, a French-owned
artificial silk factory in Prat de Liobregat, while 40,000 metalworkers stayed out for the
whole of August. Strikes also occurred in vital sectors like the docks, the artery of the
city, and at the Telefónica, the main communication centre. Overall, there were 41
strikes in Barcelona city in August. Meanwhile, the Builders' Union, which was burdened
by soaring unemployment, combined a call for union recognition with demands for a six
Soto Carmona, El trabajo, p.592; Trabajo, 15 September 1931; Solidaridad Obrera, 17 June, 23 July
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hour day, wage increases, sickness, unemployment and health benefits, and workplace
representation in production, administration, hygiene and hiring.56
This unprecedented wave of mobilisations was bound up with the resurrection of
the CNT and the new-found confidence this brought to Catalan workers, who felt ever
more confident to make up ground lost in the preceding eight years. Equally, to offset
the twin scourge of joblessness and favountism in the labour market, the CNT sought to
force employers to recruit new operatives exclusively through its own bolsas de Ira bajo,
the union labour exchanges. The proven ability of the bolsas de trabajo to guarantee
access to the labour market and safeguard working conditions and wages within a closed
shop was immensely attractive to the unskilled, underemployed and jobless of Barcelona.
As the mood of the workers became electrified, a growing revolutionary spirit was seen
among certain sections of the working class. This was evinced by two separate disputes
in the Sants and Poblenou districts, where conflicts over working practices, sackings and
victimisations culminated in factory occupations, during which the workers took over
the running of their workplaces.57
Although under intense syndical pressure the bourgeoisie sometimes conceded
ground on issues of wages and hours, in 1931 this was made difficult by the tremors of
recession. Equally, the spread of the economic crisis encouraged confrontational
attitudes on the part of the bourgeoisie in those sectors where business had slackened
and where they had little to lose from a strike. Meanwhile, cynically substituting its own
class interests for the general interests of society, Catalan employers appealed to the
Madrid government to halt the CNT 'policy of destroying the entire industrial structure
and piece-work' that would culminate in the collapse of'our economic progress, the ruin
our levels of consumption, housing, clothing, leisure and the education of our children'.58
There was even less scope for discussion over issues of industrial control.
Management resisted all CNT demands to recognise their bolsas de Irabajo, alleging
56 Solidaridad Obrera, 5 May 1931; La Vanguardia. 19, 21, 24 July, 1-29 August 1931; Comercio y
Navegación, August-September 1931; Vega i Massana, La Conlederació, pp.522, 1060
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that they limited the freedom of capitalists to hire and fire, that they constituted a
flagrant contravention of the threshold of industrial control and an unwarranted attack
on the authority of the boss. The employer-union clash over the bolsas de trabajo
became a major skirmish. Petrified by the scale of union mobilisations, some on the right
began to look back to the 'the golden age of the dictatorship', when 'strikes and Street
disturbances existed only in the memory'. La Vanguardia attributed the 'spirit of pure
revolt' and the 'multiplicity of social conflicts' to what it saw as the decay in moral
standards precipitated by the demise of the monarchy. Hypocritically, while the
employers flaunted labour legislation, La Vanguardia counselled 'respect' and 'obedience'
in the hope that 'the working masses will accept the law'. Displaying a similarly selective
attitude towards the new Republican legislation, the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional hid
from the demands of the CNT behind the Jurados, endorsing the arbitration courts as a
peaceful solution to industrial conflicts and using them as an excuse not to treat with the
Confederation. Moreover, the UGT and its methods provided the Catalan bourgeoisie
with a respite from the demands of the CNT. For instance, the management at the
Telefónica submitted working conditions to arbitration in the Jurados, while employers
on the port used the 'disciplined mass' of the UGT as a counter-balance to the CNT.
Industrialists interpreted the spread of labour conflictivity, not as the product of a
class struggle based on antithetical interests but, as the result of the sinister imposition of
ideologies that exploited an essentially docile proletariat in order to advance the private
interests of 'agitators'. Accordingly, because protest was viewed by the capitalists as the
machination of a perverse amoral minority, they asserted that the forced separation of
the CNT insurgents from the rest of society would bring 'social peace' and the
pacification of the working class. The bourgeoisie put new pressures on the Madrid
government to initiate a draconian policy to restore 'the principle of authority' and end
the 'morbid pleasure' derived by the CNT 'sport' of striking and the 'cheap blackmail' of
its 'systematic campaign to force up the level of wages and cut output levels'. In another
highly telling note to the Republican government in Madrid, the Cámara de Comercio y
Navegación, the Barcelona Chamber of Commerce, spoke of the 'gravity' of the social
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situation in Barcelona and the worsening economic crisis caused by a strikewave which,
it was alleged, was destroying the industry of Catalonia and generally 'strangling
economic life'.
The Madrid government saw the CNT strikes in an equally repressive light.
Maura viewed rank-and-file union demands as a conscious offensive against the
Republic, a campaign to wreck the régime and a further example of the 'commotion' he
so disliked to see on the streets. In the words of Azafia, Maura 'vomited draconian
decrees' in Cabinet meetings, due to his determination to calm the fears of big business
and foreign capital and clamp down on 'subversion'. Azafia reflected that what was
required was an 'energetic policy to make the Republic feared'. This view was shared by
the PSOE-UGT, who were equally concerned with the defence of Republican order.
Increasingly, a consensus formed around the view that the CNT was the instigator of
random terror. Crisol, a Madrid-based left-Republican paper, likened the 'violence' of the
CNT to that of the Nazis, while El Socialista, the main PSOE daily, denounced the
editorial board of Solidaridad Obrera as 'gunmen' (pistoleros). Meanwhile, j
Internacional, the ephemeral Barcelona-based UGT weekly saw cenetistas as the 'open
enemies of the new régime' and asserted that 'the consolidation of the Republic and the
conservation of this democratic régime is worth far more than the CNT and its
pernicious leaders'. Interpreting radicalism as an act of sedition against the nascent
democratic order, Luis Araquistain, Largo Caballero's lieutenant, attacked the
'irresponsibility' of the CNT, while pledging the commitment of the UGT to defuse social
tension and police the proletariat within the new Republican order.6°
The stance of the authorities towards the mobilisations of the CNT was vividly
seen in the strike at the ITT-owned Telefónica. Under the pretext that the CNT had not
exhausted the legal channels for arbitration provided by the Jurados, the strike action
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was declared illegal by the government on its very first day. Maura claimed that the
Telefônica strike was 'political' and called for a ban of the rebellious unions which, he
believed, should feel 'the full force of the law'. Even though the telecommunications
sector was the preserve of the very rich and commercial bodies, the government justified
its intervention in the conflict on the grounds that it was a public service. Meanwhile, the
Telefónica conflict became bound up with the inter-union struggles between the CNT
and the UGT. This was recognised by the British Consul-General in Barcelona who
observed that:
'the victory of the strikers.. would be a serious blow to the cause of
law-and-order, as it would immensely increase the power of the
CNT, now the only considerable force in Catalonia. Success in this
strike would mean that it would be practically supreme in this part of
Spain and that its power would be increased in other parts of the
country, where hitherto it has not been able to make much headway
against the UGT'.
The PSOE-UGT, therefore, saw the opportunity presented by the strike to deal a body-
blow to their syndical rivals and openly counselled scabbing and recruited new workers
to cover strikers. Given that the UGT was compromised by the militancy of the CNT,
Largo Caballero's opposition to the CNT was even more radical than that of Maura. The
Labour Minister emphasised that he would tolerate no negotiation in the dispute between
employers and the strike committee. Instead, Largo Caballero encouraged talks between
the UGT and ITT in the Jurados, pointing to the possibility of a piece-meal reform of
working conditions and a greater share of the workforce for the UGT.6'
During the summer strike wave of 1931 official discourse came to resemble that
of the old monarchist authorities and was increasingly dominated by picket violence.
While it had a strong outward appearance of intimidation, picketing was open to diverse
interpretations. For the workers, active picketing was a necessary implementation of
class will, proletarian violence applied to men as well as women who broke class
61 Maura, Asi cayó, pp.281-6; La Vanguardia, 7, 24 July 1931; Solidaridad Obrera, 5, 10, 24 July 1931;
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discipline. Strikes represented highly emotional situations for workers and the decision
to down tools meant foregoing the meagre comforts enjoyed by the proletarian family.
While money might be forthcoming from other family members or the pawnshop, in
general terms, the strike presaged an intensification of relations between the striker, their
communities and the unions, all of which had to be physically defended against 'scabs'
and the police. Meanwhile, stoppages in sectors with relatively high unemployment, such
as brickmakers and barbers, generated even greater dynamics of confrontation as the
unemployed, aware that a strike victory would almost certainly raise the chance of a
return to the workplace, vigorously involved themselves in picketing duties, arranging
'hospital visits' for 'scabs'. Confirming the efficacy of such tactics, recalcitrant employers
often acceded to union demands only after they had been forced into a corner by picket
violence, as happened in a particularly violent barbers strike in the summer, during which
the owners allowed wage rises, recognised the CNT and its bolsa de trabajo following
repeated attacks on salons.62
The authorities ignored the virulence of the social situation and the merits of the
strikers' cause, viewing picket violence in exclusively coercive terms. This emphasis on
'coercion' was part of a drive to construct a consensus against the CNT. Carles Esplá,
the less liberal successor appointed by Maura to replace Companys as Barcelona Civil
Governor, condemned picketing because 'the streets are for everybody'. Meanwhile
Largo Caballero told journalists that the CNT was criminal, expounding that while 'we
[i.e. the UGT] work with ideas, they work with pistols'. Dissociating the causes of
disputes from their effects, the authorities portrayed strikes as wanton attacks on the
collectivity that followed political rather than economic motives. An example of this was
provided by the suggestions of the Republican press that the pickets in the land labourers
strike were preventing lorries from entering the city because they were bent on starving
the city of food. By locating strikes within the framework of public order, Republican
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thinking parallelled that of the monarchy and came to accept that repression could be
unleashed to decapitate the labour movement. Accordingly, Maura issued instructions
that 'energetic measures' be deployed against strikers, while Galarza, the Republican
security chief, ordered police to shoot saboteurs on sight.63
Arrests of pickets became commonplace, as the authorities revealed a profound
sensitivity to claims of employers against syndical 'coercion'. One militant who told an
employer that he would be 'made to comply' with union demands was arrested for
'threatening behaviour'. With the judicial net widening against pickets 'Miss Telefônica
1931' was detained in Madrid following an incident involving strikers and police, while in
Barcelona a group of young children was arrested in the Barn xino for taunting a
telephonist with chants of 'Maria the scab'. Seeing the favourable attitude of the
Republican authorities to their requests for protection, employers revealed their own
inflammatoiy extremism and adopted a strategy of tension. Thus, after an official ban on
strike meetings in the metal sector, management at the Casa Girona metaiworks seized
the initiative, declaring a lock-out, victimising large numbers of union activists and
sacking 1,500 operatives. Employers also relied on new 'scorched earth' tactics, ending
strikes by closing the factory and relocating, an 'all-or-nothing' strategy that left tens of
thousands of workers unemployed in Spain in the first year or so of the Republic. The
strike at La Seda de Barcelona ended in precisely this way, leaving over 1,000 workers
unemployed. Meanwhile, in the Telefónica conflict, management announced its decision
to sack all strikers and was so obdurate that even La Vanguardia was moved to condemn
heavy-handed employers as a danger to 'civic peace'.64
The combination of employer intransigence and official hostility raised the stakes
in the industrial arena, producing a generalised increase in clashes between pickets and
the security forces. In turn, pickets asserted their own right to self-defence and became
63 La Vanguardia, 7, 24 July, 1931; El So!, 4 June 1931; Las Noticias, 14, 25 June 1931; L'Opinió, 9
August 1931; Solidaridad Obrera. 19 July 1931; Maura, AsI cayó, pp.281-286; La Tierra, 8 July 1931
64 Las Noticias, 17-21,25 June 1931; La Vanguardia, 9, 19, 24,27 July, 11, 13, 19-20 August 1931;
L'Opinió, 10 July 1931; Soto Carmona, El trabajo, p.49'I; Solidaridad Obrera, 10-13 June, 10-11, 20
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even more convinced that intensive picketing and maximum solidarity were integral to
triumph. Solidaridad Obrera aided the work of pickets by printing the names and
addresses of those who broke 'class discipline' by 'scabbing'. As the first Republican
summer wore on the social situation in Barcelona steadily deteriorated. The arrival of the
Asaltos on the streets did little to calm the situation. The new police force was deployed
by the authorities to impose 'lightning bans' on strike assemblies and escort 'scabs' into
work. This was quickly followed by a number of clashes between the Asaltos and
pickets. Around the Carrer d'Avinyó telephone exchange, in the narrow streets of the
Gothic Quarter, these skirmishes were becoming almost ritualistic, as small groups of
pickets gathered to meet shifts as they went to and from work; on one occasion an
attack by a group of pickets successfully drew the Asaltos away from the 'scabs',
whereupon the unprotected blacklegs were attacked by another squad of pickets.65
As the numbers of strikes multiplied, the police became seriously overstretched.
To compensate for the growing strains on the security forces perfunctory, 'conveyor-belt'
trials were introduced for pickets, summer police leave was curtailed and instances of
police brutality towards pickets became more commonplace. In a case of 'preventive
brutality' that would not have been out of place during the monarchy, a group of workers
were detained by the Republican police in the proletarian district of Clot and, for no
apparent reason, beaten up. The Republican authorities also resorted to arbitrary
practices like detention without trial, a method that the CNT saw as a recrudescence of
the repression that workers had faced under the monarchy. During the Telefómca strike
the Republican-Socialist government detained some 2,000 cenetistas throughout the
Spanish state, the majority from Barcelona, many of whom were not brought to court
but yet remained incarcerated without trial. Another example of the legacy of the
monarchy within the 'Republic of Order' came when a speaking tour by Durruti in
provincial Catalonia was interrupted by the Civil Governor of Girona, who had the
anarchist veteran arrested to face trial for the 'crimes' he had committed during the
65 Solidaridad Obrera, 7-21 July, 20 August 1931; La Vanguardia. 23, 31 July, 5, 30 August, 1-2
September 1931
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monarchy. The workers of Girona, meanwhile, felt the obsession with the past was
inimical to the new spirit of Republican freedom and they launched a general strike that
spread to surrounding towns, eventually winning Durruti's re1ease.
Although the Republic was clearly a different type of régime to its predecessors,
the mobilisations in the summer of 1931 revealed the extent to which the government
was prepared to rely on those military forces whose repressive capacity had been proven
during the last 50 years of monarchy and dictatorship. Just one month after the birth of
the Republic, in Pasajes, in the Basque Country, the Civil Guard shot eight striking
fishermen dead. The Civil Guard was also deployed during the strike at La Seda de
Barcelona, in which the force established a temporary encampment near the factory and
restricted access to and from the city of Prat de Llobregat. On one occasion the
Benemérita' fired on the strikers, injuring nine workers. The Civil Guard was also used
by the Republican authorities in Barcelona to drive workers out of the workplace to
terminate the factory occupations in Poblenou and in Sants.67
The Republicans relied heavily on the military to maintain public order. In
Girona, during the general protest strike that followed the arrest of Durruti, martial law
was declared and the army patrolled the streets. Similarly, in early July half of the total
complement of the Barcelona garrison was confined to barracks and soldiers were
deployed during the Telefônica strike to guard telephone installations. The same month,
in Seville in southern Spain, martial law was declared by Maura, culminating in the
artillery bombardment of the Casa de Cornelio, a tavern used by communists as a
meeting-place. The police also took advantage of the suspension of civil guarantees in
Seville to apply the infamous 'ley de fugas' against four pickets who were later found
dead in the city park, while the killers were left at large. Shortly after the Sevillian
events, the Barcelona police followed suit, relying on the 'ley de fugas' to kill three
Solidaridad Obrera, 11, 12, 14, 28-31 July, 1 August 1931; L'Opinió. 29 July 1931; La Vanguardia,
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construction workers dead, wounding five others. In their defence the police asseverated
that they had been fired on first by a prisoner and from rooftops, yet no policemen were
wounded. Like in Seville, the Republican authorities accepted the testimony of the
security forces and there were neither detentions nor reprimands.68
The growing spiral of violence in the city was exacerbated by the Barcelona
UGT. Irrespective of its quietist expectancy and its public celebrations of Republican
legality, the Catalan UGT perpetrated acts of anti-CNT aggression. Barely one month
into the Republic a dispute broke out at the Alena box factoiy near the port, after
ugetistas had connived with the employers to replace victimised cenetistas. When an
unarmed delegation of sacked CNT workers approached the factory to protest, UGT
men fired over 100 rounds at the cenetistas, injuring 13. This was followed by a similar
attack in Blanes, up the coast from Barcelona, which left four cenetistas wounded. In
neither case did the police make arrests, something that convinced many labour militants
that the security forces were only prepared to protect those workers who crossed picket
lines. The apparent partiality of the police encouraged numerous worker-activists to
assume personal responsibility for their physical security and arms became ever more in
evidence on the streets. Meanwhile, the frequency of clashes between ugetistas and
cenetistas grew, most notably during strikes on the port and at Telefónica, where the
management replaced CNT members with their socialist rivals. Solidaridad Obrera
denounced El Socialista as the 'police journal', the 'echo of the Company' and the 'official
organ' of ITT and Catalan capitalists. Amid fears of a bloody union war like that which
had once raged between the cenetistas and the libreuios, the CNT promised 'social
hygiene' against the incursions of 1..JGT turncoats' in Catalonia. At the same time, the
physical attacks by ugetistas on cenetistas heightened suspicions inside the
Confederation that the Catalan UGT was 'the vacuum cleaner for all the residues,
detritus and scum that are the sad inheritance from past repressive regimes: it has
68 El MatI, 18-19 June 1931; La Vanguardia, 9 July 1931; Solidaridad Obrera, 8, 24-25 July, 12
September 1931; Maura, Mi cayó, pp.206, 240-277; Azaña, Obras, vol.4, p.43; Macarro Vera, Sevilla,
pp.47-52; Vidarte, Las Cortes, pp.76, 119; La Vanguardia, 5 September 1931
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become the willing receptacle of militant gunmen'. From the level of violence perpetrated
it was not entirely unreasonable for the CNT to surmise that its socialist rival 'had picked
up all the undesirable elements and a large number of gunmen from the Sindicato Libre',
making it 'a cloak for the gunmen and mercenaries of Anido', the former military
governor of Barcelona. Moreover, Solidaridad Obrera published evidence of links
between ex-libreños and members of the Barcelona UGT.69
The Catalan capital was, nevertheless, distinct to UGT strongholds like the
Spanish capital, where there were strong traditions of corporatism among workers and
employers. 70 By contrast, the structure of Catalan capitalism and the attitude of the
bourgeoisie engendered particularly open industrial conflicts which vitiated the
applicability industrial courts like the Jurados. Consequently, the Madrid government
was mistaken in concluding that because the Catalan CNT rejected the Jurados it sought
to undermine the Republic. Moreover, although the strike-wave of the summer of 1931
was unprecedented in the history of Catalan industrial relations, it was not a
revolutionary attack on the state.
It must be stressed, however, that the strikes were not entirely detached from the
political context that accompanied the coming of the Republic. The CNT rank-and-file
knew that it had contributed to the fall of the monarchy and had many illusions in the
new Republican authorities who had aroused broad expectations of change. The
Telefónica conflict was a clear example of this process. ITT had been awarded the
Telefónica during the dictatorship, amid much bribery involving the dictator and his son,
José Antonio. The result was that ITT was exempted from tax payments, while the state
accepted responsibility for all plant maintenance from the public purse. Both the
Republicans and the PSOE inveighed against the Telefónica contract as an indictment of
69 F037 1/1 5774/W7 137/46/41: Report from Consul-General King, 9 June 1931 (PRO);
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business practises under the dictatorship. Prieto publicly referred to the contract as a
'theft (latrocinio), an unaccountable robbery (atraco)'. The Republicans promised a
prompt revision of the contract when they came to power and some within the
Republican-Socialist coalition even vowed to nationalise the telecommunications sector.
Meanwhile, despite the generosity of its franchise, the Telefónica management quickly
became renowned for its draconian industrial policy and the imposition of an
authoritarian labour discipline that had removed all job stability among its low-paid
workforce.7'
When the CNT reorganised between 1930-1931 the vehemently anti-union
management sacked a number of union militants and supplied their names to the police.
By the time the CNT tabled its demands at the Telefônica, the rank-and-file was
encouraged by the presence in power of those who had condemned ITT so vocally
during the dictatorship. It was also confident of victory because its central demands for
better wages and working conditions, and for the readmission of some 1,500 workers
sacked by management before the Republic, were hardly of a revolutionary nature. Even
when the strike began, the Telefónica workers were optimistic, at best expecting
government support for their demands, at least anticipating tolerance towards their
claims against the management. 72 However, as we have seen, the transformation of the
Republican Revolutionary Committee into the first Republican government was
accompanied by an abrupt change in perspectives.
There is another sense in which the strike wave was also connected to the advent
of the new régime. In conjunctural terms, the coming of the Republic signified the end of
the artificial social equilibrium that had previously been imposed by the dictator. The
Republic, therefore, inherited a virulent social context. According to the figures of the
International Labour Office, with the exception of the Portuguese, Spanish workers were
the lowest paid in Europe, with a spending power six times lower than American
71 Cánovas Cervantes, Apuntes, pp.171-175; Solidaridad Obrera, 25 January, 24 February, 12 March, 4,
25, 30 April, 21 May 1931; de Guzmá.n, La SegundaRepüblica, p.76
72 Abad de Santillán, Contribución, vol.3, p.71
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operatives. Even in recession-torn Germany, wages were twice as high as in Spain, while
the food price index was markedly lower. In this sense, the strike mobilisations of 1931
reflected a largely spontaneous collective effort by the most downtrodden elements of
the Catalan working class to recoup wages and guarantee a basic level of material
existence in the face of a rising cost of living, inflation and unemployment. 'We are the
authentic pariahs of the capitalist world', remarked Solidaridad Obrera, and 'it is truly
remarkable that the whole population of Spain is not on strike'. Matters were further
exacerbated in those industries with high levels of unemployment, where syndical
structures were often radicalised as jobless workers flooded into the bolsas de trabajo.
As the CNT Barbers' Syndicate explained on the eve of a strike action, after seven years
of dictatorship union rank-and-filers were in a 'desperate situation... on the point of
sinking'. This burdensome legacy could not bring restraint upon workers, whose
grievances could not be rapidly redressed through the Jurados. Hence, the unskilled
working class articulated its aspirations through the CNT, in the form of a generalised
strike offensive in pursuit of 'bread-and-butter' demands and anti-unemployment
measures which, contrary to the conspiracy theories of the Republican government,
aimed to secure improved working conditions, wage rises, union recognition and defence
against joblessness, and not the overthrow of the new régime. Similarly, other union
demands, such as for exclusive recognition of the CNT bolsa de Ira bajo, were long-
standing ambitions that were not designed to upset the Republic.73
The 1931 strike campaign was driven on by the new proletariat in the ghettos on
the outskirts of Barcelona like Santa Coloma and La Torrassa in l'Hospitalet and in the
Cases Barates, where, for the first time, the CNT organised the thousands of unskilled
immigrants who had entered the unions in the hope that their wretched material situation
could be altered through collective syndical mobilisation. These peripheral working class
Solidaridad Obrera. 13 January, 26 March, 13 August 1931; Las Noticias, 11 December 1931;
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districts were seething and on a propaganda visit to the proletarian outskirts of the city
in May Garcia Oliver praised the 'barbarous' atmosphere reigning among the immigrant
proletariat. 74 It was this groundswell of activity that lay the basis for the meteoric revival
of the CNT between 1930-1931 and the series of mobilisations that followed. During
these strikes, the CNT grew in numbers, drawing in hundreds of thousands of workers
who saw the Confederation as the best vehicle to pursue their day-to-day material
aspirations, underlining the extent to which membership was always conditional on the
ability of the unions to fight, and sometimes win, against the bourgeoisie.75
The open, decentralised nature of the CNT provides a further explanation for the
eruption of strikes in the days of hope after the birth of the Republic. The climate of
branch union meetings was one of ebullience following the recent victory over the
monarchy. Sentiments that the time was ripe for change electrified assemblies and shop
stewards were keen not just to recapture past economic positions but, in a more general
sense, regain the collective dignity of the proletariat and recuperate the revolutionary
reputation of the CNT. This makes sense of demands for the re-employment of
victimised workers during the epic strike at La Canadenca in 1919 and the 1917
railwaymen's strike. Many strikes took place through the CNT but not necessarily under
the direct control of the union, as many shop stewards were either simply unprepared or
unable to neutralise such a groundswell in favour of action. The Confederal masses were
also aroused by the traditions of material, moral and physical solidarity among the CNT
unions. This stimulated an avalanche of industrial conflicts. However, the tendency to
push demands without full consultation with other unions meant that a number of strikes
were so hurriedly launched that they lacking in basic preparation and carried few real
Solidaridad Obrera, 2 September 1930, 18 April, 24 May, 14 June, 1, 2, 16, 28 September 1931
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chances of success. Nevertheless, when the dispute arrived at a position of stalemate, the
striking union executive looked to the Barcelona Local Federation for assistance and
appealed for Confederal solidarity and financial support from other union sections.76
The unrelenting wave of strikes increasingly irritated the anarcho-syndicalist
union leadership which, since the relegalisation of the CNT in 1930, had been concerned
at the growing number of industrial conflicts. While the long-term aims of many of those
inside the CNT went well beyond the bourgeois Republic and although there were
definite limits to the sacrifices the rank-and-file were prepared to make for the new
régime, the CNT leadership was ready to allow a brief period of coexistence with the
Republic, during which the unions were to be re-organised before the next stage on the
road to ultimate social liberation.
The priontisation by the CNT leadership of practical trade union organisation
over their ultimate revolutionary objectives pushed them towards a reformist praxis. This
was evident from their warnings that excessive strikes might sap proletarian energies and
endanger future revolutionary developments. Similar organisational concerns were
reflected in the fears of the moderate leadership that the failure in strike actions would
produce a wave of disenchantment across the union base and lead membership to pave
away. This was matched with disquiet that those who remained in the CNT would be
radicalised by the failure of ill-prepared strikes, thereby making a clash with the Republic
inevitable.
These worries grew in the summer of 1931, when the moderate leadership
attacked a series of strikes that it regarded as an abuse of CNT federalism and solidarity.
While the CNT leadership accepted that the rank-and-file had many legitimate
grievances, Solidaridad Obrera implored unions to consider the interests of the entire
organisation before entering into a dispute. The moderates hoped to regulate the flow of
conflicts, even hinting at the desiribility of a kind of 'stacking system' for starting
industrial conflicts, whereby those unions with the most disadvantaged members would
76 Solidaridad Obrera, 8 July 1931; Traba jo,15 June 1931; La Vanguardia, 13, 30 August 1931
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be allowed to begin strike action first, during which time other unions would be required
to provide financial solidarity. Solidaridad Obrera also took issue with those shop
stewards who it believed initiated conflicts unnecessarily. In an attempt to restrain the
militancy of the union base, the CNT daily appealed for the rank-and-file to ostracise
impulsive factory delegates. More propagandistically, the moderates played down the
accumulated injustices felt by the proletariat and blamed strikes on the FM. When
possible the moderates intervened to prevent strikes. On one occasion the moderate
union leadership even accepted the intervention of the Civil Governor to avert a strike by
CNT bakers. The leadership also successfully persuaded both the Textile workers and
Builders' unions to withdraw their strike committees, thereby forestalling conflicts that
would have affected up to 100,000 workers in the Barcelona area.77
The struggle of the moderates to stem the tide of rising militancy was a labour of
Sisyphus. The emergence of a 'Republic of Order' and the sectarian activities of the
UGT, matched with the accumulated expectations of labour and the expansion of the
CNT among younger and unskilled workers, all conspired to generate dynamics of
radicalisation that very quickly produced a number of protracted union struggles in
Barcelona. A pattern of industrial conflict revolving around a cycle of mass strike, boss
intransigence, UGT 'scabbing', official repression and a concomitant rise in proletarian
militancy, sabotage and picket violence was, therefore, established early on in the
Republic. Employer intransigence and state and UGT repression were instrumental in
accelerating the formation of the Confederal Defence Committees byfaIstas from the
grupos de acción and cenetistas from the picketing teams. Amid spiralling violence,
whether flyposting by night or picketing by day, the pistol became a guarantee of
protection for cenetista militants from either police or ugetistas.
Solidaridad Obrera, 2 November, 13 December 1930, 7, 19, 27-30 May, 9 June, 3, 16, 19 July 1931;
La Vanguardia, 4 July, 9-15 August 1931. That the Builders' Union, the only union under the control of
the FM in summer 1931, actually pulled back from the brink of strike action in the summer of 1931 at
the behest of the CNT Local Federation, would tend to undermine the claim that the strike wave was the
work of the faLctas.
146
The increasingly frequent clashes between the Republican security forces and the
CNT Defence Committees created a growing distrust for the new police among
cenetistas. Moreover, as armed clashes with the Asaltos became commonplace, the
armed anarchist grupos came to the fore on the streets. At the end of July two Asaltos
were left seriously wounded after they attempted to detain a group of militants outside
the CNT Textile union offices in the anarchist stronghold of Clot. The same night, when
a contingent of Asaltos and police attempted to raid what they alleged was a 'clandestine
meeting' of the Confederal Defence Committees at the Carrer de Mercaders Builders'
Union offices, the security forces were met by a hail of gunfire. This was followed by a
four-hour siege, involving hundreds of members of the security forces, that left six
workers dead and nearly 50 wounded on both sides. Tellingly, the grupistas only agreed
to surrender to the army, fearful that the police would apply the ley defugas.78
The sharpening tempo of violence turned the balance away from the moderates
who, although they accepted the limited use of sabotage and aggressive picketing, relied
most of all on a mixture of syndical muscle and negotiation. By contrast, the upsurge in
conflictivity created a climate that allowed the radical anarchists to deploy their own
violence which, they believed, would frighten the bourgeoisie into submission. An
example of the tactics of the anarchist radicals was seen at the end of July, when an
armed group arrived at the main telephone exchange on Passeig de Gràcia, in the
bourgeois heart of the city, and laid a huge explosive device. Rather than cowing the
enemies of the Telefónica strike into submission, the violence of the anarchist radical
presented the authorities with a a pretext to launch an all-out assault on the CNT, much
to the chagrin of the anarcho-syndicalist moderates. Even though it was highly unlikely
that the union executive had any knowledge of the Passeig de Gràcia attack, an order for
the arrest of the strike committee was issued, all union meetings were banned and the
union leadership was forced into clandestinity, from where the strike was lost. 79 Rather
than advance the cause of the strikers, therefore, such bomb attacks served only to lose
78 La Vanguardia, 25 July 1931; Bueso, Recuerdos, vol.2, pp.58-60
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strikes. Yet defeat also bolstered the position of thefaIstas within the CNT, as it was the
radical anarchists who were best placed to tap the frustration of the growing numbers of
workers who felt defrauded by the 'Republic of Order'.
Although many industrial workers in Barcelona took advantage of the first
months of the Republic to attain much-needed improvements in their working
conditions, the overall trend was towards disappointment at the way the authorities
seemed to be protecting employers. For example, the month long strike of 42,000
Barcelona metal workers ended at the end of August after the authorities brokered a deal
whereby employers accepted most union demands, including an end to piece-work, wage
rises and the establishment of an unemployment subsidy. However, as soon as the CNT
returned to work the Republican authorities turned a blind eye as employers held back
their contributions to the unemployment fund and eventually wrecked the settlement.
The Telefónica strike was another huge failure for CNT and when the management
threatened mass redundancies, many cenetistas joined the UGT. As summer turned to
autumn, these defeats radicalised many union members, especially the branch activists,
the true backbone of the Confederal organisation, who ran the CNT on a daily basis,
organising meetings and collecting contributions. Highly concerned with working
conditions, these base militants rarely spoke in public, yet they were most active in
formulating working class demands and they were highly respected in the workplace.
Disappointed that the Republican change was not the magical panacea for the ills facing
the proletariat, it was this section of the Barcelona CNT that was most radicalised by the
experience of the summer strikes and the continuation of the 'wages of misery that
impede us from satisfying the most elementary necessities'. These criticisms soon gave
way to talk in favour of destroying capitalism, along with 'this lamentable Republic'.80
The most revolutionary elements within the FM sought to tap these frustrations
and blame the strike defeats squarely on the Republic. In keeping with the libertarian
orthodoxy that the constituted power is always an anti-proletarian force and the
Solidaridad Obrera, 13 August 1931
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protector of the privileged classes, the anarchists cited the repression of CNT strikes and
the talk of a 'Republic of Order' as evidence that the Republic and the monarchy were
'the same dogs with different collars'. The anarchists were confident that the working
class would not tolerate this for long and that the consolidation of the Republic would be
impeded. GarcIa Oliver and the 'anarcho-Bolsheviks' proclaimed that the Barcelona
proletariat would be at the forefront of a new revolution that would bring the shaky
edifice of the Republic tumbling down. In fact, the spontaneous strike-wave and the
signs of mass impatience at the tempo of change provided evidence for 'Nosotros' that
the masses had already partially overcome their 'complex of fear' towards the security
forces and that a simple spark would incite a huge revolutionary conflagration in Spain.8'
The revolutionary optimism of the anarchists was in large part shared by the
dissident communist Bloc and although the level of mobilisation of the Barcelona
proletariat was not replicated elsewhere in the Spanish state, La Batalla told workers
they were 'on the eve of an immense revolutionary convulsion'. Like the radical
anarchists, the BOC was adamant that the new régime had to be superseded by the
revolutionary working class. However, the dissident communists were shorn of the
apolitical illusions of the anarchists and the anarcho-syndicalists and they were not
surprised by the clash between the middle class Republicans and their erstwhile working
class allies. As the OSR explained, 'the Republican government can never be on the side
of the workers, nor on neutral ground. It is a bourgeois government and it has to
forcefully defend the bourgeoisie against the proletariat'. Consequently, the communist-
syndicalists claimed that in the face of the generalised syndical offensive, 'the central
Republican authorities' and the 'social-fascists' of the 'counter-revolutionary' UGT 'have
embarked on an open offensive against our union organisation, the CNT'.82
Even though they were growing in influence, the FM and the BOC still did not
represent majority positions within the CNT. Equally, although the class collaborationist
stance of the UGT had heightened grass-roots hostility within the Confederation towards
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the socialists, the standing of the new régime was not totally damaged and there was no
discernible swing against the Republic. Instead, the bulk of the criticisms from the
moderate CNT leadership about the repressive turn of events and the 'legal violence' of
the Jurados focused on specific personalities inside the Republican government,
especially Maura and Largo Caballero, both of whom were despised as 'lackeys of US
imperialism' and the Catalan bourgeoisie. Maura became known in CNT circles as
'Maura of the 108 deaths', referring to the number of fatalities during his term as Interior
Minister, or 'the son of Maura' (el hgo de Maura), a reminder of the bloody legacy of his
father and a play-on-words that inferred the minister was of uncertain parentage. In June
the CNT began a campaign to remove Maura and Largo Caballero from government, an
initiative that was premised on the reformist assumption that if the two offending
ministers were replaced, the CNT could co-exist happily with the new authorities.
Solidaridad Obrera even issued a call for Maura to be tried under Republican law as a
monarchist provocateur. Although the CNT press issued condemnations of'Republican
fascism', this was not seen as an institutional problem but merely something inherent to
the repressive personal qualities of the two ministers and their 'anti-anarchist
psychological make-up'. This highly subjective view was also shared by some anarchists,
as well as the Prisoners' Support Committee, who was always highly sensitive to the
effects of state repression. Curiously, despite its growing responsibilities, the Prisoners'
Support Committee refused to blame the bourgeois Republic for the repression, singling
out instead 'a few men who, from authority and the security services have declared a war
to the death' against the CNT.83
A dialectic had, nevertheless, emerged: as the Republic became more repressive,
the CNT revealed its growing frustration with the limited nature of change brought by
the Republic and more readily adopted a position of hostility towards the new
authorities. Largo Caballero and the Republican government were warned that by
attacking the CNT they were 'playing with fire and it is possible that this fire will
Solidaridad Obrera, 28 April, 19 June, 3, 5, 10, 23-29 July, 20 August, 2 September 1931; Abad de
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consume your plans'. Similarly, the branch union from the Telefónica, radicalised by its
stoppage, issued an apocalyptic threat of the 'general revolutionary strike throughout
Spain' if the government did not refrain from aiding ITT. On another occasion,
Solidaridad Obrera announced that 'a Republic administered by executioners and
assassins cannot interest anybody, even less so the workers.. .Today, like yesterday, the
reins of power continue to be held by the bourgeoisie'. The CNT was vehement that
there be any peace with a Republic 'sold to the plutocracy'. Meanwhile, the union
leadership had an attitude of aprés nous le deluge and the anarcho-syndicalists warned
the Republican government that if it made life difficult for the existing leadership, they
would end up facing a more hardened revolutionary CNT leadership. However, the
attacks of the moderates on the government are best seen as attempts to placate their
radical critics in the unions of the CNT, rather than as a declaration of an insurrectionary
intent to replace the Republic with a revolutionary order. Certainly, the Confederal
leadership maintained its expectant 'wait-and-see' attitude towards the Republic and
openly expressed its conviction that the CNT would get a better deal when the
Generalitat assumed control of law-and-order.84
Solidaridad Obrera, 11 June, 2-3, 23, 29 July, 21 August 1931; La Vanguardia, 17 July 1931;
Batalla, 11 June 1931; El Luchador, 24 July 1931
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Chapter 4: The Battle for the Streets
4.1. Autonomous Catalonia
When Macia accepted de los RIos's proposal to replace the Catalan Republic of
April 14 with the Generalitat the political initiative passed back to Madrid. The ruling
Republican-Socialist coalition in Madrid entrusted the Esquerra with the task of drawing
up an Autonomy Statute, a bill for Catalan home rule. Only aller the Autonomy Statute
had been accepted by the Catalan people would the Madrid Cortes consider the issue of
Catalan self-government. The Esquerra was, therefore, in an ambiguous position: it had
won a massive electoral mandate in the April municipal elections but, until Madrid
devolved power to Barcelona the party lacked any real authority or institutional channels
through which it could develop its policies. The Esquerra was seen to be in power but, in
fact, it was largely a spectator, unable to enact the reforms it had promised before April,
the very progressive policies that it hoped would galvanise the coalition of forces that
had greeted the coming of the Republic. Moreover, as the growing rivalry between the
Catalan CNT and the Madrid government threatened to poison social and political
relations in Barcelona and weaken the Republic, the ERC became increasingly frustrated
at its inability to determine the course of events.
The Esquerra faced two major political tests in the summer of 1931: the first
parliamentary elections to the Madrid parliament at the end of June, followed by the
plebiscite on the Catalan Autonomy Statute in early August. These two votes generated
an electoral climate in Barcelona throughout the summer months. In the run-up to both
votes, the hallmark of ERC electoral propaganda was the evocation of the same mass
expectations that characterised the April municipal elections. In June, the Esquerra
frequently described its electoral programme and its pact with the reformist USC as
'revolutionary'. Even the electoral process was deemed 'revolutionary'. In similar vein,
despite his advanced years, Macia declared himself to be 'a child of the revolution'. This
rhetoric was typically confused, however, and the party eclectically mixed its historical
models and metaphors. At one electoral rally Companys promised a kind of socialist
transformation, declaring himself in favour of 'the nationalisation of the big factories'.
Two days later LluhI i Vallescà cast his vision back a few centuries to the great
bourgeois upheavals, drawing parallels between the plans of the ERC and the English,
French and American Revolutions. Meanwhile, in the prelude to the plebiscite on the
Autonomy Statute, the ERC promised that their future labour legislation would the most
progressive in the world, superior to that of both Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia.'
Like the electoral propaganda of the ERC in April, the June electoral agitation
lacked internal consistency and was largely conceived to arouse mass aspirations and
draw people to vote for the 'revolutionary aggression' of the Esquerra. To this end, the
ERC issued concrete promises of'union freedoms', the implementation of
'comprehensive workers' insurance' to deal with unemployment, an ill that the party
regarded as 'one of the most imposing problems which the Republic has been presented
with'. The ERC election campaign was framed within a broad concern for the most
humble sectors of Catalan society, including the immigrant proletariat. In a direct
overture to the new proletariat, Aiguader I Miró explained that 'we feel for the Catalonia
of the oppressed and this is the Catalonia that we want to liberate with all our
power.. .We want to make a free nation and justice for all men, wherever they come from
and however they speak'. In similar tones, Macia solemnly pledged that a vote for the
ERC would bring 'social justice' and 'total freedom'.2
The agitation in favour of the Autonomy Statute was of a similar character. The
ERC appealed to the non-Catalan residents through its commitment to 'freedom', 'social
justice' and action on 'social questions'. In one intervention Macia emphatically declared
his support for the jobless: 'I say to all the workers that while the Generalitat is in our
hands, they will have the best guarantees possible for culture and work'. Finally, two
days before the vote, the headlines of L'Opinió resounded: 'Say "YES ! " and the old
chains from two centuries will fall. The day after tomorrow Catalonia will be free'.
Meanwhile, it was maintained that those who voted against the Statute would commit 'a
crime of lèse patrie. . . they are deserters against the cause of freedom [and] traitors to
Catalonia and the liberal spirit'.3
1 L'Opiniô, 12-13, 20-27 June, 29 July 1931
2 L'Opimó, 13, 24, 26 June 1931
L'Opimó, 25, 31 July, 1 August, 1 September 1931
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In an attempt to tap the hostility felt towards Maura and Largo within the CNT
the ERC condemned the policies of both ministers, promising to guarantee 'full syndical
freedoms' and repeal all the unpopular legislation introduced since April, including
Largo's labour laws. Not only did the anti-government rhetoric of the Esquerra serve its
short-term electoral purposes, but it was also part of an attempt to channel the
frustration of the Barcelona CNT during the opening months of the Republic. Certainly,
the CNT leadership was highly impressed by these overtures and hoped to use the
Generalitat as a counter-balance to the hostile policies of Madrid. Peiró praised Macia's
'high moral authority' and even some anarchists remained under the spell of the President
of the Generalitat. Meanwhile, although the CNT neither advocated a vote for the ERC
in the June parliamentary elections, nor sanctioned the Autonomy Statute, like in April,
Solidaridad Obrera farcically announced the absolute independence of the CNT from all
political parties, while advertising the meetings of the petit bourgeois Esquerra and
remaining closed to any positive discussion of the proletarian politics of the Bloc.4
The continuing dalliance of the anarchists and the anarcho-syndicalists with the
Esquerra is curious, not least because both tendencies thoroughly misunderstood the
dynamics of the national question. Indeed, despite their federalist traditions, both the
anarchists and the anarcho-syndicalists vehemently rejected the legitimacy of the national
demands of the Galician, Basque and Catalan peoples. Ironically, these national
aspirations received greatest sympathy among the supposedly 'centralising' communists,
who advocated that the workers' movement should seize control of the fight for national
freedom in a twin struggle against the various local bourgeoisies and the central
authorities in Madrid. 5 By contrast, the libertarians were guided by a Socratean self-
image as citizens of the world, within which Barcelona was regarded as a universal,
proletarian capital. Meanwhile, Catalanisme, in all its variants, was perceived by the
4 L'Opinió, 24 June, 29 July, 7-9, 12 August 1931; Josep Tennes, Federalismo. anarcosindicalismo v
catalanismo, Barcelona, 1977, pp.149-iSO; Solidaridad Obrera. 31 May, 4-5, 16 June, 3,28 July 1931;
El Luchador, 6 November 1931; La Batalla. 4 July 1931
Solidaridad Obrera, 19, 26 April 1931; Miró, Cataluna; Jordi Sabater, Anarguisme I Catalanisme. La
CNT i la fet nacional català durant la Guerra Civil, Barcelona, 1986, passim.; Ricard de Vargas-
Gotarons et. at., Anarciuisme i alliberament nacional, Barcelona, 1987; José Luls and José Maria
Arenillas, Sobre la cuestión nacional en Euskadi, Barcelona, 1981; Miravitlies, Ha traIt Macia, passim.;
LaBatalla, 16 July 1931
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libertarians as an inherently bourgeois and reactionary creed, synonymous with the
repression of the proletariat and the division of the international working class
brotherhood. The contradictions of this vacuous internationalist philosophy were seen
days after the collapse of the monarchy in a CNT manifesto that warned the ERC against
separating Cataloma from Spain. Bizarrely reminiscent of the most centralistic
proponents of Bourbon autocracy, the CNT threatened to 'place all its forces in the
streets', promising that if the Generalitat seceded from the Spanish state 'all the Catalan
proletariat will rise up, as a single man and block this', using all its resources, 'from the
general strike to armed insurrection'.6
Despite its Universalist rhetoric, there is no doubt that the anarchists and the
anarcho-syndicalists allowed their supporters to vote for the ERC in the June elections
and in the plebiscite on the Autonomy Statute in August. In the parliamentary elections,
the poor result of the BOC and the emphatic victory of the ERC is evidence enough,
while one leading Barcelona anarchist later described the vote on the Autonomy Statute
as 'the second act of the Republican drama'. This was no exaggeration: from an electoral
register ofjust over 790,000 in Catalonia, the 592,691 votes cast in favour of the Statute
amounted to 75% of the entire census. Meanwhile, there were only 3,276 votes cast
against, 1,105 spoiled papers and the abstention rate was below 25%. Solidaridad
Obrera regarded the plebiscite as 'the will of the people against the oppression of an
illiberal government'. Therefore, as well as welcoming the birth of the Republic, the CNT
masses also provided Catalonia with its first chance for self-determination in two
centuries.7
The Esquerra was understandably triumphant after the rapturous endorsement of
the Autonomy plebiscite. L'Opinió declared that 'the Catalan Revolution' has begun,
because 'today, Catalonia is free.. .For the first time ever the individuals who represent
Barcelona are true representatives of the people'. This was echoed by Macia who told a
jubilant crowd from the balcony of the Palau de la Generalitat: We are free!' ('Ja som
6 Solidandad Obrera, 19, 24 April 1931
Las Noticias, 30 June 1931; L'Opinió, 1 July 1931; La Balalla, 4, 16, 23 July 1931; Sanz, i
sindicalismo y la polItica, p.2 17; Mba, Catalufla, p.240; Solidaridad Obrera, 2 August 1931; Mba, Els
problemes, p.88
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iliures!'). More symbolically, Josep Dencàs, a rising figure in the Esquerra, likened the
Catalans to the Israelites, moving ineluctably towards their 'promised land'. The
triumphal calculations of the Esquerra were anchored in the naïve belief that the Madrid
Republican government would ratify the Autonomy Statute immediately. L'Opinió
embodied this ingenuous sentiment, declaring that 'this is the time for the will of the
people.. .Now it will be confirmed that the Spanish Republic is liberal and democratic'.
Inspired by equally artless expectations, Macia appealed to the central government to
legislate the home rule without haste and he set off for Madrid to obtain parliamentary
approval for the draft Autonomy Statute. Many Catalans believed they were on the brink
of a new age and, convinced that Macia would return from the Spanish capital with the
Statute accepted, the homecoming of the President of the Generalitat was that of a
conquering hero, and the streets of Barcelona were lined with delirious crowds.8
The resounding mandate acquired by the Esquerra from the Catalan and the
immigrant masses alike in the three votes between April and August obscured the reality
that the party had actually conquered nothing. Given the sluggish gradualism that
marked the treatment by the central government of all the pressing issues facing the
Spanish state and the masses, any hopes that Madrid would speedily endorse Catalan
autonomy were naïve in the extreme. Moreover, the customary legislative languor of the
Spanish Republicans was enhanced by the traditional anti-Catalanisme of the Madrid
political elite. According to the British Embassy in Madrid, the central authorities felt
nothing but 'apprehension' at the transferral of powers to Barcelona.9
As we have already seen, españolismo was particularly rife among the socialists.
This was particularly true of Pneto who, according to the testimony of Azafla, proposed
the use of force against Macia if he refused to back down over the issue of the Catalan
Republic. Although the ERC had acquiesced peacefully in April out of respect for the
interests of the new Republic, the PSOE remained highly suspicious of the Catalan
L'Opimó, 2-15, 25 August, 5 November 1931
F0371/165051W6393: Letter from Sir G. Grabame, 3 June 1932 (PRO)
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Republicans, despite the fact that the Spanish socialists were represented in the
Generalitat government by Vidal i Rosell, the Catalan UGT leader.'°
The PSOE was also motivated by tactical concerns. Their main misgiving was
that if powers were devolved from Madrid to Barcelona the ERC might scrap the
Jurados in Cataloma as a concession to the CNT. Such a departure would leave the UGT
isolated in Catalonia and preclude any possibility of massaging new life into the Catalan
UGT. It was this fear that encouraged the PSOE to slow down the passage of the
Autonomy Statute in the Cortes. To this end, El Socialista embarked on a campaign
against Catalan self-government, asserting that the ERC would bring the 'balkanisation
of Spain'. The PSOE also articulated a series of chauvinistic declarations about the 'racial
political incapacity' of Catalans. Moreover, despite the pro-Republican, anti-rightist and
democratic spirit of the majority of Catalans, El Socialista aroused alarm that the Lliga
could win future elections to the Generalitat and that therefore the devolution of powers
to Barcelona would create an Achilles Heel for the Republic, allowing the right to use
Catalonia as a launch-pad to conquer the Republic. The anti-federalist climate generated
by the PSOE was sufficient for the Autonomy Statute to become bogged down in a
quagmire of bureaucratic committees, parliamentary filibustering and legislative
immobility in the Cortes.'1
The anti-Catalanisme of sections of the Madrid government and the lassitude of
the Cortes placed the Esquerra in a highly compromising situation. The fundamental
problem for the Esquerra remained that although the party was seen as occupying power
and controlling policy, real authority rested in Madrid and the Generalitat was unable to
influence the legislative process until the full implementation of the Autonomy Statute.
Thus, for all the vague promises of liberation and the portrayal of Catalonia as the avant-
garde of the new democratic Republic, the ERC had no means by which it could
ameliorate the brutal context facing those most in need of assistance.
10 Azafa, Obras, vol.4, p.154; Gonzalez Casanova, Federalismo, pp.302-303. Eventually Vidal i Rosell
resigned from the Generalitat because of the conflict between the ERC and the PSOE over the Statute,
however, Macia replaced him with Josep Jove Sarroca, another PSOE member, on 20 December 1931:
Balcells, Marxismo, p.34
11 El Socialista, 7, 15, 25-26 July, 2, 4 August, 25 September, 23 October, 6 December 1931; Cruells,
Macia, pp.140-14!
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Since the demise of the Catalan Republic and the resignation of Companys as
Civil Governor, the only remaining power base left to the ERC was the network of
Councils under the control by the party. However, municipal power was no real solution
to the problems facing the ERC. Firstly, most of the Councils had highly limited powers
of tax collection. Secondly, the financial resources of most Catalan Councils were in
utter disarray after the corruption of the dictatorship. The new municipal administration
in Barcelona inherited a financial disaster following the corruption in the run up to the
1929 Exhibition and the years of generalised mismanagement during the 1920s had left a
municipal debt roughly equivalent to the national debt of Portugal. The economic
situation inside Barcelona Council highlighted the meek reformism of the Esquerra and
the party quickly reneged on its earlier promise to write-off the municipal debt after
financial institutions warned that such an action constituted an unacceptable confiscation
of bank capital. Finally, the impecunious situation of the ERC Councils and the
Generalitat worsened in July when the Banc de Catalunya suspended payments due to
capital shortages. When the Banc de Reus and the Banc de Tortosa followed suit, the
instability of the major Catalan financial institutions was complete. Meanwhile, Prieto,
ever suspicious of the ERC and keen to restrict the independence of Cataloma,
precipitated the further collapse of the Banc de Catalunya from the Ministry of the
Economy by withdrawing its state funding and freezing all loans to both Barcelona
Council and the Generalitat, thereby guaranteeing a budget deficit throughout the
coming years.' 2 The parsimonious attitude of the Madrid government and the hostile
attitude of Pneto in the Treasury, debilitated the intended source of funding for the
Generalitat public works scheme which, in the words of an admirer of Macia,
represented 'a heavy blow' for his populist option.'3
12 C1ia Canellas and Rosa Toran, Dels regionalistes de la Lliga a la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera',
L'Avenp, Barcelona, 1983, 58, pp.42-49; L'Opinió, 8 April, 5-6 June 1931; Jaume Alzina, L'Economia
de la Catalunya Autànoma. Barcelona, 1933, p.89; Francesc Cabana, La Banca a Catalunva. A punts per
a una histôria, Barcelona, 1966, pp.9 1-160; Joan Sarda and Liuc Beltran, Els problemes de la banca
catalana, Barcelona, 1933, passim.; La Vanguardia, 8 July 1931; Balcells, Crisis. pp.72-76, 91-92;
Poblet, Aiguader, p.203
' L'Opinió, 13 March 1931; Cruells, Macia, p.131
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However, even if the Autonomy Statute had been ratified immediately, its highly
moderate terms, which allowed for the incremental devolution of powers from Madrid to
Barcelona, meant that for the future the Generalitat would be a toothless institution. For
instance, the terms of the Autonomy Statute made the Generalitat responsible for
indirect, rather than direct, taxation. According to Balcells, this denied the Generalitat
233 million pesetas yearly. This ensured that the Catalan government would remain in a
highly parlous state and, therefore, be incapable of fulfilling the reform package that had
hitherto been the dominant theme of ERC propaganda. Under these circumstances,
Macia seemed anything but the nationalist superman his supporters believed him to be.
Nevertheless, the ERC remained undaunted and L'Opinió reflected that 'faith moves
mountains'. The problem was whether this view would be shared by the Catalan and
immigrant masses who had invested great hopes in the electoral promises of the
Esquerra and the Republicans and who now wanted to see a return on their support.14
4.2. 'Las cosas del palacio van despacio': the Unemployed and the
Republic
While the unemployed had placed immense faith in the Republic, drastic
measures were still required if their loyalty to the new institutions was to be cemented.
With this in mind, one month after the founding of the Republic, the Madrid Republican-
Socialist government augmented the existing welfare activities of the Instituto Nacional
de Prevision with a new national unemployment fund, the National Unemployment Fund
(Caja Nacional contra el Paro Forzoso). However, in keeping with the traditional
bureaucratic slumber of the Spanish state, the National Unemployment Fund was largely
concerned with the collation of statistics and drafting plans for public works. Moreover,
budgetaiy problems meant that the Nacional Unemployment Fund was never anything
more than an indication of the good intent of the Madrid government)5
' Alba, Cataluña, p.241; Balcells, Historia, p.253; L'O pinió, 15 July, 9, 16, 29 August, 15, 22
September 1931
Soto Carmona, El trabajo. pp.359-360
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The weaknesses of central government unemployment policy made it imperative
that the ERC deliver on its promises of unemployment relief, particularly its electoral
pledges to safeguard 'the right to work' through a programme of public works, if social
stability was to be preserved under the Republic. However, as we have already seen, the
absence of any institutional powers made this impossible and the failure to fulfil the
promises it had contracted to the masses placed the ERC in an invidious situation.
Macia still hoped that unemployment could be minimised if the Madrid
government fulfilled an agreement to expand the port. However, the port project was
another victim of the anti-Catalaniste centralism of Pneto, who restricted the control of
the Generalitat over the port development programme. Starved of funds, the public
works on the port progressed veiy slowly, particularly after the CompafiIa
Transatlãntica, the consortium responsible for the works, went into crisis, typifying the
inadequate funding of public works schemes. Indeed, in the view of Balcells, such
programmes underwent a 'painful eclipse' during the Republic, as many public works
projects promised by the ERC remained on the drawing board. Hence, while Esquerra
was impressed by the municipal housing initiatives of the socialist administration in
Vienna, there were no funds available for such schemes and the ERC-controlled
Barcelona Council continued to rely on the slum clearance of yester-year. Equally, there
were no major programmes for sanitising or beautifying the ghettos. Instead, the ERC
relied on token gestures, devoting interminable Council meetings to renaming parts of
the urban landscape after celebrated figures from the anti-monarchist struggles of the
past. Accordingly, the Can Tunis Cases Barates were renamed after Ferrer i Guardia, the
anarchist educationalist executed by the monarchist authorities in 1909, while a street
was named after Segul. However, this did not change much for the poor of the city, who
the ERC remained incapable of defending unemployed, as seen when the Council failed
in its attempt to prevent significant rises in bus and tram fares in September 1931.16
Faced with the hard realities of power, the Generalitat set about establishing
bureaucratic bodies in an attempt to channel the aspirations of the unemployed and
16 Poblet, Aiguader, pp.203-204; Balcells, Crisis, p.147; Solidaridad Obrera, 22 May, 23 June, 30 July
1931; L'Opimó, 26 June, 10 September, 3, 11 December 1931; El Mali, 18 June 1931
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forestall an explosion of mass discontent. Therefore, soon after the birth of the Republic
the Unemployed Workers' Commission (Comissió Pro-Obrers sense Treball) was formed
to liaise between the new Catalan authorities and the unemployed. Headed by Manuel
Serra i Moret, the Vice-President of the USC and the Generalitat Economy Minister, the
CNT refused to join the Unemployed Workers' Commission on the grounds that it was a
semi-governmental body. However, this did not prevent the anarcho-syndicalist
leadership from delegating representatives to attend its meetings. Because one of these
representatives was none other than Pestafia, then CNT National Secretary, it is clear
that the Unemployed Workers' Commission was seen as anything but an irrelevancy by
the anarcho-syndicalists.'7
The Generalitat Unemployed Workers' Commission was never anything more
than a cushion between the new régime and the unemployed. From its conception, it was
evident that the formulation of constructive anti-unemployment policies did not figure
among its priorities and it normally restricted itself to holding 'consultative' meetings
with representatives of the Generalitat. The real functions of the Unemployed Workers'
Commission were to police the jobless. This was evident from its periodic calls for 'calm'
and 'understanding' from the out-of-work, its admonitions against any possible explosion
of discontent and its opposition to all attempts by the jobless to pressurise the authorities
into action. Instead, in a language noticeably similar to the quietist vernacular used by
Republican politicians, the Unemployed Workers' Commission argued that it was
necessary to allow the Republic to stabilise itself before the new authorities could set
about resolving the issue of unemployment, 'as all the nations of the civilised world have
done' (sic!). In the mean time, there was absolutely no scope for any mobilisations or
struggles that might clash with Republican legality, 'as this would be thoroughly
unjustified given that the ministers of the Republic have promised sweeping measures to
deal with the distressing situation in which we find ourselves'. These appeals to caution
were matched with forthright condemnations of all the 'excesses' committed by the
17 La Nan, 30 April 1931; Las Noticias, 1 May 1931
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unemployed and a rejection of'any disturbance of the peace or the assault on banks or
food shops'.'8
The ERC justified the betrayals of its electoral promises in an ever more
conservative discourse. An example of this was the manner in which the unemployment
subsidies once advocated by the party were dubbed 'immoral' as they would create 'a
new caste' among the unemployed and within the working class. Instead, the ERC
proposed the far cheaper option of calling on the jobless to display 'serenity', 'patience'
and 'discipline' as this would allow the Republic to consolidate its rule and pass the
Autonomy Statute, whereafter the Generalitat would promulgate the necessary legal
channels to attend to the legitimate aspirations of the unemployed. The ERC also
revealed a new arrogance, downplaying the incidence of unemployment in Barcelona and
glibly denying responsibility for a problem that it dismissed as an unfortunate inheritance
from the monarchy. Indicative of this trend, Serra i Moret, the head of the Unemployed
Workers' Commission, told journalists that 'unemployment is not such a big problem'.'9
The jobless felt differently. Because of the great expectations aroused by the
Esquerra among the masses, the unemployed petitioned the 'true representatives of the
people' in the belief that the Republican authorities would respond favourably. In
l'Hospitalet a meeting of over 600 jobless cenetistas attacked the 'intransigence' of
landlords and shopkeepers who 'will leave us to die of hunger and cold' and placed its
'trust in the leftism of the Council to satisfy our just demands', which included an
'immediate lowering of rents', an end of evictions of the unemployed and defence of 'our
inviolable right to work'. In Barcelona, meanwhile, a succession of unemployed workers'
delegations visited both the Council and Generalitat, calling for resources to be diverted
to create more jobs. These demands were sometimes backed by rallies of the jobless, like
the demonstration of unemployed workers who marched on the Generalitat Public
Works Office and the Council Chambers in the Placa de la Repüblica the week after the
proclamation of the Republic, on April 20. The main demand of the marchers - the 6-
hour day in industry - had figured in the ERC electoral platform for the April municipal
1 LaNau, 20,22 April, 2 May 1931; L'Opinió, 16 July 1931, Las Noticias, 3 May 1931
' L'Opinió, 21 June, 12 July, 13, 21 August 1931; Las Noticias. 6 June 1931; La Nau, 27 April 1931
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elections and consequently, many of the unemployed undoubtedly believed that their
requests were far from unreasonable. A delegation from the march went into the
Generalitat for talks with Serra I Moret, Macia, Companys and Aiguader i Miró, while
the rest of the unemployed waited outside. During the discussions Serra i Moret, the
Generalitat Economy Minister, offered 'not only verbal support but real assistance',
assuring the unemployed that 'governmental action in the form of a subsidy or
unemployment insurance, will undoubtedly be forthcoming'. Meanwhile, Macia issued a
decree establishing public works to cut unemployment. These overtures satisfied the
delegation and they and the demonstrators withdrew peacefully from the Placa de Ia
Repüblica.2°
These words were never translated into deeds. The failure of the authorities to
deliver on these and other pledges confirmed popular wisdom that change from above
was too protracted ('las cosas del palacio van despacio') and that the traditionally slow-
moving attitude of the authorities had survived into the Republic. Eleven days after the
march on the Placa de la Repiiblica, on April 31, the patience of the Barcelona
unemployed snapped when a new march of the jobless to the Plaça de Ia Repüblica
ended violently. According to Las Noticias, the demonstrators, 'on the whole young
people', attacked nearby shops and requisitioned comestibles. When the marchers
reached Les Rambles, they entered La Boquerla', Barcelona's central market, seizing
more food. This was followed by a collective shop-lifting spree at a warehouse in the
Barn xino.21
The riot of the jobless occurred on the eve of the first Republican May Day.
Coming just two weeks after the birth of the new régime, the new authorities hoped that
May Day would underline the consensus between the Republic and the labour
movement. This was reflected in the PSOE and the UGT celebration of May Day as a
'day of peace'. Similarly, in a bid to undermine its exclusively proletarian content, the
ERC decreed May Day was 'a day of the people'. All the main trends within the labour
20 Letter from the Comisión de Obreros en palo forzoso to 1'Hospitalet Council, 22 October 1931
(AHLL); La Nau, 20 April 1931; Solidaridad Obrera, 21 April 1931
21 El Diluvio, La Vanguardia and Las Noticias, 1 May 1931; F0371/15772/W5305/46/41: Report from
Consul-General King, 5 May 1931 (PRO)
163
movement planned mobilisations and meetings in Barcelona. Not surprisingly,
unemployment and the economic crisis dominated the concerns of the myriad labour
organisations and the various panaceas on offer reflected the diverse tactics of the rival
factions inside the workers' camp. In tune with their quietist expectancy, at a small UGT
rally in Barcelona speakers called for the government 'to adopt effective measures to
resolve the crisis of unemployment and growing inflation'.22
Despite the efforts of the socialists and the Republican authorities, the rallies and
demonstrations organised by the working class organisations in industrial cities like
Barcelona and l'Hospitalet revealed the extent to which class identities were coming to
the fore, as the proletariat, rather than 'the people', emerged as the major protagonist. In
l'Hospitalet the May Day demands of the CNT included a number of measures at which
the Republicans had already balked, including the full expropriation of the clergy and the
'disannament of all the institutions that served the monarchy, such as the police and the
Civil Guard'. However, the impact of the recession exerted the greatest influence on the
thinking of the revolutionaiy left and the May Day in Barcelona province emphasised the
growing need for constructive action against unemployment. The top demand of the
CNT in l'Hospitalet was the implementation of the 6 hour working day. Meanwhile, the
Barcelona rally of the BOC, which attracted 12,000 workers, called for radical medicine
against the recession, because 'with the Republic or without it, all the problems of the
working class remain'.23
The epic May Day rally in Barcelona was organised by the CNT at the Palau de
Belles Arts, a venue that lay in between the industrial zone of Poblenou and the city
centre. Tremendous excitement surrounded a rally that constituted the first open show of
support for the Confederation since the early 1 920s. In the run up to the rally, the CNT
condemned the ERC's definition of May Day as 'a day of the people' as a bastardisation
of a key event in the proletarian calendar. Instead, the Confederation raised the slogan
22 Las Noticias and La Vanguardia, 3 May 1931
23 Petition from the CNT to the Mayor of l'Hospitalet, 1 May 1931 (A}ILL); Las Noticias and k
Vanguardia, 3 May 1931; Julia DIaz, Madrid, pp.5-40; Solidaridad Obrera, 1 May 1931; Lluis Ysern
Lagarda, El moviment obrer i la Re publica, 1930-1932, Valencia, 1987, pp.56-66; La Batalla, 23 April,
7May 1931
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'The First of May Against Unemployment, Inflation and For a Reduction in Rents'. This
platform promised positive action in favour of the unemployed and the unskilled of the
city and attracted over 100,000 workers from all over Barcelona and beyond, the largest
mass gathering seen in the city since the birth of the Republic.24
At the same time as the CNT rally, just 200 metres down the road, alongside the
Arc del Trionf the Barcelona FM and a number of community and tenants' groups
organised their own rally under the slogan of 'The International Holiday of
Revolutionary Gymnastics'. Many hundreds of workers on their way to the CNT rally
stopped in the street to take in the curious sight of a lorry draped in red-and-black flags,
that served as the platform for the anarchist speakers. Both the CNT and the FM rallies
addressed the general need for immediate action in support of the wageless and the low-
paid, including a reduction in rents, the readmission of the unemployed into the factories
and the confiscation of Church property to finance public works. However, the
resolutions of the FM meeting, as its title suggested, were articulated in revolutionary
terms. Moreover, as one of the speakers observed from the lorry, 'I counted no less than
100 comrades who, with pistols in their belts, awaited the opportunity to throw
themselves into the practice of "revolutionary gymnastics".25
The subterfuge of the FM in convoking a separate meeting deliberately timed to
clash with that of the CNT was a clear reflexion of their separate agenda of Ira bazón.
That the falsias were also cenetistas is not enough to explain this machination; the
bloquistas, a number of whom attended the CNT May Day rally, were also cenetistas,
but their party respected the independence of the unions and held a separate meeting on
the other side of the city on MontjuIc. In the view of a non-FM libertarian, the May Day
counter-rally organised by thefaistas was the first 'anarchist plot' against the CNT.26
The FM coincided its meeting to end at the same time as the CNT rally.
Consequently, tens of thousands of cenetistas poured out onto the streets from the CNT
rally at the Palau de Belles Arts at precisely the same moment as the organisers of the
24 Solidaridad Obrera, 3 May 1931
25 Las Noticias and Solidaridad Obrera, 3 May 1931; Madrid, Ocho meses, p.140; GarcIa Oliver, El eco,
pp. 115-1 16
26 Bop s España, p.116
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anarchist meeting were leaving to march to the Placa de la Repiiblica to submit their
demands to the Generalitat. Symbolising the projected osmosis of trabazón, the workers
from both the CNT and the FM meetings merged with their banners to produce a
colossal demonstration of working class expectancy. The authorities were impassive in
the face of this colossal sea of around 150,00 proletarians and although the Civil Guard
had earlier been ordered to attack a small demonstration of the PCE, nothing was done
to halt the massed ranks of the Barcelona CNT and the demonstration flowed ineluctably
and peacefully towards the Placa de la Repüblica. 27 The proletariat, quite literally, had
taken the streets of Barcelona and as the front of the demonstration reached Les
Rambles, the rearguard of the march was almost half a kilometre away in the Plaça
dlJrquinaona.
In what was hardly a vote of confidence in the Barcelona security forces, Macia
responded to news that the march was bound for the Generalitat with an order that only
the Catalan Mossos d'Esquadra should be in the Placa de la Repüblica to greet the
demonstration. Yet the small contingent of Mossos was very quickly outnumbered by
the marchers and when the head of the demonstration arrived in the Placa de la
Repüblica singing the anarchist anthem, 'Los hijos del pueblo', the whole of Carrer de
Ferrán and Les Rambles were occupied by seemingly unending waves of workers. As
thousands more demonstrators filed into the Placa de la Repiblica below the citadels of
power, what had been an essentially peaceful demonstration was suddenly engulfed in
violence.
The violent turn of events remains obscure, although it seems that as the square
filled up with proletarians the Mossos d'Esquadra chief in the Placa de la Repüblica lost
his nerve and called for police reinforcements. Shortly afterwards a contingent of
Guardias de seguridad arrived on the scene, only to find themselves outnumbered in the
confined and confused space of the Placa de la Repüblica and unable to relieve the
Mossos dEsquadra inside the Palau de la Generalitat. Minutes later, when a delegation
27 The only violent incident reported during the march to the Placa de la Repüblica occurred on Les
Rambles when a panic-stricken Guardia de seguridad drew his sword and was disarmed and beaten by
marchers.
166
of cenetistas and faIsta.s entered the Palau de la Generalitat, the Guardias de seguridad
apparently feared that the building was being stormed by marchers. Meanwhile, the
frantic activities by the Mossos d'Esquadra to secure the entrance to the Palau de la
Generalitat was mistakenly interpreted by demonstrators as an attack on the delegation.
In the resulting mêlée the Guardias de seguridad opened fire on the demonstration,
sparking off a 45 minute long gun-fight that left a balance of one Guardia de seguridad
dead and two wounded, alongside ten wounded workers. The final act of this bloodshed
underlined the residual hatred of workers for the police and the violence ended only after
the hated Guardias de seguridad were relieved by soldiers, who were welcomed as the
'sons of the people' and therefore trusted not to resort to the ley defugas.28
It is difficult to attribute blame for the May Day violence in the Placa de la
Repüblica. The FM certainly exploited the timing of the CNT rally to hi-jack the May
Day celebrations. However, although the falsias were armed and while they clearly did
not shy away from a fight, their spirit of confrontation is not enough to explain the
events. Instead, it is most likely that the first shots emanated from the security forces. At
this point events became even more confused, because former members of the Sindicatos
Libres and rightists who had mingled with the demonstration took advantage of the
turmoil to provoke a gunfight. This is borne out by the fact that the majority of those
arrested on arms charges were ex-libreños, as against a singlefaIsta.29
The May Day violence was, nevertheless, a watershed in Barcelona. While Macia
repeated his call for confidence in the Generalitat and the Republic and promised quick
action in favour of the unemployed, the ERC became concerned with order and keeping
the volatile unemployed off the streets. These growing security fears accentuated the
conversion of erstwhile reformists into vehement supporters of law-and-order. This was
exemplified by Maclà, who mused that 'if the monarchy represented disorder, the
Republic must signify order'. Similarly, Companys, who was still Civil Governor on May
28 Las Noticias and Solidaridad Obrera, 3 May 1931
29	 presence and expertise of annedfalstas was overstated by GarcIa Oliver in his memoirs, where
he tendentiously gives the impression that omnipresent and well-drilledfaistas controlled 'all four
corners' of the Plaça de la Repüblica, a view unconfirmed by other sources: Garcia Oliver, El eco,
ppl 15-117; Solidaridad Obrera, Las Noticias and La Nau, 2-5 May 1931; El Luchador, 8 May 1931;
Tierra v Libertad, 8 May 1931; Madrid, Ocho meses, pp.138-144
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Day, took up this theme on numerous occasions, placing new emphasis on law-and-
order and declaring that 'the Republic represents order, not disorder, and to maintain
order I will implement strong measures... [and] repress such outrages with absolute
determination'. On another occasion, he vowed 'to defend public order come what may',
because the Republic signified 'authority'. Nevertheless, according to Paco' Madrid, a
prominent Republican publicist and secretary to Companys fretted that more police were
needed to avoid 'mob rule in the city'. Increasingly, therefore, the ERC placed emphasis
on 'social peace' which, it was maintained, was imperative for the peaceful consolidation
of the Republic. Equally, Catalan Republicans, like their Madrid counterparts, began to
juxtapose 'the negation of authority' with the need for a 'Republic of order' which, it was
maintained, was a vital prerequisite for the administration of justice' for the
unemployed.30
Having seen the explosive nature of conflicts stemming from joblessness the
Generalitat was driven into action. Firstly, the Catalan government reiterated the
importance of its Unemployed Workers' Commission, which increased its attempts to
police the unemployed. Secondly, although the impecunity of the Generalitat and
Barcelona Council precluded large-scale, long-term public spending commitments, the
May Day and the violent demonstration of April 31 revealed the pressing importance of
showing some largesse to the jobless. Thus, from early May Barcelona Council began
issuing food vouchers from the Comisana de Beneficència, the Council Welfare
Department office on Caner de l'Hospital in the Barn xino. The voucher system was
organised through the Unemployed Workers' Commission, who required all applicants
for relief to prove that they had been resident in Barcelona for at least 5 years. Despite
its restrictive caveats which discriminated against immigrant workers, the food voucher
system was inundated with requests for assistance and quickly proved incapable of
responding to the scale of joblessness in Barcelona.
Rather than assuage the wounds ofjoblessness, the voucher system brought new
tensions among the unemployed to the surface. Because there was only one central
30 Madrid, Ocho meses, pp.136, 138, 143-145, 171-214, 250; La Nau, 2 May 1931; Las Noticias, 1, 3
May 1931; El Diluvio, 30 May 1931; L'Opinió, 9, 16 August 1931
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distribution point in the whole of the city, large numbers of unemployed workers,
sometimes entire families, converged on the narrow Caner de l'Hospital in the hope of
some relief from their poverty. Tension quickly mounted as up to 3,000 unwaged queued
outside the Welfare Department. Moreover, many of those unemployed who were
excluded from receiving vouchers by the residency limits also turned up. By the end of
June, scuffles between the unemployed and police had given way to frill-scale rioting. In
one such instance, the Welfare Department offices were stormed by the angry jobless
who seized a number of vouchers. Meanwhile, when a defiant demonstration set off to
the Placa de la Repüblica to complain about police aggression, nearby shopkeepers
fearfully closed their shops. Finally, when the marchers attempted to cross Les Rambles
they clashed with police, whereupon they split up, entered bars and demanded food
under threats of violence.3'
To reduce the increasingly volatile queues of those attending the Welfare
Department office Barcelona Council replaced the voucher system with 'comedors
populars', municipal soup kitchens which provided meals for the jobless. Though the
Welfare Department office on Caner de l'Hospital was the main site of the new soup
kitchens, serving 1,200 lunch-time meals, other locations were introduced in areas with
heavy unemployment, including the Can Tunis Cases Barates. ERC politicians
periodically visited the soup kitchens, which they argued were 'magnificent', 'a model of
cleanliness' providing 'succulent' food to the jobless. In July the Mayor of Barcelona
Aiguader i Miró described the fare on offer in the soup kitchens as 'impressive'.32
However, the soup kitchens were dogged by controversy, including allegations
that the change from food vouchers to meals had been accompanied by considerable
municipal graft and that lucrative contracts had been awarded to friendly caterers by
closed meetings inside the chambers of Barcelona Council. The most common
complaints regarded the quality of the food in the soup kitchens. Solidaridad Obrera,
many of whose readers had eaten in the soup kitchens, described the food as 'slops'. The
quality of the victuals in the soup kitchens was also condemned by the most moderately
La Vanguardia, 19 August 1931; Las Noticias and Solidaridad Obrera, 27 June 1931
32 L'Opinió, 10 July, 13 August 1931; La Van guardia, 10 July 1931
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minded of the jobless. In defence of the cuisine in the soup kitchens, one of the catering
contractors, a far from disinterested party, maintained that 'the unemployed couldn't eat
better at the restaurant tables of the rich'. This was a highly unfortunate challenge,
because many of the unemployed felt they could and the press reported numerous
instances of'eating without paying' ('corner sin pagar') by groups ofjobless workers,
ranging in size from four to 150. On one occasion, a gang ofjobless workers succeeded
in demanding food in the Barcelona Ritz.33
The soup kitchens failed in much the same way as the food vouchers before
them. Disquiet with the soup kitchens underlined the reality that what the unemployed
wanted above all else was work, not relief. It was not even the case that the meals
provided much assistance, particularly as the unemployed were still burdened with rent,
the largest expenditure facing the proletarian family economy. Meanwhile, the
insouciance of the authorities towards the unemployed continued to generate new levels
of rebellion, the results of which were often both volatile and unforeseen. The strength
of these dynamics was seen with the emergence of what La Vanguardia termed 'a spirit
of protest' about the quality of meals at the soup kitchens on Carrer de l'Hospital, that
led to street-fighting between the unemployed and the Asaltos, during which a worker
was shot and wounded. This infuriated the unemployed, who set out on a protest march
to the Placa de la Repüblica, bearing the bloody shirt of the wounded comrade at the
head of their demonstration. However, since May Day, the political tide had turned
against the unemployed and subsequent attempts by the jobless to march on the Plaça de
la Repüblica had met with the violence of the various branches of the security forces.
Hence, when the jobless énragés reached Les Rambles they were attacked by police,
who prevented them from entering Carrer de Ferran. Another attempt at a protest march
in the afternoon met with Civil Guard cavahy charges and running street battles that
lasted sporadically for several hours.34
La Vanguardia, 5, 28 July, 19 August, 20 September 1931; Poblet, Ai guader, p.202; Solidaridad
Obrera, 14 June, 4 July 1931; El MatI, 4 June 1931; Las Noticias, 5, 27 June 1931
34 La Vanguardia, 9 July 1931; La Nau, 27 May 1931
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The violent reconquest of the streets by the security forces and the disdainful
attitude of the authorities towards the unemployed showed how the marginalised,
unskilled and largely immigrant sectors of the most despairing sectors of the working
class were ignored by the Republican transition. The battle of the authorities to impose
'social order' on the streets after May Day meant that clashes between the unemployed
and the security forces became commonplace, as the police took to breaking-up the
impromptu street demonstrations of the unemployed. Even when the unemployed
greeted the victory of the ERC in the June Cortes elections by sitting down on Les
Rambles and peacefully blocking the traffic, contingents of Asaltos quickly arrived to
force the protesters to withdraw. Undeterred, the unemployed regrouped, provoking
renewed and bloody clashes with the security forces in the city centre.35
The wrath of the jobless was extended towards those social sectors who were
least affected by the crisis and in whose interests the unemployed believed the security
forces were acting. An example of this was seen at the end of July, when a peaceful
march of unemployed workers to the Generalitat in the Placa de la Repitblica was
blocked by Civil Guard cavalry. Following a bout of ritual streetfighting, the unemployed
withdrew to demand food from a number of nearby hotels. When the hotel owners called
for police protection, there were new clashes between the Asaltos and the squads of
unemployed workers.36
Frustration at their lot under the new democratic order shifted the anger of the
unemployed squarely towards the new Republican leaders in Barcelona. According to
Francesc Madrid, political secretary to the various Barcelona Civil Governors in 1931,
even before the security forces began barring the access of the unemployed to the Placa
de la Repüblica, marchers already taunted Republican politicians in the surrounding
buildings with chants of'We're hungry! We're unemployed! You eat and we don't!
Robbers!' This resentment was exacerbated by revelations of the huge salaries received
by Republican politicians for their political and bureaucratic duties, rewards that were
La Vanguardia, 5 July 1931; Las Noticias. 21 June 1931
36 La Vanguardia, 15, 28 July 1931
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seen by the urban poor as a sign that the new authorities had exploited the transition to
engage in self-interested careerism.37
4.3. Unemployed Self-Help
The jobless responded to their harsh economic circumstances with a series of
self-help strategies. Street sellers, characteristic of all unstable and underdeveloped
economies, were one such spontaneous response. This street trade, like the rest of the
irregular economy in Barcelona, expanded markedly because of the crisis of the 'official'
economy. The majority of the growing body of mobile traders was made up of newly
unemployed workers who had invested their last few savings in modest merchandise,
which they peddled on the streets and around established shopping areas and markets.
The life of the street traders was very humble and their commerce served only to make
poverty a little more bearable. The street traders were very popular with consumers. This
was particularly true with the unskilled and the unemployed in areas like the Barn xino
and l'Hospitalet, where the street traders provided a much-needed alternative to over-
priced market traders and shopkeepers. Meanwhile, ci mercadet, a purpose-built trading
zone constructed by the street traders near the Barn xino, attracted workers from all
over Barcelona. Although they sometimes bought merchandise from the same
wholesalers as the shop and market traders, the street traders had no overheads and their
prices were lower.38
Another measure adopted by the most depressed sections of the urban populace
was the non-payment of rent. The first collective opposition to rent payment began at the
end of April, in the dockside district of Barceloneta. This action coincided with a
growing desire among certain sections of the CNT to assist the unemployed. This was
37 Madrid, Ocho meses, p.145. ERC Cortes diputados received 12,000 pesetas yearly, alongside the
18,000 pesetas paid to Generalitat Consellers. Not only was it possible to combine official duties with
other business interests, but top positions on quangos, like the port development committee or the
Comité Cotonera, a govermnent-funded supervisory body for the Catalan textile industry, offered
additional salaries of between 20,000 and 30,000 pesetas yearly. Meanwhile, the ERC Mayor of
Badalona had a salary of 24,000 pesetas salary, nearly 5 times the yearly income of many of the better
off workers in the town: Cánovas Cervantes, A puntes, p.162; La Colmena Obrera, 6 December 1931
38 Solidaridad Obrera, 15 February 1932, 9 April 1936; Minutes of l'Hospitalet Council meeting, 1 June
1933 (AHLL)
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especially true of the FAT-led Barcelona Builders' Union which, emblematic of the city's
largely unskilled proletariat, was compelled to place unemployment at the centre of
syndical strategy because around 15,000 of its members, approximately 40% of its entire
supporters, were out of work. Consequently, a so-called Comisión de Defensa
Ecônomica (CDE) was created by the builders' union militants in a bid to take the battle
of the economically dispossessed to the bourgeoisie. Headed by Parera and Santiago
Bilbao, anotherfaIsta from the Builders' Union, the CDE set about studying working
class living costs in Barcelona, including rents and food prices, before launching a
campaign to reduce the encumbrance of high rents on low-paid workers and the
unemployed.39
Testimony to the degree of effervescence among the jobless and proof of how
their aspirations asserted themselves spontaneously when they were not given organised
expression, a rent strike began in Barceloneta while the CDE was still defining its
strategy. As soon as it began, however, the CDE seized on the rent strike as a necessary
part of a contingency plan for proletarian survival in the economic crisis. The advice of
the CDE to workers was succinct: 'Eat well and, if you don't have the money, then don't
pay your rent!' Equally, for those troubled by 'scandalous rents' and 'indecent conditions',
the tip was the same: Don't pay!' Spurred on by the CDE the rent strike spread like fire
throughout the most depressed proletarian districts of Barcelona under the slogan of
'Work for all! Lower the rents!' For thousands of the estimated 40,000 jobless in
Barcelona and the further 160,000 living below the poverty line, the rent strike
possessed a beautiful simplicity that was irresistible to workers who had nothing to lose.
Obviously, the non-payment of rent meant an immediate gain for strikers, representing a
significant rise in disposable income for those in low-paid employment without the
hardships of an industrial stoppage. Meanwhile, for the unemployed, it was a crucial
liberation from the unsustainable burden of rent payments.4°
Solidaridad Obrera, 16, 18, 25 April, 1, 25 November 1931; COPUB, Memoria de los trabajos
realizados durante el eiercicio de 1931. Barcelona, 1932, p.s140; ButlietI de l'Institut d'Investigacions
Econômiqç, 13, 1933, p.4
COPUB, Memoria...de 1931, p.469; Solidaridad Obrera, 26, 30 April, 7, 21, 24 June, 18 July, 15
August, 6 November 1931
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The rent strike was also bound up with the mass expectations aroused by the
ERC before the birth of the Republic, when it had proposed curbs on the unregulated
activities of landlords and a new deal for tenants. Meanwhile, after the collapse of the
monarchy, radical Republicans in Barcelona continued to endorse price cuts and rent
reductions to alleviate 'the crisis of unemployment' and end the 'animal existence'
endured by a significant section of the working class. With the ERC duly put in power,
many tenants sought to force the pace of change and remind the authorities of the need
to act on the housing question.4'
The organisers of the rent campaign were emphatic that they did not seek to
clash with the Republic and they stressed that their aspirations were exclusively
economic. Since its creation, the CNT had proposed action on rents and attacked the
parasitism of landlords and shopkeepers, just as there were long-standing proletarian
traditions of agitation against high prices and the cost of living that dated back to the
rampant inflation of World War One and before. The rent strikers also emphasised that
they sought neither the economic ruination of the property-owning class nor the
revolutionary abolition of landlord-tenant relationships. Instead, the strikers made it clear
that their aim was to end the payment of exorbitant rents and that they were prepared to
pay rent, but only after a 40% reduction, a figure that the CDE calculated was both
'modest' and would yield a 6-17% financial return to the landlord above the cost of
repairs, which, as demonstrated by the dreadful condition of housing stock in proletarian
Barcelona, did not amount to much.42
The CDE was adamant that words alone would not overcome the intransigence
of a landlord class that had become accustomed to having its own way and was unused
to any challenge to its authority. It followed, therefore, that the rent strike had to rely on
mass mobilisation. The CDE rejected calls from the Republicans that the rent strikers
should end their campaign and rely on the authorities to tend to their problems at some
unspecified date in the future. In the first instance, official rent arbitration procedures
41 L'Opimó, 13, 27 March 1931; La Calle, 15 May, 16 October 1931
42 Adolfo Bueso, Como fundamos la CNT, Barcelona, 1976, pp.53-54; Solidaridad Obrera, 13 Januaiy,
26-28 March, 13 May, 15 August 1931; Tierra y Libertad, 5 September 1931
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were highly laboriousness and largely unattractive due to the rise in the cost of living that
followed the advent of Republican rule. Moreover, as the CDE pointed out, if the rent
strikers ended their campaign and waited passively for change to come from above, they
would be effectively disarming themselves in the face of their enemies. Instead, it was
implied that immediate action against high rents was required, the very panacea that the
Republicans themselves had promised before they took power. This view was echoed by
Tierra y Libertad, which opined that because of the slowness of the Republicans to better
the situation of'the people', the rent strike was 'opportune': 'we will do more in a few
months than several centuries of legislation'. Meanwhile, in the opinion of Parera, one of
the founders of the CDE, the rent strike was strengthened by the conservatism of
Republicans politicians who 'ignored the voice and the needs of the people, who have
now projected their aspirations into the CDE'.43
This was no exaggeration. Throughout the summer of 1931 the CDE
consolidated itself through a series of mass meetings. The rent strike grew on a daily
basis which, as a non-sectarian initiative, was open to all workers who wished to join,
not just those within the CNT. The only demands made by the CDE on new strikers was
that they register with the strike committee and thereafter act in absolute solidarity with
other strikers. It was the open nature of the rent strike that was of paramount
importance as agitation on living standards, as illustrated by the wartime CNT-UGT
general strike in favour of an abaratamiento, could only really be effective if it drew in
workers without restriction of political creed. By the end of July, the CDE claimed that
the rent strike spanned 45,000 tenants in Barcelona city alone, predicting that their
number would double in August. These triumphant predictions were fulfilled and by late
summer there were over 90,000 rent strikers in the Barcelona area. Meanwhile, the
action also began to spread beyond the Catalan capital and in September 'significant
resistance' to the payment of rents was reported along the coast in Calella to the north
and to the south in Vilanova i la Geltth.
Las Noticias, 3 May 1931; BoletIn Oficial del Ministerio de Trabajo y Prevision, 23, June 1932,
p.595; SolidaridadObrera, 12 August 1931; Tierra y Libertad, 11 July, 1 August 1931
Solidaridad Obrera, 13, 15 May, 5 June, 4, 21 July, 5, 14-15, 26 August 1931; La Vanguardia, 8 July,
24 September 1931; Las Noticias, 26 June 1931
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The strength of the rent strike can also be attributed to the high level of
community-based solidarity within proletarian districts. Accordingly, when landlords
evicted tenants for the non-payment of rent, CDE activists and neighbours were always
on hand to reinstate tenants and their furniture. Equally, if families could not be re-
installed straight away, there were always offers of beds and temporary accommodation
in the community. When the tempo of evictions intensified, so too did the rate of
reinstatements, which increasingly assumed the form of community celebrations, drawing
in rent strikers from surrounding streets and, at crucial moments, other districts. On
occasions, popular feeling was so intensely overwhelming that bailiffs refused to carry
out evictions.45
Another strength of the rent campaign was that as it spread, it incorporated the
specific grievances of tenants of any given district within the overall struggle for a
reduction in rents. In the Cases Barates, the rent campaign fused with long-standing
demands for school provision, health facilities, street lighting and transport links. In
Santa Coloma de Gramanet the campaign championed the complete exemption of the
unemployed from all rent payments, while in Horta, the rent strikers issued an audacious
series of demands, including the removal of the Civil Guard from the district and the
immediate closure of the local church. Demands for free travel for the jobless were also
advanced by the some of the groups of rent strikers.
During the struggle, the CDE widened its attack to include all those social
sectors that it held responsible for the abject condition of the Barcelona proletariat.
Denunciations of shopkeepers and market-traders became ever-common in the
propaganda of the Comisión. Following a visit to La Boquerla, a CDE delegation
remarked that because of uncontrolled food prices "life" is a privilege. The people either
do not eat or, at best, eat little and badly'. Days later, at a CDE meeting attended by
1,500 people in the fiery CNT waterfront stronghold of Barceloneta, where the rent
strike began, Santiago Bilbao excoriated shopkeepers and landlords for 'robbing' the
workers, after parsimonious employers had already 'pilfered' from their wage packets. In
Solidaridad Obrera, 5, 20 May, 15 August 1931
Solidaridad Obrera, 9, 31 May, 4, 8, 18, July 1931; Tierra v Libertad, 8 August 1931
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a significant escalation of its campaign, the CDE began publishing names and addresses
of shopkeepers who, it alleged, manipulated the price and quality of products of
foodstuffs. In the words of one CDE spokesperson, its 'first attack was aimed at the
landlords. The second against those employers that provoke the crisis of unemployment
of which we are the victims. The third against the shopkeepers and monopolisers of
foodstuffs. And the fourth, went to the very heart, against the financial trusts which,
more sinister of all, engender the misery, the pain, the ignorance and the slavery of the
great proletarian masses from high up... The solution has to emerge from the people and
which they have to impose themselves... The authorities have failed and we will now see
what we can achieve ourselves'.47
Mass unemployed struggles such as those spearheaded by the CDE were just one
way in which the poorest sectors of the Barcelona proletariat struggled to survive in the
absence of basic social welfare provision. Many refused to accept that joblessness should
carry the penalty of hunger and viewed illegality as a legitimate response to their material
scarcity. Press coverage of 'crimes against property' revealed an array of different
strategies utilised by the unemployed and the low-paid to lessen what was often an
unrelenting economic penury. These strategies included a wide span of street activities,
ranging from the relatively skilled craft of pickpocketting, across to bicycle thefts, 'stick-
ups' and 'muggings'.
In the overwhelming majority of cases, this illegal self-help of the jobless was
directed against the middle and upper classes, the very sectors which, as anyone brought
up in the proletarian milieu of Barcelona knew only too well, held a massive monopoly
of property. Consequently, the 'mugging' of rich pedestrians, especially those upper class
women who could not withstand the temptation to advertise their fortune publicly, was
commonplace, particularly in zones like Les Rambles, where the middle classes
intermingled with the working class. Bourgeois flats were also regularly raided, with
gangs sometimes removing furniture and even front doors.4X Meanwhile, owing to the
Solidaridad Obrera. 28 June, 3 July, 23 June 1931
' Las Noticias, 18 April, 3, 6, 10, 23 May, 5, 13, 17, 26 June, 19 September, 16, 22 December 1931, 7,
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buoyant black market in small arms in some of the bars around the Barn xino and the
port, pistols were common. Armed individuals targeted the plush suburbs of Alt
Barcelona, around Sarrià, Pedralbes and Vailvidrera, the high area of the city, both
socially and geographically speaking, for 'stick-ups' and robberies in and around the
fashionable weekend homes of the bourgeoisie. These raids were sometimes quite
lucrative, especially as in the post-Wall Street world the monied class of Barcelona had a
distrust of banks and often kept substantial sums of money at home, although there were
also suspicions that the rich exaggerated the money lost in house robberies for insurance
purposes.49
Highway robbery on the isolated country roads (carreteras) that connected
Barcelona with neighbouring towns was also very common. Through their isolation and
the relative absence of police, these roads were a great attraction to armed robbers who,
either alone or in small groups, patiently awaited the sound of an approaching car before
emerging gun in hand to block its path. It was unusual for cars to drive on when
challenged and, in such cases, a warning shot was often sufficient to persuade the driver
to halt. A variation of this tactic was to block the road with a stolen car and simulate a
break-down, as this allowed robbers an even greater element of surprise when
unsuspecting drivers stopped to help. Like the raids on houses of the rich, the rewards of
highway robbery were high: car ownership in the 193 Os was the exclusive preserve of
the economic oligarchy and the occupants of cars would be relieved of their money,
documentation, jewellery and any other valuables. It was not unusual for gangs of
highway robbers to stop up to four or five cars in a stint, before melting away
undetected back to the city.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess the true scale of highway robbery. While the
geographical spread of the highway robberies reported in the press indicates that there
were numerous groups of individuals committed to this practice in the greater Barcelona
area, this was more than likely the tip of the ice-berg because, as La Vanguardia noted,
fear of 'reprisals' meant that the incidence of highway robbery was heavily under-
' Las Noticias. 6 January, 16, 17, 23 May, 25 August, 12 November 1931, 2 February 1932
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reported. This was confirmed by the police, who emphasised the complete confidentiality
they offered to the victims of highway robbery in the hope that more would come
forward. However, the need for confidentiality was also enormous because the quiet
outlying roads were popular night-time locations for motorised bourgeois lovers, a
number of whom were actively breaking the Seventh Commandment when highway
robbers contravened the Ninth. 50
Higher up the economy of urban illegality were the armed seizures of taxi-drivers
purses. The common practice was to hire a taxi and direct it to a suitably isolated
destination, often the very peripheral roads frequented by the highway robbers. En route,
the economic relation between taxi-driver and customer would be reversed. Equally, the
commercial establishments in the city known to have money on the premises provided
prime targets for armed robberies, especially shops, tobacconists (estancos), bars and
jewellers. Meanwhile, for those with even greater nerve, the armed bank couriers who
delivered the factory pay-rolls were an immensely attractive target. Finally, most daring
of all, and obviously more remunerative, were bank raids, the pinnacle of armed
illegality.5'
Normally, however, the struggle for survival of the unemployed was far more
mundane. That said, this struggle adapted itself to the contours of the urban setting of
the unemployed and represented a colourful hierarchy of illegality. The jobless initiated
numerous collective shoplifting sprees and periodic raids on port stores and warehouses,
actions that drew in large groups of unemployed and had a certain degree of planning.52
More common still were the 'smash-and-grab' raids launched by those who required
basic foodstuffs. Typifjing the desperation of the urban poor, bread, the fundamental
component of proletarian diets, provided the main objective of many thefts in which
jobless workers entered bakeries and demanded loaves. When necessary, these threats
50 Las Nolicias, 7 May, 12, 19 June, 9 October, 20 November, 16, 18 December 1931; L'Opinio, 19
November 1931; La Van guardia, 6, 10, 13 March, 7 April 1932; Communi que from the Guardia
Urbana to the Mayor of l'Hospitalet. 2 April 1933 (AHLL)
Las Noticias, 11, 20 January, 1 February, 1, 31 March, 9, 11 April, 8 May, 16, 19, 25 June, 1, 24, 29-
30 October, 3-4, 6, 20, 27 November, 1, 19-20, 23-24, 30 December 1931, 8 January 1932; L
Vanguardia, 25 July, 1, 4-5, 28 August, 1 September 1931, 6 March 1932; L'Opinió, 16 June, 30
August, 24 July 1931
52 Las Noticias, 30 April, 5 November, 8 December 1931; La Vanguardia, 11 September 1931
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were backed up with the threat and practise of violence. Another technique was for a
lone woman to enter a shop and order a substantial amount of provisions. When the
groceries were packed, 'persons unknown' would enter the shop and convince the
shopkeeper that it was both unwise and unreasonable to prevent the unemployed from
taking food that they needed to survive but yet, through no fault of their own, could not
afford to purchase." Groups of unemployed workers also frequently toured hotels and
bars demanding food from the kitchens. For those who wished to avoid tasks of food
preparation or, who lacked the means to do so because they were homeless, there
remained the option of 'eating without paying' in restaurants, whereby small groups of
unemployed ate in bars and restaurants before excusing themselves from paying by virtue
of their jobless condition and what they asserted was their 'social right' to life. Three
unemployed men applied this same principle on a hedonistic level, spending a night in a
El Parallel cabaret, before leaving in the early hours of the morning without paying their
bill of 375 pesetas.54
The predominantly immigrant unemployed in the ghettos provided some of the
most desperate acts of illegality. Although the plight of the jobless in the ghettos was
dire, it was partially offset by the proximity of farming land and small allotments.
Throughout the Republican years arable land in depressed, urban areas like l'Hospitalet
and Santa Coloma was scoured for foodstuffs by the jobless. While these forays onto the
land often yielded little more than a few vegetables or a handful of artichokes, when
lucky, the unemployed made off with a chicken for a rare and usually unattainable meat
supper. According to the Sociedad de Patronos Cultivadores in l'}{ospitalet, an
important local agrarian pressure group, by the end of 1931 the groups of unemployed
who 'attack our fields and take away everything they can carry' were so active that
landowners were forced to guard crops 'at all hours, day and night'. At times, the
audacity of the jobless was matched by their imagination. In VEsplugues, just down the
road from l'Hospitalet, an unemployed car mechanic was arrested in flagrante delicto
Las Noticias, 1 October, 4, 8, 27 November, 26 December 1931, 4 February and 3 May 1932;
Communiques from the Guardia Urbana to the Mayor of 1'Hospitalet, 13 May, 19, 21 June 1933 (AHLL)
4 La Vanguardia, 21 August 1931, 29 July 1932; Las Noticias, 4 April, 18 May, 5 June 1931, 8 January
1932; El Mati, 6 June 1931; Solidaridad Obrera, 25 July 1931
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stripping parts from a luxuiy car. On another occasion a pair of unemployed workers
was arrested stealing light-bulbs from street lamps. Meanwhile, in a climate of privation,
religiosity was a luxury that the unemployed of l'Hospitalet could ill afford and running
the risk of eternal damnation, jobless workers periodically lifted collection boxes from
churches. Thus, while the residual anti-clericalism among the proletariat dissuaded many
unemployed workers from accepting Catholic charity, by the same token, atheistic
sentiments legitimated the robbery of valuable gold icons from churches, a practice that
was very common in the 193Os.
Although a powerful array of factors militated against intra-working class crime,
there were, nevertheless, a few cases in which proletarians were the objects of illegality.
One unfortunate pickpocket (ratero) who infiltrated the CNT May Day demonstration in
search of wallets and watches was discovered and beaten by indignant marchers before
the police managed to protect the felon from the wrath of the crowd. In such cases,
Solidaridad Obrera encouraged workers to take direct measures of self defence and
when a worker was robbed at gun-point of his wages the CNT daily counselled that 'it is
necessary for us workers to arm ourselves, to prevent them [i.e. criminals] from robbing
us of the fruit of the sweat of our brows'.56
Despite a generalised sympathy for the underdog within proletarian Barcelona,
before the onset of the recession many workers felt a certain ambivalence towards
recidivists. This view was bound up with the well-known connexions between right-wing
gunmen and convicts from at least World War One, the legacy of which was an
association between illegality and anti-proletarian behaviour. By contrast, the popular
self-image held by many workers was that of the honourable wage-earner living
exclusively from labour. This perception accorded with the perspectives of the moderate
CNT leadership, whose view of proletarian morality was, in essence, little more than a
radical version of the bourgeois conception of the 'good worke?. Accordingly, the
La Vanguardia, 4 March 1932; Las Noticias, 20 May, 5 December 1931, 24 February 1932; Letters
from La Sociedad de Patronos Cultivadores to the Ma yor of 1'Hospitalet, 30 October, 12 November 1931
(AHLL); Communiques from the Guardia Urbana to the Mayor of l'Hospitalet, 5 October, 6, 7, 13, 20
November 1932, 12 May 1933, 4, 12, 15, 19, 22, 28 June, 10 July, 4 August, 25 September 1934, 11
March, 21 May, 21 June, 6 July 1936 (AHLL)
56 Las Noticias, 2-3 May 1931; Solidaridad Obrera, 16 June 1931
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anarcho-syndicalists accepted the right of workers to break the law in a strike by beating
up 'scabs' but regarded other illegality, such as 'crime', as being inappropriate to
'disciplined' and 'honourable' workers. In the first half of 1931, when Solidaridad Obrera
reflected the editorial line of the anarcho-syndicalists, the CNT daily often echoed
official perspectives on illegality, attributing what it described as 'criminal robberies' to
the work of'malefactors'. Similarly, while thousands of cenetistas lived in and around the
Barn xino, and even though the offices of the CNT Catalan and National Committees
and many Barcelona CNT unions were located in the area, the anarcho-syndicalists
shared some of the same reservations as bourgeois ideologues towards Barcelona's most
denigrated district. Indicative of the suspicion felt by the anarcho-syndicalists towards
the Barn xino, Solidaridad Obrera provided a sensationalist description of the area that
would not have been out of place in the bourgeois press, describing the poorest quarters
of proletarian Barcelona as a place of 'degeneration' and 'moral crime', ftill of bars and
cabarets where 'the poor whore, the shameless pimp, the drunkard, the crook and the
lout are the owners of the streets'.57
From 1931 onwards the moral code of the anarcho-syndicalists was placed
under real stress, as the ravages ofjoblessness prompted the expansion of illegal modes
of behaviour. This was reflected in a growing gulf between the union leadership and
sections of the grass-roots, most notably the unemployed, as cenetistas engaged in
practices that were shunned by the moderate anarchosyndica1ists.5S
Solidaridad Obrera, 14 January, 13, 19, 26, 30 May, 19, 24 June 1931
La Vanguardia, 1 September 1931; Las Noticias, 21 November 1931
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4.4. Criminalising the Unemployed
As we saw earlier, from the beginning of the Republic, bourgeois and middle
class pressure groups made it clear to the new authorities that the 'principle of authority'
had to be maintained. In the wake of the various manifestations of unemployed self-help,
these same groups petitioned the authorities afresh, in a further bid to secure their
privileges within a 'Republic of order'.
Shopkeepers and market traders interpreted street trade by the unemployed as a
direct threat to their own livelihood and the commercial pressure groups of the urban
petit bourgeoisie called for its repression, 'using all means necessary'. One Barcelona
traders' association, the Lliga de Defensa d'Industria i Comerc de Sant MartI, warned the
Council that the jobless vendors would soon provoke a 'disturbance of the peace' and
issued a thinly veiled threat that its members would take the law into their own hands.
There were similar demands from traders in the Hostafrancs district, due to the steady
increase in trade by unemployed vendors from neighbouring l'Hospitalet. However, it
was el mercadet, the citadel of street trade, which attracted the wrath of the commercial
class, even though it was away from the environs of established markets and, therefore,
satisfied the major criticism of street trade, namely that it should not be in direct
competition with market stallholders. Nevertheless, the market traders called for the end
of el mercadet, describing it as 'a disgusting Moroccan bazaar' where unhygienic food
was sold to unsuspecting consumers. It was even alleged that el mercadet was a centre
for crime.59
The authorities found it difficult to ignore the voice of the market vendors.
Firstly, while the market traders represented relatively small commercial interests, they
were organised into cohesive pressure groups that were based on the clearly defined
spaces of the local markets and often incorporated all the market vendors in any given
locality. This endowed their economic organisations with significant power. Secondly, in
response to the perceived threat of the unemployed street traders, the market traders
formed new pressure groups, such as the Associació per la Defensa de los Venedors dels
Vanguardia, 12 August 1931; El Mati, 14 June 1931; L'Opinió, 7 August 1931 La Vanguardia,
13, 18, 23 September 1931; L'Opinió, 20 September 1931
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Mercats, which served as an umbrella orgamsation for market traders throughout
Barcelona. Thirdly, and most importantly of all, the tax payments of the market traders
was an important source of municipal revenue. This allowed the market traders to exert
a certain amount of economic pressure over the authorities through their payment and
they repeatedly threatened to withdraw their municipal taxes if the unemployed vendors
were not repressed.6°
Similarly crude attempts at blackmail were employed by the landlords of the
COPUB, who warned the authorities that if they rent strike was not speedily ended, they
would also withdraw taxes. The COPUB expected a high degree of official protection
from the Republic, despite both its openly monarchist past and its close relationship with
the Italian Embassy, the centre for many anti-Republican conspiracies in Barcelona. Not
only did the COPUB offer discrete support for the cultural activities of the Embassy, but
it also sent a delegation to the fascist-sponsored 'International Congress of Urban
Property' in Rome in 1933.61
Despite its visceral anti-Republicanism, the landlords' association felt it
opportune to display a new-found Republicanism, even ciying crocodile tears that the
rent strike might generate 'an unnecessary state of alarm, prejudicial to the consolidation
of the Republic'. The landlords also suggested that they placed the future of the new
régime above their own narrow financial interests and the COPUB repeatedly couched
its opposition to the rent strike on the grounds that the mobilisation was led by
'irresponsible elements' committed 'to compromise the new political institutions by
provoking conflicts' and replace the Republic with a Bolshevik dictatorship. In
l'Hospitalet the hypocrisy of the COPUB was even more contrived, expounding
ludicrously that 'property has made a great and modem city from the fields' of the city,
only to see this civilisation endangered by the rent strike, which they alleged was the
Spanish episode of the 'organised offensive against world property', similar to that which
'occurred in Russia'. La Vanguardia also joined the fray against the rent strikers and
60 Las Noticias, 22 May, 2 October, 17 December 1931; Minutes from l'Hospitalet Council meeting, 28
August 1934 (AHLL); Letter from la Unió de Venedors del Mercat de Coilbianc to the Mayor of
l'Hospitalet, 4 September 1935, (AHLL)
61 COPUB, Memona de los trabajos realizados durante ci ejercicio de 1933. Barcelona 1934, pp.36, 45
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denounced the 'violent tone' adopted by Durruti at a CDE meeting in Sants. Meanwhile,
the landlords maintained that the rent strike 'harms tenants' interests' and was the
'unfounded' work of'agitators' out to rupture the 'hannony between landlords and
tenants', 'impede the implementation of the Republic' and 'damage the national economy
with the subsequent moral and material ruin of the entire country'. In contrast to the
insurrectionary and irresponsible attitude of the strikers, the landlords professed their
'civic tolerance'. Just as the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional hid from the mobilisations of
the CNT behind the legality of the Republican Jurados, so the property-owners urged
'tenants of good faith' to assist 'the triumph of order and social peace' by channelling their
grievances through the legal avenues provided by the Republic. Equally, the landlords
called on the Madrid government to 'maintain the principle of authority' against rent
strikers and impose an 'unyielding' repression of the 'state of insubordination of many
thousands of tenants [and the] state of anarchy in Barcelona, especially in the peripheral
districts'. Finally, although the CDE was an openly constituted section of the CNT, Pich i
Pon, the Radical President of the COPUB, implored the authorities to place it outside
the law.62
The emergence of the unemployed en masse on the streets aroused considerable
fear of the unemployed among the economically stable sectors of Barcelona. The
appearance of the unemployed vendors was viewed in highly threatening terms by the
middle classes as 'plagues' of 'rebel traders' illegally 'invading' the streets and 'bursting
forth' like a 'true swarm' around markets. In keeping with this hysterical conservative
language, the incursions of the jobless into the fields around l'Hospitalet in search of
food were described as 'invasions' and the 'storming' of estates. The overriding message
behind this discourse was that the inherently uncontrollable masses had to be repressed.
The residents of Les Corts, an area where the ERC enjoyed significant support, called
for a drive against the Street traders, whom they described as 'vagabonds who infest our
district'. The market traders from 'La Boquerla' and the shopkeepers from Carrer de
lHospital echoed these requests for repression and advocated the strengthening of police
62 COPUB, Memoria...de 1931. Barcelona, 1932, pp.93, 255-267, 440; Las Noticias, 1 May, 7 October
1931; La Vanguardia, 7, 18-21 July, 16 August 1931
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patrols in the Barn xino. Similar demands for repression emanated from the economic
elite in neighbouring l'Hospitalet. Alleging that 'the absence of representatives of civil
authority' had allowed a 'spirit of disorder' to spread among the unemployed, the main
economic elites and their pressure groups in l'Hospitalet blackmailed the Council with
the threat of withholding its taxes unless the authorities acceded to its demand that a
new Civil Guard barracks be constructed near the proletarian ghettos of Coliblanc and
La Torrassa. In a further attempt to highlight the need for swift action on 'public
security', the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional took the unprecedented step of opening up a
fund to buy land on the outskirts of Barcelona for the construction of a new Civil Guard
barracks to ensure the 'principle of authority' in the proletarian belt of the city.63
Other pressure groups also implored the authorities to curb the illegality of the
unemployed. In the autumn of 1931 self-employed taxi drivers staged a general strike
and protested to the Civil Governor about both the robberies perpetrated against them
and, more generally, the absence of 'law-and-order'. Similarly, the religious community
demanded swift action against the so-called 'sacrilegious robberies' of religious icons and
collection boxes from churches in working class areas. Private security guards, some of
whom were killed and wounded during bank robberies, advocated greater powers to
carry arms, a call that was echoed by the Asociación de Vigilantes Particulares
Nocturnos de Barcelona, the professional association of the night-watchman employed
privately and by the Council to watch over the streets and private property of Barcelona.
Meanwhile, aghast at the practices of 'eating without paying', restauranteurs and bar
owners told the authorities that they were unprepared to accept the burden of feeding
the jobless and reminded the Council that their taxes paid for a police force that they
wanted to see repressing the 'excesses' of the unemployed on the streets. Finally,
63 La Vanguard.ia, 9 July, 12 August, 23 September, 29 October, 2 December 1931, 4 March 1932; kii
Noticias, 14 May, 5 December 1931; Letters from La Sociedad de Patronos Cultivadores to the Mayor of
1'Hospitalet, 30 October, 12 November 1931 (A}{LL); Letter from the Presidents of la COPUB. la
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hoteliers, worried at the overseas reputation of the city as a 'den of thieves', called for a
comprehensive repression against all law-breakers.64
These moral panics were fully assimilated by the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional,
the most powerful bourgeois pressure group in Barcelona province. The Fomento
spearheaded the campaign against 'the absence of the principle of authority' and
organised a petition, signed by all major employer and commercial groups in Catalonia,
which, though professing the 'loyal adherence to the Republic' of the signatories, made it
clear that their future support was conditional on 'the re-establishment of order'. In what
amounted to a bourgeois critique of the security situation since the coming of the
Republic, the Fomento explained that 'professional villains' and 'the unwashed' (los
desaliñados) had interpreted the change in régime as a suitable opportunity to launch an
'eruption of certain forms of criminality'. The results of this criminal conspiracy against
established society had produced 'the extension of evil', as testified by the multiplication
of 'violent acts against the individual and wealth'. In the face of this onslaught, the
Fomento reasoned that 'the ordinary resources of the police have proven insufficient and,
despite what are at times the heroic efforts of the security forces and the Civil Guard,
crimes multiply and, in their near totality, remain unpunished'. Thus 'fearing that tragic
days may return for our city with the recrudescence of shameful crimes', the Fomento
advocated a war without quarter against the growing criminal rampage and that 'mass of
undesirables, living on the margin of the law, for whom crime is a profession'. The
Fomento concluded its draconian epistle with a call for the anning of the middle classes,
asserting that 'civilisation' could only be saved if the 'men of trust and order' and 'people
of moral trustworthiness' were organised in vigilante groups to 'contribute to the
punishment of villains' and 'banditry' with the 'immediate and energetic sanctions these
acts of vandalism demand... serving as a healthy warning to the criminals so that they may
know the penalties to which they are exposed'.65
Las Noticias, 20 May, 3, 31 October, 2, 21 November 1931; La Noche, 3, 7, 10 November 1931; j
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These same authoritarian panaceas were expressed in the bourgeois press, which
showed considerable support for the arming of the 'men of order'. La Vanguardia and i&
Veu de Catalunya attempted to raise the ardour of the petit bourgeoisie by imploring this
'enduring and suffering class' to 'wake from its lethargy to return the lost equilibrium to
society' through 'the union and defensive organisation of the middle class'. The bourgeois
press amplified law-and-order concerns, raising the spectre of the illegality of the
unemployed on a daily basis and putting pressure on the authorities to provide 'the
maximum guarantees for the lives and property of citizens' and maintain 'order' and
'peace'. In a typical exaggeration, La Veu de Catalunya included robberies and other
everyday illegal acts under the general heading of 'Terrorism'. Meanwhile, writing as if
crime had never existed before the Republic, the impression was conveyed that the
departure of the King had stimulated a profound collapse in collective morality, the end
of 'respect for the law' and the wanton 'anarchy' of law-breakers. In similar tones, k
Vanguardia evoked grim pictures of a sick society burdened with the 'contagion' of the
crime-wave, 'a constant threat to the health of the social organism'. Meanwhile, declaring
law-and-order to be a question of 'Them and Us', La Vanguardia proclaimed its support
for a war against 'all types of malefactors' (maleantes) and tirelessly asked the
Republican authorities: 'When will the robberies end?' Yet La Vanguardia already had
the answer: it advocated a strong state because the criminals 'have to be watched
(vigilados) and be contained in all their abuses', warning that 'the problem of public
order will worsen daily if the new régime does not abandon its timidity' and re-establish
'the principle of authority'. Accordingly, La Vanguardia courted General Sanjurjo, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Civil Guard, and commended his planned expansion of'la
Benemérita'.
Given the patterns of illegality prior to the Republic, reactionary allegations that
the demise of the monarchy had loosened popular morality were clearly unfounded.67
Instead, the lamentations of bourgeois pressure groups and the conservative press that a
66 Veu de Catalunya, 15 April, 3, 22 November 1931, 7 January 1932; La Vanguardia, 1, 9, 25
September 1931
67 See pp.5-9, 20, 24, 34-35 of Chapter 1
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crime-free and law-abiding era had ended confinns the opinion of Geoffley Pearson that
ahistorical nostalgia for a mythical stable past is a fixed element in the conservative
mind.68
Under scrutiny, it seems that the coverage of crime in the bourgeois press was
often imagined rather than real and based on righteous editorial indignation, rather than a
careful interpretation of events. An example is provided by the fantastic claims of the
conservative daily La Nau, which sustained that the crime rate had soared since the fall
of the monarchy because 'undesirable elements' and 'criminals' were on the streets, having
been freed from the jails in the city on April 14.69 That the panics of the right-wing press
were essentially designed for internal consumption was comically revealed when k
Vanguardia was forced into an embarrassing voile face after its screeching journalistic
sensationalism convinced both the British and Italian governments to advise their
subjects not to visit what was being portrayed as a Barcelona devoid of public order.
Aware of the damage that it had inadvertently caused economic interests that
represented an important source of advertising revenue, La Vanguardia promptly issued
a long editorial that affirmed that there was no breakdown of law-and-order in the
Catalan capital and that the Republican security forces were in full control of the streets,
thereby contradicting the overall thrust of nearly all its coverage of law-and-order since
the birth of the Republic.70
For all their inconsistencies, fears of popular illegality continued to serve as a
useful vehicle for more general concerns about social stability and the threat posed by
the masses to private property. The same apprehensions were also linked to a narrow
xenophobia that excoriated 'the large number of foreigners who have descended on
Barcelona'. It was these 'alien elements' who, respectable opinion believed, were
responsible for a 'drastic rise in the criminal population'. In l'Hospitalet the commercial
bourgeoisie was particularly disconcerted by the disparity between the immigrant and
Catalan inhabitants and referred to 'two classes of citizens' in the city. Although this
68 Geoffrey Pearson, Hooli gan. A History of Respectable Fears, London, 1992, passim.
69 La Nan, 15 April 1931. In fact, as seen in Chapter 2, pp.43, 45, the so-called 'common' prisoners
remained incarcerated after the birth of the Republic.
70 La Vanguaj4ja. 13,25 September 1931
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division was not, in itself, the cause of alarm, the balance between the 'two classes' was.
In the view of the l'Hospitalet economic oligarchy, one side of this divide, 'the lovers of
order', was made up almost exclusively of'those born here, and who, generally living in
the centre of the city, never commit any kind of action that may bring the slightest
detriment to the city, owing to their love of the area'. However, these 'first class citizens'
were an isolated minority alongside the workers of PHospitalet, 'the other contingent of
the population of over 20,000 inhabitants who have taken root in Collblanc and La
Torrassa, who, on the whole, are not natives of the city'. The bourgeoisie concluded that
it was necessary to repeal the legal rights of these immigrants and keep them under
surveillance as they 'are not real citizens, because, for whatever reason, be it poverty or
their natural spirit of disorder (sic!), they are regularly producing situations,
confrontations, and illegal and unpatriotic demonstrations'. 7 ' Clearly, the signs were
growing that proletariat of Barcelona Province might prove as ungovernable during the
Republic as during the monarchy.
4.5 'The People' Divides
Unemployment increasingly revealed the antagonistic interests of the out-of-
work and the shopkeeper. More and more the social fragmentation engendered by
unemployment was a direct influence on socio-political developments. By striking out
independently to satisfy their own material needs directly, the unemployed clashed with
the interests of the commercial class, a part of 'the people' which, in collaboration with
the working class, had guaranteed the birth of the Republic. At first, the Esquerra had
hoped to arbitrate over the diverse aspirations of the constituent parts of 'the people',
however, as the distinct elements in the popular anti-monarchical coalition returned to
face one another in the new conditions after April 1931, this situation changed.
The ERC was now forced to define its position. Because the Esquerra was
politically linked to many of the social and economic elements who were appalled by the
71 Fomento de Trabajo Nacional, Memona. ..1931, pp.2O3-2O 'I; Letter from the Presidents of la COPUB.
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militant practices of some of the jobless, the party could not sit by impassively as a key
part of its electoral constituency came under attack. Hence, while the Esquerra
continued to enshroud the inequalities within the capitalist city by addressing itself to the
'citizenry', undifferentiated by class, the party increasingly came to favour specific sets of
interests within 'the people'.72
The ERC leaders had always believed that the consolidation of the Republic
required the appeasement of their middle class supporters. It was reasons of political
survival, therefpre, which made the ERC bend to the winds of the growing law-and-
order campaign and clamp down on the unemployed. After all, the market traders were
also a source of political support for the Catalan Republicans. Equally, many Esquerra
Councillors emanated from a similar commercial milieu. A survey of the ERC-dominated
l'Hospitalet Council between the years 1931-1936 reveals that Councillors were heavily
drawn from the urban petit bourgeoisie, like Salvador Gil i Gil, the ERC Deputy-Mayor
and founder member of Estat Català, an important shopkeeper who, by nature and class
inclinations, was predisposed towards the interests of the market traders, just as he was
repelled by the spread of street trading.73
In general terms, the ERC venerated the values of thrift and industriousness of
the small commercial class. L'Opinió idealised 'the shopkeeper who has established his
business within certain laws... [and who] pays taxes and his staff. The tiuhIns' even
maintained that there was a harmonious relation between the commercial class and
consumers, alleging that 'the buyer and the seller complement one another' and that the
honest shopkeeper represents 'a real guarantee for the consumer'. By contrast, L'Opinió
inveighed against the jobless Street traders, reflecting that unlike the virtuous
shopkeeper, they 'can pull the wool over our eyes, with quality as with weights'. Lumped
together with the 'plague of lottery sellers and accordion players' who, it was alleged,
converged on Barcelona, L'Opinió denounced the 'swarm' of 'rebel traders' for the
72 L'Opinió, 5 June 1931
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'damage' and 'obvious harm' they caused the middle class. The tiuhIns' were emphatic
that street trade was an issue for the security forces.74
The Republican authorities declared war on the unemployed traders and
Barcelona Council passed a series of resolutions prohibiting mobile trade throughout the
city. The authorities legitimated this campaign against the street vendors with allegations
that unregulated trade represented a danger to 'public health', a line preferable to
admitting that their motivation was simply the defence of the sectional interests of a part
of their electoral constituency. However, repression was not the answer to unemployed
Street trade and because the socio-economic plight of the mobile vendors remained,
municipal bans on their activities were defied. In turn, this 'negation of authority'
convinced the Esquerra that the unemployed vendors were intent on making Barcelona
'an anarchic city'. Consequently, the street vendors were regarded by the authorities as
morally lost and became targeted as part of the illegal 'underworld' in Barcelona.75
Repression was given a new impetus in August 1931 when LluIs Puig Munner,
an ERC Councillor from the Barn xino, created the Brigade for the Repression of Street
Trade (Brigada de repressió de Ia venda ambulant), a 'special security service' which, in
conjunction with the Guardia Urbana, the council police, was devoted to driving the
street vendors from the streets. The strategy of the new municipal police was to seize
and cordon off a street favoured by the traders, whereupon they would be lined-up on
the pavement and searched, while their merchandise was impounded. On missions into
hostile proletarian districts the Council police squads were accompanied by Asaltos,
providing the pathetic contrast between well-fed, six-foot tall Asaltos and the shabbily
dressed, hungry-looking street vendors. Meanwhile, in l'Hospitalet, where municipal
resources could not afford to fund a police team specifically dedicated to repressing
jobless traders, the Council deployed the Civil Guard in areas where Street trade was
particularly rife. Gil i Gil, the Deputy Mayor in the city, offered warm praise to 'la
Benemérita' for its 'actions in the repression of street trading'. Nevertheless, by
L'Opinió. 7August, 20 September, 19 November, 2 December 1931, 14 January 1932
L.a Nau, 24 April 1931; El Diluvio, 16 May 1931; Las Noticias, 22 May 1931; Madrid, Ocho meses v
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November 1931 the scale of the actions against the street vendors were so widespread
that in just three days Puig Munner reported that a total of 4,000 kilos of foodstuffs had
been confiscated from unlicensed traders in Barcelona alone. While the Council
continued to justify the drive against the street traders with references to concerns for
public health, these claims were undermined by the decision of the authorities to donate
sequestrated produce to the kitchens of local hospitals, as well as the reported theft of
confiscated food by police and tales of its re-sale to the established market traders.76
At the bidding of the market and shop traders, the municipal authorities set
themselves on a path of escalating confrontation with the street vendors. Even when the
authorities were busy harassing the street traders and making scores of arrests, market
traders and the commercial middle class continued to petition the authorities for more
repression to end 'the embarrassing spectacle' of unlicensed trade. Similarly, in
l'Hospitalet, at a time when the street vendors were reeling from the police measures of
the Council, the Unió de Venedors dcl Mercat de Collblanc accused the authorities of
being too 'soft' on these 'lawbreakers'.77
This insatiable demand of the market traders for repression culminated in the
destruction of ci mercadet, a 'cleansing operation' (operació de neteja) in the view of
L'Opinió, that took place under the watchful gaze of a lonyload of Asaitos, a delegation
of ERC Councillors, market traders and the embittered Street vendors. The same day,
Asaitos occupied the Placa de la Repüblica to repel any protests by the street traders.
Meanwhile, speaking volumes about the petit bourgeois drift of the Republic, a
succession of delegations of market traders arrived to congratulate the municipal
authorities on removing ci mercadet 'for the good name and prestige of the city and the
businesses of Barcelona'.78
76 La Vanguardia, 13 August 1931, 3 March 1932; L'Opinio, 1 June 1932; Solidaridad Obrera, 13
September 1932; Communiques from Guardia Urbana to Mayor of 1'Hospitalet, 8, 13 September 1934;
Minutes from l'Hospitalet Council meeting, 10 Januaiy 1933, 28 August 1934 (AHLL); Letter from the
Mayor of l'Hospitalet to the commander of the Guardia Civil post. 7 March 1936 (AHLL); Las Noticias,
12 November, 16 December 1931
77 La Vanguardia, 27, 30 August 1931; Letter from La Umó de Venedors del Mercat de Coliblanc to to
the Mayor of l'Hospitalet, 4 September 1935 (AHLL)
78 La Vanguardia,, 19 September 1931; L'Opinió, 20 September 1931; Las Noticias, 2, 7 October 1931
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The descent of the ERC-controlled municipal authorities into repression was
mirrored by the increasingly reactionary stance adopted by the civil authorities. By mid-
summer, the heady days of Republican jubilation in April seemed very distant. Esplá,
who had replaced Companys as Civil Governor in June, retired in the first week of
August, apparently exhausted at the seemingly unrelenting succession of civil, industrial
and social conflicts that was increasingly paralysing the Catalan capital. 79 That same
week Maura, as was his prerogative as Interior Minister in the central government,
appointed Oriol Anguera de Sojo as temporary Civil Governor, pending the selection of
a permanent replacement for Esplá.
The appointment of Anguera de Sojo was far from coincidental. The untimely
resignation of Esplá brought home to the Madrid authorities the need to cap the rising
levels of social mobilisation in the Catalan capital. Anguera de Sojo was regarded as the
ideal man for this task. Although a member of the Partit Catalanista Republicà, Anguera
de Sojo was a right-wing lawyer who had been appointed President of the Barcelona
Law Courts after the birth of the Republic. Anguera de Sojo represented the extreme
right-wing of Catalan Republicanism: he was a pious catholic and a highly reactionary
figure, who aroused suspicions in the labour movement that he had 'escaped from an
altar during the Inquisition'.80
The accession of Anguera de Sojo to the Civil Governorship, the third person to
fill that position since the coming of the Republic, served as a further spur to the
growing levels of repression. His arrival in office coincided with a peak in the interest of
central government in the Barcelona rent strike. Eternally envious of CNT strength in
Cataloma and dismissive of any social struggle that developed outside the structures of
the Republican system, Largo Caballero described the rent strike as 'absurd'. Moreover,
at the behest of the COPUB, the veteran socialist leader raised the dangers posed by the
rent strike to the landlords of Barcelona in a cabinet meeting. In response, the Madrid
government made it known that the strikers would be made to 'comply with the law' and
ordered the Civil Governor to impose 'the rapid implementation of eviction orders' in
79 Madrid, Ocho meses, p.181
Adelante, 2 March 1934
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'defence of the national economy'. 8 ' As a property owner himself; Anguera de Sojo
needed little introduction to the challenge presented by the rent strike and his class
inclinations could only have been strengthened by his official brief to break the resistance
of the rent strikers and reimpose 'calm' on the streets.
It has been suggested that the ERC opposed the repression initiated by Anguera
de Sojo. 82 There are a number of problems with this point of view. Firstly, Macia
approved the appointment of Anguera de Sojo, who was, after all, a member of the
ACR, one of the coalition partners of the ERC in the Generalitat. Secondly, by August,
the Esquerra and the Generalitat were highly concerned about the rent strike. The
COPUB successfully persuaded the Generalitat to act and Macia told one delegation of
landlords that he recognised 'the importance of the interests they represented'. Equally,
the ERC was highly suspicious of the CDE, not least because of its public pledge of
support for the Street traders. Lastly, and perhaps most decisively of all, the rent strikers
had established a major stronghold in the Council-run Cases Barates, jurisdiction for
which rested with the ERC-controlled Patronat de l'Habitaciô and the Comissariat de
Cases Barates. The ERC housing committees also drew connections between the social
protest of the rent strikers and lawlessness, damning the 'absolute disorder' of
'provocateurs' whose 'threats and other violent procedures' endanger 'the public peace of
our city and social justice'. In response to this 'criminal action', Dencàs advocated the full
suppression of the strike and of the CDE. In similar vein, L'Opinió regretted the
'coercion' of 'agitators' in the Cases Barates which, it noted, had been built for the
benefit of 'the most humble classes'. Although the tluhIns' still recognised that the Cases
Barates were in need of some refonn, they sustained that a prerequisite for this was the
cessation of the strike and the 'normalisation' of public order. 83
The coincidence between municipal and civil authorities allowed the repression
of the rent strike to gather pace. In 1931 the legal department of the COPUB took up
La Vanguardia, 23 July 1931; COPUB, Memona...1931, pp.263, 479
82 Ep ic Ucelay da Cal, La Catalunya Populista. Imatge, cultura i polItica en l'etapa republicana (1931-
1939), Barcelona 1982, p.147
83 COPUB, Memoria...de 1931, p410; Solidaridad Obrera, 26 August 1931; Las Noticias, 14 October
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4,398 legal cases against tenants, nearly 4,000 more than the preceding year. To break
the deadlock, the COPUB launched the unprecedented step of running a free eviction
service that provided legal advice, lorries and men, to enable its members to remove
strikers from their property. The Republican state also steadily increased its attacks on
the rent strikers and the CDE. Rather than promulgating radical measures to alleviate the
burden of exorbitant rents, the first reform of the tenancy laws during the Republican
period was highly beneficial to the landlords, increasing the ease in which 'rebellious
tenants' could be evicted. The judiciary joined the chorus against the rent strikers, calling
for powers to impound their property after evictions to prevent their reinstatement. At
the same time, in its bid to destroy the CDE, the Madrid government blocked any
possible negotiation. Under a Civil Governor popularly seen to be acting directly under
the orders of the COPJJB, the authorities did everything in their power to assist the
landlords. Reflecting his legal background, Anguera de Sojo became captivated by the
legal minutiae of the organisation of the CDE and he sacrificed the aspirations for
change inherent to the rent strike on the altar of Republican legality. Official actions
became progressively more arbitrary as sweeping new judicial powers were invoked
against strikers. Asaltos were deployed in large numbers to supervise evictions and the
judiciary provided details of strikers for the blacklist maintained by the COPUB. In a bid
to bleed the rent strike dry and demoralise activists, the authorities began slapping petty
legal bans on CDE rallies at the eleventh hour, after the costs of renting a venue and
publicising the meeting had been met. Finally, informed by his belief that the rent strike
was a conspiracy imposed on the majority of tenants by a 'pernicious minority', Anguera
de Sojo imposed a full ban on CDE meetings, even though it had committed no
punishable offence. When this brought no immediate dividends, the Civil Governor
demanded the heads of the CDE and called for a list of the names of all members of the
Comisión from the Barcelona CNT Local Federation. Meanwhile, when this threat was
left unheeded a heavy fine was placed on the CNT, much to the satisfaction of Azafla,
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who fttlly backed Anguera de Sojo's quest for an 'energetic policy' to make the Republic
'respected' and 'feared'.84
Ironically, the spirited defence of 'the principle of authority' was accompanied by
the resurrection of illegal practices, including the quinizenes, whereby strikers were
detained without trial on government order. Bilbao, one of the founders of the CDE, was
dragged from his bed and interned without trial after he referred to the rent strike at a
CNT meeting. In a fi.irther attempt to decapitate the tenants' movement, Anguera de
Sojo ordered the internment without trial of other CDE activists, including Durruti,
GarcIa Oliver, and Parera, the recently appointed secretary of the Catalan CNT Regional
Federation. 85
The COPUB and the judiciaiy, both of which evidently sought to end the dispute
by thoroughly humbling the tenants, continued to call for increased powers to deal with
the strike. 86
 This repressive goal received a new impetus with the passing of the Ley de
Defensa de la Repüblica in October 1931. This classic law of exception was based on
1922 German Law for the Defence of Democracy and was the legislative negation of the
Constitution. Though perceived by its supporters as a defence against violent threats to
the régime from both right and left, in practice the Ley de Defensa de la Repüblica
withdrew constitutional rights far more frequently from the 'enemies of the Republic' on
the political left. The Ley de Defensa de la Repüblica also had a preventive thrust which,
as Azafla noted, responded not to an actual threat but 'to avoid the birth of that danger'.
Despite the far-reaching nature of this law, it was passed without any real parliamentary
discussion. From the outset the PSOE deputies de los RIos and Largo Caballero were
firm supporters of the bill, while the support of many less certain socialist Deputies was
secured after Azafla guarantied the party cabinet places in the eventuality of any
reshuffle. Meanwhile, the ERC, and especially Macia, who had earlier publicly stated
84 COPUB, Memoria...de 1931, pp.44, 255-257, 492; Solidaridad Obrera, 5 June, 30-3 1 July, 5, 12, 15
August, 10 October 1931; COPUB, Memoria de los trabajos realizados durante el eiercicio de 1932,
Barcelona, 1933, p.65; Las Noticias, 27 June 1931; El DIa Gráfico, 13 October 1931; Juzgado
Municipal to the Mayor of l'Hospitalet, 28 August 1931 (AHLL); Manuel Azaña, Obras completas. Una
polItica. En ci Poder y en Ia Oposición, Mexico, 1966, vol.2, pp.273-274, 282-284
85 Solidaridad Obrera, 25 June, 14, 27 August, 9 September 1931; Las Noticias, 11 October 1931;
Tierra y Libertad, 5 September 1931; La Vanguardia, 19, 27 August 1931
86 La Vanguardia, 26 September 1931; COPUB, Memoria...de 1932, p.91
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their opposition to laws of exception, was brought to heel through threats and promises
about the Autonomy Statute. According to his memoirs, Azaña's only regret about the
new law was that it had not been decreed earlier by the Provisional Government.87
Testimony to the obsession of the authorities with conspiracies, the vague
articles of the Ley de Defensa de la Repüblica proscribed any action likely lead to
resistance or disobedience to the law, as well as the illegal possession of arms. It also
became an offence to spread news likely to incite a breach of the peace or conmiit a
gesture likely to bring discredit against the institutions of the state. In the trade union
sphere, Largo Caballero's labour laws were reinforced by articles that prohibited all
strikes which did not give eight days notice to the authorities. The suspension of work
without due justification, as well as any industrial stoppage not linked with working
conditions, were also outlawed. Finally, the Interior Minister was given new powers to
ban meetings and rallies by groups and unions that were either deemed to be anti-
Republican or likely to encourage infringements of the law. 88
Reflecting official concern with the rent strike, the very day after the passing of
the Ley de Defensa de la Repáblica, before the press had even printed its text, the new
legal weapon was rolled into battle against the rent strikers. The new law broke the
resilience of the rent strikers in many districts. The solidarity that characterised the rent
strike now met with internment without trial, while those evicted tenants who dared to
reoccupy their flats were interned without trial. In areas where the strike was especially
solid, like l'Hospitalet and in the Cases Barates, the law was used as a cloak for the
wholesale invasion and search of districts by police and Asaltos. Meanwhile, the CDE
effectively became a proscribed organisation, while its parent, the Builders' Union, was
outlawed by the civil authorities who refused to authorise its meetings.89
The Esquerra showed new signs that it had swallowed its reformist pride and
accepted the repressive line of Madrid. Companys endorsed the 'clear and perfect vision'
87 Azaña, Obras, vol.2, p.65 and vol.4, pp.93, 185, 260-262; L'Opimó, 24 July, 23 October 1931; La
Batalla, 31 December, 1931, 14 January 1932
88 MC. Garcia-Nieto, La Segunda Reptiblica. Economla y aparato del estado. 1931-1936. Mardid,
1974, vol.1, pp.256-257; BaIlbé, Orden püblico, pp.323-335
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1931; Tierra y Libertad, 22 August 1931; La Noche, 13 November 1931
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of the campaign of Anguera de Sojo to 'save the Catalan economy from the threat of
those who act irresponsibly'. As well as breaking its promise to introduce rent controls,
the ERC-controlled Council also contributed to the offensive against the rent strikers,
cynically allowing their eviction on the grounds that their flats were uninhabitable, while
worse flats remained occupied by non-strikers. Moreover, after a swift increase in the
rent and a revision of the contract, flats once deemed 'uninhabitable' suddenly become
'habitable' for suitably pliant tenants. The municipal authorities also turned a blind eye
towards the overt intimidation of tenants which, given the trend whereby many landlords
collected rents with pistols, often exceeded that of eviction.90
The CDE attempted to break the united front between the Republican authorities
and the COPUB by revealing the twilight activities of many landlords and their manifest
disloyalty to Republican democracy and the state. As well as publicising the monarchist,
pro-dictatorial past of the COPUB, the CDE saw beyond the image of respectable
middle class propriety cultivated by many landlords to reveal their barely concealed
criminality and illicit strategies to cheat the state, such as tax evasion. The CNT press
substantiated these exposes with documentary evidence, thereby confirming Rider's view
that fraud and corruption were 'standard practice among landlords'. 9 ' However, despite
the janus-faced attitude of landlords towards the Republic, their alliance with the
authorities held firm during the rent strike as officialdom remained convinced of the need
to repress all 'excesses' in the street.
The rent strike epitomised how the struggles of the unskilled and the unemployed
facilitated the emergence of a new repressive consensus in the early months of the
Republic. The Generalitat, which was keen to develop the Catalan tourist industry,
acquiesced in the demands of hoteliers, bar and restaurant owners for heavier policing to
prevent 'excesses' by the unemployed. Similarly, to avoid large formations of the
unemployed in the city centre and the accompanying danger of Street disorders, the
Council introduced extra distribution centres for municipal vouchers, a change which, as
° Solidaridad Obrera, 2 June, 9, 19 August 1931
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L'Opinió recognised, stemmed not out of a desire to make life easier for the unemployed
but, as 'it is the most secure method for the state' and avoided large numbers of jobless
gathering on the streets. Meanwhile, large numbers of Guardia Urbana were now
stationed around the Bat-ri xino, where they were backed up by periodic patrols by the
Asaltos. It was also noticeable that the authorities were increasingly wary of all
manifestations of popular rowdyism, whether drunkenness or pitch invasions at football
matches.92
Events developed assumed a similar form in neighbouring 1'Hospitalet, where the
local Council received a rude reminder of the growing divergence between the new
authorities and those who had taken to the streets to guarantee the Republican take-over
in April 1931, when a member of its inner sanctum was robbed and unceremoniously
beaten up in working class Coliblanc. Such incidents could have only enhanced the
commitment of the l'Hospitalet authorities to augment the existing repressive forces,
including the controversial reorganisation of the dreaded Sometent, the 'civic guard of
capitalism' that the Republicans once vowed to disband. Indicative of the new tough
policing in l'Hospitalet against the 'dishonest unemployed', a gang of highway robbers on
the Carretera de Cornellà met with the combined forces of the Sometent, the Mossos
d'Esquadra and the Civil Guard.93
Besides the obvious need of the Esquerra to calm the security fears of sections of
its petit bourgeois electoral constituency, the growing prioritisation of order over justice
also reflected anxieties about the passage of the Autonomy Statute in the Madrid Cortes.
The ERC feared that any apparent softness in its attitude towards either law-and-order
or the CNT might show Madrid that the Generalitat was not responsible enough to take
on the onerous tasks of building an autonomous power. Companys frankly admitted that
while immediately after the birth of the Republic rhetorical leftism had been a necessary
device to prevent the new régime from being 'swept aside by the people', now was the
92 L'Opimo, 10, 16 July, 13 August 1931; El Diluvio, 30 May 1931; Las Noticias, 1, 3 May 1931;
Solidaridad Obrera, 25 September 1931; La Noche, 17 November 1931
L'Opinio, 29 August 1931; La Publicitat. 13 Januaiy 1932; Communi que from the Guardia Urbana to
the Mayor of l'Hospitalet, 10 October 1932 (AHLL); Solidaridad Obrera, 21 September 1932, 6 April
1933; Las Noticias, 8 May 1931
200
time for nation-building, a new agenda that hinged on replacing 'disorder' and 'the
revolution in the street' with 'discipline' and 'order'. These sentiments were reiterated by
Paco' Madrid, who observed presciently that 'Companys brought order to the revolution;
Esplá was the intermediary stage, between the revolutionary gesture and the initiation of
the principle of authority of the Republic, to which Anguera de Sojo wanted to give
judicial form'.94
Despite the initial ambivalence of the economic elites towards the new régime,
the defence of 'the principle of authority' and the 'Republic of Order' laid the basis for a
new understanding between the Republican authorities and those forces that historically
displayed most hostility to democracy. This partial rapprochement owed much to the
new repressive consensus that developed in the first few months of the Republic around
the question of the unemployed. Far more than anyone else, it was Anguera de Sojo who
consolidated this consensus and won over important sectors of the business class to the
Republic. The Fomento del Trabajo Nacional welcome his jea1ous protection of the law
and authority'. Meanwhile, the COPUB showed its gratitude to 'the agents of authority'
for repressing its 'rebellious tenants' by making a series of large donations to collections
on behalf of members of the Civil Guard and the security forces, as well as establishing a
special 'collection' for Anguera de Sojo as a reward for his 'brilliant action during his
time as Civil Governor'. The COPUB also expressed its thanks to the central government
for enacting the Ley de Defensa de la Repñblica, which, it believed, had proven so
central in the cessation of 'acts of rebellion'.95
There were also signs of a new understanding between the Esquerra and some of
the old props of the monarchical order. This was reflected in a series of donations to the
Generalitat unemployment fund from the officers at the central Barcelona police station
on VIa Laietana and from the Asociación de Vigilantes Particulares Nocturnos de
Barcelona, the professional association of night-watchman. Meanwhile, General Lopez-
Ochoa, the Captain-General of Catalonia, organised similar collections for the
94 Madrid, Ocho meses, pp. 197-198, 266; L'Opinió, 26 June, 14 July 1931; La Batalla, 24 September
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Generalitat unemployment fund among employers and his fellow officers. 96 Much to the
chagrin of the 'LiuhIns', Macia endeavoured to win over liberal elements from the
Catalan bourgeoisie and from the summer of 1931 the President of the Generalitat began
receiving regular delegations from business associations. Increasingly, the advocates of
the 'Republic of Order' cemented their relations around the Generalitat in a kind of
nascent 'Republican high society' that included sections of the economic oligarchy and
their military and police guardians. At a time when the Catalan authorities had severe
difficulties finding money to assist the unemployed, this emergent elite was visible at the
so-called 'honorary banquets' held in honour of leading Republican dignitaries in
Barcelona. An example of these select gatherings was the 'exquisite dinner' organised by
Barcelona Council for over 500 guests in honour of the ERC in June 1931, at which
Macia, Aiguader i Miró, Companys and the other Generalitat ministers sat alongside the
leaders of all the main Catalan political parties, including the Lliga. Also present were
prominent judicial figures like Anguera de Sojo, members of business and property-
owning associations, including the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional and the COPUB, as
well as the Barcelona Chief-of-Police and high-ranking military officials. A perusal of the
guest-lists of these soirees, which continued throughout the years of the Republic,
revealed the consolidation of a new system of patronage in the city. While this
Republican elite embraced many from the professional middle class who had been
excluded by the monarchy and was, therefore, a far wider social circle than its
monarchist predecessor, the elitist economic pressure groups which supported the anti-
democratic regimes of the past remained within the new Republican network. 97 Thus, the
traditionally close relationship between bourgeois Barcelona and the local authorities
was not broken by the Republic. Moreover, the acceptance by the Esquerra of values
like 'order' and 'hierarchy' revealed that its 'populist-republican' project was, in essence,
little more than a slightly radicalised version of the traditional nationalist goal of class
collaboration between the socially distinct elements within the Catalan national
96 L'Opinió, 10 June 1931; La Vanguardia, 8 July, 26 August 1931; Las Noticias, 16 May 1931;
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community. This is not to say that the Republic was the same as the monarchy. Clearly,
not only did the new régime recognise democratic protocols in a manner unseen in
Spain's past but, it was also more socially inclusive than previous regimes. Despite this,
however, the conflicts of the unemployed and the unskilled in the early months of the
Republic illustrated the limits of social inclusion under the democracy and highlighted the
reality that the aspirations of sizeable sections of the population of Barcelona had been
ignored by the transition. Moreover, within the 'Republic of order' the exclusion of
marginal social sectors was set to become even more discernible.
4.6. The Spectre of the 'Underclass': the 'Deserving' versus the
'Undeserving' Poor
The growing social exclusiveness of the Esquerra was reflected in its plans for a
'vigilant democracy'. It was increasingly obvious that those who had to be watched were
from the lower echelons of society. This task required a new '[security] service for the
protection of the Republic'. The Catalan Republicans were becoming fixated with the
need for specialised police teams dedicated to the repression of specific social groups.
They had already created the Brigade for the Repression of Street Trade to eliminate the
jobless traders, and they followed this by organising two new forces, one to clean the
port of villainous people' and another for 'rounding up beggars and tramps'. Meanwhile,
in keeping with the formula of a 'vigilant democracy', tough new punishments were
introduced for anybody found in possession of an unlicensed firearm and stiffer penalties
were enacted for those without adequate identification. The ERC also hoped to
introduce a national identity card scheme to replace the discredited cédula personal
system, a system that for years had allowed the free adoption of noms de guerre and
aliases through the cards issued to payees of the non-compulsory Council tax. Not only
was it possible to pay the tax for a number of different addresses under assumed names
but, addresses could be invented and on more than one occasion police in l'Hospitalet
searched for individuals who had given fictional addresses in half-built streets.98
98 LasNoticias,6October 1931;L'Opinió, 11, 13, l6August 1931
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Before these changes were enacted the Esquerra offset the absence of
intelligence in the sprawling ghettos on the periphery of the city by integrating the
People's Mayors' of April 14 into the emergent structures of repression. Following the
fragmentation of 'the people', the People's Mayors' used their knowledge of their
erstwhile allies in the fight against the monarchy to consolidate the 'Republic of order'.
The Councillors of l'Hospitalet played a new intelligence-gathering function within the
overall network of containment placed around the city's rebellious populace. As part of
the long-term project of enhancing state control over civil society, the Mayor regularly
pooled information concerning the background and conduct of his citizens with the
judiciary, especially those 'dangerous individuals' with 'criminal records'. In one such
report, the Mayor described José Alberola, an anarchist educationalist and a veteran of
the struggle against the monarchy, as a regular 'trouble-maker' who had been jailed on a
number of occasions. Meanwhile, another CNT unemployment activist was referred to
as 'having a dangerous background, always figuring in patrols of ill-intentioned people
(sic! )'. The 'intelligence-gathering' role of municipal politicians also contributed to the
process of disciplining the jobless by investigating requests for information on the
'background' and 'conduct' of workers from an array of official bodies in order to
distinguish the 'truly unemployed worker' from 'layabouts' and the 'work-shy'.99
The greatest energies of the authorities were directed towards the Barn xino. In
the 1920s, Paco' Madrid wrote widely on the dangerous threat of the baixfons, the
'underworld' of Barcelona. Like much of bourgeois opinion, these moral strictures
concentrated on the presumed criminogenic features of this 'forbidden zone' and the
assumed moral shortcomings of many of its inhabitants who, it was asserted, had made a
conscious choice in favour of a life of leisure outside the official economy, paid for by
'easy money' (dinerofácil). It was axiomatic in Republican circles that the scum of
European society, bolstered by members of the Marseille mafia, had converged on
neutral Barcelona during World War One in an attempt to flee either the draft or
Mayor's notes on Orden del Juzgado MuniciDal to the Mayor of ltHospitalet, 28 August 1931, 20
April 1932 (AHLL); L'Opinió, 25 July 1931; Correspondència de 1'Ajuntainent de 1'Hospitalet, 1930-36
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wartime labour conscription. Thereafter, they had formed a criminal underworld during
the bella epoca war years, enriching themselves from the political and industrial intrigues
in the city, as well as from prostitution, racketeering and narcotics. Finally, with the
coming of the Republic, the authorities sustained that the organised criminals in the Barn
xino had wrested control of part of downtown Barcelona. By exploiting the sometimes
irrational popular fears about prostitution, usurious pimps and opium and cocaine
pushers, the authorities justified their repressive crusades in favour of 'public morality'
and sought to gain wider assent for their plan to re-establish the authority in an area that
they portrayed as outside official control. Egged on by Companys during his spell as
Civil Governor, Police Chief Menéndez set about reimposing the 'principle of authority'
in a puritanical drive against the hidden economy of the Barn xino. However, it was
noticeable from the start, that the police moved as heavily against the jobless street
traders and the unemployed as much as the drug pushers, petty criminals and the
orgamsers of illegal gaming for whom the campaign was invoked. 100
From the beginning of the crusade against tbadness' in the Barn xino, Police
Chief Menéndez relied on the ràtzia, the lightning raid used by the monarchist security
forces on streets or bars that were believed to be 'criminal haunts'. Needless to say, the
ràtzia was a highly indiscriminate tactic. This was compounded by the tendency of the
police to place the onus on detainees to prove their innocence. Nevertheless, the
Republican authorities saw the ràtzia as vital to the extension of police control over the
hostile population of the Barn xino. However, the objectives of ràtzies remained as
questionable as ever and in one swoop a number of individuals were detained even
though there was not the slightest evidence that any of them had committed an offence.
In fact, only occasionally did these raids lead to the detention of individuals who were
actually wanted for specific offences. Meanwhile, despite the public recognition of
habeas corpus and the due processes of the law by the Republic, the police exploited the
cover afforded by the quinizenes, another old monarchist practice, to rely on what was
euphemistically referred to as 'intensive interviewing', away from the prying intervention
100 Francisco Madrid, Sangre en Atarazanas, Barcelona, 1926, passim.; El Escándolo, 22, 29 October
1925, 6, 20 May, 15 July, 7, 14 October 1926; Madrid, Ocho meses, pp.156-157, 175
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of magistrates and defence lawyers. Similarly, brutality and the illegal use of the 'third
degree' remained integral components of interrogations, especially for those detained
under the quintzenes.'°' Ironically, therefore, the readiness of the Republicans to defend
the 'principle of authority' led them to diverge from established legal practice and employ
the very procedures that they had earlier condemned.
Another continuity between the Republican police methods and those of the
monarchy was that crime was regarded as an essentially working class activity. The
underlying assumption behind the police campaign in the Barn xino was the traditional
perspective that all crime could be attributed to the working class, particularly the
unemployed. Accordingly, police stereotypes of the villain remained anchored around
caricatures of the urban working class. Nevertheless, as elsewhere in capitalist Europe,
crime remained a supra-class activity and, at different times, members of all social classes
in Barcelona behaved illegally, as in instances of employers who ignored workplace
safety legislation, shopkeepers who adulterated foodstuffs and doctored weights and
measures, landlords who flaunted housing legislation and the widespread middle class
predilection for confidence tricks and tax evasion. Indeed, a Council inspection team
found that the 'majority' of traders in one Barcelona market doctored their scales. 102 If,
after this litany of petit bourgeois illegality, workers still figured more prominently in the
crime pages, this largely reflected the disproportionate amount of attention the police
directed to tracking them down and the willingness of the press to dwell on one specific
form of illegality at the expense of others.
In reality, what distinguished what Frank Pearce has called 'the crimes of the
powerful' from popular illegality was not their seriousness, nor even their legal status,
but the perception and response of the authorities. This was illustrated by the scant
official comment that followed the savage beating and murder of an unemployed worker
101 Las Noticias, 9 May 1931; L'Opinió, 29 July 1931; Solidaridad Obrera, 2lOctober 1932, 1 July
1933; Tierra y Libertad, 7, 24 October 1932
102 Madrid, Ocho meses, pp.202, 214; Enrique Serrano Fatigati, 'Alimentos adulterados y defunciones.
Apuntes para ci estudio de la vida obrera en Espafla', Estudios de Historia Social, 15, 1980, pp.297-303;
Las Noticias, 16 June, 14-15 November 1931; El DIa Gráfico, 26 November 1931; La Vanguardia, 7
April 1932; La Calle, 16 October, 6 November 1931; La Publicitat, 10 Januaiy 1932
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caught stealing from allotments in l'lHospitalet by smallholding peasants.'° 3 Similarly, the
disparities between the punishments meted out to jobless workers who stole from
shopkeepers, on the one hand, and the shopkeepers who cheated workers by watering
down milk and doctoring scales, on the other, revealed that the authorities viewed illegal
acts against the petit bourgeoisie to be far more serious than criminal acts detrimental to
the consumer. Meanwhile, although the authorities refused to ignore middle class crime
with the same benign tolerance as their monarchical predecessors, sanctions were applied
against the established classes in a highly controlled manner: they often never exceeded
warnings, they rarely extended to imprisonment, and they were never accompanied by
the police beatings apportioned to deviant proletarians. Consequently, the aphorism that
'the working class is policed by the state, while the middle class is merely inspected', was
confirmed by the Republic.
In keeping with its growing concern with law-and-order, the Republican press
assuaged the security fears of the middle classes with a journalistic campaign far
removed from its past interpretation of illegality as a socio-economic phenomenon linked
to the inequalities of material life. This journalistic zeal, matched with the new post-
dictatorial freedoms of reportage, contrived to produce a highly misleading picture of
street crime. Newspapers sometimes carried news of minor infractions of the law, such
as bag-snatching or shoplifting, on successive days. The thrust of the exaggerated focus
on illegality was to vindicate publicly the pursuit of the 'principle of authority' within a
Republic of order'. Thus, one Republican maintained that because Barcelona was
besieged by an incessant wave of 'assaults, robberies, theft, violence.. .it may not be
possible to build a peaceful society'. The ERC press attempted to manufacture public
acceptance of 'discipline' and 'order', asserting that 'the salvation of the Republic lies in
respect for the principle of authority'. L'Opinió dropped its reservations towards the
security forces, describing the police as a force that warranted 'the maximum respect' and
had to be strengthened as 'a symbol of authority' for the Republic. Meanwhile, the
monarchist Civil Guard was described as 'the guard of the Republic'. Las Noticias, a
103 Frank Pearce, The Crimes of the Powerful, London, 1976; Las Noticias, 4, 6 December 1931
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newspaper with proud traditions of uncovenng police corruption, made a similar voile
face. Las Noticias became highly receptive to police press releases, even in cases bereft
of firm evidence and where irregular police procedures had been employed. Illegality, or
'banditry' (apachismo) in the view of Las Noticias, was increasingly seen in
psychological and sensationalist terms, epitomised by bizarre allegations that 'specialist
thieves' were at work in Barcelona dedicated to the highly unskilled practice of snatching
ladies handbags. It was even alleged that street crime was the work of gangs who had a
wider 'mission of committing robberies to discredit the Republican régime'. Perhaps most
staggering of all, Joan Ventalló, from the left-wing of the Esquerra and a leading
member of the L'Opimó group, made the instrumental identification between joblessness
and crime, declaring that unemployment was a 'problem of public order, a simple police
problem'.104
The ERC disingenuously removed the activities of the unemployed from their
wider socio-economic context, opining that forms of behaviour which were clearly
inspired by the deteriorating socio-economic situation in Barcelona were, in fact, part of
a criminal conspiracy bent on subverting established morality. Thus, unemployment
agitation and illegality were increasingly seen as the outcome of conscious subversion, as
if they were calculated attacks on the new régime. According to Companys, 'criminals
impersonating the unemployed' 'stirred up' the jobless to commit 'criminal acts' and
'outrages' in keeping with the plans of 'undesirable elements', 'anonymous subversives'
and 'all the malefactors (maieanles) in Barcelona' who sought to become the 'lords of the
streets'. Similarly, Police Chief Menéndez interpreted attacks on the security forces as
the outcome of dark machinations against the Republic. These views were matched with
a growing resentment that the new freedoms were being exploited by the jobless. Both
L'Opinió and Anguera de Sojo berated groups such as the CDE and the cowardly
unemployed for remaining quiet when 'it was more dangerous' to protest during the
dictatorship, yet acting with 'abandon' under the democracy, as the new liberties allowed
'°4 L'Opinió, 14, 17 July, 16 August, 23 October 1931,29 April, 31 May 1932; Llibertat, 6 June 1931;
L'Obra, 12 September 1931; Las Noticias, 7 March, 29 April, 3, May, 8 November 1931, 11 May 1934;
Petition of the Centre d'Esciuerra Republicana de Catalunya del Districte tercer de 1'Hospitalet to the
Mayor of l'Hospitalet, 10 January 1932 (AHLL)
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them to 'feel brave'. Even 'crimes against property' were viewed as anti-governmental
plots and were doubly condemned, firstly, as infringements of the criminal code, then as
an affront towards the new régime. These views of an anti-Republican intrigue were
echoed by Paco' Madrid, who alleged that 'all those people who didn't mutter a word
during seven contemptible years of dictatorship, now met in the Placa de la Repiiblica
and demanded work'. The thrust of these repnmands supported the project of the
'Republic of Order'. L'Opinió explained that because the Republic had introduced 'the
government of the people', all violence, whether in strikes or mobilisations by the
unemployed, was 'intolerable', an unacceptable 'attack' on the new order, the work of
'armed enemies of the people'. This exclusiveness was echoed by Gil i Gil, who
maintained that any transgression of the law was the work of 'an enemy of democracy',
including the jobless street traders, all of whom were 'enemies of the Republic'.
Meanwhile, according to Ventalló, although 'moving along a non-violent path', the
Republic will not be 'a weak regime' nor will it 'tolerate a minority that attempts to
disturb order in the hope of imposing a system of oppression on a people that has yielded
a regime of freedom'.'°5
In fact, as in the case of the 1931 strike-wave, the actions of the jobless were not
part of a conspiracy to subvert the Republic. Rather they reflected the rearguard battle
for survival of the most depressed sectors of the urban proletariat, a battle that preceded
the Republic. For example, the campaign for a reduction in rents and the mobilisations of
the unemployed both began during the Dictablanda. Similarly, popular traditions of the
unemployed rejecting municipal soup kitchens in favour of work, food requisitioning and
'collective protest by riot' ran deep among the workers of Barcelona.'° 6 The ERC failed
to appreciate this and the party's increasingly proprietonal attitude towards a régime that
was the end product of its political odyssey meant that it found it near impossible to
accept any criticisms of the Republic, whether valid or not. In turn, this sensitivity fused
105 L'Opimó, 6 May, 24 June, 16, 20, 26-27 August, 22 September, 23 October 1931; Llibertat, 6 June
1931; Madrid, Ocho meses, pp.145, 158; Minutes of 1'Hos pitalet Council meeting, 10 January 1933
(AHLL); Las Noticias. 4 June 1931
106 Garcia Oliver, El eco, p.1 15; Arranz, Camps, Ct. al., El Poblenou, p.144; Kaplan, Red Cit y, pp. 122-
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into a highly exclusive attitude towards the unemployed and the belief that the jobless
had no legitimate right to protest about their situation. This found its culmination in the
view of the Esquerra that the main problem with joblessness was not the poverty
imposed by unemployment but, the acts of protest that accompanied it. 107
This was not simply a case of misinterpreting the origins of the social protest of
the unemployed: it was part of a concerted effort of the Republican authorities to
criminalise the struggles of the jobless and separate militant unemployed activists from
the bulk of the workiess. In an attempt to vili& the activists who sought to organise the
jobless, the authorities borrowed heavily from the lexicon of previous monarchical
administrations. The Republicans successively attributed the orchestration of the
mobilisations of the unemployed to 'outside elements', 'reactionaries', 'the detritus of the
city', 'the enemy within', 'enemies of the Republic' and 'provocateurs' who paid the poor
'ten pesetas' to cause 'disturbances' and 'outrages'. Similarly, mass mobilisations like the
rent strike, which drew in thousands of people, were attributed to the 'anarchic action' of
'a minority of tenants' and 'professional agitators', 'a few hundred spoilers' and
'irresponsible loudmouths' whose base 'manoeuvres' and 'shameflul demonstrations' were
'a danger and a discredit to the city'. Meanwhile, it became orthodoxy for the authorities
that 'detritus' impersonated the jobless to disrupt public order. 'Paco' Madrid spoke of
'picturesque criminals who pass as unemployed workers', while Azaña believed that
unemployment was grossly exaggerated by 'the clandestine propagandist [and], the
professional agitator'. Even acts of 'eating without paying' were blamed on 'people with
bad backgrounds', not 'the real unemployed'.108
The growing impact of unemployed struggles impelled Republicans to dwell on
the 'subversion' of the radical left. By looking lefiwards, the Republicans ignored the
provocateurs on the right in Barcelona, like the monarchist rabble-rousers denounced in
the worker press for impersonating building contractors and making false offers of work
107 Las Noticias, 27 June 1931; L'ODimó, 24 June, 10, 17 July, 13 August, 23 October, 19 November
1931
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to unemployed construction workers. Highlighting the priorities of the authorities, a
group of unemployed builders from the Barn xino who had been left standing on a Street
corner awaiting bogus building contractors, was viciously attacked by police as it set off
to protest to the Civil Governor. According to Solidaridad Obrera the authorities now
wished to punish the victims of unemployment, while allowing rightists to 'play with the
miserable Situation' of the jobless. Suggesting that the attention of the authorities was
now directed disproportionately towards revolutionaries, Anguera de Sojo was obsessed
with signs of the dark conspiracy of'the mysterious force' of the FM. Equally, illegality
was near-exclusively attributed to leftist anti-Republican 'deviants' and despite evidence
to the contrary, Las Noticias chose to describe an anned gang of ex-libreños and
rightists who robbed a cinema as 'communists'.'°9
The fixation with 'agitators' and 'conspirators' reflected the ERC plan to pacify
the jobless by dividing them along the traditional lines of the 'deserving' and 'undeserving'
poor. According to this schema, the 'deserving' poor or the 'real unemployed', that is to
say, those deemed capable of self-improvement, merited official assistance and were to
be integrated within the networks of municipal assistance. Meanwhile, the 'undeserving'
poor, which was expanded to include unemployed organisers and street vendors, were
'deviants', 'undesirables' or the 'professional poor', who represented a danger to society
and had, therefore, to be repressed.'1°
The endeavours of the authorities to demarcate the unemployed on these lines
grew in direct proportion to the incidence of social agitation. This policy was initially
articulated by Companys who, following the first unemployed riots after the birth of the
Republic, announced that only 'honourable and dignified workers' would receive relief
from the authorities. After further unemployed riots in early July, Ventalló committed
himself to helping 'the real unemployed who do not go around the streets making a show
Solidaridad Obrera, 12 May 1931; Madrid, Ocho meses, pp.139, 188-189; L'O pinió, 9 September
1931; Las Noticias, 3 November 1931, La Van guardia, 16 February 1933; Rainón Fernández Jurado,
Memories d'un militant obrer (1930-1942), Barcelona, 1987, p.314. The idiocy of the anti-communism
of the Esquerra was resplendent in July, when one its members attributed all the mobilisations of the
jobless to the Catalan Stalinists, ignorant of the fact that their puny forces had little or no influence over
the unemployed in the Catalan capital: L'OpimO, 17 July 1931.
110 See J. Serna, 'La desocupacio i el control social', Batlia, 8, 1988, pp.9-23; L'OpiniO, 21 August, 2
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of themselves and attacking market stalls but, who remain at home, choosing not to
create spectacles with professional layabouts'. The next month Barcelona Council began
differentiating between what it called 'the unemployed', who it promised to assist, and
'those who have never worked' and 'the unskilled' ('los sin oficio'), who were to be
interned in workhouses."
The value of this distinction was that it split the unemployed, by offering financial
support to 'morally healthy' individuals in return for their 'social discipline'. Meanwhile,
this notion gained the acceptance of the 'deserving' poor for the repression the 'anti-
social' activities of the 'undeserving' poor, who were believed to pose a danger to both
society and an impediment to the solution of the problems facing the 'deserving' poor. In
a typical flight of vitriol, L'Opinió blamed all the problems of the unemployed on:
'those who have never worked, nor have any wish to work; the
professional vagabond who does nothing other than collect junk
from the street, who sleeps under a lion at the monument to
Columbus [at the port end of Les Rambles] and resigns himself to
living from the left-overs of the grub at the barracks. The worker
who cannot find work, and who we must find work for, is one thing,
and the professional tramps are another'.
The bonafide jobless were, therefore, implored to ostracise 'those people without any
wish to work' and ignore the advice 'subversives', whereafter the authorities would begin
to address the problems facing 'the real unemployed workers'."2
This prognosis appealed to the aspirations of self-advancement of skilled
workers: it promised to civilise uncouth plebeians and bring culture to the unskilled.
Most importantly of all, the views of the authorities reaffirmed the official consensus that
it was legitimate to deploy police measures against the jobless. This was timely, because
increasingly the activities of the police and the scant welfare services overlapped in the
drive to isolate 'troublemakers' and 'ensure that only the truly unemployed workers are
assisted'. Accordingly, there were a series of police round-ups of 'tramps', beggars,
'malefactors' and homeless unemployed workers, who were photographed and filed,
before being either jailed or interned in workhouses. Meanwhile, the Council Welfare
111 Las Noticias, 1 May 1931; L'Opinió, 17 July 1931; La Vanguardia, 13 August 1931
112 L'Opinió, 10 July 1931
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Department played a leading role in this repression because, as one commentator noted,
'it is not difficult for the organisers of the welfare services to tell who needs assistance
and who must be persecuted'."3
The 'deserving'/'undeserving' poor dichotomy became a favourite propaganda
weapon for the Republicans. In the rent strike, the Esquerra raised the spectre of the
'undeserving' poor to isolate the strike organisers from their potential supporters. In a
blatant attempt to incite envy and turn public opinion against the strikers, the ERC also
spread unproven allegations that striking tenants in the Cases Barates were spending the
money they normally paid in rent on extravagant alterations to their flats and that some
were sub-letting their flats and renting luxurious flats elsewhere. It was even maintained
that a number of strikers had started small businesses with the savings they had made
during the rent strike and that they had moved away to live in villas along the Catalan
coast. More plainly, the strikers were pilloried as being 'uncivilised' or as 'squatters'."4
Tales of the nefarious, anti-social ways of the 'undeserving' poor were an
appropriate foil to the plans of the authorities to prune the welfare budget and make a
section of the unemployed responsible for its own welfare. So, while the Esquerra
promised to help the 'deserving poor' it felt that 'the truly needy children of Barcelona'
should not get 'a single penny directly'. This stance was justified by the authorities
through a succession of largely unsubstantiated stories about a thriving black market in
vouchers. The Republican press joined this campaign, projecting images of the
unemployed as 'tricksters' and 'con-men' from the Barn xino and outlining the dangers of
showing benevolence to inveterate wrongdoers. L'Opiniô revealed that 'the professionals
of common crime, jail-birds, tramps, those living outside the law, those who have never
worked nor wish to, salaried subversives and those among the unemployed who dedicate
themselves to the lucrative business of buying up the vouchers' were enriching
themselves at the expense of the Council and, of course, the 'deserving' poor. Such
claims were complemented by a cartoon published in L'Opinió, entitled 'The New Land
113 El MatI, 4 June 1931; Madrid, Ocho meses, pp.137-138; Fernando Barangó-Solis, Reportaies
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of Milk and Honey', which portrayed jobless workers in the Parc de la Ciutadella, one of
their favourite haunts, engaged in an Epicurean orgy of sunbathing, picnics, outdoor
games and love-making. It was even averred that some of these 'professional layabouts'
were so adept at their trade that they spent weekends in the seaside resorts of
Casteildefels and Montgat. Meanwhile, according to 'unnamed shopkeepers' other
'fraudsters' regularly exchanged 40 or 50 vouchers at a time for the most expensive
meats, pates and quality wines."5
Official propaganda and the concentration on voucher fraud carried the clear
message that unemployment was the harbinger of crime. By isolating poverty from its
social context, the emphasis on the 'undeserving' poor transformed the question of
unemployment into an essentially moral issue, explaining the immense poverty of a
section of the working class as the outcome of its immoral ways. Republican social
philosophy, therefore, remained trapped in a highly traditional strait-jacket and reversed
the causes of unemployment, postulating that joblessness was derived from the individual
shortcomings of the out-of-work themselves, rather than the contradictions of what
Fernando Alvarez-UrIa has described as 'an arbitrary productive system that obliges
millions of citizens to renounce their own identity and humanity, to alienate themselves,
to survive'." 6 Consequently, for the Republicans, the greatest ill engendered by
unemployment was not poverty, but the dangers this represented for social mores.
The incapacity of the Republicans to comprehend the series of circumstances that
led from unemployment to poverty, homelessness or illegality, impelled them to focus
instead on the 'bad ways' of a degenerate and poorly socialised urban 'underclass', the
'dangerous class' of elite demonology, which, due to its failure to overcome its desperate
circumstances, was seen to be beyond redemption and moral regeneration. Because the
'underclass' apparently chose to live the way it did in its ghettoised hovels and, therefore,
'allowed' itself to be brutalised by social degradation, the authorities saw no need to help
its wretched members. Instead, as confirmed by the voucher fraud, throwing money at
Solidaridad Obrera, 13 October 1931; La Vanguardia, 13 August 1931; La Publicitat, 8, 12 June
1931; L'Opinió, 17-19, 24-25 July, 29 August, 2 December 1931
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the problem of unemployment only created more immorality, the authorities concluded.
Thus through its incapacity to accept its social responsibilities and its inability to abide
by fundamental public morals, this 'underclass' was a burden and a living threat to the
rest of society and, therefore, had to be watched.
The theory of the 'underclass', thereby, allowed the Republicans to stigmatise
sections of the unemployed and create fiendish stereotypes of'criminal types' around
which a repressive consensus could be galvanised. At the same time, the spectre of the
'underclass' satisfied the bourgeoisie and the authorities as it exonerating the economic
and political status quo of all responsibility for unemployment, blaming instead the
victims, who were portrayed as a socially and morally inferior tribe of degenerates, a
dangerous conglomeration that presented a mortal danger to both bourgeois property
and the Republican political agenda for change.'17
The preoccupation with an 'underclass' amalgamated with existing fears about the
non-Catalan population.' 18 The strains placed on the agencies of law-and-order by the
rapid urbanisation and demographic expansion of the 1920s and the uncertainties this
created in the minds of the middle and upper classes were attributed to the southern
Spanish immigrants, who were seen as unnecessary additions to the 'sunken' and
'dangerous' classes of urban Catalonia. The calls by Esquerra for the 'purification' of the
'undeserving' poor from the jobless were increasingly interspersed with images of
'parasitic immigrants' coming to Catalonia to 'be unemployed'. This perception was
heightened by the practice of the ERC to describe the unemployed in Spanish as 'los sin
trabajo' or 'los parados', rather than in Catalan as 'els sense feina' or 'els parats'.
Meanwhile, without any concession to reality, an array of demons, ranging from street
vendors, criminals andfaistas, were crudely equated with the immigrants, as the
Esquerra established a stereotypical profile of the good Catalan worker and the irascible
Spanish outsider. This identification was heightened in the public mind through the
practice of the judiciary to state the birthplace of detainees from outside Catalonia in its
7 LasNoticias, 17 June 1931; L'Opinió, 17, 19 July 1931
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press releases, even though this lacked judicial significance and was not applied
consistently to offenders from Catalonia."9
The anti-immigrant backlash of the Catalanistes grew in proportion to the
economic crisis. Immigration was also a cross-party issue that transcended the formal
political divisions of the right and left and it was interpreted by the Lliga and Esquerra
alike as an affront to the new régime, a criminal act in its own right and 'an offensive
against Catalonia'. The strength of this xenophobic campaign meant that during the
Republic, for the first time ever, immigration was exploited as a political issue by a ruling
party in Catalonia.'2°
Invoking 'the general interests of the Republic', the Esquerra engaged in a
xenophobic diatribe against the very immigrant masses who had voted for its in the April
and the June elections and endorsed the Statute. Now, however, worried that its
programme of class harmony and national unity was threatened by the push of unskilled
workers and the unemployed to improve their material conditions, the Esquerra regarded
these masses as illiterate creatures who were ignorant of Republican enlightenment
philosophy and a danger to their historic project of political modernisation. Symptomatic
of the parochial exclusiveness of the ERC, Dencàs regretted the presence of so many
interlopers in 'our house' (casa nostra), intruders who threatened the already fragile
social situation in Barcelona. Employing the same discourse of the alien invasion,
L'Opinió damned the 'trains that arrive full of people who come to be unemployed' and
form 'swarms' of beggars and 'undeserving' poor. With similar rage, Republicans in
rHo spitalet, 'the gateway to Barcelona', vilified 'virulent plagues' of 'outsiders'. This
supremacist imagery of immigrants 'flooding' into Catalonia 'systematically', 'by the
trainload', was a constant theme of the Republican press, whose favourite caricature
became 'the illiterate murcian', who 'one fine day arrived in Barcelona with the murcian
truck, the carrier of a fair contingent of "sin trabajo". Meanwhile, highlighting the
'undeserving' status of the immigrants, according to Llibertat, a l'Hospitalet ERC weekly,
'when they arrive in a town the first thing they ask for is the welfare office'. This 'army' of
119 L'Opinió, 17, 19, 25 July, 2 December 1931, 26 October 1932; La Publicitat, 10 July 1931
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'vegetating' immigrants constituted an 'asphyxiating' burden on already stretched welfare
resources, 'robbing the bread of our Catalan children' and converting Catalonia into a
'poor house'.'2'
The nominal leftism of the Esquerra increasingly failed to mask its growing inner
bigotry, as reflected in its condemnation of 'Japanese imperialism' as 'the yellow peril'!'22
The immigration issue also graphically revealed the social elitism of the Republican
project. Indeed, the ERC did not object to immigrantsper. Se. and some 'outsiders'
figured in its ranks, albeit of a higher social standing than the unskilled Andalusian
immigrants that were excoriated in its press. However, what the Esquerra really disliked
was the threat posed by the predominantly immigrant-based 'new' working class. The
immigration issue exposed the extent to which the Esquerra's idealised view of the
humble home life of the 'good worker' without 'vices' was poles apart from the stifling
poverty of the unskilled and the unemployed. These masses were feared by the Esquerra
as an irrational, dark, cultureless force and, while they needed the general assent of the
masses, the Republican political project increasingly left little room for the mobilisation
of autonomous working class organisation. To be sure, the benign reformism of the ERC
and the elitist Fabians of the USC was forged in the mind of the intellectual middle class
and was anchored in the assumption that the masses were a culturally retarded social
sector, likely to confuse what was in its best interests if it was not led by enlightened
professionals. Even ostensibly radical figures, such as Aiguader i Miró, held a thoroughly
dismissive view of passive, atomised urban masses whose civic ignorance highlighted
their need for political and moral leadership by the educated middle class. Accordingly,
the urban masses were assigned the position of spectators within a process of social
change calmly mapped out by perspicacious politicians.'23
Throughout the rest of the Republic the Esquerra pointed to the spectre of
immigration to justify its policy on unemployment. Immigration gave the party a new
pretext to reject unemployment subsidies as an 'absurd, anti-economic and anti-social'
121 L'Opinió, 10 July, 13 August, 5 November, 2 December 1931, 17 May, 26 October, 2 December
1932; El Diluvio, 6 May 1931; Llibertat, 5 August, 5 October, 20 December 1933
122 L'Opinió, 18 May 1932
123 L'Opinió, 1 August 1931; Fortitud, 1 July 1933; Poblet, Ai guader, pp.42-43
217
measure that would 'attract all the unemployed of Spain to Barcelona'. The ERC also
denounced all manifestations of charity on the same grounds. Meanwhile, despite a
clause in its party statutes recognising 'the freedom of movement and selection of
residence', the ERC accepted a key demand of the bourgeoisie and committed itself to
ending the status of Barcelona as an 'open city' by halting the 'invasion' through the
construction of a 'cordon sanitaire' of immigration controls. It even favoured a 'passport'
system that required incomers to present a valid work pennit or proof of savings.
Repatriation was also introduced 'for those elements who may aggravate the problem of
unemployment in our city and in Catalonia' because, as L'Opinió put it, 'nobody would
tolerate an unknown individual installing themselves in their house simply under the
pretext that it is better than their own'. Enforced by a new immigration police based at
the city's train stations, road entrances and port, it was hoped that these 'hard but fair'
measures would reduce unemployment by at least 50% and, while the ERC conceded
that they signified an attack on civil liberties, it justified them by its 'right to prevent
those from coming who might create conflicts'.'24
The repressive stance adopted by the Esquerra was encouraged by the central
Republican government which restricted the entrance of foreign workers into Spain and
saw immigration as a matter of 'public order'. This policy found its apogee in the highly
distastefi,l practice of summarily expelling anti-fascists and refugees from the growing
number of authoritarian regimes that abounded in Europe and Latin America during the
1920s and 1930s. This meant that Portuguese, Bulgarians, Argentinians and, especially
Italians, were repeatedly cast into the abyss of a hostile continent by the authorities,
sometimes after being held unconstitutionally without trial for over 15 months. Yet few
places left to go in a continent increasingly under the grip of dictatorship, it was common
for émigrés to flout expulsion orders.'25
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125 LuIs MartIn-Granizo and Mariano Gonzalez Rothvoss, Derecho social, Madrid, 1936, p.3 19;
Solidaridad Obrera, 25 September, 13, 28 November 1931, 24, 29 March, 2 April, 6 August, 20
October, 5 November, 7 December 1932, 24 August 1933, 29 September 1934, 16 January 1935;
Tiempos Nuevos, 31 January 1935
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The repatriation of non-Catalans to their Spanish birthplaces was a similar failure.
There were numerous instances of deported immigrants returning almost immediately to
their adopted home, knowing that the factories of Catalonia provided better chances of
finding work than the arid fields of southern Spain. In some instances, unemployed
workers who were repatriated as 'beggars' twice in the same week still managed to
return to Barcelona by the weekend. Despite the expense and limited success of the
repatriation programme, the policy remained the cornerstone of ERC thinking on
unemployment and it received the full support from its coalition partners in the USC.
Even Serra i Moret saw no contradiction between his belief in socialism and his belief
that unemployment was caused by the immigrant workers who came to work in
Barcelona before the 1929 World Exhibition, rather than the contradictions of capitalist
production.'26
From 1931 onwards all the unemployment initiatives developed by the ERC had
some kind of a draconian component at their core. For instance, the statistics of the
Generalitat Departament de Treball, the Catalan Labour Ministry were directed to
differentiating between the unemployed according to their birthplace. This allowed the
authorities to repatriate 'unworthy' immigrants, while offering limited financial assistance
to 'needy' and 'deserving' Catalans. Similarly, Barcelona Council issued the 'Targeta
d'Obrer Parat', a much-disliked identity card scheme that recorded the work record of
the jobless and carried the penalty of the workhouse or repatriation for those who did
not possess it. The Generalitat Unemployed Workers' Commission also continued to
police the unemployed and became heavily involved in sifting the 'undeserving' immigrant
jobless chaff from the 'real unemployed' wheat. The Institute of Workers' Assistance
(Institut d'Asistencia Obrera), another semi-official unemployed body created by the
Generalitat, was formed, in the words of L'Opinió, 'not to give to the poor but, to
repatriate outsiders and round up the tramps' and 'to separate the problem of
unemployment from that of "idleness", that 'permanent disease which threatens the
peace of all peoples'. In conjunction with 'a special police force' formed within the
126 L'Opimó, 10 July 1931, 7 April 1934; La Nau, 27 April 1931
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Guardia Urbana to intern the homeless, vagrants and street traders, the Institute of
Workers' Assistance began to fuffil the 'laborious task' of the 'purification' (depuraclO) of
the jobless.' 27 Meanwhile, to receive unemployment assistance from the Unemployed
Workers' Commission the jobless had first to agree to accept any work they were offered
and fulfil a series of stringent conditions, including evidence of residence in Barcelona
for at least five years, a clause that excluded the substantial number of immigrants who
came to work on the public works programmes of the dictatorship after 1926, as well as
the thousands of workers who returned to the city after the contraction of the European
economy after 1929 or who went into exile during the years of the dictatorship. Equally
questionable were clauses that required proof of 'good conduct' and evidence that the
claimant was a 'true worker', two conditions which, considering past battles for trade
union recognition, effectively excluded any worker who had ever played an active role in
the CNT. Nevertheless, even after 'a rigorous declaration' from the claimant and the
satisfaction of all the aforementioned prerequisites, the possibility of financial assistance
only existed in situations where 'true need' was proven.'28
Even within its own parameters the Generalitat Unemployed Workers'
Commission was a failure. Firstly, it failed to cater for the needs of the 'deserving' poor.
Secondly, it did not keep its promise to assist those in 'true need'. Those with the
greatest need, the homeless, were vilified by the Generalitat as 'undeserving vagrants'.
This prescriptiveness was thoroughly at odds with of the reality of unemployment in
1930s Barcelona, where the dividing line between housed and homeless was fluid.
Lastly, the Generalitat unemployment bodies operated with a torturous gradualism. This
was illustrated by the Generalitat-run Labour Exchange (borsa de treball) and its
Council-organised equivalent. Although both of these quasi-official labour exchanges
were tied to centres of local power and offered the possibility of employment to its
members through clientelism and political favouritism, they nevertheless managed only
to find work for 11% of their unemployed members in 1931. Consequently, these bodies
' 27 L'Opiraó 19, 25 July, 13, 29 August 1931 La Nau. 27 April 1931
'28 E1 Mati. 21 June 1931; L'Opinió, 4 August 1932
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appealed largely to the more stable and skilled workers, who possessed the patience
needed for life in the laboriously bureaucratic official labour exchanges.
The exclusiveness and complicity of official unemployment bodies in repression
and repatriation meant that they attracted only a small minority of the jobless, 'the real
unemployed' in the view of the ERC. Immigrant workers logically remained outside. This
is borne out by the absurdly low numbers of unemployed furnished by the Generalitat
borsa de treb all, according to which, in mid- 1931 there were under 10,000 unemployed
workers. Most revealing of all, according to the Generalitat, unemployment in the
building industry stood at 3,593. By way of contrast, the Barcelona CNT Builders'
Union alone claimed more jobless members than the entire Generalitat Labour
Exchange. 129 It is likely that the unemployment figure in the building industry cited by
the Generalitat referred almost exclusively to the unemployment of skilled workers and
those who were either Catalan or who had lived in Barcelona for years. Meanwhile, the
CNT statistics almost certainly referred to unemployment among the unskilled and those
who had recently arrived in the Catalan capital. The figure cited by the CNT is almost
certainly the more accurate of the two because, as we have already seen, not only did the
building industry have some of the highest levels ofjoblessness in Barcelona but it was
also an industry that attracted large numbers of immigrant workers.
This dichotomy and polarisation between the CNT and the Generalitat were most
portentous: it reflected the break-up of 'the people' and created the conditions for a full-
scale clash between the Confederation and the new authorities, a conflict that generated
tremendous enmities that would shake the Republic to its very foundations.
129 Balcells, Crisis, p.19; Soto Cannona, El trabajo, pp.359-360; La Vanguardia. 13 August 1931;
L'Opinió, 21 June 1931; Herithndez Andreu, Espafla, p.97; Solidaridad Obrera, 25 March, 1 November
1931
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Chapter 5: 'The Same Dog With a Different Collar': The FAI and the
Republic
5.1. Policing the Crisis
The growing realisation by the most militant sections of the Barcelona
unemployed that they were excluded from the new democratic institutions was
accompanied by a significant rise in proletarian discontent with the Republic. Denied any
real opportunity to articulate their aspirations, the unemployed displayed a growing
disposition for direct action and aggressive forms of protest. In the middle of July, at the
height of its allegations about the misappropriation of Council welfare vouchers,
L'Opinió reported that its offices had been 'threatened' by unemployed activists.
Meanwhile, the arbitrary procedures of the authorities, such as the banning of
unemployed workers' meetings, further fanned the fires of rebellion and simply
encouraged jobless workers to adapt clandestinely to legal prescriptions. On the streets,
new patterns of violence and repression were established as the security forces and the
jobless vied with one another for access to public spaces. Moreover, when the
authorities clamped down further on the activities of the unemployed, the results were
often unpredictable. For instance, when Asaltos were called in to disperse an alfresco
meeting of the unemployed in the Parc de la Ciutadella, the city park was converted into
a battlefield.'
These same dynamics of confrontation grew between the security forces and the
jobless street vendors. Unable to afford the confiscation of their goods or to meet
Council fines, the jobless traders violently resisted the police whenever possible. Because
the jobless vendors tended to intervene on each others' behalf against the security forces,
street fights increasingly became the order of the day. Just a few days after the
destruction of el mercadet, vendors trading around Sants market responded aggressively
to the confiscation of their goods by the authorities. When the police withdrew, the
jobless traders regrouped in a very defiant mood. Holding the stall holders responsible
for the repression they had suffered, the unemployed entered the market, threatening
traders with knives and clubs, while destroying or stealing their goods. Underlining the
1 L'Opinió, 19 July 1931; La Vanguardia, 31 July 1931; Las Noticias, 1-2 December 1931
new combative attitude of the street traders, the following month, when Asaltos arrived
to disperse them from the market in the neighbouring district of Hostafrancs, there was
an 'uprising' (motIn) of traders, who, together with sympathetic locals, fought off the
Asaltos, before sacking the market.2
Repression only served to aggravate anti-police feelings and strengthen class and
community identities. In l'Hospitalet, the spontaneous anger of what the authorities
dubbed 'the mob' (la chusma) was directed at the police whenever they attempted to
arrest the street traders, a diversion that often allowed the vendors to escape. In reply,
the police opted for more robust methods of detention in a bid to immobilise street
traders before they appealed to the public to intervene on their behalf. This resulted in an
increase in police brutality because the swifter the arrest, the more violent was the
technique employed. The Asaltos, in particular, were criticised for using unnecessary
violence when making arrests, even against women and child street traders. This only
exacerbated existing enmities towards the security forces and when a 10-year old street
trader was hit and killed by a bus as she attempted to escape detention, a crowd of
fellow traders and passers-by set about the police.3
Police methods did not remove the socio-economic raison d'être of the street
traders and they were ever-present on the streets of proletarian Barcelona and
l'Hospitalet throughout the Republic. At times of stiff repression the traders simply
adapted their 'business' to the new terrain imposed by the authorities, many choosing to
operate from house doorways, a vantage point which allowed them to survey the streets
and to guard against the sequestration of their goods by the police. Furthermore,
because the street vendors were often popular figures within their communities, they
relied on the considerable goodwill of local people. Whenever the repression relented,
the jobless Street traders normally returned to the markets. In S ants, as soon as a
sustained police drive against 'rebel traders' came to end, there were renewed calls for
2 ElDIa Gráfico, 24-25 September 1931; Las Noticias, 1,21 October 1931; L'Opimô, 20 August 1931,
La Vanguardia, 19, 21 August, 24-25 September 1931; Solidaridad Obrera, 30, April, 22 May, 27 June,
30 October 1931; Communi gues from the Guardia Urbana to the Mayor of l'Hospitalet, 17 July, 7
October 1932, 10 April 1936 (AHLL)
Conmiuniciue from the Guardia Urbana to the Mayor of l'Hospitalet, 10 June 1933, 10 April 1936
(AHLL); Solidaridad Obrera, 7 July 1933, 1 February 1936
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new action due to 'extraordinary increases' in 'irregular trade' around the markets.
Meanwhile, in the Santa Eulàlia district of l'Hospitalet, street traders braved the
repression to sell their wares inside the market, provoking daily incidents with market
traders, who predicted that they would soon be outnumbered by the jobless traders.
Amid growing conflictivity, market barrow-boys regularly assisted the efforts of the
Guardia Urbana to flush out the street traders. This prompted a new series of enmities as
the jobless street traders responded to this aggression by singling out the barrow boys
for beatings. Unbowed by the offensive of the authorities, the Street traders remained
and, at the height of the recession, l'Hospitalet Council recognised that the number of
'illegal traders' was 'increasing on a daily basis'.4
The street traders now expected very little from the new régime and symbolic
gestures by the ERC, such as amnesties for fines against street traders on the anniversary
of the birth of the Republic, were greeted with derision. The vendors had been hounded
and criminalised by authorities who 'robbed' them of their goods for doing little more
than attempting to eke out a living under circumstances that were neither of their own
choosing nor making. In the course of this experience the street traders met with the new
Republican police forces which they regarded as repressive as those which had existed in
the days of the monarchy.5
Social polarisation was similarly exacerbated by the repression of the rent strike
as strikers vented their wrath on 'enemies' like bailiffs and removal men, as well as more
obvious ones, like landlords. The ardour of the CDE was tempered under the heat of
repression and activists warned that 'rather than sleep on the streets, we are ready for
anything'. In Sants, following the reinstallation of an evicted family, neighbours protested
at the house of the landlord, informing him of the dangers of re-eviction. Rent strike
pickets responded to growing official repression of the strike with ever-more violent
methods and landlords reported being threatened with firearms. Assaults on bailiffs also
became more common as this represented the quickest way to halt an eviction. In
Las Noticias. 10 November, 18 December 1931, 29 August 1935; La Vanguardia, 23 August 1935;
Minutes of the 1'Hospitalet Council meeting, 1 June 1933 (AHLL)
La Vanguardia, 14 April 1932; Solidaridad Obrera, 8 February 1932
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Poblenou a family remained in its flat after the bailiffs were set upon by neighbours and
on one occasion bailiffs in l'Hospitalet were in such a hurry to escape angry protesters
that they left their lorry behind. Meanwhile, in the explosive Can Tunis Cases Barates
popular frustration at evictions was directed at the clergy and night-watchmen and police
fought to prevent residents from torching the local church, before a lorry load of Civil
Guard finally re-imposed order. Although since the promulgation of the Ley de Defensa
de la Repüblica mass involvement in the rent strike had receded in most of Barcelona,
the degree of solidarity in working class communities like Poblenou, l'Hospitalet and the
Cases Barates meant that the security forces had to get increasingly involved and
evictions were effected in military-style operations. Moreover, in areas such as the Cases
Barates and in parts of l'Hospitalet, the mix of intense community solidarity and high
levels of poverty meant that the hardships imposed through continuing the strike were
offset by non-payment. Thus often in the face of unrelenting police harassment and with
no electricity or water, many strikers refused to yield to the authorities and the
landlords.6
The deployment of the security forces against the mobilisations of the
unemployed heralded the failure of the Republican project to end the internecine warfare
between state institutions and civil society. Moreover, as the police were called upon to
contain the illegality of the unemployed, so the hopes of the Republicans to endow the
security forces with popular legitimacy were further dashed. From their arrival on the
streets of Barcelona, the repressive activities of the Asaltos in labour disputes and
against the unemployed showed how Republican institutions were used against the
masses and led to a growing identification of the Republic with the propertied classes.
Meanwhile, because the Asaltos were forged from the same material as previous security
forces, their failure to change popular perceptions of the police was to a large extent
sealed. To be sure, just as the Asaltos continued to display the same lack of
professionalism of the monarchical police, so did they also employ the same arbitrary
violence. In the dark of the night a group of Asaltos startled by a backfiring car, shot a
6 Solidaridad Obrera, 15-19, 28 August 1931, 17 September 1935; Las Noticias, 30 June 1931; Las
Noticias, 11, 22 October, 29 November 1931; El DIa Gráfico, 2 October 1931; Adelante, 7 Januazy 1934
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night-watchman dead. The new force also displayed a violent indiscipline and cenetistas
regularly protested about the unwanted 'boxing lessons' that they received in police
stations from the Asaltos. Off-duty the Republican police displayed a similar lack of
discipline, as testified by complaints of violent, drunken behaviour by Asallos during
their spare time. Other branches of the Republican repressive forces revealed a similar
brutishness, such as the policeman who had a taxi-driven night out around the cabarets
of Barcelona, before pulling his revolver on the driver in an attempt to avoid paying the
fare.7
The personal failings of individual policemen cannot, however, explain the
inability of the security forces to win the hearts and minds of proletarian Barcelona.
Instead, this owed more to the enduring nature of popular anti-police traditions and the
tensions created by the economic crisis. This was tacitly recognised by the authorities
themselves, whose attempts at strengthening the police, the 'clean-up' of the Barn xino
and re-establishing 'the principle of authority' were necessary complements to continuing
economic inequality. The same was true of the Ley de Defensa de la Repüblica which,
according to Azaña, although it produced 'excesses', was 'necessary to govern'.8
Similarly, the Republican criminal code was overwhelmingly concerned with the 'legality'
of contract and the defence of private property and safeguarded the same historically
specific set of socio-economic relationships as the laws of the monarchy. In other words,
although the Republican state was clearly distinct to its monarchist predecessor, the
commitment of the new authorities to underwriting the highly exploitative,
underdeveloped economic system that had developed during the years of the monarchy
was inimical to their political project of democratisation and creating popular state
institutions.
It was the institutional function of the security forces as defenders of the general
cohesion of bourgeois society that largely determined police tactics and poisoned
relations between the repressive forces of the state and the workers of Barcelona in
7 Ballbé, Orden pCiblico, p.339; Solidaridad Obrera, 25 December 1932, 8 February, 21 March, 20 June,
15 November 1933; El Luchador, 27 November 1931; L'Opinió, 29 July 1931
8 Azafia, Obras, vol.2, pp.106-107
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much the same way as under the monarchy. Moreover, the growing demands placed on
the police as the front-line shock-force of the state in the worker districts was
aggravated by the strains of the recession.
Firstly, there was the rise in conflicts between the police and the unemployed
derived from the daily threat to property posed by popular illegality. As the security
forces proved incapable of protectmg private property against conventional acts of
illegality by the unemployed, the authorities augmented the civil police with members of
the political police. Therefore, members of the Bngada de Investigación Social, the
branch of the security forces normally used in the repression of political enemies of the
state, were ordered to patrol country roads against highway robbers. 9 This
interchangability of'civil' and 'political' police functions, a common feature of law-and-
order under the monarchy, therefore continued into the Republic and heightened the
tendency of the masses to regard the police per. Se. as the advanced guard of the
capitalist order.
Secondly, the recession enhanced the reliance of the authorities on the security
forces and the penal system to impose social discipline on workers who were no longer
subjected to the indirect fetters of the workplace and the informal coercion of daily
responsibilities of work. 10 The police responded to this additional function with
'preventive brutality' against the unemployed. Throughout the Republic laconic
policemen preferred to open fire on suspects rather than set off in their pursuit. The Civil
Guard patrolling the fields around l'Hospitalet had a reputation for shooting chicken and
vegetable thieves on sight. The newly formed security corps on the port also tended to
shoot first and ask questions later. When a gang ofjobless workers was disturbed
stealing merchandise on the docks, one of the group was summarily shot in the back
when he attempted to flee. Another of the port security corps mistook two unemployed
workers fishing on the waterfront as robbers and opened fire, killing one, whereupon his
outraged friend overpowered the guard and clubbed him to death. Meanwhile, the
9 Las Noticias, 31 December 1931
10 Ivan Janovic, 'Labour Market and Imprisonment', Crime and Social Justice, 1977, pp. 17-31; Richard
Quinney, Class. State and Crime, New York, 1977, pp.'3 1-140
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Sometent, the 'terror of both town and country' in the view of Solidaridad Obrera,
continued to claim working class lives with impunity during the Republic."
Brutality was also meted to unemployed workers irrespective of whether they
were involved in illegality or, in urban protest movements. Although not listed as an
offence by the legal code, police sought to neutralise aspects of what they perceived as
very threatening features of working class street culture. In circumstances where police
officers felt what they described as an 'insubordinate attitude' was in need of correction,
they had no qualms about administering a salutaiy beating. For instance, without the
slightest hint of remorse, the Guardia Urbana in l'Hospitalet candidly reported to the
Mayor that they had given 'hospital treatment' to two workers who were 'being insolent'
towards the authorities. On another occasion, two workers 'larking about' who mocked a
bourgeois on a bicycle on MontjuIc were assaulted by a pair of Civil Guards.' 2
 This
extra-legal violence was left unchecked by the authorities and served to embitter the
daily battle between police and jobless in working class communities.
The only places where the Republican authorities could claim success in
improving the standing of the police were areas like the Eixample and Gràcia. In districts
such as these, where the ERC and the other Republican parties had an organised popular
base, the more economically stable inhabitants accepted the need for a !Republic of
Order' and had enormous faith in the intentions of the new authorities.
However, life in these areas contrasted enormously from the myriad hardships in
the ghettos. On the streets of districts like l'Hospitalet, Santa Coloma and Horta there
was an uninterrupted street war between unemployed workers who, by the very
conditions of their physical existence, were forced to live outside the law. This is
confirmed by police reports in PHospitalet, 'the most explosive district' in Catalonia in the
view of GarcIa Oliver, which reveal a constant struggle by both the police and night-
watchmen to prevent the theft of foodstuffs from nearby estates and break-ins at flats
and houses in the bourgeois city centre. In these ghetto areas, the accumulated
La Vanguardia. 11 September 1931; Communique from the Guardia Urbana to the Ma yor of
iHospitalet, 22 June 1934 (AHLL); Solidaridad Obrera, 21 September 1932, 6 April, 20 August 1933
12 L'Opinió, 29 July 1931; Communique from the Guardia Urbana to the Ma yor of l'Hospitalet, 26 April
1936 (AHLL); Solidaridad Obrera, 19 June 1931
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experiences of a section of the proletariat as the policed encouraged a distinct cultural
outlook on matters of law-and-order and perpetuated the popular view of the security
forces as the repressive agents of an invidious and unequal system. This was confirmed
by the lamentations of La Vanguardia, that the bulk of Barcelonins felt a 'general
disrespect' towards the uniformed representatives of the law.' 3 The stubborn and
venomous nature of this 'disrespect' was reflected in mass resistance to all branches of
the security forces. Whenever the police attempted to make arrests hostile crowds of
locals frequently formed in an attempt to thwart the security forces. It was immaterial
whether the crowds knew the detainee or, for that matter, why the police wanted to
make the detention: what mattered was the popular perception that 'one of us' was under
attack from 'one of them', victimised by the same oppressive forces which preserved the
hostile world within which the proletariat as a whole was trapped.
In response to collective resistance, police tactics became more robust. In the La
Torrassa-Collblanc zone of l'Hospitalet, police operations came to resemble the
manoeuvres of a foreign army of occupation in hostile enemy territory. These
innovations merely exacerbated the existing alienation felt towards the force and
inflamed community reactions even more. One police report explained that after an
Asalto hit a felon while making an arrest, the agent was surrounded by an aggressive
crowd whose mood was so incensed that the Civil Guard and the police were forced to
intervene speedily, 'otherwise things would have turned very nasty'. On the tough streets
of l'Hospitalet beat policemen sometimes received written death-threats and, when the
odds favoured those who did not have the law on their side, especially under the cover
of night, workers had no hesitation in administering a thrashing to both policemen or
private security guards, whether on or off duty.'4
Policing in the Barn xino produced similar patterns of popular resistance. The
threat of arrest, illegal detention and even false prosecution in police ràtzies prompted
enormous opposition to the extending arm of the law. Similarly, Council repatriation
13 La Vanguardia, 1 September 1931; GarcIa Oliver, El eco, p.416
Solidaridad Obrera, 24 December 1931; CommuniQues from the Guardia Urbana to the Ma yor of
l'Hosi,italet, 17 July 1932, 18 March, 14 June 1936 (AHLL)
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policies engendered tremendous hostility from immigrants, both non-Spanish and non-
Catalan. Throughout the Republic there were numerous reports of 'the mob' (la chusma')
violently impeding police duties in the Barn xino and intervening to prevent the arrest of
'common criminals'. Moreover, because the popular hatred towards policing was
common knowledge, there were frequent cases of detainees resisting arrest and
imploring passers-by to intercede on their behalf against the security forces. On one such
occasion, in Carrer del Cid, in the heart of the Barn xino, an individual with what the
police termed a 'bad record' noisily resisted arrest, prompting a speedy response from
residents of the neighbouring flats, who left their tenement blocks to attack the police
and free the wanted party, while other neighbours bombarded the intruding security
forces with bottles, cans and rocks from their balconies. In the end, the security forces
fired shots in the air to effect the arrest.'5
In moments of community tension the arrival of the police on the streets
produced highly flammable situations. For instance, when a tram crashed into a group of
children in Barceloneta, neighbours immediately took to the streets, calling on the
authorities for the trams to be replaced with buses. Despite assurances from Jove i
Sarroca, the USC Councillor, that the demands of the demonstrators would be raised
with the Council if they went home peacefully, the crowd continued to block the tram
lines. Finally, when the police were called in to disperse the crowd, the mass
disapprobation for the security forces prompted what La Vanguardia described as a
'popular uprising' (motIn popular) as demonstrators challenged police for the control of
their area, successfully driving them out of Barceloneta. Rather than await the ponderous
decision of the authorities, the people of Barceloneta chose to end the danger to their
children immediately througb a collective riot, ripping up as tram lines before a
substantial contingent of Asaltos arrived to re-impose order.'6
The battle for the streets between the police and the masses underlined the
disintegration of 'the people', the ephemeral political reality that had ensured the peaceful
transition to the Republic in the spring of 1931. Although 'the people' was always devoid
15 Las Noticias, 9, 16 May, 24 December 1931; La Vanguardia, 9 September 1931
16 La Vanguardia and Solidaridad Obrera, 21 July 1931
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of any real socio-economic basis, it rapidly fragmented as 1931 wore on. Now, more
than ever, there was a growing confrontation between what the Bloc termed the 'two
Barcelonas'.' 7 Symptomatic of the divergent agendas of the Republican authorities and
the working class was the official reaction to an outbreak of bubonic plague near the city
rubbish tip in 1'Hospitalet at the end of the summer of 1931. Despite this crisis which
threatened the lives of thousands of workers and the daily evidence of the huge pestilent
cloud that hung over l'Hospitalet and Barcelona, the authorities downplayed the danger
to public health and Aiguader i Miró defended the 'perfect' health bodies in what were
'the cleanest cities in the world'.' 8 The cavalier attitude of the authorities towards the
plague contrasted sharply with the concurrent barrage of press complaints about
'licencentiousness' and 'evil-doers'.
As we have seen, joblessness was the decisive factor that sharpened conflict
between the constituent parts of'the people', because the open wounds of unemployment
pushed the most depressed sections of the proletariat to clash directly with the interests
of the petit bourgeoisie and then physically, in the streets, with Republican security
forces. From promising real change, the authorities moved to embrace the 'rule of law'.
This presupposed the reaffirmation of the status of the proletariat as a propertyless class,
leaving many workers feeling betrayed and aware that the post-monarchical stress on
legal equality was little more than a mask for the preservation of the law of the rich.
The unflilfilled aspirations aroused by Republicans among the masses were
translated into hatred for the new authorities. As the Badalona CNT put it, tired of
'words, words and promises.. .the immense majority of the working class felt completely
defrauded'. In l'Hospitalet, unemployed workers reminded the Council that they had
'trusted their warm words', while others had 'risked their freedom, even their lives, so
that a government which would realise their hopes might come to power.
Disillusionment is a bad adviser and it may create enemies'. 19 The repeated failure of the
17 Front, 30 July 1932
18 L'Opinió 29 August, 1 September 1931; Solidaridad Obrera, 6, 13 September 1931; La Vanguardia,
30 August 1931; L'Obra, 26 September 1931; Clarainunt i Furest, La pesta.passim.
19 La Colmena Obrera, 30 October 1931; Letter from la Comisión de Obreros en pare forzoso to
iHospitalet Council, 22 October 1931 (AHLL). The disaffection with the failure of the authorities to
help the large numbers of unemployed in 1'Hospitalet cannot be separated from a dismal turnout in the
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authorities to deliver on their earlier promises to assist the unemployed led the jobless to
direct their frustration squarely towards the Republicans. Angel Samblancat, one of the
Councillors responsible for unemployment relief in Barcelona, faced the growing rage of
the unemployed during a visit to the soup kitchens in the Can Tunis Cases Barates. His
arrival provoked a mass riot, as the predominantly jobless inhabitants of the area stormed
the soup kitchens and fought with police. At one stage, guns were brandished, and
Samblancat, a veteran of the campaign against the monarchy, ran for his life. 20 Indicative
of the changing relationship between the Republican political elite and those who had
previously voted for them, in the summer-autumn of 1931 a growing number of
politicians applied for gun licences and armed themselves.2'
The experience of the first months of the Republic convinced large numbers of
workers in Barcelona that the law, like that of the monarchy before it, was the law of the
well-fed minority bent on protecting its property from those who had none. The ease
with which the bourgeoisie and the middle classes found the ear of the new authorities,
along with continuing economic inequality, confirmed the prognosis of the revolutionaiy
left that the formal legal and political equality introduced by the Republic were pyrrhic
advances. In the view of one anarchist critic, 'converted into the first Government of the
bourgeois Republic, the Revolutionary Committee quickly forgot its agreements and the
mission which the people had entrusted it by voting for it'. This view was shared by the
dissident communists, who maintained that the new democracy was a 'fiction' and that
the Republicans stood for 'class democracy in favour of the bourgeoisie'. By adopting a
conservative line in a society where there was precious little to conserve and everything
to transform, the Republicans were accused of turning their backs on the working class,
the social sector that represented the main guarantee against reaction.22
city in the June Cortes elections, Out of step with the large poll in Barcelona: La Vanguardia, 14 July
1931
20 Solidaridad Obrera, 11 June 1931; Las Noticias, 11-12 June 1931. When he returned to his office that
day in an understandably shaken state, Samblancat duly resigned from his post on the unlikely grounds
of 'press pressure'.
21 Jefatura Superior de Policia de Barcelona to the Juz gado Municipal de l'Hospitalet, 28 September, 25
October 1931 (AHLL); Gobierno Civil de Barcelona to the Mayor of 1'Hospitalet, 20 April, 1 May, 1
June 1932 (AHLL)
22 Cánovas Cervantes, Apuntes. p.269; La Batalla. 12 March 1931
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The real possibilities of attracting sectors of the CNT rank-and-file in Barcelona
in the first three or four months of the Republic had passed. The social fissures produced
by the economic crisis fragmented the cross-class coalition that brought the Republic in
Barcelona and the authorities embarked on a policy of repressing the unemployed. To
assuage the fears of sections of its own political constituency and to satisfy the central
authorities that it was a responsible force of government, the Esquerra moved to the
right and accepted the need to curb the actions of the poorest sectors of Catalan society.
The stage was set for a full-scale clash between the ERC and the CNT.
5.2. The Rise of the FAI
The CNT was the vehicle for the frustrated hopes for radical change among the
unemployed. The immigrant workers who found themselves excluded from the semi-
statal, gradualist bodies like the Generalitat Unemployed Workers' Commission, flooded
into the CNT bolsas de trabajo. By early summer 1931, when the average
unemployment rate in the Barcelona CNT unions was 13%, the Woodworkers' union
claimed that 42% of its members were jobless. In May 1931 the unemployed street
vendors formed the Society of Street Traders in Fish, Vegetable and Fruit as a section of
the Barcelona CNT Food Workers' Union. Radicalised by the 'tenacious persecution' of
their 'humble trade' and 'struggle for life', the street traders attacked the plan of the
authorities 'to move us from the streets to the hospitals'. 23 Solidaridad Obrera defended
the 'honest way of life' of the street traders, alleging that they had moral and commercial
superiority over the shopkeepers. The embrace of the street traders by the CNT,
reflected how the Confederation was prepared to articulate the aspirations of those
social forces which where treated with derision by the authorities, who feared them as
dark, ignorant masses. Indeed, the CNT press berated the criminalisation of the popular
practices of the jobless and reflected that 'under the Republic a new criminal type has
23 Solidaridad Obrera, 20 May, 7, 23 June, 22 July, 13, 21, 26 August, 28-30 October 1931, 15
Februaiy, 22 March 1932; La Vanguardia, 5 March 1932; Las Noticias, 17 November 1931; El DIa
Gráfico, 20, 26 November 1931; La Publicitat, 10 Januaiy 1932. The growing activism of the street
traders mirrored that of the costers, the rough equivalent to the street traders in nineteenth centuly
Britain, who had a similar hatred of the police and a history of social agitation in the Chartist
movement: Henry Mayhew, London Labour and the London Poor, London, 1851, vol.1, p.22.
233
been invented: any worker who is unemployed and wishes to work to bring some bread
to his children must be imprisoned for public disorder' or face attack from the Asaltos,
'the sociologists with rubber truncheons'24
Battle-hardened by their experiences of the first few months of the Republic, the
street vendors altered the disposition of the CNT towards the Republic, presaging new
conflicts between the Confederation and the authorities. Rather than passively 'condemn
many proletarian families to death' the street traders pointed out that if the Republic
continued to pursue them 'like criminals' and 'alien dogs' (perrosforasteros), they would
be forced to turn to 'criminality' as 'the only way to procure our daily sustenance'. The
disappointment with the new order was summed up by the l'Hospitalet CNT Society of
Street Traders, who maintained that 'the transition from monarchy to Republic was
nothing more than a change in names and personnel, while the procedures, ambience and
mentalities of the authorities have remained the same'.25
Similar anti-Republican sentiments were provoked by the rent strike. Disgruntled
at the repression of its mobilisations, the CDE warned that 'if the Republic doesn't favour
the people, because it is more interested in defending capitalism, we, the children of the
people, will defend our brothers against Republican interests of reactionary stock'. In its
self-defence, the CDE argued that:
'this Commission has committed no greater crime than to lead
the spirited defence of the economic interests of the wage-earning
population. To this end, it has unmasked the rackets and fiddles of
the landlords, of the shopkeepers and, of the bourgeoisie. It has
placed the whole population of Barcelona and its environs in a state
of effervescence. It has stirred up public emotions and placed the
people who make others rich in a position of strength against their
exploiters'.
A protest movement for the release of Bilbao, one of the founders of the CDE interned
without trial, culminated in a mass rally of 5,000 workers on MontjuIc at which Durruti,
Garcia Oliver and Tomás Cano Ruiz all launched sustained attacks on the anti-worker
policies of the Republican government and its defence of the 'oligarchy of the landlords'.
24 Cultura Libertaria. 1 January 1932; Solidaridad Obrera, 22 March 1933, 21 September 1935, 9
February 1936
25 Solidaridad Obrera, 31 October, 1 December 1931, 24 November 1932, 3 Februaiy 1933
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Heralding the possibility of a complete rupture between the unions and the Republic,
Durruti pledged the CNT to defend the just and humane rights of the proletarians in the
face of the tyranny of power'.26
The growing anti-Republicanism engendered by the struggles in the early second
half of 1931 provided the wider context within which the FAT strengthened its position
within the Barcelona CNT as part of its desired goal of trabazón. It is certainly no
exaggeration to state that the FAT rode on the crest of the wave of the myriad
discontents of the unskilled, unemployed and immigrant proletariat. The Builders' Union
office on Caner de Mercaders, the focal-point for the faIstas returning from exile and jail
after April 1931, was also the unofficial headquarters of the CDE and by the beginning
of July, the listings of CDE meetings were like a Who's Who' of the Barcelona FAT, with
Ricardo Sanz, Cano Ruiz, Garcia Oliver, José Xena, Durruti and Francisco Ascaso all
regularly addressing rent strike meetings. A wave offaIstas earned their spurs in the rent
strike, going on to establish themselves as active militants in the Barcelona CNT. Parera
joined the Catalan Regional Committee, while Bautista Castillo Guimero succeeded Sanz
as president of the Builders' Union. Other anarchists, like 'The Three Musketeers', Garcia
Oliver, Francisco Ascaso and Durruti, who were previously barely known in the city,
now enjoyed a new standing within the CNT and emerged as 'the three fundamental feet
of the colossus' of the FAT. Meanwhile, in the view of many cenetistas, Garcia Oliver
established a reputation as a better speaker than SeguI. Their new credibility saw the
expansion of the 'Nosotros' group of Garcia Oliver, Francisco Ascaso and Durruti, which
attracted new members such as Adolfo Ballano Bueno and Antonio Ortiz Carpintero
from the CNT Wood Workers' Union. The rent strike also provided an opportunity for
new contacts between the previously dispersed anarchist grupos de afinidad. This was
particularly the case in Barceloneta, the La Torrassa-Collblanc zone of l'Hospitalet, and
26 Solidaridad Obrera, 24 June, 2, 12, 19 August, 1, 3 September 1931; El Luchador, 4 September 1931;
Tierra y Libertad, 11 July 1931
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in the various groups of Cases Barates, all of which became solid bastions of the FAT,
who produced its weekly paper, Tierra y Libertad, from the Horta group.27
The turbulence of the unemployed struggles facilitated growing criticisms of the
quietism of the CNT leadership on the question of the jobless, particularly from the FAT-
controlled Builders' Union. These criticisms were not unfounded. The CNT leadership
refused to take a resolute lead and the issue ofjoblessness did not figure as a big issue at
the regional congresses and conferences it organised in the summer of 1931. In fact,
apart from a propaganda drive aimed at the estimated several thousand workers who had
dual employment at a time when many had none and general overtures that 'the cause of
the unemployed is the cause of all workers', the anarcho-syndicalists were far more
concerned with organising those still at work. Meanwhile, when they did show an
interest in the question of unemployment, they veered towards reactionary positions,
including the adoption of immigration controls and 'the abolition of women's labour as
relief against unemployment'. Pestafia, increasingly seen as the embodiment of reformism
in the CNT, participated as an observer at the notorious gathering of the Generalitat
Unemployed Workers' Commission that resolved to repatriate the non-Catalan
unemployed.28
All the reservations of the radical anarchists about the CNT leadership crystalised
around the view that they were not making a sufficiently energetic protest against the
growing harassment of the jobless. The FAT was well placed to tap this discontent, not
least because its apolitical discourse was immediately understandable to the majority of
cenetistas, who had been schooled in the language of anarcho-syndicalism. The wider
political context also favoured the FAT. In general terms, in 1931, like after World War
One, it was obvious that the barriers placed by the authorities in front of the CNT
favoured the ascendancy of the radical anarchists. The anarchists, meanwhile, employed
sleight of hand in the election of Congress delegates. For example, although a waiter,
27 GarcIa Oliver, El eco. p.115; Solidaridad Obrera, 6, 10 July 1931, 13 October 1933; La Vanguardia,
27 June, 4, 7 July 1931, 6 April 1933; Sanz, El sindicalismo y la politica, pp.200-204; Tierra y Libertad,
25 July 1931; Rider, 'The practice of direct action', in Goodway (ed), p.105, n.72
28 Solidaridad Obrera, 22 April, 5, 10, 22, 29 May, 2 June, 11, 14 July, 2, 11 August 1931; Minutes of
the Plenum of the Barcelona CNT Local Federation. 29 November 1931, Archivo Histórico Nacional,
Salamanca (Al-IN); Las Noticias, 1 May 1931
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GarcIa Oliver attended the June 1931 CNT National Conference as representative of the
Barcelona Wood Workers' Union. Similarly, Urales attended CNT Conferences as
delegate for a fictional Land workers' Union from the Andalusian province of Córdoba.
Following communist and anarcho-syndicalist criticisms of the growing intervention of
Urales in the CNT, a minuscule Union of the Liberal Professions was formed, which
quickly became his exclusive fief and a prominent weapon in the FAIL crusade to assert
its hegemony over the Confederation. These administrative irregularities were
accompanied by a campaign of physical abuse directed byfaIstas against their rivals,
which was responsible for an increasing number of 'regrettable incidents' that began to
occur at CNT assemblies.29
However, for all their considerable chicanery, it is an oversimplification to claim
that the FAT seized power of the CNT unions. Indeed, more than anything, it was the
repressive turn of the Republic that pulled the initiative away from the anarcho-
syndicalist leadership. This was reflected in the way complaints about specific repressive
government figures gave way to more generalised criticisms of the régime from the
union rank-and-file. Increasingly, therefore, the cenetistas believed that the Republic
confirmed the anarchist orthodoxy that the constituted legal power, irrespective of its
outward characteristics, was always an anti-proletarian force, the protector of the
privileged classes.
The ascendancy of the anarchist supporters of trabazón in the Confederal
Defence Committees and the Prisoners' Support Committees grew alongside the
repression, as did the libertarian criticisms of both the CNT leadership and the
tMussolini-type methods' and 'white terror of the Republic'. The Prisoners' Support
Committee damned the police measures of the Ley de Defensa de la Repüblica and
applauded the popular hatred of security forces whose 'mission was, is and will continue
to be the persecution of workers and the humble'. A number offaIstas, including
29 Bueso, Recuerdos, vol.2, pp.35-54; GarcIa Oliver, El eco, pp.1 15, 216; CNT, Memoria del Congreso
Extraordinario celebrado en Madrid los dIas 11 al 16 de iunio de 1931, Barcelona 1932, especially pp.
25, 74-76, 84-85, 195-198; CRT, Memoria del Pleno Regional de Sindicatos Umcos de Cataluña.
Celebrado en Barcelona del 5 al 15 de marzo de 1933, Barcelona, 1933, p.3!; Solidaridad Obrera, 3, 5
August 1931,21 June 1933
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Francisco Ascaso, received first hand knowledge of the brutality of the Republican
police. Meanwhile, the Italian anarchist refugees of the Italian Anarchist Group (Gruppo
Anarchico Italiano), affiliated to Barcelona FM, and the International Refugees Support
Committee (Comité pro-perseguidos internacional), formed in the Catalan capital to
support anarchist exiles, reviled the repatriation policies of the 'comic democracy'. The
most emotive issue for the anarchists and the Prisoners' Support Committee was the
return of the quintzenes and internment without trial, which they denounced as the
'monarchical technique' of decapitating 'the rebellion of the CNT'. In response, the
Prisoners' Support Committee raised its attack on what it accursed as a government of 'a
few men who, from the positions of power and the police headquarters, have declared a
war to the death on all workers'. Similarly, at a Prisoners' Support Committee rally,
Parera accused the authorities of backing the same economic interests as the monarchy,
while Durruti told the audience that the choice for the proletariat was stark: either
social-fascism or libertarian revolution.30
Mounting disgust at the fate of those interned without trial reached a peak at the
end of August when independent medical opinion confirmed that cenetistas in the Model
jail had been beaten by police. 50 internees in the jail responded with a hunger strike
under the slogan 'Freedom or death'. Amid rising tension, and despite warnings that his
presence would be regarded by prisoners as a provocation, the Civil Governor Anguera
de Sojo decided to visit the prison on September 2. The arrival of the main mover in the
recrudescence of internment without trial sparked off a protest riot by the detainees.
When the Civil Guard was called in events quickly escalated and the noise of fighting in
the jail alarmed relatives and workers outside in the surrounding streets. Meanwhile,
worker-delegations toured nearby workshops and news rapidly spread that a number of
prisoners had been killed in the jail. In a spontaneous gesture the Barcelona CNT
ordered a protest strike against internment without trial to which an estimated 300,000
workers responded.3'
30 Solidaridad Obrera, 19 April, 23 August, 1-2, 9, 17, 29 September, 6 October, 3, 8, 10, 26, 28
November 1931, 5 November 1932; CNT, Memona del Congreso...de junio de 1931, p.219; Tierray
Libertad, 13, 27 June, 5 December 1931; El Luchador, 9 October, 20 November 1931
Solidaridad Obrera,. 17 July, 29 August, 3 September, 10 November 1931
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The FAT now saw the moment it had been waiting for to test the insurrectionary
waters in the Catalan capital. Calling for a 'nation-wide revolutionary general strike for
the triumph of anarchist communism', the FAT ordered its grupos onto the streets, along
with the armed squads from the Confederal Defence Committees and the Prisoners'
Support Committees. Barricades were erected in Coliblanc in l'Hospitalet, Sant Andreu
and in parts of the Gothic quarter and the Catalan capital was paralysed for 72 hours.
The middle classes responded with panic and food stocks were quickly sold out. The
strike also spread to the outlying towns of Granollers, Manresa, Mataró, Sabadell and
Terrassa. However, this was not an auspicious baptism of fire for the FAT grupos and the
Confederal Defence Committees, who engaged the security forces in nothing more than
sporadic guerrilla actions. The Madrid authorities ordered that two naval warships be
moored in the port and the last pockets of armed resistance were mopped up by Civil
Guard cavalry. Meanwhile, martial law was declared, under the cover of which the
police used the 'ley de fugas' to kill three workers, leaving another five wounded. The
final death toll was 16 grupistas dead, six seriously wounded and 300 detained, around
half of whom were interned on prison ships in the harbour.32
The repercussions of the September events were most heavily registered inside
the CNT, rather than on the streets of Barcelona. In the aftermath of the street
confrontations the balance of forces between the FAT and the moderate leadership were
altered irrevocably. The general strike coincided with the release of the so-called
'Treintista manifesto' issued by thirty leading anti-FAT cenetistas opposed to trabazón
and what they saw as an 'audacious minority' that propagated the 'myth of revolution'
through 'the violent deed'. These treinhistas, predominantly older anarcho-syndicalists
headed by Peiró and Pestafia, lamented the disintegration and radicalisation of the social
situation, both of which they regarded as the work of the FAT. Although the treintistas
retained revolutionary objectives, their short term objective was for an armistice with the
32 La Vanguardia and L'Opinió. 3-9 September 1931; La CaIle, 11, 25 September 1931; Tierra v
Libertad, 5, 12, 19 September 1931; El Luchador, 25 September, 2, 9 October 1931; La Batalla, 10, 17
September 1931; Madrid, Ocho meses, p.227; F0371/15775/W10124/46/41,
F0371/15775/W10194/46/41, F0371/157751W10335/46/41 and F0371/157751W10541/46/41: Letters
from Sir G. Grahanie, 5, 7 and 11 September 1931 (PRO)
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authorities that would allow the open and legal organisation of Confederal institutions.33
Given the march of events, the hopes of the treintistas were naive in the extreme.
It was increasingly obvious that the defence of the socio-economic interests of the CNT
membership promised a full-scale clash with the electoral constituency of many
Republican parties. Moreover, prescriptive legislation such as that enacted by Largo
Caballero and the Ley de Defensa de la Repüblica criminalised a series of traditional
CNT practises and made confrontation with the new régime inevitable. The assault on
the CNT was so great that one delegate from the Barcelona Local Federation
complained that after six months of Republican rule all conventional syndical activity
was effectively 'useless' because the authorities 'don't allow us to act at all'.34
The rarefied atmosphere provided by the repression of the September general
strike created a climate that inhibited the reasoned discussion of the treintista manifesto.
Equally, the many voices that favoured a middle road between the polarities offaIsmo
and treintismo were drowned out. Typical of its over-confident zealotry, there was not
even passing discussion of the treintista manifesto inside the FM. Instead, the militant
anarchists seized on the document as a 'whipping-boy' and showed a particular knack for
directing rank-and-file attention away from their own tactical limitations by launching
hysterical attacks on its sacrificial enemies within the CNT.35
The ideological onslaught against the treintistas was carried out with enormous
aplomb by the vituperative Urales and his daughter, Federica Montseny, the Pied Piper
and Lady Macbeth of the young anarchist malcontents respectively. Urales and
Montseny sustained a vitriolic offensive against all enemies of the FM, anarcho-
syndicalist and the dissident communist alike and both real and imagined, from the pages
of the weekly El Luchador and the bi-monthly La Revista Blanca. Interestingly, for all
their professed understanding of the sentiments of the Confederation, neither of these
individualistic, middle-class intellectuals were actually members of the CNT or the FM
Bueso, Reciterdos, vol.2, pp.349-353; L'Opimó, 30 August 1931
34 Minutes of the Plenum of the Barcelona CNT Local Federation, 24 October 1931 (AHN)
Solidaridad Obrera, 5 March, 14 July, 3, 6 September 1931
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at the time. Instead, it was largely due to their press ownership, particularly La Revista
Blanca, the flag-ship of Iberian anarchism, that the Urales family intervened directly in
the Confederal movement. However, these anarchist press barons had a highly
ambivalent relationship with organised labour. During the monarchy, the anti-syndicalism
of the Urales family earnt Federico a ban in some in CNT centres and on one
embarrassing occasion he was physically ejected from a union office. Meanwhile, during
the Republic, the Galician CNT alleged that the divisive labour of the Urales family did
more damage to the unions than the Civil Guard. The difficulties experienced by the
Urales family in the unions highlighted the uncomfortable modus vivendi between the
Spanish libertarian movement and intellectuals. This was also reflected in the attitudes of
Montseny, who sometimes displayed a prejudiced and disdainfril view of the masses.
Indeed, like the middle class Republicans, Montseny believed that 'the people are like
children.. .they have the candour and the primitive instinct of infancy.. .the collective
condition of the eternal child'.36
In the aftermath of the September general strike the anarchists launched 'the final
assault' on the centres of Confederal power. The faIstas and their supporters tirelessly
inveighed against the 'betrayal' of the strike by the 'bourgeois' CNT leadership who, it
was alleged, 'sold-out' the 'revolutionary struggle' at 'the decisive moment' through its
pact with the ERC. Overcome by events, instead of holding their ground and answering
their detractors, the treintistas capitulated in the face of the rebellion of the radicalised
Barcelona unions and they resigned a number of key positions to their radical opponents
in September, including the editorial board of Solidaridad Obrera. The following month
at the Regional CNT Plenum in Barcelona a new faIsta editorial board was elected, with
Felipe AlaIz as editor, assisted by Alberola, Cano Ruiz, Liberto Callejas, Eusebi Carbó,
Garcia Oliver and Montseny.37
36 E1 Luchador, 8 May, 11 December 1931, 19 February, 18 March, 1 April 1932; GarcIa Oliver, El eco,
pp.21 5-216; Teresa Abellô and Ennc Olive, 'El conflicto entre la CNT y la Familia Urales-Montseny en
1928. La lucha por el mantenimiento del anarquismo pub', Estudios de Historia Social, 32-33, 1985,
pp.3 17-332
Ysern Lagarda, El moviment obrer. p.94; Solidaridad Obrera, 22-24 September, 14, 21 October 1931;
El Luchador. 23 October 1931; GarcIa Oliver, El eco, p.216. The most thorough works on this question
are Vega i Massana's, El Trentisme and La Confederació
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From autumn 1931 onwards, the treintislas were in a clear minority in the
Barcelona CNT. Meanwhile, although thefaIstas claimed no more than 2,000 activists
throughout Spain38, they were concentrated in Barcelona where they were hegemonic in
the textile, construction, wood, glass, energy, car and intellectual workers' unions. The
Catalan capital, where the CNT claimed over 150,000 members, emerged as the central
bastion offaismo, a position that it held for the rest of the Republic. Moreover, because
of its specific gravity within the CNT on both a regional and state-wide level, the Catalan
capital was crucial to controlling the National and Regional Committees, both of which
were based in Barcelona. 39 By early 1932, therefore, faistas occupied key posts in the
organisation: Jover, Ricardo Sanz and Garcia Oliver were on the National Committee,
Francisco Ascaso, José Canela, Patricio Navarro and Ramón Porquet were on the
Regional Committee, while Segundo MartInez was secretary of the Barcelona Local
Federation. The FM ascendancy and trabazón were effectively assured.
If the hopes of the treintistas that the state would not impede the development of
mass organisations were ingenuous, so too was the belief of thefaIstas that by throwing
a few hundred poorly armed militants into the streets they were either going to produce
the revolution or, at a minimum, encourage the authorities to change their tact.
Nevertheless, the FM was unrepentant. Following its 'heroic gesture' in September the
faIstas felt 'sadness' at the 'blood and violence' but, at the same time, 'happiness' at the
'great power of the masses which escapes all control, discipline and everything which
smacks of authoritarianism, order, command and leadership'. This tnumphalism inspired
an impassioned letter from the Italian anarchists exiled in Barcelona who warned the
faIstas against elitism and called on them to appraise past defeats of the revolutionary
left, both at home and abroad. This view was echoed by the BOC, who feared that
'anarchist intolerance', conditioned by the long years in which they were unaccustomed
38 Josep Maria Huertas Claveria, Obrers a Catalunva. Manual d'histôria del moviment obrer (1840-
1975), Barcelona, 1994, p.243
Solidaridad Obrera, 22 September 1931. Over half of the delegates on the Comité regional were from
Barcelona. Overall, Vega i Massana calculates that with 12-17 members on Barcelona's 24 unions, each
of which delegated members to the Local Federation, Regional Committee and National Committee, 'in
quantitative terms approximately some 500 militants decided the Confederal resolutions in the city of
Barcelona, which was the most important centre of anarcho-syndicalism during the Second Republic':
La Confederació, p.3 18.
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to facing questions from within the labour movement, might provoke a damaging split in
the CNT. To prevent this, the dissident communists requested that the FM reflect on the
wider context and advocated the unity of all revolutionary forces, pointing out that 'the
revolution is not the property of any single sector of the working class'.40
These warnings went unheeded and the rise of the FM in Barcelona was
accompanied by an immense explosion of sectarianism. In the early part of 1931 the
anarcho-syndicalists had hoped to win favour with the FM by hounding communists
from the CNT, 'so that the Spanish Revolution does not finish up like the Russian
experience'. This led to the adoption of the anti-democratic 'Madrid Agreements' at the
May 1931 National CNT Conference. Dubbed 'a labour of social hygiene' by Solidaridad
Obrera, 'The Madrid Agreements' strengthened the executive of the CNT to the
detriment of grass-roots democracy and prohibited communists from holding union
positions irrespective of rank-and-file opinion. The enactment of the 'Madrid
Agreements' provided a justification for the disciples of trabazón to impose their dogmas
on the hitherto heterogeneous CNT and brought into question the position of seasoned
union militants like Adolfo Bueso, a dissident communist and leading cenetista in the
Barcelona Printers' Union and in the regional federation. The witch-hunt against
'communist infiltration' and 'enemy' BOC 'scum' reached new heights. Puente, an
influential FM ideologue, who, incidentally was a physician, and not a trade unionist,
asserted that it was 'anachronistic' to have communist workers inside the CNT. This
sectarianism led to an inquisitorial cruelty, exemplified by the decision of the Prisoners'
Support Committees to withdraw the subsidy paid to the family of a jailed cenetista after
he was found guilty by the anarchists of being 'in contact with a political party'.4'
Portents of the exclusiveness of the FM were seen in the rent strike. There was a
growing tendency for speakers to exploit CDE meetings as fora for lauding the spiritual
virtues of anarchism. Occasionally, FM speakers addressed assemblies billed as CDE
40 Tierra y L'bertad, 8 August, 12 September 1931; La Batalla, 15 August 1930, 7 May, 10 September
1931
Solidaridad Obrera, 15 March, 21 April, 17 May, 4-5, 13 June, 13 July, 25 August, 11 September, 20
November, 4, 9 December 1931; CNT, Memoria del Con greso...de junio de 1931. pp.37-45; Traba jo. 15
June 1931; CRT, Memorias...de 1931. pp.11 1-112; Minutes of the Plenum of the Barcelona CNT Local
Federation, 15 May 1932 (AHN)
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meetings without making even a passing reference to the rent strike. Moreover, although
both the CDE and the rent strike were formally open to all workers irrespective of
ideological persuasion, it was clear that the anarchists resented the influence of other
sectors of working class opinion within the movement. At a mass CDE rally in July
Parera attacked 'the extreme Bolshevik left' and asserted that the aims of the unemployed
would only be guarantied with 'the installation of anarchist communism'. When
communists in the audience attempted to answer this rabidly sectarian anti-Marxism
fighting broke out among an audience which, like the Barcelona working class, was
politically heterogeneous.42
The anarchists concealed the nefarious and divisive effects of their sectarianism
with an ultra-leftist hyperbole. This maximalism also conditioned the stance of the FM
on the issue of unemployment, which they saw in essentially revolutionary terms.
Assuming that capitalism was entering a state of irrevocable collapse and that the
proletariat was in a state of revolutionary readiness, the anarchists saw no need to strike
a balance between short-term collective measures aimed at lessening the lot of the
jobless and the long-term solutions of the social revolution. Instead, the falsias focused
on the 'final solution' provided by revolution, 'the death of the criminal bourgeoisie' and
the destruction of 'an economic order that cannot guarantee a life for all'. The Barcelona
Builders' Union, the standard bearer of anarchist unemployment initiatives, advocated
'profoundly revolutionary tactics, concordant with our revolutionary identity'.
Accordingly, it was averred that if workers were sacked, 'the struggle has to be pursued
to its logical conclusion.. .up to the seizure of the factories and workshops'.43
The anarchists brought all their sectarianism into play against their bloquista and
treintista critics who feared, prophetically as it turned out, that the unemployed might be
abandoned before 'the great revolutionary night' that thefaIstas dreamt of At the August
1931 Catalan CNT Congress the debate on unemployment was eclipsed by FM anti-
communism. A few months later at the Lleida Regional CNT Plenum the question of
joblessness was, nevertheless, raised as a 'life or death' issue for the unions. The
42 Tierra y Libertad, 11 July 1931
Solidaridad Obrera, 27 February, 2 April, 12, 29 May, 4, 21 July, 7-8, 15, 18, 20 August 1931
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resolution passed at Lleida mapped out the organisation of the unemployed in
Unemployed Committees (Comités de los obreros sin trabajo) that would be co-
ordinated by a Local Federation. However, this initiative was always secondary to the
unrelenting anti-communism of thefaIstas. During a discussion on the organisation of
the out-of-work of the Barcelona Local Federation, the FM delegate from the Metal
Workers' Union opposed the formation of an Unemployed Committee in his industry
because of the influence of'those who advocate the formation of the United Front [i.e.
the BOC]' among the jobless and on the grounds that a number of the existing jobless
committees were 'completely communist'. In reply, the textile workers delegate called for
a purge of bloquistas and the increased policing of all union committees, pointing out
that 'it is essential that the control and posts are in the hands of our comrades and that
we know their history in the organisation'. For the anarchists then, it was preferable to
leave the unemployed unorganised, rather than see them fall under the sway of rival CNT
factions. Consequently, they ignored all the initiatives of their bloquista and treintista
rivals in the CNT, irrespective of the effect this had on the overall morale of the
unemployed.
Belligerently interventionist, the faIstas sought to impose their orthodoxy on all
the heretics in the CNT. A case study of the overbearing attitude of the Barcelona
anarchists can be seen in their dogmatic rejection of any campaign aimed to furnish the
jobless with a subsidy or public works. Such a course was rejected by the FM as 'charity
and illusory palliatives', 'immoral measures', tantamount to begging from the state. This
maximalism had disastrous effects in Badalona, where the CNT devised a counter-crisis
project. This initiative was based on a public works plan for the infrastructural
development of Badalona, including public hygiene reforms, a river control programme,
the beautification of the city and the extension of a seaside Rambla running between the
town and the Mediterranean. Intended as a local agreement between the CNT and the
Badalona authorities, the initiative was to be funded by a tax on employers, landlords
and workers, as well as by slashing the salaries paid to Councillors and the city police
Minutes of the Plenum of the Barcelona CNT Local Federation, 10 January 1932 (AkIN); La Batalla,
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chief Following a series of mass rallies and demonstrations, it was evident that the plan
was highly popular with the rank-and-file in Badalona, who saw it as a respite from the
worst ravages of joblessness.
The BarcelonafaIstas were alarmed at what they saw as the 'reformism' of their
comrades in Badalona. Trampling on the federal traditions of the CNT, the FM
advocated 'the expulsion of all the workers' organisation of Badalona from the
Confederation' if the plan was ratified by the unions. Unbowed by this threat of
excommunication, a Congress of the Badalona CNT refused to be treated as a naughty
child by the FM and adopted the project. This placed the FM-led Barcelona CNT in a
dilemma and while the initial threat to expel the Badalona CNT was not fulfilled,
anarchist militants from the Catalan capital refused to accept the decision of the
Badalona unions. According to a leading Badalona activist, in a singular disrespect for
union democracy, 'a throng of Confederal men and libertarian idealists' came to the town
to apply 'official and unofficial pressures' on cenetistas, explaining in a 'low and insolent
manner', sometimes accompanied by 'more than dishonest means', that the problem of
unemployment and all the sufferings of capitalism could only be eradicated after the final
universal drama of social revolution. In the end, the faIsta line was imposed on the
Badalona CNT. This was a disaster for Confederation in Badalona and it prompted
considerable demoralisation among the grass-roots: 'many workers, totally disgusted,
destroyed their union cards', while large numbers of unemployed, whose hunger dulled
the revolutionary expectancy that overflowed inside the FM, displayed 'total and
desperate indifference' towards unions.45
Opportunistically, the FM did not baulk in its cynical exploitation of the issue of
unemployment as a weapon against it enemies in the struggle for power within the
Confederation. While faIstas berated the 'reformist' calls of the anarcho-syndicalists for
rank-and-file contributions to union-organised jobless funds, the anarchist-led Builders'
Union ran its own 'unemployed contribution' among employers and provided subsidies to
those jobless workers registered with its bolsa de trabajo. Moreover, despite their
La Colmena Obrera, 30 October, 6 December 1931; Manent i Pesas, Records. pp.152-174
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maximalism, the anarchists were not blind to the need to introduce short-term benefits
for the jobless, even if they were far from practicable or, for that matter, desirable. To be
sure, a common anarchist demand was 'the measuring out of work' among all employed
and unemployed; 'we will all eat less, so that all can eat', in the words of Solidaridad
Obrera. In practice, however, this policy amounted to the apportionment of misety and
low wages to larger numbers of workers. More commonly, according to the policy
adopted at the 1925 Amsterdam Congress of the International Workers' Association
(IWA) and ratified by the CNT the month after the birth of the Republic, the anarchists
upheld the 'continuous struggle for the implementation of the six-hour day'. Meanwhile,
in June 1931 the CNT called on its unions to attain the 6 hour day in their industries
within the space of three months, as it was a 'simple and most humane proletarian
demand, [which] in fact constitutes the socio-economic-political revolution within
capitalist privilege'. Yet the talk of the six-hour day was little more than verbal
demagogy. Not only did the battle for the six-hour day require strong, mass, united
unions, precisely the very things that anarchist sectarianism was rendering impossible,
but many unions, most vocally the Barbers and the Shop workers, pointed out the
absurdity of the policy when they had not yet won the eight hour day. The CNT Dockers
went as far as describing the slogan for the six-hour day 'a famous piece of nonsense'!
Under the inspiration of the FM the unemployed inside the CNT were also
exploited for guerrilla actions and acts of'propaganda by the deed'. The aim of the
faIstas was to encourage the unemployed to disrupt public order to show the authorities
and the wider populace the despair and the spirit of rebellion of the jobless. This cynical
manipulation of the jobless as cannon-fodder for the wider project of'revolutionary
gymnastics' was effectively sealed at a Plenum of the Barcelona unions in October 1931,
where it was agreed to 'embark on a campaign with the unemployed, throwing them into
the Street'. The germ of this policy was earlier during the campaign of the CDE, who
responded to tram fare increases with a call on workers to 'direct your rage against the
Minutes of the Plenum of the Barcelona CNT Local Federation, 29 November 1931 (ANN);
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trams and buses!' Increasingly, then, the jobless were launched into a series of symbolic
and futile struggles. The Santa Coloma CNT invited the unemployed to seize all
unworked land, a call that led to a number of sterile clashes with the police. There were
also growing instances of 'union placements' (imposiciones sindicales). These
'placements' involved unions sending jobless workers into workplaces, where they would
set themselves to work and, at the end of the day, demand wages from the employers
that they claimed had been 'legitimately earned'. On the docks, 'union placements'
sometimes involved as many as 300 workers and tended to be particularly violent. Yet
the 'placements' were a largely fruitless gesture for the jobless, as employers normally
responded by calling the police to arrest the unwanted operatives, who ended up unpaid
and, quite often, jailed for their trouble.47
It was an irony that the frustrations of the unemployed were tapped by the FM
en route to securing its hegemony within the Barcelona unions. Once at the helm of the
Confederation the faIstas failed to advance any realistic programme for the daily struggle
of the jobless. Instead, as was prophesied by the bloquistas and the treintistas, the
unemployed were progressively abandoned by the anarchists, who subjugated the
interests of the jobless to their more pressing revolutionary ambitions. The shortcomings
of this situation provoked occasional bursts of indignation among activists who lamented
that 'nothing has been done' to organise the jobless.4X
As well as its maximalism, the virulent sectarianism of the FM also militated
against an effective campaign on behalf of the jobless. It was axiomatic that agitation in
favour of the jobless, whether of anarchist, communist, socialist or anarcho-syndicalist
disposition, required wide class unity. By contrast, FM zealotry served only to weaken
the vitality of protest movements and dissipate potential proletarian strength by
provoking damaging conflicts among the wider community of workers. It was no
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surprise, therefore, that the FM-controlled CNT did not repeat the kind of mass show of
strength and solidarity embodied by the rent strike. Indeed, while the absence of far-
reaching collective struggle against unemployment can, to a certain degree, be explained
by the generalisation of repression from 1931 onwards, most of all, this owed to the
tactical limitations of thefaIstas.
5.3. Against the Republic
After the September general strike positions between the main social
protagonists in Barcelona hardened. The Fomento del Trabajo Nacional and the COPUB
organised a fund for those members of the security forces injured 'defending the peace'
during the general strike. The CNT and the FM came under intense criticism. i
Vanguardia lamented the return of 'the violent ones', while Catalanistes attacked the
September action as 'prejudicial to the freedom of Catalonia'. L'Opinió led its own tirade
against the 'professional agitators' and 'deviants' it believed were destroying the prestige
of Cataloma. Meanwhile, from the Generalitat, the USC denounced 'the irresponsible
elements who control the trade union movement', while Macia condemned 'a minority of
professional provocateurs'.49
The appearance of the 'Treintista manifesto', however, provided a new option for
the Republican authorities. In keeping with their penchant for differentiating evil from
virtue, the Republican authorities began distinguishing between 'good' and 'bad'
syndicalists. New references to the Ireintistas as the 'healthy elements of the
Confederation', fused with existing political imagery and mythology about the 'true
Catalan worker' and 'the agitator', invariably taken to be immigrant and of either
anarchist or communist affiliation. The stereotype of the immigrantfa&a became
current in official circles, an essentially political construct aimed at isolating the
anarchists from the mainstream of the Catalan Volksgemeinschaft in just the same way as
images of rude and crude 'los sin trabajo' were intended to marginalise sections of the
unemployed. As with the 'deserving'/'undeserving' poor, the ERC set about attempting to
Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, Memona...1931, p.l'12; COPIJB, Memona...1931, p.488; L'Opinió, 9
August 1931
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draw the 'true' workers into the Republican framework, while condenming the
'immigrants' and 'extremists' who, it was suggested, were bent on turning the 'good'
indigenous workers against the Republic.50
The Catalan-immigrant dichotomy is not an adequate explanation of the internal
divisions within the CNT, however. Not only were there immigrants among the
treintislas, such as Pestana, but a fair number of Catalans figured among the faistas,
including Urales, Eusebi Carbó and GarcIa Oliver. A far more decisive difference
between the two factions was the degree of occupational stability enjoyed by their
supporters. In this context, it is evident that Peiró's ideas on stable workplace
organisation were directly conditioned by his uninterrupted employment from 1923
onwards as a skilled glass worker at a co-operative in Mataró. On the other hand, as
L'Opinio correctly grasped, although among the CNT rank-and-file '90% are not
anarchists', the 'anarchist minority' was unquestionably backed by 'the people who sweat
most and earn the least'. 5 ' This was at the root of the appeal offaismo, for the anarchists
were stoically supported by the unskilled, who lacked any significant bargaining power
and put in long hours for meagre pay, and many of the jobless, who did not sweat at all.
That larger numbers of immigrants backed the FM had more to do with the
concentration of non-C atalans in the most insecure and unstable occupational sectors in
Barcelona city. By contrast, the treintistas enjoyed most support in provincial Barcelona,
where there were fewer immigrants but, most crucially of all, where the workforce
enjoyed better working conditions, more secure employment and where the bourgeoisie
was more transigent.
It suited the interests of the authorities and the Barcelona bourgeoisie to
propagate the myth of the 'immigrant' FM. The caricature of the 'alien' FM was geared
towards dividing the working class in much the same way as the unemployed had been
divided and facilitated the distinction between the 'deserving' Catalan proletariat and the
'undeserving' immigrant workers. After the September general strike the authorities
continued to expound the orthodoxy that the Republic respected the law and allowed for
50 L'Opinió, 9 August 1931
' L'Opinió, 9 August 1931
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the open pursuit of legitimate working class aspirations, however, as the divisions in the
CNT opened up, many Republicans believed that the CNT was weakened and that they
could drive their advantage home, punishing the 'immigrant' FM, while aiding the
'healthy elements' in the CNT.52
As the vice imposed by the authorities on the CNT closed tighter, Solidaridad
Obrera correctly concluded that 'the block of our enemies is now fully meshed'. By the
end of the summer strikes were now far more difficult to win, they lasted longer, were
more drawn out and more conflicts were lost. This was a sobering reality that further
radicalised union militants and convinced the grass-roots that there would be very few
easy gains under the Republic. The civil liberties situation was another source of alarm.
The authorities continued to hold cenetistas without trial and mistreat detainees. In the
middle of September the first cenetista died from injuries inflicted inside the VIa Laietana
police headquarters. Meanwhile, Bilbao, the architect of the CDE who was still detained
without trial for his part in the rent strike, attacked what he saw as the new 'dictatorship
in Barcelona'. Yet the die was cast and in mid-October Anguera de Sojo outlawed the
FM, banning its press and meetings, although Tierra y Libertad continued to publish
after it shedded the FM logo that it had sported since its inception. The FM interpreted
the official ban as proof that the ERC was 'anti-anarchist, like the Castilians'. In the view
of Tierra y Libertad, it was a declaration of war from the authorities, a sign that 'from
above, from power, they are provoking a social war that we must accept with all its
consequences'. ThefaIstas also warned that this provocation was a 'serious error',
because 'in clandestinity and in anonymity its action will be more radical and more
violent'. 53
 Events were to conflnn this prediction.
The FAT responded to clandestinity with a call for its grupos to come to the
fore, 'ready to give up their lives for freedom'. The grupislas responded by directing their
fury against those it held responsible for the injustices perpetrated against it. Indeed, the
very week in which the FM was forced into clandestinity grupistas began disrupting
52 La Calle, 11 September 1931
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meetings of the ruling Catalan and Spanish parties. In early November a Republican-
Socialist meeting was scheduled to take place on MontjuIc, at which Victoria Kent, the
Director of Prisons, Companys, the Mayor of Madrid and Araquistamn, Largo's intimate
ally, were all due to speak. The occasion was 'converted' by anarchists into a prisoners'
demo. According to Solidaridad Obrera, the mere mention of Companys's name
'produced a wave of repulsion in the auditorium', while Kent was jeered and could not be
heard over the chants in support of the prisoners, as 'popular fervour took over the
meeting'. The following month an ERC meeting in Poblenou was, according to
Solidaridad Obrera, 'converted into a rally for our prisoners', producing 'something of a
shindy (trifulca)' and a certain amount of fighting asfaIstas armed with coshes and iron
bars overcame Esquerra stewards. This was followed by more attacks on ERC meetings,
in both the Catalan capital and in the provinces, as the gulf between the anarchists and
what they mocked as a 'pseudo-revolutionary' party of lawyers' widened considerably.54
In what was perhaps a last ditch attempt by the Esquerra to curry favour with
CNT moderates, towards the end of 1931 the party launched a campaign against the
Civil Governorship of Anguera de Sojo, the person who had done most to turn the
Barcelona Confederation against the Republic. The ERC drive against Anguera de Sojo
is, nevertheless, open to various interpretations and it could be maintained that the
removal of such a bellicose individual from public office actually made good sense in
terms of the 'order' espoused by the Esquerra. Whatever the rationale, the ERC did
contribute to the pressure that saw the irascible Civil Governor resign in December
1931, although the breach between the ERC and Anguera de Sojo was later healed.55
However, by the time Anguera de Sojo stood down, the anarchists had already
locked the CNT into the spiral of violence that was integral to the 'revolutionary
gymnastics'. As far as the faIstas were concerned, even if these insurrectionary exercises
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did not provide the desired spark that would set-off the latent revolutionary fire, they
were at least detei-mined to impede the institutionalisation of the proletariat within the
Republic by forcing the authorities to rely on repressive measures. After a speaking tour
by Prisoners' Support Committees activists, including Durruti and Francisco Ascaso, the
insurrectionary script of thefaIstas was acted out for the first time on January 18,1932
in Alt Liobregat, where anarchist-led miners pronounced libertarian communism.56
It later transpired that the miners had been led to believe that 'the social
revolution had erupted' and that 'Spain was in arms'. In Figols, cenelistas responded by
disarming the representatives of the state, raising the red-and-black flag of the CNT over
official buildings and declaring the advent of classless society. The rising spread like wild
fire throughout the worker-colonies of Alt Liobregat, spurred on by starvation wages
and employer intransigence in a series of recent local conflicts in the textiles and mining
sectors. Nevertheless, the insurgents were peaceful in their methods and there was no
retribution directed at either property-owners or the security forces.
The authorities were outraged at the rebellion of the miners. Obsessed that the
Republic should be feared, Azafla responded in a bellicose manner, showing what he
described as a 'determination to move with all speed and with the greatest violence to
repress the rebellion'. With little thought of mediation, the Minister for War dispatched
General Batet, in his capacity as head of the 4th 'organic' military region, to quell the
rising, giving him 15 minutes to re-impose order. Fortunately, the prudence of Batet
prevented a blood bath and the insurrectionists surrendered peacefully to the army, when
he guarantied that their lives would be respected.57
The response of the CNT to the rising displayed none of the decisiveness shown
by the authorities. Confirming the ruralist belief of the FM that the city was the
56 My analysis of the events of January 1932 is taken from the following sources: Las Noticias,
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'saboteur' of the revolution, there was immense confusion in Barcelona, where the Local
Federation did not even hear of the events in Figols until the afternoon of January 19.58
It was a further 24 hours before representatives of the Barcelona organisation met with
delegates from the CNT Regional and National Committees and activists from Figols
and Manresa. Even then, instead of preparing a solidarity strike in Barcelona, many
union delegates, faistas included, 'went home to bed', rather than stay in contact with the
Local Federation. Finally, before what it called the 'consummated act', the Catalan CNT
Regional Committee 'agreed to make the movement its own'. However, the Regional
Committee made no attempt to channel the rising and while Barcelona awaited a
generalised uprising in the provinces, the provinces hung on the lead of the capital. The
Barcelona CNT leaders prevaricated until the weekend, when they called a general strike
that was destined to have a reduced impact on a few factories, bars and part of the
transport network. Only on Monday, a full week after the beginning of the rising in
Figols, did the movement had a real impact in the Catalan capital, where the strike was
complete in the large metal and textile factories. The Confederal Defence Committees
also entered the fray, setting up barricades in Clot and Sant Andreu in the North of the
city and engaging the Asaltos in a number of gunfights. The faIstas also took to the
streets in l'Hospitalet and in La Torrassa an Asalto was shot dead.
The events of January 1932 proved that the Confederal Defence Committees
were still far from operational. Firstly, the element of surprise was lost when Durruti and
Francisco Ascaso were arrested in 'La Tranquilidad', the bar on El Parallel that served as
the nerve-centre of the FAT-apparatus. Secondly, according to the Builders' Union
delegate in the Barcelona CNT Local Federation, the '300 comrades on a war footing on
the streets' lacked the weapons of combat as 'the comrade who knew their secret
location was captured'. The authorities showed no such disorganisation in restoring
order. Heavily-armed Asaltos were dispatched to occupy peripheral working class
districts and by the end of the day of the strike a fragile peace had been imposed on
Barcelona, with over 200 detainees. The post-rising repression showed a shift in policy
5 Solidaridad Obrera, 17 January 1932
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on the part of the authorities, who now sought to repress without quarter the most
revolutionary sectors of the proletariat in a bid to decapitate a radicalised labour
movement, leaving moderate, more pliable elements at the helm. This policy was
crowned by the deportation without trial of 104 anarchists to Spanish Gtiinea and the
Sahara under the Ley de Defensa de la Repüblica, a number of whom, including Durruti
and Francisco Ascaso, had played no part in the rising whatsoever. In his memoirs,
Azaña made it clear that this draconian measure was part of a strategy to free Pestafla
from 'the preponderance of the gunmen', as 'his situation is difficult among the
revolutionaries'. Companys, meanwhile, provided Azaña with a list of names offaIstas
still at liberty who, though innocent of any specific offence, were in his opinion
'dangerous individuals'. Lastly, the repression underlined the continuation of military
power in the Republic and despite the Azaña reforms a number offaIstas and bloquistas
were tried and jailed by army Councils of War for 'insulting the authorities'.59
The scale of the post-rising repression inhibited any effective mass protest by the
CNT against the deportations. When the Builders' Union called for a 24 hour general
protest strike, the Transport and Railway Workers' unions revealed that such a stoppage
was an impossibility because the CNT 'has lost control of the workers' owing to 'the
disorientation which exists within our class following the recent mobilisation'. Although
they were not involved in the rising, the repression also affected the BOC, whose offices
were closed indefinitely and a number of bloquistas were interned without trial.
Nevertheless, it was the CNT that bore the brunt. The press and unions of both the CNT
and the anarchists were subjected to increased official harassment. Solidaridad Obrera
was banned until early March and all CNT unions were still suspended in April,
providing the employers with an opportunity to victimise large numbers of militants. The
Generalitat followed suit and sacked numerous cenetistas from its flickering public
works programme.6°
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Given the failure of mass protests, the CNT showed its opposition to repression
by relying increasingly on the armed propaganda of the Confederal Defence Committees.
In the view of one BarcelonafaIsta, 'violence engenders violence'. Accordingly, the
protests against the repression assumed the form of a bomb campaign in which the
Barcelona Council Chambers and those workplaces where militants had been victimised
were targeted. Meanwhile, in nearby Terrassa, anarchist grupos seized the town for a
few hours in protest at the deportations.6'
The Januaiy action produced the definitive breach between the various factions
inside the CNT. The treintistas opined that the chaotic 'putsch' exemplified all the
limitations of the libertarians. The same was true of the bloquistas, who dammed the
FAT for failing to grasp that the revolution needed a co-ordinated seizure of power. The
BOC also criticised the treintistas for failing to keep abreast of revolutionary
developments. The FAT, meanwhile, mythologised the rising as a blood offering to
anarchy, while denigrating the 'cowardice' of other tendencies in the labour movement.62
Before the bloquistas or the treintistas could take advantage from the removal of
many key faistas from Barcelona and attribute responsibility for the January debacle to
the revolutionary fantasies of the FAT, the anarchists took the initiative and embarked on
their own quest to find 'the cause of the failure' of the rising. This was followed
throughout the spring of 1932 by what was little more than a FAT-inspired witch-hunt, in
which the anarchists deflected attention away from emptiness of their insurrectionary
preparations with a fierce campaign of defamation against their enemies in the CNT. In
the meetings of the Barcelona Local Federation, the Builders' Union delegate took the
lead, attacking the 'shameftul' role of the moderate-controlled Regional Committee for
'not preparing the ambience' and for failing to arm grupistas in the prelude to the rising.
This criticism was upheld by the Barcelona Local Federation, who blamed the failure of
the 'revolution' on 'reformists' in the CNT. Similarly, Manuel Prieto, one of the leaders of
the rising, accused the moderates of being 'counter-revolutionaries'. In defence of the
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moderates, Emili Mira, Pestafla's ally on the Regional Committee, reasoned that it was
unfair to blame the failure of a rising on those who had not contributed to its
preparation. Mira also pointed out that the solidarity strike in the Catalan capital had
been called off by the anarcho-syndicalists only after 'the events of great violence which
had been promised [by the FM] in Barcelona did not occur'. Despite reminders from the
Leather Workers' Union of the dangers of'playing at the revolution', in the emotional
context of repression, the moderates were increasingly blamed for the failings of the
rising and the voices of reason inside the CNT were drowned out by a chorus of blind
insurrectionary optimism from the faIstas. This was underlined by an address to the
Barcelona Local Federation by 'Nosotros' member Jover, who stated that 'although
materially perhaps Spain is not ready for the revolution, morally it is and the revolution
should have been made... Spain, even without Barcelona, should have launched itself into
revolution... [However] it would have triumphed in Spain and even in Barcelona if the
Regional Committee had not sabotaged it'.63
Following the January 1932 putsch the FM adopted the ultra-sectarian line
which, irrespective of its effect on the CNT, dominated its orientation until the Civil
War. In a bid to ensure FM hegemony in the CNT the radical anarchists were prepared
to expel their enemies from the unions. This mission was given a new impetus after some
high profile defections from the anarchist camp to the BOC, including Ramón Magre, a
former Solidaridad Obrera journalist, and Prieto, 'the hero of the insurrection of Alt
Llobregat'. The FM moved to isolate what it regarded as the growing dissident
communist 'cancer' at the April 1932 CNT Catalan Regional Plenum in Sabadell, where
the BOC-inclined unions from the Confederation, including the Local Federations from
Girona, Lleida and Tarragona, along with a number of individual cenetistas from
Barcelona, were all judged and expelled for heresy. The expulsions were followed by a
series of attacks by grupistas on BOC meetings and a number of bloody skirmishes with
bloquista stewards."
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Seemingly unaware that they would be the next victims of the sectarian crusade
of the FM, the treintistas continued to vent their anti-communism and fully backed the
expulsion of the bloquistas from the CNT in the first half of 1932. To be sure, the
moderates had little chance to buy time for themselves. Like after the September 1931
Barcelona General Strike, the repression in Catalonia in 1932 favoured the rise of the
FM and weakened the case of those CNT Regional Federations which favoured an
equammious resolution of the differences inside the Confederation. 65 The growing
disillusionment of the proletariat with the Republic after the deportations together with
the worsening economic crisis in 1932, and the violence that accompanied it, had already
conspired to wrench the initiative away from the Ireinhistas. Moreover, thefaistas
rejected any prospect of a truce with the treintista 'counter-revolutionaries', who it
believed were 'incompatible' with the CNT. Even Peiró, an anarcho-syndicalist who had
devoted his entire life to the unions and was also a member of a FM grupo in Mataró,
was branded as 'the most degraded police agent' by anarchist enrages.66
The position of the FM in the CNT was consolidated in March when Pestafia and
Mira resigned from the National and Regional Committees respectively, only to be
replaced by the faIstas Manuel Rivas and Gilabert. The treintistas were now almost
totally isolated in the CNT power structure. At the next Catalan CNT Regional Plenum
held in May, the treintista-controlled Sabadell unions were forced to withdraw for their
own personal safety. This was the prelude to the expulsion of the Sabadell unions in
September. In what was described by the anarcho-syndicalists as an 'uncivil war',
grupistas began attacking assemblies of treintista-led CNT unions and assaulting
individual critics of the 'war of wolfs' unleashed by the faIstas. Meanwhile, by the end of
the summer, the signatories of the 'Treintista manifesto' and their supporters were being
arbitrarily expelled from the CNT at 'syndical trials' that generally took place at poorly
advertised meetings which were often pre-packed with faIsta majorities from other
unions. Finally, when the treintistas fully separated themselves from the CNT to develop
65 Dionisio Pereira, A CNTna Ga/ida, 1922-1936, Santiago de Compostela, 1994, pp.89-91
Cultura Libertaria, 5 February, 29 April 1932; Tierra y Libertad, 1, 22 April 1932; El Luchador, 5,
12, 19 February, 8, 15 April 1932; Solidaridad Obrera, 15 March 1932
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their own syndical and organisational identity, the FM showed its distaste by sending its
grupistas to break-up the meetings and rallies of its anarcho-syndicalist rivals.67
The split of the colossus that was the CNT in 1931 and its repression by the
authorities in the wake of the revolutionary gymnastics saw a staggering collapse in the
bargaining power of the Confederation. Membership of the Catalan CNT fell from its
high point of 400,000 in August 1931 to 222,000 in April 1932, a loss of nearly 180,000
workers. 68 This was just the beginning of the collapse in Confederal membership
following the switch to 'revolutionary gymnastics' and the CNT would not re-gain its
1931 strength before the Civil War. Not only were the unions pruned of those
syndicalists who erred from the path of anarchist righteousness, but hundreds and
thousands of other workers who had flooded optimistically into the Catalan CNT in
1931 in pursuit of 'bread-and-butter' aspirations left the union disenchanted, cognisant of
the reality that the immense combative syndical force of the Confederation had been
significantly dented by the severity of the authorities and the pseudo-revolutionary line of
the FAI.69
The bulk of these union defections was in the Catalan provinces, where the more
stable proletarian milieu and a lower level of unemployment and repression gave less
credence to the faIsta strategy of incessant confrontation with state forces. By
comparison, during the first year of the Republic, the CNT lost under 50,000 members in
the Barcelona region, what amounted to roughly one-quarter of the overall losses of the
Catalan CNT. Thus, with 143,710 cenetistas in Barcelona province, well over half the
overall Catalan membership, the standing of the Barcelona Local Federation was
enhanced within the Confederation. Nevertheless, on a qualitative level, the vibrant
exchanges that previously marked union assemblies were less frequent under FM
hegemony and it was not uncommon for gatherings to be near inquorate, with tiny
67 Solidaridad Obrera, 18 March, 3 May, 17 June, 30 September 1932; Cultura Libertaria, 20 May, 17
June, 15 July, 16, 23 September, 7, 21 October, 3, 10, 17 November, 14, 21 December 1932, 3 January,
3 March 1933; Sindicalismo, 14 February, 14, 21 April 1933; Tierra y Libertad, 14 April 193368 Solidaridad Obrera, 26 April 1932; La Batalla, 21 April, 1 May 1932
69 Arding to the British Consulate in Barcelona, by the middle of 1932, the CNT was 'finding that
the bulk of the working people are failing to respond to their propaganda as readily as before'. See
F0371/165051W6457/12/41: Report from Consul-General King, 30 May 1932 (PRO)
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minorities of the overall union membership resolving important questions. Moreover,
increasingly devoted to the problems of clandestine existence and revolutionary
preparation, perforce, from 1932 onwards the meetings of the Barcelona Local
Federation had little opportunity to deal with the organisation of the unemployed.70
5.4. Revolutionary Gymnastics and the Cycle of Insurrections
The removal of the most determined opponents tofaIsmo from the CNT during
the second half of 1932, matched by the growing predominance of unskilled, low-paid
and unemployed workers with little bargaining power and few prospects of a gradual
improvement in their position, paved the way for a new round of 'revolutionary
gymnastics'. 1933, optimistically welcomed by Solidaridad Obrera as 'the year of the
social revolution', was the high-point of this process, a year which began and ended with
anti-Republican anarchist uprisings.7'
On 8 January 1933, almost a year after the Alt Llobregat rising, the FM initiated
its second insurrectionary putsch with the aim of ending the 'mortal crisis of capitalism'.
The new action bore all the hallmarks of the deficient organisation of the FAI. 72 On a
national level, the rising was scheduled to coincide with a strike action of the CNT
Railway Workers' Union, which the FM hoped would prevent the mobilisation of
troops. Yet as the UGT was the majority union in this sector, the opening premise of the
insurrectionary plan was highly misguided. Moreover, the CNT railway workers were
themselves highly divided over the projected action and, fearing that its dispute would be
relegated subjugated to the insurrectionary ambitions of the libertarians, the strike
committee called off their stoppage at the eleventh hour.
° Minutes of the Plenum of the Barcelona CNT Local Federation, 29 November 1931, 10 Februaiy, 25
March 1932 (AHN)
71 Solidaridad Obrera, 1 January 1933
72 Solidaridad Obrera, 8 January 1933. My analysis of the January 1933 rising in Barcelona is largely
based on Comercio y Navegación. January 1933; La Vanguardia, La Veu de Catalunya and L'Opimó, 1-
23 January 1933; Solidaridad Obrera, 1-26 January, 5 February 1933; Garcia Oliver, El eco. pp. 130-
133; Paz, Durruti, pp.244-249; F0371/17426/W472/1 16/41: Letter from Sir G. Gra1aine, 10 January
1933; F037 1/17426/W576/1 16/41 and F037 1/174261W577/1 16/41: Reports from Consul-General
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260
In Barcelona, the cornerstone of the rising was a plan to stonn the military
barracks in the capital in order to compensate for the arms shortages of the
revolutionaries. However, the FM showed few signs of insurrectionary prowess and in
the days leading up to the rising a number of bomb factories were discovered by the
police which, though technically impressive, reflected the poor preparation of the
insurgents. The ally of surprise was completely lost when police succeeded in
intercepting a number offaIstas as they ferried supplies of arms and explosives around
the city before the start of the rising. Similarly, a police swoop on the Builders' Union
offices on Caner de Mercaders led to the discovery of a large haul of ammunition.
Complaints from the FM that the bourgeois-Republican press and the police were
'fabricating' stories of'anarchist plots' masked the irritation of the anarchists that they
had inadvertently forewarned the authorities of the impending insurrection. Finally,
following the arrest of Garcia Oliver, one of the main architects of the insurrection, and
the self-detonation of an enormous bomb factory in Sant Andreu, the Barcelona FM
brought the date of the rising forward and ordered a general mobilisation of its 'combat
forces'.
Given this inauspicious start, it was not surprising that the putsch was a short-
lived affair in Barcelona. The first major action by the insurgents was a two-pronged
attack on the Law Courts and the Sant AgustI barracks on the Passatge de Pujades, on
the edge of Poblenou and the Gothic Quarter. After 15 minutes fighting with security
forces some 50 grupistas were forced to cover their retreat into the Poblenou district
with hand grenades, having failed in their bid to seize the barracks and procure much-
needed arms. Meanwhile, in the city centre a series of skirmishes on Les Rambles and the
surrounding streets in the Barn xino, produced the deaths of two members of the
security forces and afaIsta. The police swiftly regained the upper hand on the city's main
thoroughfare and prevented the insurgents from storming the Atarazanas barracks at the
port end of Les Rambles. When the faIstas attempted to reach the barracks along El
Parallel, they were successfully repelled again by the security forces, who also
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succeeded in dislodging the insurrectionists from their operational headquarters in Bar
Rosales.
The failure of the advanced FAT squads to seize arms meant that it was only a
matter of time before the putsch was snuffed out by the authorities. With the city centre
reasonably secure, the scene of the fighting switched to the outlying proletarian districts,
especially Clot, Poblenou and Sants and l'Hospitalet. Nevertheless, the combat remained
very low-key and by the end of the first day the insurgents were clearly routed. The
following day, despite some sporadic sniper fire in and around the Barn xino, Barcelona
was relatively quite.
The pitiful scale of the rising bore few signs of the 'meticulous study' behind what
Garcia Oliver valued as 'one of the most serious battles between the libertarians and the
Spanish state'. 73 Of the three sectors into which the insurgents divided Barcelona, only in
the northern zone around Poblenou, under the control of Francisco Ascaso, did the
faIstas manage seriously to engage the security forces in armed action. This far exceeded
events elsewhere in the city. In the southern zone, around the CNT bastion of Sants, the
plans for the rising were immediately brought into disarray when the requisitioned taxi
carrying Garcia Oliver, the sector organiser, and some of his close associates, was
intercepted en route to a planned attack on a nearby Civil Guard barracks. The most
woeful showing, however, occurred in the eastern zone around Gràcia and Les Corts,
under the control of Durruti. Despite his plea for the grupistas 'to die for the great cause
of the proletariat', there were no recorded incidents of any significant disturbances in this
sector, something that ranided Durruti for a long while afterwards. Meanwhile, plans to
demolish all of the main military, civil and police offices in Barcelona and symbolically
wreck the nerve centres of capitalist authority floundered due to the poverty of FM
supply lines. In many places FM bomb factories were discovered by police and faIstas
were arrested. While Ricardo Sanz and a team of CNT drain workers succeed in placing
and detonating a huge bomb under the Via Laietana police station, the building, along
GarcIa Oliver, El eco. pp.130-131
262
with GarcIa Oliver and the otherfaIstas who had been incarcerated in the basement, was
saved by its deep foundations.
Many of the weaknesses of the rising were derived from the limitations imposed
by the elitist grupisino of the FM. For instance, while the FM lost the element of
surprise, by beginning the insurrection on a Sunday they immediately ruled out the
possibility of organising a general strike of the industrial proletariat. This reflected the
FAT's lack of interest in mass struggle and there was no attempt to broaden the
movement beyond the 200-odd members of its grupos de acción in the Barcelona area.
Workers were neither leafleted nor informed of the revolutionary events that the falsias
were attempting to force. In Clot and Poblenou events assumed comic-opera
proportions when anarchist youth entered the bars and taverns to inform an unsuspecting
clientele of the curse of alcohol and tell them that money was abolished.75
Elsewhere in Catalonia, support for the FM action was very patchy. The
movement had no real impact in the other Catalan provincial capitals, where the bulk of
the organised proletariat followed the BOC. The only important centre in provincial
Cataloma where libertarian communism was proclaimed was Terrassa, along with the
smaller surrounding towns of Cerdanyola del Vallès, Montcada and Ripollet.
Nevertheless, the rising remained a minority pursuit and in Cerdanyola del Vallès, with a
population of over 3,000, there were under 50 insurgents, half of whom came from
nearby Sabadell. Support for the putsch was equally poor in Ripollet where, after
disarming the two Mossos dEsquadra stationed in the town, the anarchists set about
burning the municipal archive and the Republican flag. However, before the old society
could be filly destroyed, the fledgling anarchist society was swamped by the security
forces of the bourgeois state arriving from the Catalan capital, ending the libertarian
communist experience in Barcelona province after only three hours.76
74 According to Peirats, there were 200 falstas in Barcelona, divided into 27 grupos: Huertas Claveria,
Obrers, p.243
Jaume Fabre and Josep Maria Huertas Clavera, Tots els barns de Barcelona, Barcelona, 1976, vol. 1,
p.44
76 Miquel Sanchez, La Segona Repüblica i la Guerra Civil a Cerdanyola (1931-1939), Barcelona, 1993,
pp.57-60
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The failure of the masses to be ignited by the 'spark' (chispazo) of January 1933
left a few hundred anned individuals across the peninsular isolated, underlining the
weaknesses of the revolutionary recipes of Mikhail Bakunin and Auguste Blanqui.
Although the grupistas had acquired new experience of combat, they had also proved
that they were ill-supplied and incapable of engaging the security forces in anything other
than sporadic Street battles, let alone confront the army. Moreover, given the negligible
success of Blanquism in nineteenth century Europe, it was hard to see how in the first
part of the twentieth century, against a more modern and heavily armed state, putschism
could lead anywhere other than to disaster.
With hindsight, in both Catalonia and in Spain, the January 1933 rising was most
memorable for the repression that accompanied it. Although in Barcelona the death-toll
was eight, almost evenly divided between the security forces and the insurgents, the
overall Catalan total rose to 16, following the application of the ley defugas by the
security forces in Lleida and Cerdanyola del Vallés. In the Catalan capital, the repression
was spearheaded by the police and in the Via Laietana police station agents formed the
infamous 'pasillo', flanking the route to the cells and beating detainees into
unconsciousness with truncheons, coshes and rifles. One faIsta had his nose broken with
a rifle butt, while Nosotros' members were singled out by the police for specific
attention that left Garcia Oliver with a cracked head and broken ribs.77
The most horrific bloodletting by the state forces came in the village of Casas
Viejas, a malarial hamlet in Andalusia. Typical of the uncoordinated nature of the rising,
the anarchists of Casas Viejas, like the Figols miners a year earlier, believed that the
insurrection had succeeded everywhere else in Spain. Consequently, when the
Andalusians went ahead and proclaimed a new society, the insurrectionary movement
had already been quelled elsewhere in Spain. Although this isolation would have been
possible for the security forces to lay patient siege to the last redoubt of the insurgents,
the government, particularly Casares Quiroga and Azafia, feared that events in Casas
Viejas might re-ignite the flames of the still smouldering putsch. Keen to appear tough,
Solidaridad Obrera, 13-14, 28, 31 Januaiy, 2-4 Februaiy 1933; El Luchador, 10 February 1933;
Tierra y Libertad, 27 January, 17 March 1933
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the government issued stern orders to snuff out the rebellion. The Asaltos adhered to the
severe line demanded by the government and, according to the investigative commission
into the events that followed, they interpreted their instructions as an invitation to apply
the ley defugas. When the anarchists of Casas Viejas refused to surrender to the
Asaltos, their improvised fortress was torched. Those who were not burnt to death were
machine-gunned by the security forces as they attempted to escape, leaving a death toll
of 22 dead, including several women and children. As a macabre lesson to the rest of the
villages, the charred bodies of the dead insurgents were left on display before burial.78
This was not the end of the repression. There was a thorough assault on the
CNT-FAJ throughout Spain. All the major Barcelona unions, as well as a number of
provincial ones, were banned indefinitely, thereby allowing the bourgeoisie to victimise
workers of all persuasions and slash wages. The prison population expanded as police
interned hundreds of known anarchist militants without trial. Educational Ateneus, bars
and cafés frequented by activists were raided and closed down and in the Santa Coloma
Cases Barates the Civil Guard established a temporary camp. Solidaridad Obrera, like
the other titles associated with the CNT-FAI, came in for regular harassment under the
Ley de Defensa de la Repáblica, accumulating bans and fines of thousands of pesetas for
covering the repression or for simply mentioning events at Casas Viejas.79
The authorities took advantage of the circumstances to deliver a blow to the
BOC, even though it had not participated in the rising. In Cerdanyola del Vallès the Civil
Guard applied the ley defugas against Pere Poch, a young bloquista. In the aftermath of
the rising, the BOC central office in Barcelona was raided and a number of militants
were interned without trial. The ban on BOC meetings and its press was intensified when
Azafla ordered police to chase the shadows of an absurd 'anarcho-fascist-communist
plot' to assassinate ministers. As the police net widened a bloquisla with an anarchist
namesake was arrested and charged for his involvement in the rising. Probably the most
78 Federico Urales, La barbarie gubernainental: Espafia 1933. Barcelona, 1933; Ramón Sender, Viaje a
la aldea del cnmen, Maclrid, 1934; Francisco Guerra, Casas Viejas: apuntes para la tragedia, Jerez,
1933; Jerome It Mintz, The Anarchists of Casas Viejas, Chicago, 1982, pp.186-200
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bizarre abuse of power was the arrest of Nm, the Trotskyist intellectual and respected
Catalan translator of Tolstoy, who was detained on explosives charges.8°
Police practices highlighted the manner in which Republican justice was
becoming increasingly iniquitous. The freedoms promised in the Constitution were
regularly by-passed and, confirming the assertion of the anarchists that Republicans
sought to 're-establish the Inquisition', the authorities re-opened the notorious
monarchical den of torture in the Puerto de Santa MarIa in Cádiz as a 'preventive prison'
to cope with the growing number of those interned without trial in Cataloma. With the
number of social and political prisoners topping 9,000, Solidaridad Obrera declared that
'the whole of Spain is a prison'.8'
The repression weighed down on the regular syndical functions of the CNT.
Clandestine union organisers complained that they were unable to stand up to the
employer's offensive, just as they could not forestall what they described as 'a system of
imposition and injustice in the workplace'. 82 In an attempt to extricate Confederal unions
from the post-rising repression, the FAT and the CNT maintained that the January 1933
insurrection was the exclusive work of the faIstas. This represented a highly attractive
escape route from repression, for not only did it hold out the renewed possibility of open
agitation through syndical channels but, it also promised the extension of Ira bazón
through the growing collaboration of cenetislas and faIstas in the Prisoners' Support
Committees. Furthermore, it is also likely that the FAT was concerned that the disastrous
impact of anarchist initiatives on the CNT might provoke an anti-faIsta backlash among
the union rank-and-file in Catalonia or from other Regional Committees. Already Madrid
cenetistas had used terms highly reminiscent of the treintistas to revile the 'sterile'
revolutionary infantilism of the FAT, even suggesting that the Catalan CNT-FAT had
been infiltrated by police agents or provocateurs 'who wished to bring a repression
80 Solidaridad Obrera, 5 February 1933; Sanchez, La Segona Rep iblica, p.59; La Batalla, 12, 19, 26
January, 2 February, 27 April, 8 June, 27 July 1933; Azafla, Obras, vol.3, pp.505, 512. Despite
enthusiastic police claims of 'leads' and 'investigative procedures' in the 'Nm case', the charges were
dropped after a number of top-ranking Catalan politicians, although ideologically opposed to the
Trotskyist, demanded that he be released in what was a preposterous set-up: L'Opinió, 1, 5, 8 April 1933
Sanz, El sindicalismo y la politica. p.245; La BaAala, 9 February 1933; Urales, La barbarie, p.23;
Solidaridad Obrera, 8 February, 10 March 1933
82 Solidaridad Obrera, 28 January 1933
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against the CNT'. Similarly reminiscent of the anarcho-syndicalists, CNT, the daily paper
of the Confederation in central Spain, reminded the Catalans that:
'the lightning blow, the hasty gamble, is already out-moded. Our
revolution requires more than an attack on a Civil Guard barracks or
an army post. That is not revolutionaiy. We will call an
insurrectionary general strike when the situation is right; when we
can seize the factories, mines, power plants, transportation, all the
means of production'.83
Following both internal and external criticisms, the Catalan Regional Committee
and the CNT National Committee issued a fiuriy of manifestos attesting that the unions
knew as little about the January 1933 rising as they did about its precursor a year earlier.
The CNT leadership also expounded that because the recent mobilisation had an
'exclusive anarchist content', there was no justifiable reason for the authorities to attack
the Confederation. In its defence, the CNT even alleged that the rising was simply the
spontaneous result of the 'misery' imposed on the people, 'violence to oppose the
organised violence of the state' and a régime that promised justice but left capitalist
privileges and oppression intact. This view was endorsed by the novelist Pio Baroja who
praised the 'optimism and purity of the fighters', whose rebellion he attributed to the
failure of the Republic to act against unemployment. Finally, in February, the FAT
Peninsular Committee accepted full responsibility for the putsch, emphasising that its
action did 'not go hand in hand with the CNT', which remained 'absolutely independent
of us'. 84
The efforts of the directive committees of the CNT-FAI to exonerate its
institutions of guilt were undermined firstly, by the obvious determination of the
authorities to break the power of the major Catalan unions, and secondly, by the logic of
trabazón, which implicated the Confederation in the rising by more than just association.
In fact, not only had the putsch in Catalonia had been organised through the Confederal
Defence Committees, of which GarcIa Oliver was secretary but, it is unthinkable that the
Barcelona CNT Local Federation did not know the details of the rising.
83	 9 January 1933
84 Solidaridad Obrera, 10-15 January, 10, 15 February 1933
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It would be a mistake to conclude, however, that there was any serious
discussion about the putsch among the bulk of union militants. The January 1933 rising
highlighted the extent to which the conspiratorial putschism of the anarchists was
thoroughly inconsistent with the democratic traditions to which the CNT laid claim. It
appears that the initial suggestion that the railway strike should be exploited for the
mobilisation came from 'Los Indominables', a Barcelona-based FAT grupo of
Bakuninists, who opined that once the masses saw the example of the sublime
mobilisation of the selfless anarchist fighters, the rising would spread spontaneously
throughout Spain. Once 'Los Indominables' gained the assent of the Catalan CNT
Regional Committee for their plan, 'Nosotros' took over the preparation of the rising.
Although not formally part of the anarchist organisation, 'Nosotros' effectively controlled
the Catalan CNT-FA1 by 1933. In the words of Fidel Miró, 'Nosotros' was a 'super-FAT'
or a PAT within the FAT', which constituted the defacto leadership of the movement,
largely on the basis of the charismatic power wielded by the living anarchist legends of
'The Three Musketeers'. 'Nosotros' ensured that its plan for the putsch was accepted by
the higher committees of the CNT-FAI, where after it fell to Garcia Oliver to establish
the date for the rising and authorise the Confederal Defence Committees to act.
According to Pedro Morato Queralto, a provincial member of the Barcelona FAT who
was detained for his part in the putsch, the level of internal dialogue that preceded the
rising was minimal: no more than 50 delegates from the Catalan Confederal Defence
Committees voted on the desirability of the rising. There was no further discussion and
the final details were outlined in a smaller gathering at an unnamed bar on El Parallel.85
The putschism underlined the incapacity of the anarchists to organise a co-
ordinated, state-wide revolution; they sacrificed everything to their adventurism and they
destroyed, without creating a new power. The FAT had split the CNT, it had disrupted
the daily syndical tasks of the Confederation through its belief in isolated group action,
while its blind policy of revolutionary confrontation with the state brought repression
crashing down on the entire labour movement. By March 1933 Catalan CNT
85 Tierra y Libertad, 23 January 1932; Gómez Casas, Anarchist Organisation, p.137; Miró, Catalufia,
p.66; La Publicitat, 30 June 1933
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membership was under 200,000, around half its level two years earlier. Moreover, in the
Barcelona bastion of the FAT, CNT numbers were also beginning to be depleted, falling
by 30,000 in under a year to 113 ,000 . 86 Meanwhile, the treintistas and the bloquistas
increased their own organisational drives and consolidated their distinct syndical
identities.
These shortcomings of FAT 'putschism' led other libertarian factions who sought
a more 'constructivist', syndical-based transformation to define themselves in terms of
their opposition to the 'revolutionary gymnastics'. 87 However, the anarchist opponents to
the 'cycle of insurrections' were still in a minority in Catalonia, the veritable engine of
faIsmo, where the standing of 'Nosotros' was largely intact. Nevertheless, fearing that the
so-called 'constructivists' would 'strangle' the revolution, 'Nosotros' opted to join the FAT
on a formal basis. The FAT organisation was also now placed on a more coherent basis,
with a new faIsta Regional Committee formed in Catalonia, while in the capital, a Local
Committee was responsible for connecting the disparate grupos that still sometimes
existed in total independence from other FAT groups.88
The FAT, therefore, clung to its essentially Bakuninist conception of the
insurrection. Indeed, by the logic of'revolutionary gymnastics', the January 1933 putsch
and the subsequent rise in state brutality actually made it a greater success than the
January 1932 rising. According to Durruti, irrespective of the ramifications in human and
organisational terms, the January 1933 action was validated as it forced the pendulum
movement from reformist illusion towards revolutionary aspiration, by preventing the
bourgeoisie from passively co-opting the proletariat into the capitalist economic order
and thwarting Republican politicians from peacefully fortifying the new state around a
reformist labour movement. Meanwhile, the faIstas continued to nourish their elitist and
voluntarist conceptions of a revolutionary process that they believed they could force
forward alone, without the communists, socialists or even the anarcho-syndicalists.
Ludicrously, just one month after the suppression of the January 1933 putsch the FAT
86 CRT, Memoria...de marzo de 1933, pp.5-9
87 Miró, Catahtha, p.51
88 Garcia Oliver, El eco, pp.123-124
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Peninsular Committee affirmed that 'we have no doubt that the social revolution will
soon come'.89
Before this final revolutionary showdown, the FM had no short-term policies
around which to organise the unemployed. Instead, from clandestinity the anarchists
continued their policy of 'throwing the jobless into the street' and calling on the
unemployed to 'rebel' for 'death or victory' in the fight for their 'right to life', irrespective
of the unpopularity of this strategy with sections of the jobless. Nevertheless, many of
the unemployed and the unskilled were prepared to follow the slogans of the FM and
throughout 1933 there was an upsurge of guerrilla activity within their ranks. 'Union
placements' continued and there were cases of 200-strong groups ofjobless workers
entering building sites and metal works in central Barcelona and attempting to work,
before the police arrived to remove them. In a bid to generate employment groups of
jobless builders began ripping up paving stones around the city. The anarchist call to
action met with strong assent among the new proletariat in the ghettos. In Sant Andreu
and Santa Coloma unemployed workers periodically occupied unused land and fought
the police who attempted to eject them. In the proletarian belt of the city where town
met country the unemployed continued to enter estates and requisition foodstuffs,
particularly in l'Hospitalet. Lastly, patterns of popular illegality were largely unaffected
by police repression, as reflected in assaults on shops, markets and 'sacrilegious
robberies' in churches. In one dramatic raid, the Mercat del Borne in the Gothic Quarter
was taken early in the morning by over a group of 80 people who tied up lorry drivers
and made away with all the foodstuffs that they could carry.9°
As 1933 wore on, the pseudo-revolutionary violence of the grupistas
increasingly permeated the issue of unemployment which, the falsias maintained, had to
be resolved exclusively by force. Accordingly, a number of employers who laid workers
off during slack periods received death threats from FM grupos. In the summer of 1933
falsias in YHospitalet acted on these threats and killed two employers in the city in
89 Paz, Durruti, pp.248-2'19; Solidaridad Obrera, 10 Februaiy 1933
Tierra y Libertad, 13 January, 17 March 1933; Solidaridad Obrera, 21 February, 14 March, 4, 15
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separate machine gun attacks. On other occasions, factories where workers had been
sacked were bombed by the grupistas.9'
The central struggle spearheaded by the unemployed of the CNT in 1933 was the
epic four month strike by the Builders' Union, a mobilisation that provided a constant
side-show to city life during the summer. 92 As we saw earlier, this most deprecated
section of the workforce, which comprised the veritable outcasts of Catalan industry,
had been devastated by unemployment since the collapse of the dictatorship in 1929. A
mainstay offais,no since 1930, the Builders' Union went on strike in 1933 to attain the
six-hour day, despite the fact that the employers in the sector had never even accepted
the legal working day of eight hours. Nevertheless, it was testimony to the ardour of the
unskilled that the struggle drew in thousands of unemployed builders in Barcelona, who
attended mass rallies and organised picketing squads in the hope that success in the
strike would allow them to be re-integrated into the workplace.
The volatile intervention of the unemployed in the builders' strike engendered a
firm dialectic according to which the more the authorities clamped down on the union,
the more explosive became the mobilisations of the hungry strikers and jobless builders.
This was epitomised by a 25,000-strong demonstration organised in protest at a series of
bans on strike meetings in June. Predictably, the authorities ordered the security forces
to disperse the demonstration and when Asaltos fired on the march, killing one striker
and wounding many more, the builders turned the centre of Barcelona into a
battleground, arming themselves with bottles, chairs and paving stones from nearby bars
in the Placa de la Universitat. Prevented from marching openly, the demonstration split
up into frustrated fragments and the builders registered their protest by riot, attacking,
looting and requisitioning foodstuffs from commercial premises on their way. A large
part of the demonstration moved along the Ronda de Sant Antoni, though 'not before
having smashed to pieces all the shop windows of the shops and cafés of that bourgeois
91 La Vanguardia, 5 January, 17 May, 20 July 1933; Comercio y Navegación, June-July, November
1933
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thoroughfare', causing thousands of pesetas of damage. 93 The following month, as the
builders pushed for recognition of their right to the streets, another protest march was
blocked by Asaltos, producing running battles as strikers attempted to regroup in the city
centre. Meanwhile, a section of the marchers swept through the Barn xino, attacking
premises of businesses that had opposed the CNT, before launching an impromptu mass
shop-lifting spree, smashing windows and seizing a considerable amount of goods and
food. Reflecting the poisonous social divisions in the city, as the protesters entered
Caner de l'Hospital they greeted by an armed group of shopkeepers, who opened fire,
killing a passer-by. Minutes later, in a nearby bar, the protesters found a strike-breaking
building site foreman and shot him dead.94
While the Builders' strike initially involved thousands ofjobless workers, the
conflict eventually became a surrogate for the coherent organisation of the jobless.
Indeed, the more protracted the struggle became, the greater was the involvement of the
Confederal Defence Committees, to the detriment of forms of mass mobilisation. Tierra
y Libertad promised that scabs would be bombed off the sites and from May onwards
explosions were a growing feature of the conflict. In July a staggering 280 bombs were
discovered by the Civil Guard in Barcelona province, 200 of which were in l'Hospitalet.
Meanwhile, by early August explosions were occurring on sites at a rate of nearly one a
day. These bomb attacks were the work of the vanguard grupistas who looked on the
conflict as a means of testing the performance of their shock-troops. The rising number
of gun attacks on 'scabs' and their Civil Guard escorts fulfilled a similar function. As the
initiative slipped away from the union, the FM brought tenor to the centre of the social
question. Following a call in Tierra y Libertad for anarchists to 'try' the 'socialist
assassins' who betrayed the struggles of the working class, gr-upistas assassinated seven
leading Barcelona ugetistas in the space of a few months in the summer of 1933. In the
Solidaridad Obrera, La Publicitat, La Van guardia, 13 June 1933; Tierra y Libertad, 16 June 1933;
Comercio y Navegación, June 1933; El Luchador. 23 June 1933
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most grotesque case, a ugetista was assassinated byfaIstas as he walked hand-in-hand
with his young daughter in a Sants street.95
Small group violence was a poor compensation for mass pressure and the
mobilisations of the unemployed builders were increasingly sacrificed to sterile acts of
grupista terror. Finally, with the strike in a stalemate situation, Ricardo Sanz, Bilbao and
the rest of the anarchist leadership of the Builders' Union quietly ended the stoppage,
accepting a return to work on the basis of a 44-hour week, along with small wage rises
and slightly improved working conditions. This was a staggering sell-out by the
anarchists: the settlement was little different to a deal produced by the Jurados months
earlier that had been rejected by the CNT. It was also a significant retreat from the 36
hour week that the anarchists had promised the strikers and the unemployed right until
the very end of the conflict. In a break with the CNT tradition of open syndical
democracy, the ballot organised by the anarchist union leadership that decided the return
to work was held in secrecy. Moreover, the ballot result - 1,227 voting in favour, with a
mere 616 in favour of continuing the stoppage - was a pathetic and unrepresentative
turnout from a union membership of 35-40,000, further underlining the sense of betrayal
and demoralisation of the union grass-roots, as well as discontent at the attitude of the
Confederation towards the unemployed.96
5.5. Dealing with the Unemployed and the Malefactors: la Ley de Vagos
y Maleantes
After the January 1933 putsch the bourgeois psyche was petrified by the prospect
of social unrest. The conservative press gave the impression of a veritable holocaust
produced by 'the manoeuvres of Moscow', spinning fantastic yarns of'god-fearing
citizens' being forced to kiss the red flag during an insurrection that left an immense
carnage of untold 'men, women and children dead and wounded'. The criticisms of the
bourgeoisie fell squarely on the Republic. The Confederación Patronal Española, the
Comercio y Navegaciôn, May-August 1933; Tierra y Libertad, 2 June 1933; L'Opinió, 9 July 1933;
Sindicalismo, 14 July 1933; Justicia Social, 15, 22 July, 4 November 1933; La Vanguardia, 21 July 1933
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273
leading Spanish employers' confederation, issued a manifesto soon after the January
rising ascribing all 'social crime' to the consequences of what it described as the
'advanced' social laws of the Republic. The catholic right developed this theme,
explaining the dislocation of public order to the indifference of the laicist Republic to
traditional moral values and the 'subversive' attempt to re-define the relationship between
church and state. In similar terms, the rebellion of one of the insurgents killed by the
security forces was attributed to the fact that 'he was separated from the family'. This,
the right claimed, reflected the way in which by 'attacking the foundations of religion, the
spiritual engine of all peoples, the family, property and order, the entire fabric of civil
cohesion and social discipline are undermined'.97
Intent on exploiting the upsurge of'social crime', the rightist press reported trials
and repressive state activities on a daily basis under sections entitled 'Gunmen and
Terrorists' or 'Yesterday's Disturbances'. These were often fleshed out with reportage of
unconnected court proceedings, all in an attempt to give the impression that 'disorder'
was a feature of everyday life under the Republic. Quietly nostalgic for the days of
monarchy, the coverage of the rightist press favoured legislation that would allow the
revival of preventive detention to inhibit 'unadaptable elements' from destroying existing
civilisation with their 'revolutionary epilepsy'. While the propertied classes showered the
Republican security forces with thousands of pesetas for their 'spirited defence' of the
'principle of authority', the authorities were upbraided for allowing 'anarchist outrages' to
pass by with 'immunity'. The COPUB protested to the Generalitat about the 'anarchic
ambience' offered by the city and the 'spirit of disorder that permeates our people'.
Similarly, the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional believed that the softness of the law
encouraged 'excesses', something that should be rectified to 'make agitators feel the full
force of their deserved punishment'.98
The all-encompassing fear for public order was replicated in the Republican
camp. L'Opinió, the left-wing of the ERC coalition, carried a regular page entitled
97 La Veu de Catalunva. 9-14, 17, 20 Januaiy 1933; L'O pinió, 28 January 1933
98 La Vanguardia, 10, 29 January 1933; COPUB, Memoria...de 1933. p.46; Comercio y Navegación,
July 1933; Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, Memoria...de 1933. p.9
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'Terrorist Disorders', in which it campaigned for 'greater energy' from the state to deal
the decisive tblow' that would finish 'once and for all' with 'terrorism'. Accepting the need
for preventive legislation, L'Opinió favoured the 'inexorable punishment' of any
transgression of 'public order' before the machinations of the 'malefactors' produced 'the
destruction of society'. Meanwhile, the summer builders' riots had the 'LluhIns' preparing
for Armageddon, announcing they were on a 'war footing' because 'the enemy is
knocking at the door, prepared to destroy everything'9
The security fears of the Republicans, matched with their sensitivity to the
criticisms of the right and the bourgeoisie, culminated later in the year in the enactment
of the Ley de Orden Páblico. Drafted by ex-Civil Governor of Barcelona Anguera de
Sojo, the law permitted the comprehensive suppression of the Constitution in times of
social unrest and its replacement with martial law, according to which power would be
transferred to the military until public order could be re-established. Article 38 allowed
the authorities to 'prohibit the formation of all types of groups on the public highway'.
Meanwhile, arousing numerous comparisons with monarchical crowd control tactics, the
new law specified that 'if orders to disperse are disobeyed, after three warning signals the
security forces will use the necessary force to re-establish normality. No warning is
necessary if the security forces come under attack'. According to Bailbé, 'this law
completed the conditions for an authoritarian state' and formalised the repressive powers
of the state.'°°
Unlike in 1931, when members of the Madrid government cracked the ERC into
line to back the Ley de Defensa de la Repüblica with threats to the Autonomy Statute,
in 1933 the ruling Catalan party energetically endorsed the Ley de Orden Páblico.
L'Opinió, the faction that had once been the most committed voice for reform inside the
Esquerra, enthusiastically greeted the new law as 'a good aid for the Republic'.'0'
The right-ward drift of the tiuhins' reflected the growing conservatism of all the
disparate forces that made up the ERC coalition. In the course of 1933, with the
L'Opinió, 10-18 January, 30 April, 11-12, 22 July 1933
Ballbé, Orden publico, pp.359-363
L'Opinió. 31 August 1933
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autonomous institutions still in a process of evolution, extreme right-wingers from Estat
Català sought to gain acceptance inside the ERC coalition for a policy of appeasement
towards important sectors of the Catalan bourgeoisie. This authoritarian current centred
on Dencàs, and his autocratic hench-man Miquel Badia, both of whom advocated a
policy of blanket repression of the CNT. Dencàs's transition from a friend of the people
in 1931 with a concern for social justice to a pseudo-fascist demagogue exemplified the
trajectory of many of those inside the ERC who had moved sharply to the right in the
face of social conflict during the early Republican years. The experience of fortif,ing the
Generalitat from the criticisms of the left and the mobilisations of the unemployed was a
highly sobering exercise of power for the Esquerra. For Dencàs, who had been head of
the Comissariat de Cases Barates in 1931 at the height of the rent strike, his front line
role against the tenacious resistance of the CDE had imbued him with a deep-rooted
hatred for the rebellion of the proletariat. This was exacerbated by the experiences of
both Dencàs and Badia in the Catalaniste circles in Sant Andreu, a peripheral district of
Barcelona where thousands of immigrants had settled in the 1920s, many of whom went
on to join the CNT. By the 193 Os, Sant Andreu was particularly affected by the
recession, becoming one of the main theatres for unemployment agitation. In reply, the
militant Catalanistes in Sant Andreu targeted immigrants and the unemployed as the
cause of all the socio-economic ills in the area, including the upsurge in illegality.102
To counter what they described as the 'enemy within', Dencàs and Badia formed
the Escamots. Literally translated as 'squads', the Escamots were a para-military
formation composed of radical Catalanistes from the essentially petit bourgeois youth
groups affiliated to the ERC, particularly the Joventuts d'Esquerra-Estat Català, who
were led by Dencàs. At the time of the creation of the Esca,nots in 1933, Madrid and
Barcelona were negotiating the transfer of responsibility for law-and-order from central
government to the Generalitat. Dencàs and Badia argued that by creating the Escamots
they were grooming a militia force that could fulfil a key policing role within the Catalan
security forces. In the mean time, the stance of the Escamots was vehemently anti-
102 L'Opjpjó 5 November 1931; La Vanguardia. 15 March, 4-6 May 1933
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proletarian and anti-immigrant. This was succinctly encapsulated in a manifesto issued by
Badia and Dencàs entitled 'The FM is the product of Spain. Death to the FAI!"°3
The emergence of the Escamots brought to a head a number of intet-nal tensions
within the ERC coalition that had simmered since its formation. For the tiuhIns', while
their radical reformism had abated since 1931, they could have no truck with the
demagogic populism of the Escamots and they impugned the group as 'apprentice Nazis'.
The Escamots did little to heal the rifts within the Esquerra and they replied by attacking
public meetings organised by the 'Lluhins', as well as smashing up the offices of El Be
Negre, a satirical publication that was highly respected in Catalaniste circles. Finally, in
October 1933 the L'Opiniô group split away from the ERC coalition in opposition to the
rise of Dencàs, Badia and their Escamots, forming the minuscule Partit Nacionalista
Republicà d'Esquerra (PNRE).'°4
In contrast to the 'Liuhins', the bulk of the Esquerra swallowed whatever
reservations they felt towards the Escamots. The violent methods of the Escamots were
regarded by many inside the ERC as a fitting response to growing social conflictivity.
This reflected the reactionary radicalisation of sections of the Catalan middle classes in
the face of the economic crisis and anarchist mobilisations. Through their contribution to
maintaining public order, the arrival of the Escamots on the streets in the summer of
1933 met the central demand of the bourgeoisie for extra security forces. In the absence
of any alternatives, the cash-starved Generalitat developed the Escamots as a parallel
security force, ensuring that the militant Calalanistes received fill access to police
records, particularly those of anarchist militants. Moreover, the Escamots played an
important strike-breaking function, recruiting docile workers from their own ranks and
from the Generalitat borsa de Ireball to replace victimised cenetistas. 105
Despite the opposition of the notoriously anti-Catalan police in Barcelona, who
complained to Madrid, by July it was reported that the Escamots were serving as
auxiliaries to the security forces. From the start, the Escamots employed highly
103 Abad de Santillán, Memorias. pp.208-213
104 La Batalla, 26 January, 31 August, 28 September, 19 October 1933; L'Opinio. 24-26 October, 15
November 1933; Adelante, 25, 29 October, 3 November 1933; Cullà i Clara, El catalanisme, pp.193-381
105 La Batalla, 3 August 1933; Solidaridad Obrera, 3, 16-18 August 1933
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questionable methods. The very month that the Escamots began their low-key policing
role they beat up a group of cenetistas in the VIa Laietana police station. On the streets,
Escamot violence was increasingly in evidence. The Catalaniste 'third force' vented its
anti-proletarian sentiments by provoking and intimidating union militants and attacking
both CNT and BOC fly posters. However, the bulk of the aggression of the Escamots
was aimed at thefaistas, especially in the anarchist strongholds in Barcelona and in
Terrassa and l'Hospitalet. According to Urales, in the summer of 1933 both he and his
daughter were personally threatened with death by Badia and group of Escamots after a
CNT rally in l'Hospitalet. In an equally notorious episode, Badia ordered the kidnapping
of two young anarchists in Sants, who were then held and beaten up in a local ERC
centre.106
The deployment of such an obviously politicised force as the Escamots as a
quasi-police force aggravated the delicate equilibrium on the streets. The rivalry between
the Escamots and workers erupted in a series of clashes in the summer of 1933.
Solidaridad Obrera compared Badia's pups' and the 'fascist thugs' of the Escamots with
Mussolini'sfascio and the union-busting, employer-funded gunmen of Chicago. The
CNT was, however, confident that it would see off'the new gunmen of Barcelona',
dealing with the Escamots today, just as it banished the libreiios yesterday. In what
seemed to be the preparation for war, Solidaridad Obrera began listing the names,
addresses and meeting places of Escamots, detailing also the arms they carried, in order
'to prevent any unwanted surprises'. Meanwhile, the sightings of'suspicious individuals'
near the flat of Badia confirmed the poorly kept secret that at least one FM grupo had
vowed to finish with the 'chief of the fascist militias of Catalonia'.'°7
The ascendancy of the extreme nationalists within the Esquerra corresponded
with a veritable outpouring of xenophobic hatred. The phantasm of the 'invasion of the
immigrants' permeated nearly every sphere of Catalan life and was reflected in the
Tierra y Libertad, 7 July 1933; Solidaridad Obrera, 9-13, 20 June, 18, 20, 25 July, 1, 16, 23, 25, 30
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discourse of politicians, linguists, moralists and doctors, all of whom focused on the
'dangers' posed to the traditional patterns of life by 'outsiders')°8
The exclusiveness of autonomous Catalonia was fully revealed in the Catalaniste
press. For all their radical pretensions and their criticisms of the Escamots, the 'LiuhIns'
upheld their own anti-immigrant and racist stereotypes, identif,ring 'illness', crime and
social conflict exclusively with the 'continual invasion' of 'the escoria of the lowest
society' and 'the stigma of a degenerate race, the carriers of the seed of indiscipline,
crudeness, physical and moral misery'. In l'Hospitalet, Catalanistes berated the 'savages'
and 'uncivilised parasites' who came to 'rich Catalonia' in search of El Dorado to
constitute a 'monstrous curse on the city, spreading terror everywhere' and disrupting
traditional Catalan 'tranquillity and bonhomie' with their 'social attacks'. Caricatures of
the southern Spanish immigrants in the Republican Catalaniste press revealed a colonial
mentality, portraying the raw material offaIsmo as deformed and contorted sub-human
brutes, exactly like the depiction of the Irish in Victorian England. One cartoon in
L'Opinió showed a pair of unshaven immigrants arriving at Barcelona docks.
Momentarily disoriented by their new environment, one of the Spaniards asked his friend
'how will we get by if there is no work?' The answer from his learned friend was
unambiguous: 'the women will go down to the Welfare, the kids can beg charity on the
streets and we're off to create an uproar in the name of libertarian communism'.'°9
Like in 1931, the Esquerra claimed that its would-be reformist hands were tied
by a cultureless minority of 'ignorant men', the 'unruly ones', who were disrupting 'the
free Catalonia which we all want'. Similarly, the 'Lluhins' asserted that were it not for the
'illiterate cowards' of the FM, the Generalitat, the repository of rational authority, would
initiate 'a true social revolution' through the 'evolution' of the 'civic revolution of April
14th'. Meanwhile, still clinging to the aim of winning over some 'responsible' sections of
the labour movement to the autonomous project, L'Opinió maintained the distinction
108 L'Opinió. 17 January 1933; Vandellés, La inurn gració, passim.; Francesc Artal, Emili Gasch, Carme
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between those 'good' workers 'who live from their labour and deserve our respect' and
thefaIstas, 'who have never worked and live off the backs of those who do'. Verbal
support was occasionally offered for anti-FM sectors of the labour movement, like the
Sabadell unions, against the 'inculture' of the 'dictators of the FAT'. Normally, however,
the Esquerra preferred to differentiate between militant workers of all persuasions,
whether treintistas, bloquistas orfaIstas and the 'disciplined' Catalan worker. Thus,
L'Opinió alleged that a supposed 'anti-Republican United Front' had been formed,
comprising the 'immigrant-led' FM, the 'red agitators' of the BOC and the monarchist
right. Nevertheless, the FAT remained the major scapegoat for most of the problems of
the autonomous régime and was believed to be 'acting under orders received from
Madrid', in collusion with the anti-Catalaniste Spanish right, both of which spoke the
same 'foreign language'. This, in turn, led to new caricatures of the 'anarcho-vampires' of
the FAT, ladened with grenades, pistols and bags of monarchical gold."°
The multi-faceted scapegoating of immigrants was instrumental in expanding the
repressive consensus that had developed from 1931 onwards in Barcelona. Fears about
the 'gushing invasion' of 'deviants' threatening 'to annihilate our race' bolstered an
emerging bi-partisan consensus among Catalan political parties that a 'defensive cordon
sanitaire' of increased police and judicial powers and 'the most severe immigration
controls' were required to halt the 'uncontrollable flood' of 'undesirable aliens'. L'Opinió
saw immigration controls as a 'matter of life and death', justifiable 'on social and
economic grounds, for reasons of public order, for reasons of health', warning
apocalyptically that failure meant that the 'invading army of occupation will end up
triumphing over us.. .If the demographic offensive is not stopped, it is impossible to
imagine where the bombs, terror and criminality will end'. Hel.leni Segul, the daughter of
'El Noi del Sucre' who was periodically paraded by the tiuhins' as proof that the CNT
had broken with its past, spoke of the need to 'finish with the preponderance of these
individuals, the majority of them having come to Barcelona from far away lands'. The
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Catalan right and employers joined the reactionary chorus initiated by the Generalitat and
in the autonomous parliament the Lliga backed immigration controls to impede the
'denationalisation' of Catalonia. Meanwhile, proving that the strategy of the rightists in
the ERC was bearing fruit, the bourgeoisie was increasingly petitioning the Esquerra and
the Generalitat to act on its behalf."
The official effluvia concerning immigrants defied the industrial heritage of
Barcelona, whose expansion from the nineteenth century onwards was bound up with
the labour of non-Catalans. However, for all the talk of'murcians', the reality was that
between 19 14-1930 many thousands of newcomers to Barcelona were from rural
Catalonia, like Gil i Gil, the Deputy Mayor of l'Hospitalet, and the anarchist Garcia
Oliver. During the same period, the majority of the immigrants to Catalonia came from
neighbouring Aragôn, like MaurIn, the BOC leader, and Valencia, like the anarchists
Ricardo Sanz and José Peirats, all of whom spoke Catalan."2
The patterns of immigration clearly undermined Esquerra stereotypes. Moreover,
these stereotypes also ignored the way in which social violence was conditioned by the
economic recession. In reality, however, the fear of immigrants was a euphemism for the
economic crisis and it was, therefore, no coincidence that 1933, the year in which the
scares about immigrants became most shrill, was also the worst year of the economic
crisis in Spanish state. Conversely, before the collapse of its social, economic and
political certainties, when the Catalan bourgeoisie lived a life of growing splendour
through the sweated labour of its immigrant operatives, complaints about non-Catalan
'scum' were rare indeed."3
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Scares about the 'army' of immigrants were a refraction of reality, a plea for a
repressive poultice to be applied to the socio-economic wound of unemployment.
Catalanistes of all persuasions put intense pressure on the Madrid authorities to end
their 'benevolence' on the question of immigration and introduce new measures of'civic
defence' for 'the liberation of society from its enemies'." 4
 However, from the point of
view of central government, immigration controls were completely unacceptable, as this
would be tantamount to the secession of Cataloma from Spain. Instead, the Madrid
parliament introduced new repressive legislation aimed specifically against the 'outsiders'
which most worried the ERC: the jobless.
This resulted in the notorious Ley de VagosyMaleantes. Justified as a measure
against pimps and drug-pushers, the law empowered the authorities effectively to
militarise Republican democracy and brand those who opposed government economic
and social policies as 'dangerous' internal enemies of the state. This was a law of
exception against the 'bad', 'undeserving' unemployed or any other individual deemed by
the authorities or the security forces to be outside the conventional patterns of social
control. Concerned with an assumed 'state of dangerousness' and the potential
'dangerousness' of the individual to society, the Ley de VagosyMaleantes was not
meant to repress criminal acts, as these were already catered for by the existing penal
code. Instead, the objective of the Ley de Vagos y Maleantes was to isolate those
'dangerous individuals' who the police or judiciary believed were a threat to public order
in labour and concentration camps."5
The Ley de VagosyMaleantes crowned the authoritarian conversion of the
Republicans; it evinced their readiness to place order before the 'rule of law' and it
signified their recognition that the project for the re-negotiation of state legitimacy had
failed. The new law was a most revealing example of the abyss between the promises of
the Republicans and their practice. Out of power, the Republicans always condemned
preventive policing and they emphasised the formal equality of all citizens before the law.
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The Ley de Vagos y Maleanies showed how these beliefs had been revised and revealed
that the Republicans now accepted that the rights of citizenship should be selectively
denied to the poor. Highlighting the general contradiction between 'law' and 'order' in
times of mass unemployment, the legalisation of preventive imprisonment that was
integral to the Ley de Vagos y Maleantes was anathema to the classicist legal assumption
of the 'presumption of innocence' previously championed by the Republicans. This
metamorphosis was encapsulated in the personality of Jiménez de Asüa, the respected
PSOE jurist. The architect of the 1931 Constitution, Jiménez de Asüa emerged as the
most ardent advocate of the judicial concept of'dangerousness' in Spain. In drafting the
Ley de Vagos y Maleantes, Jiménez de Asüa consciously circumvented the spirit of the
1931 Constitution, especially the clause that guarantied the freedom of circulation of all
citizens throughout state territory."6
The Ley de Vagos y Maleantes became a piece of legislative terror aimed at
insulating private property and the 'Republic of Order' from the social tremors generated
by mass unemployment. The advent of mass joblessness and the changes it introduced in
proletarian social practices and psychology made such preventive legislation a highly
attractive weapon in armoury of the state. This was alluded to in a highly revealing
article on unemployment in La Vanguardia, written just months before the promulgation
of the new law. Recognising that joblessness 'presents all the aspects of an epidemic that
threatens to subvert the basis of social ethics', La Vanguardia discerned 'a new
consciousness, a new form of morality among the masses' as mass unemployment tended
towards the volatile fusion of the 'deserving' with the 'undeserving' poor. The
'underworld' was growing, the article went on, as witnessed by what it described as the
'enormous development of the army of the rogues (picaros). Many workers and
employees are becoming degraded (se encanallan), uniting themselves with others who
have always practised loutishness and begging (lapordioserla) and sponging (sabiazo) is
spreading in scale and in a manner that is frightening'. Action was needed, j,
Vanguardia concluded, to separate the 'dangerous' unemployed and 'the mob' (ci tropel)
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from the 'calm' ones, before unseen subterranean reverberations could engender 'a gang
of wolfs springing up spontaneously from the depth of the mass, like in the great
revolutions."7
L'Opinió similarly reflected that 'at all costs' the 'dangerous poor' must be isolated
from the 'respectable unemployed' to prevent them throwing in their lot with one
another. Previously, in early 1933 the 'LluhIns' had bleated that 'because there is no such
law against vagrants, it is necessary to pass one', as 'the entire territory of the Republic is
invaded by vagabonds'. These sensibilities were heightened during the long protracted
builders' strike of the summer of 1933, a conflict that the Esquerra felt was worsened by
masterless men and itinerant labourers who wandered from city to city looking for
construction jobs."8
The Ley de Vagos y Maleantes clearly matched the demands of the 'lovers of
order' who were instrumental in constructing the new repressive consensus. The
Fomento del Trabajo Nacional greeted the law as 'it would be able to stop the avalanche
of disorder'. For the right, it was an 'excellent' law, 'profoundly innovative and vital for
the defence of society' by 'removing those who are most likely to damage it'. The ruling
parties in the Generalitat, from the Esquerra to the social-democratic USC, were
similarly enraptured with a law they saw as 'indispensable', 'one of the most successful to
come out of the parliament of the Republic', the end product of their two year campaign
for action against 'los sin trabajo' (sic!) and the 'undeserving' immigrant jobless. Although
the USC reviled Hitler's concentration camps, they had no qualms about establishing
their own concentration camps for the unemployed of Catalonia and they fully supported
the law drafted by their 'respected comrade' Jiménez de As,a. Meanwhile, the
Catalanistes proved their acceptance of the law by referring to it in Catalan as the Llei
de Maleants I Ganduls, the text of which was proudly published in their newspapers.
L'Opinió impatiently awaited the first detentions under the new law and softened up
public opinion by intensifying its campaign against 'hobos' and 'tramps' and identifying
the 'cabals of the unemployed' with issues like crime, social violence, monarchist
117 La Vanguardia, 23 February 1933
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284
intrigues, prostitution and Street trade. At the same time, echoing the catholic panacea of
work as an antidote to sin, the 'LluhIns' affirmed that 'idleness and vice go together'.
Finally, L'Opimó warned the authorities that large sectors of the masses subscribed to
the popular adage 'create a law, create a loophole' and believed that the new law should
be used 'rigorously', illegally, if necessary, to restore 'normality'.'19
The first cases brought under the Ley de VagosyMaleantes were in Madrid at
the end of August. Meanwhile, Joan Selves i Carner, the Barcelona Civil Governor at the
time of the promulgation of the law and a close political ally of Companys, was still
preparing the concentration camps in which 'idlers' were to be incarcerated. The main
concentration camp in Catalonia was established in the Castell de Sant Ferran in
Figueres, a primitive castle near the French border. Other centres were established in
Barcelona, including one in the Can Tunis district, ironically at the site of the aborted
public works with which the Generalitat had once hoped to remedy unemployment. In
keeping with the parsimony of the Catalan authorities, there were problems freeing
resources to build the concentration camps and many internees had to be held on prison
ships in Barcelona harbour or in isolation in the city's jails until the purpose-built camps
could be finished. Elsewhere in provincial Catalonia, the dilapidated jail in Mataró was
brought back into service to house internees, a controversial choice which, like the
rehabilitation of the Santa MarIa del Mar jail in Cádiz, reflected the decision of the
Republican authorities to use monarchical dens of torture to incarcerate the poor. 120
Towards the end of September Selves i Carner announced that 'within a few days
the application of the Ley de VagosyMaleantes will begin for real'. However, the Civil
Governor went to great pains to emphasise that the law was to be applied not against
'real workers' or the 'unemployed', but solely against 'malefactors' to enhance 'public
hygiene'. It was announced that the Barn xino, a 'place that seems to have its own laws',
was to be singled out. 121
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L'Opinió claimed that the first internees under the Ley de Vagos y Maleantes
were exclusively 'riff-raff elements'. However, both the worker and daily press revealed a
different picture. Indeed, from the moment it became effective, it seems that apart from
being used to arrest 'hobos' around the port, the Ley de VagosyMaleantes was used to
terronse the unemployed in general. Numerous jobless workers were arrested and
subjected to a humiliating interrogation during which they were forced to explain their
mode of life and means of subsistence. The law was also used to criminalise the long-
standing practice of the jobless of touring workshops in search of casual labour, an
odyssey that was now liable to end in internment. Meanwhile, those jobless who
responded aggressively to detention only confirmed official suspicions of their
'dangerousness' and were sometimes labelled psychologically disturbed. Equally, those
who failed to have their documentation in order, whether by choice, or because they
could not afford the cost, were also interned. The same fate befell the street traders, a
perennial bête-noire of the authorities. Once the implementation of the law gathered
momentum, any proletarian who did not enjoy regular work could fall under suspicion.
For instance, there were many cases of workers being arrested while taking coffee in
bars during their repose, including a 65-year old retired man. Proving that age was no
exemption from the concentration camps, an 84 year old man was interned for begging.
In another brutal case a blind man who earned tips opening car doors outside a top hotel
in the city centre was interned in a camp.'22
Despite the earlier commitments of the authorities that the Ley de Vagos y
Maleantes would be used exclusively against the so-called 'underworld', CNT and
communist unemployment organisers emerged as a particular target for the new law.
Dangerous anarchists' practising 'union placements' were periodically interned. The law
was equally felt by Italian and Argentinian anti-fascist exiles in Barcelona. In a test case,
Durruti, Francisco Ascaso and Perez Combina were all charged under the Ley de Vagos
y Maleantes while they were on a CNT speaking tour in Andalusia, even though none of
122 L'Opimó, 30 September, 5 November 1933; Solidaridad Obrera, 5, 8, 14 October 1933, 28 August, 3
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the three was homeless and that all had jobs in a textile factory which, through an accord
between their employer and the CNT, were kept open during their absences on union
affairs. Following vociferous protests from the CNT, the Council of Ministers guarantied
anew that the Ley de VagosyMaleantes would not be used against trade union activists.
However, just a few days later police detained a cenetista in 1'Hospitalet who, though
victimised since 1931, worked casually in the Food Workers' union bolsa de trabajo.
Jobless anarchists and those who had been either victimised or blacklisted during social
struggles continued to fall prey to the law. One newly unemployed cenetista was picked
up and interned by police the very week he had been made redundant. Meanwhile, trade
unionists who had been held without trial were ritually re-arrested and interned 'legally'
under the new law. If the authorities sought to take an individual off the streets they set
impossible stipulations, requiring evidence of a continuous work record for the last five
years and interning those who could not comply. Accordingly, even cenetistas with
regular means of income and steady jobs but who alarmed the authorities with their
'dangerousness' were detained under the law, sometimes while at work. One such
example was provided by Enric Pol, a cenetista from Reus and a resident of Barcelona.
Pol worked three days weekly on the port for which he earned 50 pesetas and got a
further 20 pesetas weekly for bill-sticking for the Leather Workers' Union. Evidently not
an 'idler', the police had brought an unsuccessful case against him for bomb offences in
the builders' strike and finally succeeded in putting him away for his 'dangerousness'
under the clauses of the Ley de VagosyMaleantes.'23
In fairness to the authorities it must be recognised that the law was also deployed
against the so-called 'underworld'. Even then, however, the arbitrary nature of the Ley de
VagosyMaleantes was manifest. Reputed 'malefactors' were interned under the Ley de
Vagos y Maleantes in a highly capricious manner. The obsession with 'dangerousness'
denied numerous robbers and recidivists any chance of social reintegration or repentance
as many of those with records for 'crimes against property' were interned. In the verve of
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October, 31 December 1935, 11, 36 January 1936; Las Noticias, 4 May 1934, 31 January 1936; MartIn,
Recuerdos, pp.77-78; Tierra v Libertad, 31 January 1936
287
the authorities to 'clean' the 'scum' from the streets, even individuals who had left jail
after successfully serving their sentences and found regular employment were interned.
Meanwhile, in an acceptance of the despotic criterion of monarchical justice, many
'recidivists' who had been held illegally without trial under the monarchy were detained
'legally' under the Ley de VagosyMaleanles on suspicion of'dangerousness'. The Ley de
Vagos y Maleantes was also used by the security forces to stop and search anyone
suspected of an offence. Moreover, given the both the absence of rights to appeal and
the unquestioning acceptance by the daily press of official descriptions of 'malefactors'
leading 'immoral lives', detainees were in a highly precarious situation, a position
sometimes exploited by the police to recruit confidants.'24
The CNT placed itself at the forefront of the campaign to resist a law that it saw
as the latest example of 'Republican repression'. Solidaridad Obrera retorted that it was
the bourgeoisie and Republicans, not that the anarchists, who were opposed to labour, as
the latter aspired towards a society based on the 'magisterial axiom: all those who want
to eat, must work'. According to the CNT daily, to prevent the birth of this new society,
'the Republic of "workers" has armed itself with an arsenal of repressive laws, all aimed
at the liquidation of the revolutionary danger'. The Ley de VagosyMaleantes was a
'fascist law', 'worthy of Mussolini or Hitler', which, it was alleged, was a prelude to the
sterilisation of 'dangerous' types and the full implementation of 'the tactics of Hitler in
Spain'. Moreover, 'to talk of laziness when half a million unemployed workers wander in
misery through fields and cities is a tragic sarcasm, a sick jibe'. It was the height of
cynicism to brand those who had laboured from childhood as 'layabouts', while capitalists
who never lifted a tool in their lives were left freely to fritter their money away in casinos
and in brothels. Consequently, the CNT raged that 'the real idlers go unpunished', like
the bourgeoisie, 'a minority of professional idlers without anything to do', made up of
'malefactors', 'social undesirables' and 'parasites on the social corpus, accustomed to the
idleness into which they were born'. The anarchists retorted that it was not joblessness
124 Solidaridad Obrera, 23 September 1933, 21 September 1935; La Vanguardia, 5, 9, 19 September, 3
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but the parliamentary system that fostered 'the worst of all idlers': the deputies who
earned 1,000 pesetas monthly 'without doing anything' except renege on their electoral
promises. Meanwhile, the police were 'well-fed and well-dressed idlers', maintained by
the taxes of the 'ever-generous people'. In conclusion, Solidaridad Obrera quipped that
rather than pick on the unemployed, it was 'the exploiters of the people' who should be
interned and put to work, making 'the bourgeois, priests, ministers, deputies, military
men, police, Civil Guard, Asaltos and Security Guards abandon their "layabout"
professions to re-integrate themseLves into an active life of socially useful lab our'.'25
By opposing the Ley de Vagos y Maleantes the CNT reaffirmed its contacts with
the most disadvantaged elements of society. This reflected the broad humanist concern
of the anarchists for the 'dispossessed' and individuals on the margins of established
society. As Solidaridad Obrera put it, 'we are always with the weak, with the persecuted,
those who suffer.. .for us, the abused are always right'. In similar fashion, Tierra y
Libertad defended those pursued by the law, explaining that 'the vagrant is nearly always
a heretic, a non-conformist who voluntarily places himself outside or against economic
slavery', one of those 'without work, without a home, launched into an emigrant life' who
bravely 'refuses to submit to the despotism of the powerful'. This approximated very
closely to the lifestyle cultivated by some of the young proletarian bohemians in and
around the anarchist movement and it was feared that the law was to be used against
them to 'annihilate the free life'. 126
In practical terms, the proximity of the anarchists to the 'undeserving' poor in the
concentration camps created the possibility for an interaction between the two, building
on what traditionally had been very good relations between 'social' and 'common'
prisoners in the jails. The anarchists showed open solidarity with the 'common' prisoners,
who, like their 'social' equivalents, were 'victims of bad-tempered historical justice'.
Moreover, the libertarians promised 'an intensive campaign' against the Ley de Vagosy
Maleantes and pledged to proselytise among the 'malefactors' in the camps in the hope
that 'through their contact with us, they might be dignified, transformed into anarchists'.
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Indeed, Solidaridad Obrera explained that 'we must take advantage of all revolutionary
conjunctures to free the prisoners, as it is immense [and] magnificent to break the old
chains and open the iron gates so that the incarcerated can leave full of pleasure and
hope towards their long-awaited freedom'.'27
There is evidence that the judicial terror of the Ley de Vagos y Maleantes did
encourage some internees to accept the anarchist creed and define themselves as
libertarians. Further proof that the propaganda drive of the anarchists was not without
success, was a letter sent to Solidaridad Obrera by a group of'common' prisoners in
which they attacked the Ley de VagosyMaleantes as the law 'denies progress, kills the
freedom of thought and in its name many men are kidnapped without ever having broken
the law'. Inside the jails the struggle for decent conditions transcended the division
between 'social' prisoners detained for union or anti-capitalist activities and 'common'
detainees, conventionally seen as 'criminals' and 'delinquents'. United in struggle, both
sets of prisoners organised protests against the quality of food in the Model jail, a
campaign that extended into a protest against the use of solitary confinement and
culminated in the storming of the punishment cells. Meanwhile, in October a mixed
group of 300 internees held in Barcelona declared a hunger strike for better
conditions.'28
Growing discontent with the Ley de VagosyMaleantes was most graphically
registered by a series of risings in prisons and in concentration camps. In Mataró,
prisoners interned under the law attacked their guards with potato knives, overpowering
them. They destroyed the jail, the immediate source of their torment, before order was
re-established with the arrival of a contingent of Asaltos and Civil Guard. The CNT
praised the 'desperate heroism' of the insurgents, whom it regarded as a 'mass of
unfortunates, caught in police swoops', whose 'moral energy' provided 'an example of
militant protest, far more effective than any platonic gesture'. Solidaridad Obrera also
observed that this was just the 'beginning' of the struggle, promising that 'the
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concentration camps will be the theatre of similar scenes'. This pledge was confirmed in
the following years by sporadic uprisings of internees in the purpose built Can Tunis
concentration camp, which was severely damaged on more than one occasion. Similar
scenes occurred in the iniquitous caverns of the monarchy, like the Santa MarIa del Mar
prison in Cádiz. Meanwhile, in Puigcerdà, a mountain town on the Catalan-French
border, only a large contingent of Civil Guard prevented enraged locals from storming
the gaol following news that prisoners had been tortured.'29
The brutal conditions inside the camps provided fertile ground for these protests.
In an article entitled 'With the clients of the Ley de Vagos', Jacinto Toryho, perhaps the
most talented investigative trade union journalist of his times, gained access to an
unnamed concentration camp. Toryho described in harrowing detail the daily life in
squalid human dustbins with windowless punishment cells and meals of'stew made from
rubbish and slime', homosexual gang rapes, clinical depression and psychiatric illness. In
the view of Toryho, the 'asocial' characters against whom the law was invoked
constituted a minority of internees in these 'centres for epidemic infections and collective
degradation', while the 'majority' of detainees were simply unemployed workers.
Solidaridad Obrera also focused on the 'humid and infected' prison in Matarô and the
barbaric Santa Maria del Mar, which provided a punishment of bad food, deficient
clothing and vicious guards, a régime that regularly produced outbreaks of insanity and
attempted suicides among internees. Life was little better in the purpose-built camps.
According to cenetista internees the Can Tunis concentration camp was a 'authentic
inferno' imposed on 'rebel workers' and street vendors rather than pimps and drug
pushers. Another cenetista temporarily interned in the camp on the Barcelona waterfront
in the spring of 1934 described the filthy conditions that converted detainees into the
'living dead'. He also reported on an abysmal health situation which had led to two
deaths in three months simply because the authorities failed to act on doctors'
recommendations that sick internees should be hospitalised.'3°
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5.6. 'Death to the bourgeois Republic'
The authoritarian guise assumed by the Republic after the January 1933 rising,
combined with the repression of the Generalitat, the official clamp-down on the CNT
and the emergence of the Escamots, inspired a massive outpouring of frustration among
grass-roots cenetistas. This groundswell of opinion was instrumental in transforming the
benevolent apoliticism of 1931 into a vociferous anti-Republicanism. This culminated in
the 'electoral strike' ('Huelga electoral') of November 1933.
One week after the January 1933 rising, with the repression in full flight, a
manifesto from the CNT National Committee testified that under the Republic civil
rights and collective freedoms were 'empty words', as hollow as in the days of the
monarchy. As Solidaridad Obrera explained, 'legalistic or not, today more than ever, all
governments are class instruments of repression', geared to 'paci& the spirits' of the
proletariat. The Ley de VagosyMaleantes deepened anti-Republican perspectives, even
prompting a curious nostalgia for the dictator, when Solidaridad Obrera mused that
Primo de Rivera would never have approved a law so reactionary and cruel'. This law
was a 'fascist experiment with a democratic label', 'social-fascism' and 'legalised
dictatorship', consistent with the social policy of the Republic of 'police stations, prisons
and courts' which had produced 'a pyramid of dead and a nation converted into a
prison'.'3'
By the summer of 1933, with the Generalitat relentlessly squeezing the CNT, the
Barcelona Local Federation seized on the fact that the ERC, which posed as the most
radical of all Republican groupings, was in fact the most assiduous opponent of the
Confederation. Solidaridad Obrera dubbed the party 'the deporters of Catalonia', while
less eloquently, the L'Opinió group were described simply as 'swine' (canal/a).
Increasingly, the ERC was regarded as an explicitly repressive force, an image that was
further strengthened by the violent arrival on the streets of the para-military Escamots.
Thereafter daily confrontations between labour activists and Escamots, either at work,
during strikes or in the Street, produced a powerful dynamic for the separation of the
131 Solidaridad Obrera, 15-17, 28, 31 January 1933, 15 June, 2, 16, 28 August 1934; Tierra y Libertad,
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proletariat from the Generalitat, which was now widely regarded to be sponsoring its
own fascist militia of the radicalised petit bourgeoisie and pruning civil rights to Italian
and German levels.'32
The struggle against the Escamots became embroiled with the abstention
campaign of the CNT in the November 1933 elections. This was a decisive moment in
the political history of the 1 930s as the quasi-fascist CEDA posed a real threat to the
nominally left Republican parties who had ruled during the so-called 'bienio reformista',
the first two-and-a-half years of the Republic.' 33 Channelling the frustration of those
who had remained socially excluded during these years, Jaume Balius attacked the
'psychotic nationalism' of the Generalitat and its policy of labelling those operatives
temporarily surplus to the requirements of the Catalan bourgeoisie as 'outsiders', which,
he maintained, promised to convert Catalonia into a concentration camp. For Balius,
there was nothing to choose between the various electoral options; he maintained that
Macia now embodied 'the initial premise' of Catalan fascism, the 'leader of the Catalan
bourgeoisie' who had 'betrayed' the Spanish Revolution in 1931 with his 'false promises
as friend of the poor'. In the eyes of Balius, Macia's parochial nationalism had failed like
that the Irish Republicans after World War One. Drawing an analogy between the
national struggles in Catalonia and Ireland, Balius claimed that when t'Avi' betrayed the
Catalan Republic in April 1931 he ceased to be 'the Catalan de Valera', becoming instead
'the Catalan Cosgrave', the 'guarantor of the bourgeois political order', an 'infernal
abortion'.'34
This view was shared by the BOC who, though far more sensitive to the
progressive, anti-centralist content of Catalan national demands than the anarchists,
nevertheless juxtaposed its own vision of'proletarian Catalonia' to that of the 'bourgeois
Catalonia'. Since the Generalitat had won over sections of the capitalist class the BOC
maintained that there was 'little difference' between the two major parties of Catalan
politics, both of which it accursed as tools of big business and a 'prop for the counter-
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revolution', which had made the Catalan flag 'synonymous with scabbing'. In the words
of La Batalla, 'the Esquerra and the Lliga represent the two wings of the Catalan
bourgeoisie, two sides of the same coin'. Moreover, in the view of the Bloc, both parties
harboured fascist tendencies: the only difference between Cambó and Macia was that the
former, as a 'captain of finance', was 'more modern' in comparison with the 'feudal
gentleman' who led the Esquerra.'35
In its campaign for the November elections, the Esquerra resorted to brazen
cynicism in the hope it could revive its tarnished image and attract working class votes.
The fulcrum of this strategy was the publication of M, a 'workerist' newspaper that
aimed to recapture the spirit of the spring of 1931 with the promise of a 'return to the
primitive revolutionary spirit and to move honestly towards the implantation of
thoroughly workerist reforms.. reforms that with cries of pain and hunger the proletariat
of Catalonia is demanding'. Typifying the short-term expediency of ERC 'workerism',
Mali was published only for the duration of the electoral campaign and it ceased
publishing immediately before the poll.'36
Another similarity with the 1931 elections was that again the BOC advanced an
exclusively proletarian platform, only to be stubbornly denounced as !Muscovite fascism'
by the anarchists who tarred all 'the bandits of politics' with the same brush. Moreover,
in a significant escalation of anarchist anti-communism, faIstas attacked a number of
BOC electoral rallies, clashing with the GABOC, the Bloc defence squads. Unlike 1931,
however, instead of passing the initiative to the petit bourgeoisie, the abstentionist stance
of the CNT 'electoral strike' favoured the right. In the Spanish parliament a coalition of
the opportunist Radicals, backed by the authoritarian CEDA, was swept to power. In
Barcelona, the victory of the right in November 1933 was no less complete and the
Bloque nacional de derechas, the electoral alliance of the various incarnations of the
Spanish right, attained 15 deputies, the same number as the reactionary Lliga. In
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comparison, the Coalició d'esquerres catalanes, which included the ERC, ACR and the
PNRE, attained only 19 deputies in the Catalan capital.'37
Revolutionary elitism and political confusion were the common denominators of
the 'electoral strike'. The same year as the German labour movement fell prey to Nazism,
the CNT-FAI blocked all united anti-fascist action. Instead, the anarchists directed their
fury against what they regarded as the proven fascism of their enemies, be they
ireintistas, the socialists, the Republicans or bloquistas, all of whom were seen by the
libertarians as variants of authoritarianism. The danger of the far right was also
underestimated by the racial assumptions of the anarchists about the quintessential
'libertarian spirit' of the Iberian people. By contrast, the libertarians attributed Hitler's
success in Germany to the fact that 'at the heart of every German there is a ferment of
imperialism and a classic spirit of revenge'. Further evidence of the uniformed
triumphalism of the anarchists came when Solidaridad Obrera claimed that libertarians
were responsible for the burning of the Reichstag.'38
There were two underlying premises behind the 'electoral strike'. Firstly, as
Solidaridad Obrera explained, 'fascism is not beaten with the ballot box but in the street.
It is a problem of force that will be eliminated by force'. If a rightist triumph 'opened the
door to fascism', the anarchists promised that the 'iron front' of the CNT-FAL would
crush it and destroy the Republican parliament. Secondly, even if the right lost the
elections, significant abstention in the 'political comedy' would be taken as a mandate to
begin the 'anarchist revolutionary experience'. Before the vote, these two axioms were
recurring themes at a series of monster amnesty rallies, some of which were the biggest
ever seen in Republican Barcelona. The 'Nosotros' group played a prominent part in the
'electoral strike' and 90,000 workers in Clot heard Durruti, himself recently released
from jail, launch an impassioned plea for the amnesty of the 9,000 workers then
imprisoned in Spain. Displaying his characteristic revolutionary zeal, Durruti finished his
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speech by imploring the crowd to 'create factoiy committees, action groups, spread the
idea that we have the right to everything!' Days later, a Tierra y Libertad rally that
attracted an 'uncontainable human wave' of some 100,000 people was told by Francisco
Ascaso that repressive laws like the Ley de Vagos y Maleantes underlined the failure of
the Republic. Ascaso continued, explaining that the only option left was for the CNT,
'the hope of the international proletariat and the disinherited of the world', to pass 'death
sentence' on the state and make its revolution 'in the street'. Durruti closed the meeting,
with a typically rousing conclusion: 'we have already talked for too long: it is the time
for action...Seize what belongs to us!...The world awaits our bulldozing revolution'.'39
News of the accession of the right to power in Madrid and that there had been a
negligible turnout at the polls in libertarian strongholds, was greeted by the anarchists as
evidence that a 'revolutionary situation' had arrived. In a series of rallies there were
apocalyptic prophecies of the growing 'revolutionary hurricane' that would herald the
'final battle against fascism'. More passionately, 'Boy', a prominent Barcelonafalsta,
implored the Clot anarchist youth to 'smash' their enemies, because 'if we want to stay
alive, there is no other solution that to hurl ourselves against them, stamping over them
and passing across their corpses'. In anticipation of action, fly posters were placed
throughout proletarian districts advising women and children to remain indoors as 'the
men of strong will' began the fight for freedom. Finally, the Catalan FAT issued a call to
arms to 'all anarchists, whether in the FAT or not', to set out on the 'road to revolution'.
This was followed by a manifesto from the Catalan CNT Regional Committee addressed
'to all workers in the Catalan region', advising the proletariat to make the revolution,
because 'tomorrow no longer exists'.'4°
In the days immediately after the elections the Confederal Defence Committees
spearheaded a strategy of tension, producing a wave of gun and bomb attacks on the
various army barracks in the city. This coincided with a strike of the CNT tram workers
which, from the beginning, had been accompanied by daily bombs on tram lines. The
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tactics of the grupistas, which included bomb attacks on factories in and around, busy
city streets, were increasingly indiscriminate. An explosion on El Parallel was heard all
across the city, while a bomb at a tram station seriously injured a number of printers who
had just finished a night shift, killing one. The next day another huge bomb killed a
soldier and injured eight workers who happened to be nearby.'4'
On December 8 thefaIstas made their move. The ranks of the insurgents were
swelled by a large jail break of anarchists and 'common' criminals from the Cellular jail.
However, the authorities had been forewarned of the anarchist action by rumours of an
incipient rising which had been circulating for an entire month. Before the rising was
declared the newly formed Radical government in Madrid imposed martial law,
suspending constitutional guarantees throughout Spain, banning CNT unions, press and
cultural associations and ordered wholesale detentions of the visible figures of the
Confederal organisation, including Durruti, the main organiser of the mobilisation. The
Barcelona authorities also left nothing to chance. On December 4 martial law was
declared under the terms of the Ley de ordenpüblico and all the major CNT unions were
closed. Meanwhile, the Civil Guard established machine gun posts on key tram routes
and in strategic parts of the city. The presence of the security forces in the proletarian
belt of the city was also increased and students from the Generalitat police college were
drafted into action. In Terrassa the rising was effectively decapitated with the preventive
arrest of 7OfaIstas.
Despite these setbacks, the insurrectionaries tapped the contradictions and
tensions that had accumulated in the proletarian penphexy of the city and in rapidly
expanded areas of Barcelona, l'Hospitalet, El Prat de Llobregrat and Granollers, the
rising became a reality on the streets.' 42
 The centres of the rising in Catalonia were the
Adelante, 19, 23-24, 28 November, 2-3 December 1933; La Vanguardia, 19, 21, 23, 28, 30
November, 3, 5 December 1933; Solidaridad Obrera, 3 December 1933
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CNT strongholds in the capital, such as Poblenou, Sant MartI and Sants, and the highly
combustible areas of Coliblanc and La Torrassa in l'Hospitalet. Indeed, the anarchists of
l'Hospitalet came of age in the December 1933 rising, setting up barricades and
establishingfoci of action from where they attacked military targets and attempted to
march on Barcelona. This revolutionary willingness was commended by Balius as 'the
insurrectionaiy power and the rebel fury of men converted into beasts by a regime of
infamy and oppression'.' 43 However, this exclusively anarchist-led general strike carried
few chances of success and although the major factories in I'Hospitalet remained empty,
in Barcelona pickets faced insurmountable difficulties imposing the stoppage, especially
in factories where the dissident communists or anarcho-syndicalists accounted for the
majority of the workforce. While the anarchists successfully forced many workers at
gun-point to down tools, there were numerous reports of clashes betweenfaIstas and
rival groups of bloquistas and treintistas. In their frustration with workers who refused
to endorse their revolution, the FM adopted its own 'scorched earth' policy, destroying
plant and bombing factories, sometimes without even troubling to evacuate non-CNT
operatives.
Increasingly, the struggle of the grupistas was the battle of an isolated rearguard.
Following two days of sporadic street clashes the centres of the revolt in Barcelona, like
Poblenou, were quiet. Meanwhile, in Sants and the adjoining areas of l'Hospitalet, there
was nothing more than a few sporadic guerrilla actions, alongside acts of proletarian
'self-help' like looting and revenge attacks, presumably by street vendors, on Santa
Eulàlia market. With the return of an uncertain peace, the authorities were uneasy,
shaken by the scale of support for the rising in l'Hospitalet. This nervousness was
apparent in the behaviour of the security forces and there were several shootings, some
fatal, of innocent workers on the streets. Repression also quickly gathered pace and
hundreds of workers were detained, including militants from all proletarian
organisations, as the security forces launched a series of ràtzies in working class
districts. This culminated in the occupation of the various groups of Cases Barates and
143 Solidaridad Obrera, 24 April 1934
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l'Hospitalet and prolonged house-to-house searches by hundreds of members of the
police, backed up by army and cavalry detachments.'
The authorities and business groups were outraged by the new 'criminal attack'
on Catalonia by 'degenerate immigrants'. L'Opinió declared it was time 'to finish with the
FM once and for all', ending its 'internal war', as this is 'the unanimous will of the
citizenry and because the longer the authorities leave the FM intact, the greater the
chance that the FM will do away with the citizenry'. Advocating 'order and security', the
tluhins' were gravitating towards a Republican dictatorship. This authoritarianism was
shared by the USC, who declared that 'the first task which we must realise is to wipe out
the FM and all the faIstas using all means possible, without hesitation, without pity and
without reservations'. Employers' associations echoed this repressive mood, as did the
shopkeepers of the Federació Mercantil Catalana, who declared that repression was
'insufficient' because it was simply reactive; instead, 'it is necessary to prevent the
development of revolutions, expelling the latent state of anarchic sickness from our city'.
Amid growing bi-partisanship on the issue of order, La Veu de Catalunya, L'Opinió,
Justicia Social and La Humanitat all converged on the need for a complete ban of the
CNT, a unity summed up in the slogan of the Lliga: 'All united against the FM!'
Far from vanquishing fascism, therefore, 'revolutionary gymnastics' and anarchist
terrorism had gone a considerable way towards producing an authoritarian reaction.
Given that it had a membership ofjust over 10,000 in 1933, 1,400 of whom were in
Catalonia, it was lunacy for the FM to attempt to make the revolution alone. Moreover,
the majority of the Iberian proletariat was not anarchist and, moreover, even in its
Barcelona stronghold there were probably no more than 300faIstas, and only a fraction
of the 150,000 workers in the city had followed their 'revolutionary gymnastics'.' 45 The
'cycle of insurrections' proved that despite their reckless bravery, the limited supporters
of the FM were never going to defeat the forces of the state. Instead, given the
ideological mosaic of the labour movement, it was axiomatic that only united proletarian
action could guarantee revolutionary success. However, the faIstas refused to meditate
Adelante, 5 January 1934
145 Balcells, Crisis. p.196, n.22; Huertas Claveria, Obrers, p.2&3; Mirô, Cataluña, p.49
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on their failures and those anarchists in Madrid and Astunas who favoured unity in
action with the communists and the treinhistas were marginalised by the sectarian
Catalans, who continued to dominate the CNT. Thus, soon after the December action
the CNT National Committee resumed its attack on its 'fascist' enemies within the labour
movement, boasting that the CNT-FAI was, 'as before, at the head of the revolution and
in the front line against the fascist threat'. Meanwhile, Montseny, although a spectator
during the risings, verified the 'revolutionary gymnastics' as 'these revolutions make the
people ready', advising Death must not concern us'.'
In many ways, the FAT was playing a role similar to that exercised by the ultra-
leftist KPD in the German labour movement before the Nazi take-over. In fact, the
impact of the anarchists was even worse, as they synthesised the putschism of the KPD
of the early 1920s with the divisive sectarianism of the FM. The balance of two-and-a-
half years offaIsmo could not have been more nefarious: the anarchists had attacked the
PSOE and the dissident communists more than the bourgeoisie; the FAT had split and
divided the CNT, depleting its power in futile clashes with the state. Moreover, the
'revolutionary gymnastics' invited a ferocious repression which jeopardised the future of
the entire labour movement, depressing collective organisations by undervaluing the
traditional syndical role of unions which the anarchists preferred to utilise simply as
springboards for their futile putsches. Most alarming of all was the substitution of mass
union action with the vanguard violence of small groups offaIstas. While this
'substitutionism' presupposed a certain amount of isolation between the anarchist elite
and the mass of workers, the growing disregard of the FM for the lives of ordinary
workers was creating the first signs of a popular apathy that had a dangerous parallel
with the period before the 1923 coup.
Adelante, 19, 30 December 1933; La Revista Blanca, 28 December 1933
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Chapter 6: The Militarisation of Anarchism
6.1. The Generalitat and Law-and-Order
The Spanish parliamentary elections of November 1933 created a left-right divide
between the Madrid and Barcelona governments because although the right was in
power in Madrid, the Esquerra remained the majority party in the Generalitat. For those
Republicans who were petrified that democracy was being taken over by its enemies,
Catalonia was the 'bulwark of the Republic'. At the end of 1933, and much to the chagrin
of the anti-Catalaniste right in Madrid, the Catalan government enhanced its powers by
finally assuming responsibility for public order under the terms of the Autonomy Statute.
This meant the disappearance of the four Civil Governors who had previously been
appointed by the Madrid Interior Ministry in the four Catalan provinces. Moreover, the
Civil Guard came to receive its orders from the newly formed Comissaria d'Ordre Public
of the Generalitat.'
Armed with its new powers, the Generalitat intensified its drive against the CNT-
FM. The repression that bore down on the Confederation since the advent of the
'revolutionary gymnastics' in early 1932 reached its peak in Catalonia in 1934. This was
hardly surprising given the appointment of the reactionary duo of Dencàs and Badia as
Generalitat Interior Minister and Barcelona Police Chief respectively in December 1933.
Under the aegis of Dencàs and Badia, the Comissaria d'Ordre Public drafted Escamots
into the Catalan police force and the Generalitat imposed blanket legal and police
restrictions on the CNT, whose unions were effectively criminalised. Union centres and
offices were closed, the CNT was banned from holding meetings, militants were
prevented from collecting dues and syndical committees languished in defacto
clandestinity, forced underground by a rigorous campaign of repression aimed at
annihilating the Confederation. The mere suspicion that workers were participating in
'illegal' union affairs was sufficient grounds for arrest and it was not uncommon for
cenetistas out strolling to be picked up for 'clandestine assembly'. Similarly, the police
directed their attention to the bars, especially those in the Barn xino, where proletarian
activists met both to discuss politics and to relax during their free time. Between January
t Balcells, Historia. p.256
1 and October 4, 1934, 'La Tranquilidad', a bar popular with anarchists and workers on
El Parallel, was raided five times by police, leading to the arrest of 161 customers, the
majority of whom were 'considered by police to be highly dangerous individuals due to
their records'. This repeated police harassment finally forced the closure of 'La
Tranquilidad'. Meanwhile, when a raid on ta Tranquilidad' yielded what Police Chief
Badia regarded as a poor catch of anarchists, he ordered the random detention of
workers who happened to be then walking along El Parallel.2
The tough stance of the Generalitat provided an opportunity for employers to
turn the clock back in the factories. The victimisation of militants was widespread, as
employers refused to recognise CNT bolsa de trabajo and reintroduced piece-work and
other forms of casualised labour that had ended in many industries following the syndical
offensive of the summer of 1931. The disarray in Confederal ranks was so tremendous
that at the first clandestine meeting of the Catalan CNT Regional Committee after
December 1933 rising only a solitary delegate attended from outside Barcelona. In a
climate of defeat, the l'Hospitalet union junta complained that dozens of activists were
deserting the cause. The anarchist groups were also affected by this despondency. All
that remained of a once flourishing network of Ateneus, rationalist schools and
community groups in l'Hospitalet was the La Torrassa-based Pefla de Amigos del Arte
Escénico', which organised plays, cinema sessions and other cultural events. Barcelona
revealed a similar picture. The once buoyant Ateneu Llibertari in Sants was left with 'a
reduced group of comrades', while in Barceloneta the anarchists spoke of a 'feeling of
nostalgia' for past days of struggle. Many other anarchist groups admitted the
'demoralisation' within their ranks. The disruption of the CNT-FAI press was no less
pronounced. Following the December insurrection, the Generalitat did not allow
Solidaridad Obrera to reappear until April 1934. The editorial boards of Solidaridad
Obrera and Tierra y Libertad were periodically interned without trial. The same illegal
measure was employed to clean the streets of cenetistas and those who figured on a
'special census of dangerous people' that the Catalan authorities had drawn up after
2 Solidaridad Obrera, 6-7, 11 July, 3 August, 8 September 1934; Adelante, 26-28 January, 11, 22
February 1934; La Vanguardia, 11 January, 4-6 February, 1 March, 19 June, 4 October 1934
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November 1933. A new daily section in Solidandad Obrera entitled 'The traffic of
prisoners at the Commissariat for Public Order' testified to the rising tide of repression
and in the first ten months of 1934 this section charted the fate of just under 1,000
cenetistas and falsias in Barcelona province alone who, though detained for no specified
judicial reason, spent an average six to eight months interned without trial. The bursting
jails of the Catalan capital meant that detainees faced new problems of overcrowding, in
addition to the customary mistreatment, which was confirmed by more than one
commission of independent physicians. Adding hardship to indignity, upon release, the
internees were often jobless and, in many cases, homeless.3
The appointment of two rigid authoritarian figures like Dencàs and Badia during
a time of institutional change within the security forces underlined the heavy hand of the
Generalitat on law-and-order. The first job Dencàs set himself was to purge the Catalan
police. Highlighting the equivocal stance of the Madrid authorities towards police reform
during the first two years of the Republic, a confidential report commissioned by the
Generalitat at the end of 1933 suspected that 90% of officers held anti-Catalaniste and
monarchical attitudes. However, this was perhaps not so surprising, given that the last
Chief Commissioner of the Barcelona force before the transferral of powers to the
Generalitat was Pere Coil i Liac, a former member of Union Patriôtica, the pseudo-
fascist party formed by the dictator in the 1 920s. 4 The Generalitat, therefore, was
convinced of the need to Gala/anise the police force.
In a further reorganisation of the security forces Dencàs and Badia took the
controversial step of reorganising the Sometent, the highly suspect militia. Control of the
Sometent was given to Josep Badia, the brother of the Barcelona Police Chief, who
purged the force of monarchists and armed recruits from radical Catalanisle youth
L'Opinió. 12 January 1934; La Van guardia, 25, 28, 30 Januaiy, 22 Februaiy, 7 June, 18 July, 28
September 1934; La Batalla, 18 January, 7 April 1934; Solidaridad Obrera, 3-4, 6, 8, 10, 13-14, 18, 24
July, 1, 9, 12-16, 18, 23-24, 29, 31 August, 2, 8, 16, 22 September 1934; Adelante, 19 December 1933,
26 January 1934; La Publicitat, 8 April 1934; Abad de Santillán, Memorias, pp.192, 220; John
Brademas, Anarcosindicalismo y revolución en Espafla (1930-1937), 1'Esplugues de Liobregat, 1974,
p.133, n.25
4 Josep Dencàs, El 6 d'octubre des del Palau de Governació, (2nd edition) Barcelona, 1979, pp.48, 52.
After the fall of the dictator Coil i Llac literally bought his way into Catalaniste circles, funding La
Humanitat, the paper of Companys: Ivern i Salvà, Esciuerra, vol.2, p.482.
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groups, especially the quasi-fascist Escamots. The Sometent was highly popular with the
Catalan authorities because such a volunteer force suited its shallow pockets. Moreover,
the 'few thousand well-armed and honourable Republicans' in the Sometent were
vehement supporters of law-and-order in autonomous Catalonia and they solemnly
pledged their 'sincere love for the nation' and their readiness to contribute to 'the drive to
persecute robbers, murderers and wreckers'. With the Barcelona police contingent
standing at just over 400, the volunteer Sometent, like the Escamots and the regular
forces of Civil Guard and the Asaltos, were integral to the maintenance of public order.5
The reorganisation of the police was not simply about Catalanising the force,
however. The Generalitat also hoped to succeed where the Republicans had largely
failed between 1931 and 1933 and alter the public perception of the security forces. The
notorious Jefatura Superior de Policia on VIa Laietana, the scene of torture during the
monarchy, the dictatorship and, at times, during the first two years of the Republic,
underwent a cosmetic name change. The Generalitat placed equal importance on its
plans for modernising law enforcement. These amounted to the establishment of more
effective structures of social control which, the authorities hoped, could withstand the
strains placed on public order and enable the police to neutralise the contradictions
produced by the development of the capitalist city. Accordingly, the ERC aimed to
implement a series of mechanisms that would allow the authorities greater awareness of
public life. These measures, including new methods of surveillance and a strengthening
of night-time police patrols and the creation of a new security service to keep close
surveillance on the activities of foreigners in Barcelona, aroused much to the excitement
of the Republican press. It was also announced that long-standing plans for a national
identity card scheme would be implemented. In the interim, however, stiff penalties were
introduced for those who did not have their documentation in order, including
incarceration under the Ley de VagosyMaleantes.6
L'Opinió, 24, 28 March, 3, 13 April 1934; Balcells, Introduction to Dencàs, El 6 d'octubre, p.13; La
Vanguardia, 14 July 1934
6 Jaume Balius, Octubre catalán, Barcelona, n.d., p.6; Las Noticias, 11 May 1934; L'O pinió, 31 March
1934; La Vanguardia, 4 September 1934; Francesc Escofet, De una derrota a una victoria: 6 de octubre
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Another element in the Generalitat plans was an ambitious project for the
construction of a network of district police stations. This was intended to bring the
police closer to the people by way of community policing and end popular suspicions of
the security forces. It is unlikely that the ERC was ignorant of the unwritten assumptions
of such a change, namely that community policing carried with it the prospect of
generating intelligence, particularly about those districts that had expanded vertiginously
since 1914.
However, the Comissaria d'Ordre Public embraced many of the negative aspects
of traditional police tactics. These included the questionable system of intelligence-
gathering based on informers, a technique that Republicans had roundly denounced in
the past. 7 Indeed, this method made a mockery of the claim that the police prevented
crime, because the success of the informer system presupposed that the security forces
became an accomplice in crime, guaranteeing the criminal life of the confidant to allow
the informant-criminal continual access to other lawbreakers.
However, by the time the Generalitat acquired responsibility for public order in
1933-1934, the chances of improving relations between police and policed were
significantly slimmer than in 1931. This can be seen in a series of connected ways. Not
only had 'Republican fever' abated but, by 1934 the full effects of the Wall Street Crash
were fully apparent in Iberia, with all the attendant social conflictivity. This rendered a
retreat from robust and socially alienating police tactics quite impossible. The
intractability of this problem had already been registered inside the Esquerra, as reflected
in the rise of the quasi-fascist Escamots and the rightwards drift of the ruling Catalan
party. Equally, the Generalitat was keen to make the property-owning classes feel that
their wealth was fully protected and, therefore, committed its institutions to the emphatic
repression of any collective or individual threat to that property. To this end, the
Generalitat secured land on the proletarian belt of Barcelona to build more barracks for
both the Asaltos and the Civil Guard. Finally, as mentioned above, the team selected to
head the new police forces effectively precluded amicable relations with the majority of
7 La Publicitat, 4 April 1934; L'Opinió. 13 April 1934
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the population. Thus, alongside the authoritarian proclivities of Dencàs and Badia, both
of whom were energetically despised by all groups to the left of the Esquerra, Jaume
Vachier, an ERC Councillor and Tram owner who caused immense irritation to the CNT
during the 1933 transport strike, was made responsible for the Guardia urbana.
Meanwhile, Caselles, an ex-Civil Guard lieutenant and militaiy officer during the
dictatorship, was given one of the top jobs at the Generalitat Comissaria d'Ordre Public.8
On balance, therefore, the team assembled by the Generalitat to coach the Catalan
security forces seemed far more inclined towards war than peace.
Further evidence of the austere law-and-order agenda of the Generalitat was the
absence of any attempt to regulate the activities of private security guards. This was
highly controversial because the commercial private sector firms employed many former
policemen and soldiers who had been expelled for brutality or indiscipline and were
widely suspected by those on the left of having connections with the far right.
Nevertheless, private guards continued to be employed by district commercial
associations to police the streets by night and prevent break-ins at their premises. They
were also recruited by capitalists to guard workshops, both during and out of working
hours, a role that earned them the hatred of operatives due to their readiness to harass
trade unionists and check on the practices of workers.
Civil rights abuses also continued in an untrammelled way. Spot-searches of
'suspicious' individuals increased, as did the use of the Ley de VagosyMaleantes, both
against people with penal records for 'crimes against property' and 'dangerous
individuals' believed by officialdom to have 'criminal tendencies'. Echoing the discourse
of the monarchical authorities of yesteryear, Dencàs justified internment without trial of
all 'dangerous elements', a concept increasingly seen as coterminous with immigrants and
those with 'bad records'. The Generalitat persisted in relying on internment without trial,
using this to detain suspects who had been released by judges on grounds of insufficient
evidence. A series of abuses was perpetrated against labour activists. The BOC alleged
that a wave of detentions of its militants, who were taken to police headquarters,
La Vanguardia. 28 March 1934; L'Opinió, 24 March 1934; Adelante. 2 March 1934
306
photographed and registered, before being released without charge, was part of the
policy of the Generalitat to construct comprehensive files on proletarian activists. There
were also complaints that the police were 'planting' incriminating evidence on militants.
When a group of cenetistas complained to Inspector Tarragona of the political police
about the daily harassment that threatened their jobs, accommodation and families, the
members of the delegation, including Francisco Ascaso, received letters signed by Badia
on police department note paper that advised them to leave Catalonia 'within a week' if
they didn't like police methods. At the same time, the right of association was guaranteed
to the small numbers of fascists in Barcelona, reinforcing the misgivings of the
revolutionary left that Dencàs and Badia were following a barely hidden authoritarian
agenda. This was apparently confirmed by the discriminatory workings of the law, for
while private security guards sometimes beat up cenetistas with impunity, when
members of the CNT roughed up a member of Estat Català Dencàs intervened to ensure
that the individuals responsible received a heavy punishment. There were similar
discrepancies in sentencing and at a time when working class militants were receiving jail
sentences of a year upwards for possession of a firearm, a number of arms cases
involving rightists were dropped by the authorities.9
The notoriously poor discipline of security forces failed to improve under the
Generalitat. Authonsed to carry small arms at all times for reasons of personal safety, the
official image of the police as paragons of civic virtue were scotched by a steady flow of
reports of their drunken violence, during which they occasionally drew weapons on
unsuspecting members of the public. On one occasion, a night-watchman was threatened
with a pistol after he disturbed an Asalto making love in the city park in the early hours
of the morning. Meanwhile, despite assurances that only 'honourable citizens' and reliable
Republicans entered the paramilitary Sometent, it was evident that a large number of
monarchists remained in the militia and that their moral condition was far from certain.
On at least one occasion, Sometentistes were discovered drunk while on patrol. There
Solidaridad Obrera, 1, 3, 7, 10, 28 July, 4 August, 9 September 1934; La Van guardia, 9 August, 19
September, 3 October 1934; Las Noticias, 11, 30 May 1934; L'O pinió. 2, 21 January, 31 March 1934;
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were also cases of off-duty Sometentistes provoking disputes in bars, during which, like
the police, they were not averse to brandishing their side-arms. Another Sometentiste
settled a professional argument by shooting his employer dead, constituting a rare
example in which acts of violence by members of the security forces went to court.'°
In the context of the fractured social consensus of 1930s Barcelona the
traditional, objective function of the police as the violent defender of the law led to new
levels of brutality. This reality could not be masked by the superficial name changes of
the security forces. Independent doctors regularly confirmed that detainees leaving the
Comissaria d'Ordre Public had been brutally mistreated, the same state violence which
for years had been employed to push activists away from the labour movement. In fact, it
quickly became apparent that under the Generalitat, the Catalan police were adding a
new viciousness to the dark history of policing in Iberia. According to anarchists and
communists who had dealings with the Spanish and Catalan police forces that policed
Barcelona during the Republic, as well as their monarchical predecessors, the
autonomous Catalan force established in 1934 was the most vicious of the three.'1
New police methods were perfected by the Badia brothers, who quickly revealed
themselves to be a merciless and vengefi.ul pair who, in the view of one of their
contemporaries, 'behaved like perfect savages'. Known for his daring exploits as 'Capita
Collons' to his friends and admirers, Miquel was a middle-class adventurer, highly
representative of the new police whose institutional ethos was very much his own
making. Badia had a 'hands-on' attitude to his job as Police Chief, and although there
was no formal requirement for him to leave his office, he nourished his reputation for
bravery, regularly setting out, gun-in-hand, to join the front line during shoot-outs or
bank robberies and picking up a number of gunshot wounds in the process. Unrelenting
° La Revista Blanca, 11 May 1934; Solidaridad Obrera, 23 September 1934
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in his hatred for lawbreakers, the cruel prejudices of Miquel were exemplified after a
shoot-out between police and an armed gang on the Carretera de Ia Rabassada, when the
Barcelona Chief-of-Police ordered that the wounded 'murcianos' should be left without
medical treatment. Only after a heated argument with a Civil Guard commandant was an
ambulance called to the scene.'2
Police practises on the streets remained, therefore, both questionable and
arbitrary. This was epitomised by the arrest of one worker for 'looking suspiciously' at an
Asalto. Vachier masterminded a sharp increase in violent attacks on unemployed street
traders by the Council police. The zeal of the Generalitat to rout the CNT and establish
itself as the unchallenged master of the streets meant that the police, backed by army
detachments, periodically occupied and searched working class districts, particularly in
the Barn xino and in the peripheral ghettos. In a raid on 'Bar Zaragoza', a well-known
cenetista haunt, the political police and Asaltos smashed the bar up to such an extent
that the owner decided not to re-open. Like the paramilitary Escamots, the Sometent
clearly relished the challenge of a strike and the opportunity it provided to give plebeian
upstarts a sound thrashing.' 3 The security forces towards caution continued to shoot first
and ask questions later. In Clot, a youth running home for his lunch after work was shot
in the back and seriously wounded when he failed to respond to a call to halt. The same
fate befell two Swedish sailors in the Barn xino, whose linguistic shortcomings led them
to be seriously wounded with head and body injuries when they ignored calls from the
Catalan police. These extra-limitations coincided with growing concerns on the
revolutionary left that Police Chief Badia was recruiting a team of gunmen to murder
leading cenetistas as part of a murderous 'dirty war' against the CNT.'4
12 Solidaridad Obrera, 24 August 1934; Alba and Casasüs, Diàle gs. p.28; La Vanguardia, 19, 25 July
1934; Las Noticias. 15-18 May 1934; Balius, Octubre catalán. p.11
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Throughout 1934 a series of killings by the police revealed the reliance of the
security forces on naked terror and fuelled suspicions that the security forces had
initiated a low-intensity 'shoot-to-kill' policy against PA! criminals'. In early 1934, the
body of a youngfaIsla was found on wasteland on the outskirts of Barcelona. Although
the dead anarchist had participated in a skirmish between police and grupistas, the fact
that he died from a single shot from a police revolver suggested that he had been
summarily executed. In a separate case, an unarmed cenetista was shot and killed in
broad daylight by an off-duty policeman in a Street on the Sants-Les Corts border.
Memories of 1920s police tactics were evoked again when a grupista was shot in the
back by police, who defended their actions because their unarmed suspect had 'attempted
to escape'. Meanwhile, in mid-April police located and ambushed the Italian anarchist
Bruno Alpini and his associates near El Parallel. In the ensuing gun battle between
police and 'The Alpini Gang' over 200 rounds were fired and Alpini was left dead. This
was almost certainly the desired goal of the Barcelona police, for Alpini had already
assassinated an agent from the political police and, just days before his death, he escaped
arrest after disarming a pair of officers and stealing their uniforms.'5
The death of Alpini, which coincided with the celebrations of the third
anniversary of the birth of the Republic, was greeted by L'O pinió with 'general
satisfaction' at 'the definitive thrashing our police has given the criminals' in the campaign
to 'clean-up of Barcelona'. The Republican press provided unflinching support for the
police, whose 'undeniable qualities' were praised in the bid to rid the city of the 'criminal
classes'. As if egged on by Republican opinion, in the following month two more
'expropriators' were shot dead in Barcelona by the police and several others wounded.
No charges were brought against members of the security forces. In an increasingly
draconian climate, anonymous manifestos appeared on the streets which, quite probably
the work of the Escamols, threatened to kill 'two robbers' for every 'citizen' who fell in
La Vanguardia, 23 February, 15-18 April, 17-19 July 1934; Solidaridad Obrera, 17-20, 25 July, 9
September 1934; La Veu de Catalunva, 15 April 1934; L'Opinió, 17 April 1934; El Noticiero Universal,
16 April 1934. Apart from eliminating Alpim, however, the ambush was anything but a success. Six of
the eight expropriators shot their way out of the ambush, leaving one policeman dead and two others
critically wounded. The price of converting a busy part of the city into a shooting gallery also resulted in
serious wounds to three passers-by.
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the 'war against crime'. Although the Esquerra baulked at formally re-introducing capital
punishment, it had clearly contributed to a state of affairs which justifiedforce majeur
against illegality and, as Solidaridad Obrera alleged, not without justification, the
murderous behaviour of the Catalan police amounted to the defacto return of the death
penalty.'6
La Campana de Gràcia congratulated the police for the implacability in the
'pursuit of undesirables' which, it asserted, had led to an 'extraordinary decline' in armed
robbery. Meanwhile, La Publicitat and L'O pinió, both of which were always very close
barometers of official opinion, bragged that the tough police line had spread 'a wave of
panic' in the ranks of the 'expropriators'. This was confirmed in the annual report of the
Chief State Prosecutor, which recognised that armed robberies had decreased more
significantly in Barcelona than elsewhere in 1934. However, the triumphalism of the
Generalitat was premature. Not only did the decrease in armed robberies occur in the
context of a very high base level, but it also did not indicate that the police had
successfully ended illegality. Firstly, there is evidence that increased policing in the
Catalan capital only succeeded in pushing the 'expropriators' out of Barcelona. This was
reflected in a rise in the number of bank raids in provincial Catalonia. One team of
'expropriators', recognised as Catalans by their accents, was reported to have raided a
bank in the southern Spanish province of Murcia. Secondly, boasts that the criminals
were 'licked' proved highly imprudent and were sometimes followed by a new and
spectacular round of 'expropriations', which inferred that there was no easy repressive
solution to a phenomenon with an essentially socio-economic basis like armed
illegality. "
The Generalitat police experienced tremendous difficulties in its campaign against
the 'expropriators'. In spring 1934 the flight of a series of suspected 'expropriators' who
were being trailed by the political police led to widespread beliefs in Generalitat circles
16 L'Opinió, 7 March, 17 April 1934; La Publicitat. 18 April 1934; Las Noticias, 20 April 1933, 17-18
May 1934; Solidaridad Obrera, 9 September 1934
17 La Campana de Gràcia cited in Cucurull, Catalunva, p.229; L'Opinió. 31 March, 1 April 1934; k
Publicitat, 12 April 1934; Las Noticias, 9, 20 May, 29 July, 20 September 1934; La Vanguardia, 19, 29,
31 July 1934
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that the FM had its own informants inside the Catalan police. These suspicions were
confirmed when the body of a police informant inside the FM was found gagged and
shot on MontjuIc on the vety day he had been enlisted by the authorities. Meanwhile,
days later, anotherfaIsla recruited by the police was found assassinated alongside the
work site of La Sagrada FamIlia.'8
The Generalitat masked its frustrations on law-and-order with the conspiracy
theoty that monarchist judges in the Barcelona Courts had a policy of releasing TM
criminals' and other recidivists to destroy the public peace of Catalonia and bring
disrepute on both the Esquerra and autonomous Catalan institutions. 19 These allegations
are very difficult to believe, however, especially as Anguera de Sojo, whose hatred of the
FM was well-proven during his spell as Civil Governor, remained one of the leading
figures inside the Barcelona law courts. Moreover, both before the implementation of the
Autonomy Statute and afterwards, the Barcelona judiciary displayed implacable hostility
to all so-called 'crimes against property'. During the very period which the Esquerra
alleged was a permissive era ofjudicial laxity, jail terms for armed robbery averaged
between 13 and 17 years, while petty cases of unarmed robbery were punished without
pity, with sentences averaging around 7 years. One prolific highway robber was given a
240-year sentence, even though he did not wound a single victim. Meanwhile, during the
same period, grupistas received sentences of between 18-22 years for the possession of
explosives, 9 years for firing at the police and 8 years for tram burning.2°
The manifest exasperation of the security forces and the authorities, and the view
that they were being overrun by the 'criminal classes', reflected the problems of a strategy
which relied on police repression to reduce phenomena that were actually far more
responsive to socio-economic variables outside the control of the police, such as
unemployment, low wages and poverty. 193 Os Barcelona revealed that punitive panaceas
and increased policing did not reduce crime. Not only would it have been exorbitant to
La Publicitat, 4, 11 April 1934
19 L'Opinió, 21 January, 21 April, 1 May, 16 June, 22 September 1934; La Vanguardia, 27 September
1934
20 La Vanguardia, 17 March, 8 November, 30 December 1932, 15 December 1933, 3 April, 2
September 1934; La Veu de Catalunya, 18, 22, 28 April 1934; Solidaridad Obrera, 6 July 1934; La
Publicitat, 4 January 1935; Las Noticias, 2 July 1936
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protect all large sums of money in the city with permanent guards but, as shown in the
attacks on pay-rolls, mail trains and banks, visible armed protection did not serve as a
deterrent against surprise attacks by well equipped and determined 'expropriators'. The
reality, therefore, was that in spite of the increases in the security forces since 1931, the
talk of the preventive function of the police was an empty myth, largely invoked to
justify spending on the security forces.
Contraiy to the opinion of the Catalan right and the Madrid centralists, the
failings of the police owed nothing to the incompetence of the Generalitat authorities but
were weaknesses common to policing in big cities the world over. However, it must also
be said that technologically speaking, the Barcelona police remained backward: it was
badly motorised and hindered by a rudimentary communication system, which made it
impossible for agents to cover the wide range of possible economic targets on offer in a
business centre like Barcelona. Meanwhile, the gangs of 'expropriators', especially those
with cars at their disposal, could reach their targets, even the banks in the financial heart
of the city, and make their escape in a matter of minutes, well before the arrival of the
security forces. Ironically, police orders for the requisition of civilian cars to facilitate the
'hot pursuit' of armed gangs were greeted with considerable resistance by the middle
class car-owning and order-loving strata of the city.2'
The illegality of the 1930s also left another professional myth of the security
forces in tatters, namely that the police were geared towards crime detection. Contrary
to the self-serving claims of the security forces, if 'expropriators' were not detained in
flagrante delicto it proved very difficult, near impossible, for the police to apprehend
them. It is, therefore, no understatement to assert that police intelligence was a
contradiction in terms. On a technological level investigative work was inhibited by the
absence of forensic, fingerprinting and ballistic procedures and the little detective work
effected by the Catalan police was based on the highly laborious and obsolete method
devised by French criminologist Alphonse Bertillon in the nineteenth century. 22 The
21 Adelante. 9, 21 Januaiy, 1934; Solidaridad, 18 April 1934
22 Alphonse Bertillon, Identification Antropometriuue. Instructions signaletigues, Melum, 1893, 2 vols.;
H.T.F. Rhodes, Alphonse Bertillon, London, 1956; Trinidad Fernández, La defensa, pp.286-298
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'science' of bertiionage was gloss on the myth that the police actually set about
detecting crimes according to deductive investigative skills. Moreover, based on the
establishment of common 'distinguishing marks' (señas de idenhidad) between eye-
witness accounts and photograph albums of suspects and recidivists, bertiionage was
ill-suited to apprehending lawbreakers in a densely populated city like Barcelona. This
was confirmed by press coverage of street crime which revealed that eye-witnesses, the
cornerstone of bertillonage, often proved worthless allies in the fight against illegality. In
the case of 'expropriations' in banks and other public targets, events occurred suddenly
and without warning and were over very quickly. On such occasions, there was a natural
tendency for the majority of witnesses who had little or no personal contact with
firearms to focus more on the weapons carried by the 'expropriators' than on their
distinguishing features. Consequently, many eye-witnesses were incapable of providing a
sufficiently detailed description of the 'expropriators' who, for the sake of anonymity,
often shielded their faces with trilby hats, raised coat collars or handkerchiefs. As a
result, even when the police managed to capture an attacker red-handed, it was
notoriously difficult to get witnesses to make a positive identification.23
The rarity of crime prevention and detection meant that the bulk of police duties
revolved around 'interrogating' suspects who were detained either on the advice of a
'grass' or on the grounds of a previous criminal record. This also explains the tendency of
agents to develop the case for the prosecution by extracting a complete confession
through the systematic violence of the 'third degree'. The use of violence against
prisoners to secure confessions, therefore, far from being an accidental aspect of police
'investigations' was one of its integral features, constituting the very hub of much police
'work'. This feature of police life explains why, in place of intelligence, the main criterion
which potential police recruits needed to fulfil to gain entrance to the force was their
ability to defend themselves physically and extract confessions, by whatever means
necessary, from detainees. Hence, extra-judicial violence by the police was not the work
of a few 'bad eggs' or monarchists out to discredit the force in the eyes of the citizenry
23 La Vanguardia. 30 April 1935
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but, the ineluctable outcome of the pressures facing the force in its day-to-day activities.
It was quite evident that neither the Catalan nor the Spanish police were trained to
investigate crimes and that members of both forces were simply recruited, uniformed and
armed, and in all but the most specialised branches of the police, such as the political
police, 'training' did extend beyond general arms and self-defence tuition.24
6.2. Militarised Anarchism
Unrelenting persecution from the Generalitat police saw ERC-CNT relations
reach their lowest point in 1934. The Dencàs-Badia duo prompted comparisons with the
Anido-Arlegui dyad, who spearheaded the anti-CNT repression during the dark years of
1920s, a period which remained the bloody yardstick for all anti-worker repression in
Barcelona. Solidaridad Obrera maintained that 'the militants of the Confederation and the
anarchists enjoy no rights' in autonomous Catalonia as the Esquerra had placed itself
'unconditionally on the side of the bourgeoisie', creating 'The Republic of Guardias' and
'The Republic of Jailed Workers'. 25
 The closure of all conventional channels of CNT
syndical praxis, matched with the lower level of official harassment directed at rival
tendencies within the Catalan labour movement, exacerbated the substitution of mass
struggle for group terror by the falsias and heightened the militarisation and the
ghettoisation of the anarchist movement. 26 Thus, following the consummation of the
falsia dream of trabazón, 1934 was the peak year of grupisla activity during the
Republic as the anarchist squads became the veritable standard-bearers of the
Confederation.27
While the 'revolutionary gymnastics' had shown that the Confederal Defence
Committees were no match for the armed forces in a frontal clash, in 1934 the grupistas
24 L'Opirdó 22 September 1934; La Van guardia, 27 September 1934. The Spanish and Catalan police
were not unique by the standards of the day and in North America, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the most advanced police force in the world, only began training its recruits in criminal investigation
procedures in 1935: Julian Syinons, Crime and Detection, London, 1968, pp.140-14!.
25 Solidaridad Obrera, 6, 18, 22 July, 4, 15, 18, 26 August, 6 September 1934; Adelante. 30 Januaiy
1934; Abad de Santillán, Memorias, p.229
26 Tltis pattern was first seen at the turn of the centuiy. See Antonio Rabies Egea, 1errotismo y crisis
de la organización obrera a fines del XX', Estudios de Historia Social, 22-23, 1982, pp.205-238
27 Solidaridad Obrera, 7 July, 3, 8, 18 August 1934
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proved that they could function effectively as urban guerrillas. Indeed, it was clear that
the armed groups linked to the CNT-FAI had overcome their initial deficiencies that had
been painfully obvious in their early battles in the late summer of 1931. The organisation
of the grupistas was largely entrusted to Victoriano 'Braulio' Prieto Robles, the doyen of
the defence squads, who organised paramilitaiy training, ranging from arms instruction
and target practice, across to grenade throwing, in the isolated foot hills on the outskirts
of Barcelona.28
Although the grupos were active across Barcelona province, the regional
distribution of their actions reveals that their major operational centres were the ghettos
of the Catalan capital, particularly Clot, Horta, Sant MartI and Sant Andreu in the North
of the city, VHospitalet and Sants in the South and the scattered groups of Cases
Barates. Outside Barcelona, meanwhile, the grupistas were especially active in Terrassa
and Granollers, the two provincial areas that had experienced the most dramatic urban
development in the 1920s. In these areas, the Confederal Defence Committees possessed
sufficiently well developed supply and communication lines to assume guerrilla
functions. Despite their numerical disadvantages, the grupistas did not flinch from
launching audacious attacks, even if they involved engaging the police in gun-battles.
Though not perhaps fish swimming in a large sea of supporters, they could at least rely
on the tacit acceptance of the inhabitants of the ghettos, whose aversion to the security
forces was well proven. 29 Thus, with the exception of the Barn xino, the pattern
emerged whereby the police were ever-confident in the bourgeois centre of Barcelona,
while in the proletarian suburbs the grupistas moved with relative ease. The battle
between the grupistas and the police therefore reflected the geographical divisions
inherent to the metropolitan development of Barcelona and its environs.
However, it was the repressive political context, far more than anything else, that
had militarised the CNT-FAI and led it to increasingly rest on the armed grupos.
28 
'Braulio' was buried in an unmarked grave in Les Planes after he died during an accident while
testing a new type of hand grenade developed by the FM: Abad de Santillán, Memorias, pp.2 16-217,
246
29 La Vanguardia, 31 October, 1 November 1934; Adelante. 17 February 1934; Las Noticias, 12 May
1934
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According to Rafael Vidiella, a Barcelona cenetista-turned-socialist, this dependency on
'strong-arm men' had already led to the conflation of traditional direct action with
'individual terror' in the years after World War One. The legacy of this period, embodied
most vividly in the 'Nosotros' grupo, was a simplistic, militaristic mentality that tended to
locate complex political problems in terms of armed violence and relations of force. 30 To
be sure, there was an extensive cult of weaponry among the Barcelona anarchists that
cannot be explained exclusively in terms of self-defence, and it was de rigueur to carry
small arms, particularly the fashionable 'Star' pistol. Meanwhile, leadingfaIstas like
Garcia Oliver kept veritable arsenals, including bomb-making gear, in their flats.3'
The martyrdom of the grupistas enhanced the myths of individual resistance
surrounding the FM. Moreover, the individual audacity of the grupistas conveniently
obscured the disastrous ramifications of trabazón within the CNT. Having embroiled the
unions in the 'revolutionary gymnastics' and the attendant repression, the FAT looked on
grupista violence as a substitute for mass action. In the absence of collective pressure
from CNT unions, the FM rediscovered its Bakuninist roots, employing violence as
armed propaganda and a surrogate for mass struggle. Accordingly, the mass union was
replaced by the small group as the protagonist in the social struggle and the Confederal
Defence Committees maintained a significant level of violence throughout 1934 and
1935.
In the tram sector, where 400 cenetistas had been victimised after their strike
became enmeshed with the December 1933 putsch, the grupistas launched a campaign of
bomb attacks on plant and attempted assassinations against managers in a bid to secure
the re-admission of the sacked workers. In other sectors, grupistas also endeavoured to
fill the vacuum left by the retreat from mass syndical pressure. Unable to rely on
collective union power, armed squads toured workshops warning employers that they
would be 'dead men' if they did not take on workers from the CNT bolsa de trabajo.
Meanwhile, managers who victimised cenelislas received written threats. Joseph
3 Rafael Vidiella, 'Causas del desarrollo, apogeo y decadencia de la CNT', Leviatán, February 1935,
p.32
M, 8 January 1935; La Vanguardia, 1, 25 March 1934; La Publicitat, 19 April 1934; GarcIa Oliver,
El eco de los pasos. p.209
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Mitchell, the Scottish manager of the L'Escocesa textile factory, received a stamped note
from 'The Arm-Twisters' ('La mano que aprieta'), warning that earlier death threats and
bomb attacks on the personnel and plant of the factory were mere 'lessons'. Replete with
promises of violence, the note outlined a 'scorched earth' policy if sacked cenelistas were
not re-employed within 15 days, promising that 'we will be very cruel, for it means
nothing to us if the factory closes, because then the entire show will end up in the street'.
The note concluded with a pledge to Mitchell that 'the vengeance will be temble and
there will be days of mourning in your home and in L'Escocesa along with a threat to
send the manager on 'a one-way trip of the sort from which there is no possible return'.
In similar 'substitutionist' fashion, grupistas protested at conditions facing detainees by
shooting the director of the Model jail.32
The vanguard militarism of the grupistas was a poor alternative to the collective
struggles that gripped Barcelona in 1931. Nor was small group violence enough to offset
the waning strength of the CNT. In fact, the climate of collective despondency that had
first entered the CNT also seeped into the ranks of the grupistas. The underlying
isolation of thefaIstas was exemplified by the grupo that admitted planning the
assassinations of several employers in the belief that symbolic acts of aggression against
the enemies of the proletariat would serve as the 'spark' to arouse working class youth
from its 'cowardice'.33
Yet individual and small group terrorism failed to ignite anything other than a
burning repression that heightened syndical demoralisation. The counter-productive
nature of grupista violence was patently obvious in the reduced number of union
struggles in the dark years of anti-CNT repression between 1934 and 1935. For instance,
in Terrassa, grupistas greeted the outbreak of a strike by textile workers by assassinating
an employer, thereby providing the authorities with a convenient pretext for an offensive
against the union that culminated in the collapse of the strike. Meanwhile, defeat merely
32 La Vanguardia. 11, 16 January, 22 Februaiy, 13 September 1934; L'O pinió, 19 January 1934. In July
1936 this threat was carried out, when Mitchell's car was machine-gunned from a passing taxi: L&
Noticias. 3-4, 10-11 July 1936; F0371/20522/W5989/62/41, F0371/20522/W6059/62/41 and
F0371/205221W5990/62/41: Letters from C.G. Vaughan, 26 June and 2 July 1936 (PRO)
La Vanguardia, 24-27 November 1934, 23 July 1935; Las Noticias, 11 December 1935, 2 February
1936
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provided a new rationale for the sterile violence of the grupistas, who responded by
bombing the home of one employer and assassinating another. The grupistas also
displayed a scathing contempt for rank-and-file union democracy. An example of this
followed a dispute between workers and management at a Barcelona textile plant
management. Although the workers passed a collective union resolution that expressly
rejected all acts of'individual terror', this did not prevent the grupistas from intervening
in the dispute and the employer was shot dead by a youngfaIsta.34
Devoid of any strategic vision, grupista terror brought woeful consequences for
the entire proletariat by providing employers with either the grounds or the justification
for closing workplaces and sacking scores of workers. The assassination of a number of
employers in the recession-hit textile sector served as a pretext for the Union Industrial
Algodonera, a powerful consortium that ran a chain of textile factories, to close a series
of factories in Catalonia, leaving around 5,000 workers without jobs. Meanwhile,
suggesting that economic dislocation was, in fact, the desired end of the FM, cenetistas
on a 'go-slow' in Poble de Lillet were thrown onto the Street after their factory was
bombed.35
As the CNT unions remained drained of their past power, the grupos became
increasingly sensitive to criticism from all quarters, not just 'class enemies' but, also the
growing number of anti-libertarian voices from within the labour movement. Moreover,
the elitist and militarist ethos of the grupos, clearly an extension of the theoretical
precepts behind 'revolutionary gymnastics', validated the physical elimination of the
opponents of anarchism from inside the organised labour movement. Hence, those
ugetistas who had been assassinated by grupistas for 'scabbing' during strikes in 1933,
became part of a wider inquisitorial, anti-proletarian campaign that saw a series of
attacks on bloquista, treinhista and ugetisba 'scum' (canalla) in the bid to 'persuade'
workers to affiliate to the CNT not out of choice, but for 'health reasons'.36
Adelante, 9-11, 21 February 1934; La Vanguardia, 22 February, 4-5 December 1934
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6.3. Funding the CNT-FAI
The militarisation of anarchism was accentuated further by the financial context
of the CNT-FAI. Since the birth of the Republic the CNT and the FM had become
progressively mendicant. Rising state repression and union closures after 1932 severely
disrupted normal fund-raising activities, leaving the Barcelona unions in a particularly
parlous state, owing growing amounts of union dues to the Catalan Regional Committee.
Amid a worsening financial context, the advent of'revolutionary gymnastics' placed new
demands on the depleted resources of the unions. The situation deteriorated even more
at the beginning of 1934, because the Generalitat clamp down on clandestine union
collections meant that the Barcelona Local Federation was running on a weekly deficit of
40,000 pesetas. The Baix Llobregat CNT reported its 'distressing condition' and many
other unions reported the 'deplorable situation' of their internal resources. Apart from
inviting state repression on the CNT, the FM also bore much responsibility for the
impecunity of the unions because its inquisitorial purge of the Confederation had led to
the loss of around 80,000 members in the Barcelona area between 1931 and 1934.
Moreover, the unions who left the CNT were largely based on the more stable sectors of
the workforce, like the freintista-inclined Sabadell Local Federation, the wealthiest
unions in Catalonia. At the same time, the bulk of the pro-anarchist unions that remained
more often than not had larger numbers of the unskilled and unemployed, reduced
numbers of dues-paying members and lower levels of internal organisation.37
Over the same period, there were new pressures on the CNT press. Not only did
the loss of trade union membership presuppose a cut in the readership of Solidaridad
Obrera but, the pursuit of trabazón and the conversion of the CNT daily into an
exclusively anarchist newspaper meant that sales had fallen considerably. Subsequently,
larger amounts of union funds were required to subsidise the press. Matters were
November 1933; El Transporte, 18 June 1934; Cataluña Obrera, 26 May 1933; Comercio y Navegación,
March-November 1933; Catalunya Roja, 19 October 1933; Tierra y Libertad, 2 June 1933; El Luchador,
31 March, 9, 16, 23 June, 28 July 1933; La Batalla, 31 August, 7, 14, 21 September, 19 October 1933;
Adelante, 17-20 October, 1-2, 7, 19 November 1933; Mall. 4 November 1933
37 Minutes of the Barcelona CNT Local Federation. 7, 29 November, 28 December 1931 (ARN);
Solidaridad Obrera, 9 December 1931, 18 March 1932, 29 Januaiy, 20 September 1933; La Publicitat,
5, 8, 11 April 1934; CNTrabajo, Memona...de 1931, pp.11ff; CRT, Memoria...de 1933, pp.5-9
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compounded further by the repression. From the beginning of the 'cycle of insurrections'
in 1932 Solidaridad Obrera was weakened by a series of bans and fines imposed by the
censor. In what was ultimately an unsuccessful bid to overcome its weekly deficit, the
CNT daily was forced to accept advertising. According to one of the Solidaridad Obrera
editorial team, by 1934 the most important CNT daily in Spain was financially broke', on
the verge of being 'killed' by the censor. The FAT press was in a similarly dire financial
strait. Tierra y Libertad operated on a regular deficit, while long-standing plans for an
anarchist daily could not be fulfilled. Meanwhile, more esoteric publications like
Iniciales, an anarchist monthly aimed at 'individualists, nudists and vegetarians', also
suffered from on-going budgetaiy problems.38
The most serious effects of the economic crisis of Confederal organisations were
felt by the Prisoners' Support Committees. In 1931 the Catalan CNT had agreed to
direct 5% of all weekly union dues to the Prisoners' Support Committees to maintain the
'victims of the social war' and their families. While, from the beginning it was rare for all
the unions to honour this donation, following the downturn in CNT resources, the
funding of the Prisoners' Support Committees became even more erratic. Meanwhile, in
the wake of rising social conflict and the total rupture in relations between the CNT and
the Republic, there was a vertiginous growth in the numbers of activists who were jailed,
blacklisted or 'on the run' (perseguidos) and, consequently, dependent on the Prisoners'
Support Committees.
This combination of factors meant that the quota agreed in 1931 could not keep
pace with the demands of the Prisoners' Support Committees. For instance, by the spring
of 1932, a good week of benefits and collections that brought in over 2,000 pesetas for
the coffers of the Prisoners' Support Committees was still nearly three times below its
weekly expenditure in Barcelona. Because the CNT rested on principles of active
solidarity, this was clearly an unacceptable state of affairs that seriously jeopardised the
38 Solidaridad Obrera, 9 December 1931, 5, 17 January, 9 March 1932, 15 January, 24 June, 10 August,
7 October 1933, 13 July 1934; Minutes of the Barcelona CNT Local Federation, 28 December 1931
(A}IN); CRT, Informe ciue ci director de 'Soli', Liberto Callejas. iresenta al yleno de Sindicatos de
Catalufia. ciue se celebrará en Terrassa los dIas 24 y siguientes de diciembre de 1932, Barcelona, n.d.,
passim.; CR1, Memoria...de marzo de 1933, passim.; Peirats, Figuras, p.44; La Publicitat, 8 April 1934;
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guiding ethos of the organisation, however, despite calls from the Prisoners' Support
Committees for a 'fraternal hand' from the unions, the financial rot continued to spread.
In September 1933 the International Refugees Support Committee, which in the two
years since its formation in July 1931 had aided over 200 foreign anarchists to flee
repression, admitted it was in a 'desperate state' due to a 'lack of economic resources'
and testified to the 'unwonted frequency' with which it was 'embarrassed' when comrades
came in need of assistance or legal defence. The Prisoners' Support Committees also
confessed that it was often left struggling to scrape the money together for welfare
support and court expenses. Matters became so bad that the Marseilles Prisoners'
Support Committee, a pivotal body within the prisoners support network that assisted
perseguldos smuggled from Barcelona by friendly dockers, announced it could no longer
offer financial support to militants. Inside Barcelona the growing financial burden on the
Prisoners' Support Committees was becoming unbearable for the prisoners and their
families who made known their irritation at the irregularity of welfare payments. Finally,
cenetista and faIsta detainees issued a motion of condemnation to the Local Federation,
attacking the 'inefficiency' of the Prisoners' Support Committees and the 'lack of
attention' it paid to those who had 'fallen in the struggle against capitalism and the
state'.39
The CNT-FAI leadership needed no reminder that the plight of the prisoners was
a highly emotive factor. In 1931 the fate of the prisoners had been a time-bomb ticking
away under the treinhista leadership, as the detainees in Barcelona emerged as vociferous
adversaries of the moderate anarcho-syndicalists. It was clear, therefore, that any failure
to keep the Prisoners' Support Committees afloat and subsidise the relatives of the
detainees carried the danger of denting the credibility of the anarchists at the head of the
CNT. However, hopes that the unions could bail out the Prisoners' Support Committees
were unrealistic. Considering the dangerous paralysis and financial dislocation facing the
39 Minutes of the Plenums of the Barcelona CNT Local Federation, 7, 29 November 1931 (ANN); i:&
Publicitat, 5, 11 April 1934; Solidaridad Obrera, 11 December 1931, 18,24 March, 29 May 1932, 17,
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CNT, the FAT Peninsular Committee issued an appeal to the Confederal Defence
Committees and its own grupos for money.4°
The Confederal Defence Committees responded by initiating its own
'extraordinary' means of financing the institutions and press of the Confederation,
embarking on a strategy of armed 'expropriations'. As one Catalan activist later
explained, 'one well prepared attack and you get away with a some of money equal to
four weeks collections.. .To raid a bank was an episode of the social war'. Therefore, just
as the Confederal Defence Committees were called upon to fill the vacuum left by the
decline in CNT syndical muscle, so too were the grupos now required to guarantee the
internal funding of the Confederation. The legendaty ¶Braulio', the chief of the
Confederal Defence Committees, assumed responsibility for the financial well-being of
the movement. The Barcelona prisoners had already intimated that such a course of
action this solution would be a suitable response to the problems facing the Prisoners'
Support Committees and they proposed the formation of special 'committees' to collect
what they obliquely described as 'extraordinary contributions'. These 'expropriations' also
formed part of a campaign to 'save the daily' from the aggressive state censor, providing
Solidaridad Obrera with what one its contributors discretely described as 'loans'.4'
The recourse of the anarchists to 'expropriations' cannot be explained simply in
economic terms, however. All revolutionary and left-wing groups faced immense
economic restrictions on their activities. It was the FAT ascendancy that guarantied the
switch to illegal fund-raising tactics in the CNT and the advent of a policy which, in the
words of Durruti, was 'to seize the money wherever it may be'. The origins of the tactic
lay with the 'economic attacks' perpetrated by Francisco Ascaso, Durruti and Garcia
Oliver in the early 1920s to fund the activities of the Catalan anarchist movement. This
was followed by the fantastic bohemian voyage of Francisco Ascaso, Durruti and Jover
across Latin America, during which they paid their way with the proceeds of a string of
bank robberies, as well as financing local syndicalist groups. On their return to Europe
José Luis Gutiérrez Molina, La Idea revolucionaria. El anar puismo organizado en Andalucia y Câdiz
durante los afios treinta. Madrid, 1993, p.73
41 Porcel, La revuelta, pp.118-121; Abad de Santillán, Memorias, p.23I; Solidaridad Obrera, 19
September 1933; La Publicitat, 8 April 1934; Peirats, Figuras, p.44
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the funds were used to publish Faure's Nouvelle Encyclopédie Anarchiste and form the
Librairie Internationale in Paris.42
By contrast, the anarcho-syndicalists, like the dissident communists, were
vehemently opposed to the illegality advocated by the anarchists. Although the
bloquistas accepted collective revolutionary violence and organised 'proletarian
shopping-trips', the mass shoplifting raids of the unemployed, they rejected armed
robbery as an unacceptable practice. The treintistas shared this attitude and while they
saw popular illegality in terms of social conditions, they condemned any involvement by
labour militants. This was clear from the period when the treintistas controlled
Solidaridad Obrera in 1931, when they kept an embarrassed silence whenever illegal acts
were committed by either anarchists or union members. The treintistas saw crime as the
'preserve' of the bourgeoisie or 'convicts and brothel-goers' and they had a moralistic
attitude that was sometimes expressed in a conservative legal vernacular, in many ways
similar to that of the right. For example, during a discussion with the Mayor of
Barcelona soon after the birth of the Republic a group of anarcho-syndicalists described
Durruti as a 'common criminal'.43
The FM had none of these reservations when it came to illegality. Their new
fund-raising method was first glimpsed in spring 1932 during a bitter strike in the wood
sector, a noted FM bastion, during which a highly intransigent bourgeoisie faced
traditional 'active picketing', as well as sporadic 'expropriation' by grupistas who sought
to force the employers to pay for their obduracy.
By 1934, anned 'expropriations' were a regular side-show of city life, reflected in
attacks on lucrative targets such as pay-rolls, banks or bank messengers that reaped up
to 100,000 pesetas. During May alone, a staggering 150,000 pesetas was lifted from
pay-rolls, banks, financial offices and lottery agencies, in a series of attacks that revealed
42p , Durruti, pp.61-133; Ferrer, Durruti, pp.59-60; Salvador Cánovas Cervantes, Durruti y Ascaso: la
CNT y la revolución de julio (historia de la revolución es pafiola, Toulouse, 1939, pp.10-12
Las Noticias, 30-31 May 1931; La Batalla, 11 February, 29 December 1932; Pestafla, Lo ciue avrendI,
vol.2, pp.75-79; Solidaridad Obrera, 11 April, 30-3 1 May 1931; Cultura Libertaria, 6 November 1931, 9
June 1932; Sindicalismo, 30 June 1933; La Colmena Obrera, 30 October 1931; Madrid, Ocho meses,
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a high level of organisation and clinical execution. 45 Another fund-raising method
without the risks of the 'expropriations' was the collection of'revolutionary tax' from the
local rich. This was particularly popular with the anarchists of l'Hospitalet who
demanded sums of money from businessmen and politicians with threats of bomb and
gun attacks for those who refused to pay up.46
The Confederal Defence Committees-based 'expropriation' squads were
organised in the same way as the union defence groups. Like the Confederal Defence
Committees, the 'expropriation' teams concentrated their activities in the city in which
they lived. One member of the 'expropriation' team served as liaison with the district
Confederal Defence Committees 'quartermaster', who would furnish the necessary
assortment of pistols, sub-machine guns and, when necessary, grenades. Although the
squads normally relied on speed as their main ally, they were very well armed and on
more than one occasion the bourgeois-Republican press lamented that even if the police
managed to intercept the 'expropriators' after a raid, they still managed to escape, thanks
to their superior weaponry. In a raid on the pay-roll at Batlló Textiles the eight member
gang made off with 50,000 pesetas after fighting their way out of a police cordon in the
city centre with guns and grenades and seeing off a lorry load of Asaltos who cornered
them in Santa Coloma. When possible, the 'expropriators' acquired Studebaker and
Buick cars, both of which were faster than police models, although normally they relied
on taxis that were either hi-jacked in advance or 'hired' from friendly cenetistas, like
Fernando 'El Chofer' Gonzalez Salvador, one-time president of the Barcelona taxi
drivers' union.47
The modus operandi of the 'expropriation' teams was very similar to that
employed by the grupistas for assassinations. Just as enemies were 'targeted' for attack, a
member of the grupo would complete lengthy intelligence work before an
See the daily press for 1934, especially L'Opiniô, 2 January, 30 March 1934; Las Noticias, 1-31 May,
4 October 1934; La Vanguardia, 27 March, 19 July, 2 August, 5, 9 September 1934; La Publicitat, 5, 6,
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'expropriation', observing the objective from a logistical point of view, noting the level of
traffic in the area, the proximity of police stations and the accessibility of escape routes.
Once convinced of the viability of the project, the intelligence would then be pooled with
other grupistas. If the plan was accepted a final briefing would be arranged during which
a date for the attack would be set and the grupislas would be assigned specific duties.
After the attack, assuming all had gone well, the 'expropriators' would meet at a
previously arranged place and the money and arms would be collected by a grupista
delegated to liaise with the Prisoners' Support Committees. Meanwhile, any casualties
would be taken to doctors who were supportive of the CNT-FAI. Finally, a previously
agreed fee, deliberately set at the wage rate of a skilled manual worker in an attempt to
prevent the emergence of privileges among the 'expropriators', was then paid to the
grupistas for their efforts. 48 This payment was important because militancy in the
'expropriation' teams was very often the preserve of the unemployed who, by dint of
their jobless status, had both time on their hands to devote to the grupos and the need
for financial assistance.
It was striking that even when grupistas used grenades and sub-machine guns to
effect their escapes, there were rarely civilian casualties during the 'expropriations'. That
said, the audacity of the 'expropriators' was matched with a high degree of determination
which, in the face of resistance, quickly turned into ruthlessness, as witnessed when a
Mataró bank manager was left seriously wounded after attempting to raise the alarm
during a hold-up. The security forces, both public and private, were treated with a
similar lack of respect and the architects of the 'expropriations' showed little hesitancy in
killing either private security guards or policemen. Meanwhile, Gil i Gil, the l'Hospitalet
Councillor, was shot dead for failing to meet the 'revolutionary tax' demanded by the
self-styled 'Committee for Social Revolutionary Terrorism' ('Comité del terrorismo pro-
revolución social').49
48 La Publicitat, 1, 5-6 April 1934
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Bound by a shared ideology and common goals, there was a high degree of
solidarity and cohesion among the 'expropriators'. The police persistently complained
about the Catalan version of omerta that led detainees stubbornly to refuse to name their
colleagues. It was also common for grupistas caught gun-in-hand during raids to stick
doggedly to the story that their weapons had been provided by an individual whose
identity, like that of their associates, was completely unknown. The police thought
otherwise, and regularly attempted to extract the truth from detainees. In a number of
cases, however, it is quite likely that this defence was true, for not only was the identity
of the 'quartermaster' a well-kept secret known to only one member of the team but,
many of the grupistas referred to one another by noms de guerre or by nicknames
(apodos). Even a well-informed source like Garcia Oliver admitted that he did not know
the true identity of several of his close comrades. The squads were not completely
devoid of traitors, however, and the grupistas were occasionally forced to treat such
perfidy with 'trials' and 'executions'.50
It is possible to make a number of generalisations about the members of the
'expropriation' teams. It was extremely rare for women to participate in the grupos and
their contributions were almost exclusively of an auxiliary nature, not normally involving
the use of a pistol. Instead, the profile of the expropriation squads was overwhelmingly
young, male and working class. Even the more seasoned activists in the Confederal
Defence Committees 'expropriation' teams, like Antonio Palacios, an occasional
contributor to both Solidaridad Obrera and Tierra y Libertad and former president of the
Barcelona Leather Workers' Union, or Dionisi Eroles Batlle, a grupista veteran of the
war with the libres in the 1 920s and one-time bodyguard for Peiró, were still under 40
years of age. Activists from the anarchist youth movement, the FIJL, featured
prominently among the 'expropriators' and the arrest of a number of'young lads' (xicots
joves) by police led to the dislocation of at least two grupos. Josep Martorell i Virgili,
one of the most active 'expropriators' from the 1930s and sensationally nicknamed
Public Enemy Number One' by the Catalan press, was only 20 years old at the time of
5 Garcia Oliver, El eco, p.241; La Publicitat, 11 April 1934; La Vanguardia, 15 Februaiy, 11 December
1934, 11-12 December 1935; Las Noticias, 4 September 1934
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his detention, yet had an array of bank and shop robberies to his name and was
responsible for the death of a security guard during a getaway. 5 ' Besides juvenile
enthusiasm, the youth profile of the grupos can also be linked to rebellion of young
operatives in a city whose industry depended heavily on child labour.
There was a considerable overlap between the 'expropriators' and the Confederal
Defence Committees. One of the most prolific 'expropriation' teams of the period,
dubbed 'The Martorell Gang' by the bourgeois press, contained among its number
members of the Barcelona Prisoners' Support Committees and Confederal Defence
Committees activists from Sants and La Torrassa. According to Francisco Ascaso, one
of the team, Morales Lopez, 'excelled himself in the struggles against capitalism and the
state'. Meanwhile, the exclusively anarchist 'affinity groups' were highly active in armed
fi.ind-raising and at different times members of the Mataró-based Disciples of Bakunin'
and the 'Rebel Eagles', as well as the Barcelona-based 'Hydra', 'Libertarians' and
'Anonymous Action', were detained for armed robbery, as were members of the Ateneu
Faros, the main anarchist educational centre in the Catalan capital.52
Contrary to the stereotypes developed in the bourgeois-Republican press of the
faIsta as a savage beast, many of the arrested 'expropriators' displayed considerable
intelligence, something that helps explain how they often managed to avoid detention for
long periods of time. The landlady of a grupista killed in a shoot-out with security forces
told police that her former tenant was 'well spoken', 'very reserved' and possessed 'quite
a lot of books.. .by night he always read, locked away in his room'. Similarly, despite
being dubbed Public Enemy Number One' and compared to both Al Capone and John
Dillinger, unsympathetic bourgeois journalists could not help observing that Martorell
was an 'elegantly dressed youth' who 'possessed a level of culture that is anything but
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normal'. Another 'expropriator', Joan Piera i Bofihl, was described in the press as an
'intellectual', Meanwhile, journalists from the bourgeois press were equally bemused by
the morality and the lifestyle of the 'expropriators' who often had fortunes in his
command but yet led a frugal existence, donating the bulk of the bounty from his
'expropriations' to the CNT-FAI.53
6.4. Anarchism and Popular Illegality
The headline-stealing armed robberies perpetrated by the Confederal Defence
Committees were the most conscpicuous examples of a far wider pattern of illegality in
the 193 Os. The bulk of this illegality was a continuation of the proletarian self-help
strategies that had become commonplace since the advent of recession and consisted of
attacks on petit bourgeois and commercial targets like those discussed earlier on wine
stores, bakeries, shops and bars. Highway robbers also remained very active on the
isolated country roads around Barcelona. In Terrassa there were even reports of masked
armed men holding up bourgeois pedestrians in the city centre. While the majority of
these attacks would not have brought lucrative rewards, the perpetrators were
determined to maintain their freedom and, when challenged, they showed little
compunction in using their guns. Meanwhile, a spate of armed robberies against rent and
debt collectors was accompanied by considerable brutality by the perpetrators, a fact that
cannot be dissociated from the unpopularity of their targets.54
Throughout 1934 it became increasingly evident that the militants and
unemployed activists of the CNT were playing a growing role in this illegality. A gang
detained during an attempted train robbery included two anarchist brothers from
l'Hospitalet, both of whom were activists in the local CNT Unemployed Committee. It
transpired that another gang of three highway robbers arrested on the Carretera
d'Esplugues, who were believed responsible for a wave of highway robberies in the area,
La Vanguardia, 12 December 1933, 23 Febniaiy 1934, 8-9, 27 January, 10 April 1935; La Publicitat,
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was comprised of unemployed cenetistas from La Torrassa. There was also evidence of
an overlap between some of the unemployed activists who had earlier been detained for
'forced eating' and this armed illegality.'5
Popular illegality was encouraged by the anarchist conceptions of both
unemployment and crime that validated individual acts of criminality by the jobless,
ranging from anned robbeiy, across to shop-lifting, 'wholesale shopping' (comprar a la
mayor) according to Solidaridad Obrera, the requisition of crops from the land and even
the counterfeiting of money. One of the sporadic manifestos of the CNT Unemployed
Committee addressed 'To the jobless workers in Barcelona' counselled that 'it is
necessary that all unemployed workers take radical measures'. Meanwhile, Solidaridad
Obrera explained that 'if the partner (compauiera) of a proletarian is dying of hunger and
the children ask for bread with tears in their eyes and their father is deprived of the right
to earn it with the sweat of his brow, one way or another it must be procured'. Hunger,
what Tierra y Libertad described as the 'fhndamental crime of capitalism', was a problem
that the unemployed had to remedy itself, not by !begging the authorities to introduce
welfare benefits, but by 'the rebel gesture' of illegality. These 'gestures' had enormous
propaganda value for the anarchists, who celebrated shoplifting raids by the unemployed
as 'the only way to make Capital and the State recognise that there is hunger and that it
was necessary to do something about it'. They saw this illegal self-activity as infinitely
preferable to the other possibilities facing the unemployed and rather than accepting
'denigrating' Catholic charity, Solidaridad Obrera reflected that 'it would be more noble if
instead of asking, they [i.e. the unemployed] demanded or seized what they needed'. This
orthodoxy sometimes led anarchists to adopt a highly disdainflul attitude towards those
unemployed who did beg. One evening Dumiti brought stunned silence to the 'La
Tranquilidad' bar when he responded to the plea of a beggar by reaching inside his jacket
pocket and filling the hand of the appellant with a huge pistol, offering the advice: 'Take
it! Get to a bank if you want money!'56
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330
The anarchists continued to reject any attempt to initiate collective struggle
similar to the CDE. Accordingly, the struggle of the BOC to forge proletarian unity
within its 'Workers' Alliance Against Unemployment' ('Aliança Obrera contra ci Atur
Forcós') was disdainfully rejected by the anarchists as a 'communist plot'. The anarchists
juxtaposed the collective organisation of the unemployed with individual or small group
activity aimed at what the Catalan FAT termed the 'wearing down of the capitalist
system'. In the view of 'Marianet', a leading Builders' Union activist, certain types of
behaviour described in conservative social discourse as 'robbery' were both 'anarchist and
revolutionary'. According to their own particular interpretation of direct action as
violence, the anarchists celebrated the illegality of the jobless as a positive sign that the
dispossessed were prepared to take charge of their own destinies, an indicator of the
fighting spirit of the masses and a necessary part of proletarian survival.57
The illegality of the jobless was, therefore, anything but 'criminal' in the eyes of
the libertarians. Instead, it was the honourable pursuit of 'the right to life', 'the most
sacred right of all', which was systematically contravened by capitalism. Crime,
therefore, was one of the 'derivatives of hunger', the 'logical consequence of the
economic system', practised by 'unfortunates pursued by hunger, who rob because
hunger is killing them' and who were 'more worthy of compassion and help than
punishment'. During another discussion of illegality Solidaridad Obrera noted that 'not
only do we understand but, we also excuse, because responsibility falls on the egoistic
and brutal society that oppresses us'. The authorities naturally viewed matters differently
and jobless detainees who justified illegality to 'procure the means of existence' and
defended their entitlement to 'conquer' the 'right to life' received heavy prison terms from
outraged Judges.58
For the libertarians, the individual illegalist 'gesture' became a latter-day version
of the 'propaganda of the deed'. The anarchists sought to direct the unemployed as a
'shock force' on the streets to dislocate bourgeois social peace and demonstrate that a
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truly harmonious civic order was inconsistent with capitalism. One group of unemployed
anarchists failed to impress their trial judge when they invoked Bakunin to justify their
robbery as 'a blow' (un golpe) by which they hoped to arouse the servile spirit of the
unemployed. This illegality sometimes acquired highly theatrical features, as exemplified
in the raid of an armed gang on a cinema box office during which one of the
'expropriators' took time to explain to bystanders that he and his colleagues were not
'robbers' but unemployed workers, 'tired of living with hunger'.59
In another sense the expansion of illegality in the 1930s was in no small part the
outcome of the vicissitudes of the class struggle and the long-standing punitive practice
of employers blacklisting labour militants. The Republic had not altered the retributive
'covenant of hunger' imposed on labour activists. Indeed, the concentration of employers'
organisations in the 1 920s and early 193 Os meant that blacklists were circulated more
widely than in the past and it was more difficult for activists to dodge them by moving
elsewhere in the country. Blacklisting was also encouraged by the Generalitat, which
replaced victimised cenetistas with workers from its own borsa de treball.6°
Because the increasingly weakened unions of the CNT lacked the strength to
place activists in work, many of the hundreds of blacklisted militants in Barcelona turned
to armed robbery. José Escolano Lopez, a 'solitary robber' sentenced to a 42 year
sentence for holding up car drivers around the bourgeois suburbs on the outskirts of
Barcelona, was afaIsta and a well-known anarchist since before World War One. Other
anarchist veterans, all of whom undoubtedly figured in employer blacklists at one time or
another, set out to resolve their short-term insolvency through illegal means and figured
prominently among the highway and bank robbers of the 193 Os. The same was also true
of many of the anarchists who returned from exile in 1931 in a jobless and penniless
state. The press covered numerous Catalans with 'advanced ideas' who arrived in
Barcelona with French comrades and proceeded to 'expropriate' together. Most notably,
these included MartI Serrarols Tresseres, who was wanted for the assassination of a
Tarragona judge and had spent the 192Os eluding the authorities in Spain, Italy, France
59 La Vanguardia. 20 August 1931; La Veu de Catalunva. 24 December 1933
60 Solidaridad Obrera, 9 October 1932, 20 September 1933; Sembrar, 19 November 1932
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and South America, before returning to the Catalan capital, where he was arrested for
armed robbery. There was also a clear overlap between the 'expropriators' and the
veterans of the 'action groups' who had stood up to the Libres during the daily street
battles of the 1920s. One such activist was Angel Latorre Morales, a veteran grupista,
who was sentenced to 35 years for a bank raid in Manresa in which he killed a security
guard. Similarly, Leon Escudero, wanted for the 1918 assassination of the Mayor of
Reus, was eventually apprehended by the police while foraging the country roads on the
outskirts of Barcelona for wealthy car drivers.6'
Activists blacklisted during the watershed conflicts of the Republican years also
ranked among the 'expropriators'. These included militants those sacked after the 1931
Telefónica strike, the September 1931 general strike, the 1932 woodworker's stoppage,
the 1933 builders' conflict and the 1933 tram strike. Moreover, as well as rank-and-filers,
leading cenetistas from the Republican era practised popular illegality, including the ex-
president of the Barcelona Wood Workers' union and Francisco Tomás Facundo, also
known as Francisco Hearto, the one-time President of the CNT in l'Hospitalet.62
The connection between cenetistas and faIstas victimised and blacklisted after
the 'revolutionary gymnastics' and the 'expropriators' was equally intimate. The case
histories of those victimised after the putsches provide examples of some of the most
committed and desperate examples of the 'expropriators'. These perseguidos, who were
correctly regarded by the police as the most dangerous, were readier than most to use
their arms against the security forces and on more than one occasion these 'fugitives
from bourgeois repression' shot and killed police to guarantee their freedom. The
attitude of these perseguidos was embodied by the words of Piera, himself blacklisted
after the January 1933 rising: 'given that society declared war on me, I declared war on
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society'. 63 JoaquIn AubI Casals also stands out amongst the perseguidos. A member of
the FAT grupos from before the Republic, AubI Casals was suspected of assassinating a
Libre gunman in Badalona before being arrested with a smoking gun in the Plaça de la
Repiiblica on the bloody May Day of 1931. Escaping custody in the jailbreak that
accompanied with the December 1933 putsch, AubI Casals went on the run, participating
in the 'revolutionary gymnastics' and afterwards excelling as an 'expropriator' in the so-
called Martorell Gang'. It is, in fact, highly likely that he had long participated in armed
robbery because, according to GarcIa Oliver, it was AubI Casals and his friends who
financed the 1931 FAT May Day rally with money from a 'lottery win'. Finally, in 1935
AubI Casals was sentenced for the murder of a Mataró bank manager and for his part in
another robbery at the Banco de Bilbao in Barcelona.64
The relation between blacklisted activists and armed robbery should not be
viewed in an overtly instrumental light, because the victimised militants did have some,
even though limited, choices. For example, in the 1920s Camil Pinyón, an anarchist
metal worker and later treintista worked as a barrow-boy after he was refused
employment in every workshop in the Catalan capital. Equally, in the 1 930s Peirats, a
blacklisted anarchist brickmaker and a rising figure in the l'Hospitalet FAT, was able to
live from his newly developed journalistic talents. However, in fairness, the journalistic
talents of Peirats were not possessed by all blacklisted militants. Moreover, in the
recession-torn 193 Os a number of the escape-routes into casualised pockets of the job
market that had traditionally been open to victimised activists were closed off.65
Illegality was also, at times, a necessary outlet for refugees from fascism. In an
increasingly repressive Europe, many anarchists converged on Catalonia in an attempt to
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escape repression at home, in the hope that their Iberian comrades could provide
solidarity. Soon after the birth of the Republic Italian anarchists, many of whom had
outstayed their welcome in the neighbouring French Republic, began to arrive in
Barcelona. The ranks of the exiles were swollen after the coup d'etat of General Uriburu
in Argentina in 1930, when a number of Spanish émigré anarchists and native
Argentinians made their way to the Catalan capital. Following the advent of General
Salazar's dictatorship two years later many other anarchists came from neighbouring
Portugal. By 1935 official estimates pointed to just under 16,000 'illegal' immigrants in
Barcelona, the majority of which were 'political', fleeing fascist or authoritarian
régimes.
While the International Refugees Support Committee offered assistance for
displaced anarchists, organising collections for the anti-fascists, settling them in the city
and offering legal advice, there were few opportunities of finding work. Moreover, the
tasks of the International Refugees Support Committee were hampered by the
Republican authorities who, like their French neighbours, were far from hospitable
towards the proletarian anti-fascist exiles. Highlighting the selective policy of the
Republic towards the enemies of Mussolini, the Republic welcomed middle class, liberal
and intellectual opponents of Mussolini, who were offered asylum. Meanwhile, despite
official utterances of anti-fascist solidarity, proletarian Italian émigrés were subjected to
intense police harassment, and even expelled from the Spanish state. Even when anti-
fascist workers found stable employment it was very difficult for them to acquire work
permits and there were cases of emigres who had work still being hounded out of the
country as 'illegal immigrants' and 'dangerous anarchists'. Consequently, living under the
constant threat of deportation, and like many of the unemployed, excluded from the
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official economy, the anarchist anti-fascists were pushed towards a life of illegality in
Barcelona and took up arms to satisly their daily living expenses.67
The émigrés, like the blacklisted cenetistas, were often inclined towards illegality
due to political judgement and individual disposition. For instance, Germinal de Sousa,
an unemployed PortuguesefaIsla refugee never took recourse to armed illegality in
Barcelona. Similarly, there is no proof that leading émigrés from the Argentinian FORA
such as Manuel Villar and Abad de Santillãn ever committed acts of illegality, despite
arriving penniless to face a harsh life of exile in Barcelona. On the testimony of Abad de
Santillãn, 'Villar would have starved to death before trying his hand at such activities'.68
Equally, there is a no evidence that any of the communist refugees in Barcelona were
detained for acts of armed illegality.69
Matters were very different for the bulk of the anarchist refugees, however, the
majority of whom could not follow the example of Villar and Abad de Santillán and
wield the pen to live. Moreover, it is evident that many undoubtedly found the pistol
mightier and easier to manipulate. Hence, within the ranks of both the foreign and the
indigenous anarchists a kind of natural selection operated whereby young unemployed
worker-intellectuals used their time to write, while others, of a more adventurous
temperament, the so-called 'men of action', practised armed illegality. This was
recognised by Abad de Santillán, who admitted that some of the unemployed
Argentinians, including a number of his intimate friends, adopted 'direct action, the
daring attack (golpe de mano)' and 'were inclined to look for their survival with means•
that the law punished heavily'.70
Of all the foreign anarchist 'expropriators' it was the Italians who revealed most
aplomb. One of the most prominent Italian anarchist 'expropriators' was Pietro Bruzzi, a
Milanese anarchist and veteran of Italian libertarian struggles from the turn of the
67 Las Noticias, 7 March, 17 May, 5 June, 29 November 1931,4 May 1934; La Van guardia, 8, 17
September 1931, 5 July, 13-15 December 1932, 7 May, 8, 11 August, 27 September, 15 October 1933, 4
December 1934; La Nau, 24 April 1931; L'Opinió. 26 October 1933
68 Abad de Santillán, Memorias, pp.182, 185
69 While it is still possible that foreign communists did commit expropriations but managed to evade the
police, it is most likely that the communists eschewed acts which they regarded as 'individual terror'.
70 Abad de Santillán, Memorias, pp.182, 220-221
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century. Forced to flee fascist repression in the early 1920s, Bruzzi was expelled from
Belgium and France, where he had headed the Paris-based Committee for Political
Victims. Before his expulsion from Paris in 1928, Bruzzi entered into contact with
Spanish and Catalan émigrés, forging ties that eventually led him to Barcelona. The
illegality of the groups of Italian émigrés was characterised by such verve that they
attracted many Catalan and Spanish anarchists. For example, from 1932 until his arrest in
1934, Giuseppe Vicari carried out a series of small armed raids on shops and chemists,
both to fbnd the anarchist movement and for the subsistence of the members of the so-
called 'Vicari Gang', which included the Sabater brothers from 1'Hospitalet. Similarly, the
anarchist grupo that the bourgeois press dubbed the 'Alpini Gang', which was reputedly
led by Rimini-born Alpim, included Gabriel Jover Planes, a veteran grupista from the
1920s, as well as members from the Ateneu Faros. Another Ateneu Faros member who
'expropriated' with Italian émigrés was Josep Gardenyes. A leading Barcelonafaista,
Prisoners' Support Committees activist and one of the main organisers of the
International Refugees Support Committee, the friendship between Gardenyes and the
Italian anarchists preceded Mussolini's accession to power, when the Catalan lived and
worked in Italy.7'
The illegality that was often a necessity for the libertarian émigrés and the
blacklisted cenetista militants and the unemployed was a glorious virtue for the
anarchist-individualists in Barcelona. These individualists drew on the strands within
anarchism that had long glorified the robber. This trend dates back to Bakunin, the
doyen of European anarchism, who described the bandit as 'the genuine and sole
revolutionary - a revolutionary without fine phrases, without learned rhetoric,
irreconcilable, indefatigable and indomitable, a popular and social revolutionary, non-
political and independent of any estate'. 72 Certainly, in one sense it is true that as the
71 La Vanguardia, 6 January, 18, 24 March, 7, 4 April, 31 May, 18 July 1933, 27 December 1934, 4, 28
January 1935; Revista Anarchica, Red Years. Black Years. Anarchist Resistance to Fascism in Italy,
London, 1989, pp.'7, 37-38, 43; Tierra y Libertad, 19 September 1931; Solidaridad Obrera, 29
September 1934; Las Noticias, 17 May, 5 June 1931,4 October 1934, 5 February, 16 May, 4 July 1936;
Antonio Tllez Solá, Sabaté. Guerrilla urbana en Espafla (1945-1960), Barcelona, 1992, p.42; La Veu
de Catalunya, 6 January 1933, 18, 21 April 1934; GarcIa Oliver, El eco de los pasos, p.230
72	 in Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits, Harmondsworth, 1985, p.1 10
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harbingers of a new socio-juridico-economic order, all revolutionaries are, ipso facto,
outside the laws of bourgeois society. Some anarchists, however, took this truism as
evidence that all those outside the law were revolutionary or, at least, nascent rebels.
The typically anarchic conflation of illegality per se with revolution was given a
new impetus by the individualist anarchism of Max Stirner 7 Reasoning from the idealist
premise that the law was endowed with no other punitive power than that which the
consciousness of the meek endowed it, the Stirnerists regarded individual (criminal) will
as the grave-digger of the state. From this premise the Stirnerists lauded crime in the
same way a poet might worship beauty, viewing illegality as a liberating journey of self-
actualisation. Rather than place faith in the transforming powers of the proletariat, they
looked towards the 'dispossessed' and 'the race of the poor', an amalgam of paupers,
criminals and déclassé intellectuals, as the locum tenens of change. Meanwhile, the
Stirnerists rejected all morality based on collectivism, including that of revolutionaries, as
a debilitating gaol for the individual spirit. Similarly, they rejected all organisation, from
the CNT unions right across to anarchist organisations like the FAT, on the grounds that
these 'dominating and regulatory' bodies that turned individuals into 'machines'. Instead,
extrapolating the individualistic ethos of capitalism and elevating it to the level of
ideology, they conceived of a pseudo-Darwinian quest for survival in which beggars
were to starve, while those with a spirit of resistance would be forced to conquer what
they needed or desired, invoking their sacred right to violence. The only collective units
the Stirnerists accepted as legitimate were the 'unions of egoists', the tiny groups of
'authentic revolutionaries' which they regarded as the harbinger of change.74
Though Stirnerist individualism had never been one of the dominant strands of
the Catalan anarchist movement, by the 1930s the standing of the individualists within
the Ibenan anarchist movement had increased considerably. Firstly, many of the
anarchists exiled in Paris in the 1920s had been exposed to the individualist current in the
For Stirner's philosophy see R.W.K.Paterson, The Nihilistic E goist: Max Stirner, Oxford, 1971, John
P. Clark, Max Stirner's E goism. London, 1976 and Enrico Fern, L'anti giuridismo di Max Stirner,
Milan, 1992. For a study of Stirnensm in practice see Richard Parry, The Bonnot Gang. The Story of
the French Illegalists, London, 1987.
' Iniciales, August 1929, December 1930, May 1932, November 1934, January-May, December 1935-
February 1936
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bars and cafés of Montmartre, where the legend of Bonnot was still veiy much alive.
Acción, the Spanish publication of the Parisian Revue International Anarchiste, revealed
the influence of French theorists and validated individual struggle. Secondly, Sebastian
Faure, the spiritual guide to Durruti, strongly favoured individualism and the practical
messages of the individualist credo appealed enormously to the poverty-line bohemia of
the Iberian exiles. Thirdly, Stirnerist ethics were already evident in the cardinal tenets of
Iberian anarchism. In the view of Pestafia, the belief that universal human emancipation
would arrive through the sacrifice of the lone avenger allowed Stirnerism to draw on old
Spanish anarchist traditions of the 'myth of individual terror'."
While the aversion of the individualists to collective organisation inhibited them
from expressing themselves directly through either the CNT or the FM, a number of
historical, political and personal ties connected the individualists to those who
constituted the CNT-FAI leadership after 1932. Many of the anti-syndicalists within the
FAT created a highly favourable climate for the individualists. For example, Antonio
Dionisios' Garcia Birlan, a leading individualist of the period, was an associate of the
Urales clan, all of whom were bound together by their pronounced anti-syndicalism.
Other individualists like Alfonso Miguel, Gardenyes and the Ballano brothers, Cefenno
and Adolfo, had emerged from Barcelona's grupos de afinidad in the 1 920s, along with
many of the activists who led the CNT in the 193 Os. Adolfo Ballano had been a member
of'Los Solidarios', alongside Durruti, Francisco Ascaso and Garcia Oliver, while Miguel,
another erstwhile member of 'Los Solidarios', established himself as Durruti's favourite
driver. The contacts between the individualists and the faista leadership of the CNT
were also in evidence after the birth of the Republic. This was most notably the case with
Gardenyes, who emerged as a leadingfaista in the Catalan capital in 1931. Gardenyes
was held in particular esteem by Garcia Oliver and he regularly appeared at meetings on
the same platform as 'The Three Musketeers'. Garcia Oliver was also a close associate of
Piera, another prominent 1930's individualist. 76 Durruti, meanwhile, was an important
Acción, August 1925; PestaIa, Lo ciue aprendi, vol.2, pp.63-64
76 La Vanguardia, 10-11 August 1923, 25 June, 31 October 1933, 15 Februaiy, 31 March, 15Apr11, 19,
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point of contact between the CNT-FAI leaders and the individualist-illegalists. The
Ruano Segündez brothers, two Argentinian individualists who arrived in Barcelona in
the early 1930s, benefited from the loyal friendship of Durruti. Of the Ruano Segündez
brothers, the individualist credentials of Lucio were second to none: he was an old
comrade-in-arms of Severino Di Giovanni and Paulino Scarfó, two Italo-Argentinian
individualists who attained public notoriety and mythical status among the anarchist
groups.77
These connections made it possible for Stirnerist perspectives on illegality and
criminality to attain considerable influence amongfaIstas and, to a lesser, but still
significant extent, within the ranks of the cenetistas. Individualist ideas enjoyed much
currency in the libertarian press and La Revista Blanca showed a renewed interest in the
ideas of Stirner. It was Tierra y Libertad, however, which most keenly embraced the
individualist conception of illegality, glorifjing the 'bravery' of the bandits who robbed
the lords on the highways of pre-industrial Catalonia. Resounding with the message of
Stirner, the FAT weekly argued that because property was a 'symbol of authority', theft,
therefore, constituted a subversive act of rebellion. In similar tones, Tierra y Libertad
mused that 'robbery does not exist as a "crime". ..it is one of the complements of life'. It
was even maintained that theft played a pivotal role in the class struggle.78
The growing acceptance of individualistic illegality was increasingly seen in the
mainstream CNT press. The first shift in the stance of Solidaridad Obrera towards
illegality came with the switch in editorship from the anarcho-syndicalists to the radical
anarchists late in 1931. This trend became even more discernible after April 1932, during
the second period of editorship by Felipe AlaIz, who was a long-standing friend of
Dionisios' GarcIa, the individualist sage. As well as showing a nostalgia for the
Andalusian bandits of old, AlaIz counselled readers to 'assert their right to freedom and
Durruti. p.67; Laon-Ignacio, Los afios. pp.242, 314; Tierra y Libertad. 4 July 1931; La Batalla. 7 July
1932; La Publicitat, 10 April 1934, 4 July 1935; Porcel, La revuelta, pp.126-129
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to life, [by] seizing "illegally" the wealth that the official robbers store up under the
protection of the state'. The quasi-Stirnerian stance of Solidaridad Obrera was ever
apparent and the CNT daily praised the anarchists as 'rebels against all laws' generated by
'the vengeflil procedures of bourgeois justice' designed to protect the 'enemy society'. In
the autumn of 1932, under the editorship of Liberto Callejas, Solidaridad Obrera
acquired an even more pronounced individualistic tone, a conversion underlined by one
editorial that was a quasi-Stirnerist celebration of 'desire' (querer) as the 'order of life'.
Meanwhile, on another occasion Solidaridad Obrera welcomed those branded as
'delinquents' by 'those who control' as 'our brothers'. By 1933 these sentiments had
germinated into regular 'justifications' of'violent acts of an individual nature' in the pages
of the CNT daily. Finally, between December 1933 and 1935, under the editorship of the
Argentinian Villar, Solidaridad Obrera crowned its descent into illegalism with an
unambiguous justification of counterfeiting, explaining that there was 'little difference
between men who make false money and those who accumulate good money', because
'good money is always a little false', whether attained with 'tricks or favours', while at
least 'false money' requires 'competent people with the highest technical skills'.79
The 'conscious illegalism' inspired by the individualists was an important factor in
the spread of armed criminality during the Republican years. This was periodically
reaffirmed by the fervour with which individualists detained for armed illegality shared
their Stirnenst notions with the police. For example, when one gang of individualists was
apprehended one of their number proudly informed police: 'I'm a pure anarchist and I rob
banks, yet I'm incapable of robbing the poor, like others do'. In similar vein, one of his
associates admitted freely that 'I go into banks to withdraw with the pistol, while others
go in with the cheque book. It's all a question of procedure'. This same 'procedure' was
employed by the Ballano brothers, both of whom regularly contributed to the Stirnenst
journal Iniciales and 'expropriated' together. Individualism also provided a compelling
logic for many other anarchists in Barcelona and several associates of'Nosotros', the
'super-FAT', were convicted of armed robbery in the 1930s, including Durruti's younger
Garcia Oliver, El eco, p.188; Solidandad Obrera, 23 June, 26 August, 16 September, 13 October
1932, 12 January, 11 February 1933, 15 April 1934, 15 September 1935
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brother, Bonifacio. Individualist ethics also provided fi.irther justification for the armed
illegality of the cosmopolitan refugees. There is evidence that French individualists were
attracted to Barcelona, including Alphonse Gelabert, an anarchist deserter from the
French anny who was arrested for highway robbery and described by police as 'a very
dangerous individual'. Among the Argentinians Lucio Ruano Segündez stands out:
described by L'Opinió as 'one of the most dangerous' anarchists in Catalonia and wanted
by police for a bomb attack on the offices of one of Barcelona's employers' associations
and for assassinating two police informants who infiltrated the FM, he lived as an
individualist 'expropriator' while on the run from police.80
The emphasis of the individualists on the liberating quality of illegality also
attracted some of the 'expropriators' who had learnt their skills in the Confederal
Defence Committees fund-raising teams. Piera, a former travelling salesman for a
Catalan biscuit company, was emblematic of the trajectory of these activists. Arrested by
police in the company of Garcia Oliver before the January 1933 putsch, Piera was
savagely beaten and tortured by police at the Comissaria on VIa Laietana. The failure of
the January 1933 putsch was a watershed for Piera's involvement in collective working
class organisation. While his spirit of rebellion was far from snuffed out by the police, the
young anarchist and Confederal Defence Committee militant left the FM in the wake of
its defeat and, finding himself victimised, unemployed and blacklisted, became an ardent
individualist. Reflecting on his recent past, Piera believed it was 'simple-minded' (babau)
to remain in an organisation like the FM and he rejected the 'blind faith' and passive
mentality that he felt pervaded it. Indeed, these very sentiments had already led Piera to
dispute the division of the spoils of a Confederal Defence Committee robbery because,
as he later explained, 'I wanted the bread (calers) for myself, whatever the cost'. Police
investigations revealed that after leaving the FM, Piera and his individualist associates
operated on the country roads on the outskirts of Barcelona, before moving on to bigger
Las Noticias, 11 April, 3 November, 21 December 1931, 17 August 1932,21 April 1934, 2 July
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targets, including banks in the Catalan capital. At 20 years of age, Piera was typical of
those who were forced into a life on the margins of society by bourgeois blacklists; in the
view of Josep Maria Planes, the legal correspondent from La Publicitat, he embodied the
'idealist and human motives that push someone to become a robber.. .a lad, ready for
anything to make money to sustain a life of leisure'. Piera and his associates were lost, at
least temporarily, to both the worlds of work and collective organisation and they
robbed to live.81
A few months after the arrest of Piera, police successfully detained another gang
of illegalists that was based on ex-grupistas from the Confederal Defence Committees.
Two of the detainees had records for armed robbery, while another pair were former
'quartermasters' for the Confederal Defence Committee squads. One of the gang, Maria
Ferrer, was also a relative of Piera and an individualist who, according to Las Noticias,
'confessed to be an anarchist and enthusiastically defended the ideology before the police
agents', whom she attempted to persuade of the moral correctness of anarchism.82
The unconditional acceptance by the illegalists of all those condemned by
bourgeois justice and conservative morality meant that the individualists served as a
powerful rallying-point for all advocates of 'criminal' activities, including elements that
were conventionally described as 'underworld'. It is not difficult to see how the stance of
the individualists appealed to 'underworld' elements, particularly as Stirner himself had
regarded 'knaves' and 'villains' as the creators of a new order. The individualist message
also consolidated many pre-existing 'underworld' traditions, making it both
understandable and highly attractive to recidivists. Added to this was the general
openness of anarchists towards all marginal elements and the blind libertarian faith in
their capacity to civilise those cast aside by bourgeois society as 'criminals'. One leader in
Solidandad Obrera spoke of the desirability of such an alliance between "delinquency"
and the subversive spirit'.83
Xl Solidaridad Obrera, 31 January 1933; La Publicitat, 6, 10 April 1934; L'O pinió, 31 March 1934
82 Las Noticias, 4 September 1934
83 Solidaridad Obrera, 20 April 1932, 15 April 1934
343
In subjective, sub-cultural terms, the libertarian conception of illegality had much
in common with the culture of the so-called 'underworld'. The anarchists eschewed the
use of terms like 'robbery' (atraco) and 'steal', speaking instead of the 'transferral'
(traslado) or 'redistribution' (reparlo) of money. The culture of the 'underworld' revealed
a similar aversion to conventional conservative discourse and just as the anarchist
'expropriators' had their own linguistic code to describe illegality, many offenders
adopted a vernacular that legitimised their activities. For instance, the argot used by the
Catalan 'underworld' to obfuscate their dealings from informants and police agents
possessed no less than five equivalents to the negative-sounding 'lladre' ('thief), all of
which carried positive connotations. Like the anarchist 'expropriators', offenders rarely
regarded themselves as 'robbers' (atracadors) or 'thieves' (liadres) favouring instead
terms like as 'unfortunates' (desgraciats) or, more favourably still, as 'men of the life'
(homes de la vida).84
The widespread use of nicknames (apodos) was another facet shared by both the
anarchist underground and the criminal 'underworld'. A highly practical way of
concealing true identities from the security forces, it was common for many offenders to
be known exclusively by their nickname in exactly the same way as some of the
grupistas were known by noms de guerre. 85 These nicknames often referred to the
birthplace of an individual, such as 'El Gallego' ('The Galician')or 'El MallorquI' ('The
Mallorcan'), while in the cases oPEl Cubano' ('The Cuban') or 'El Argentino' ('The
Argentinian') they were derived from places where an individual had spent a time of
exile. Other nicknames alluded to physical or personal attributes, including 'El Nan'
('Shorty'), 'El Microbi' ('The Sprog'), Patilles' ('Sideburns'), 'El Pichi' ('The Spiv') and 'El
Cabezota' ('Big-head'). Some, such as Ramon Vila Capdevila, known to his friends as
'Caraquemada' ('Scarface'), were known by their physical deformities. It was also
common for nicknames to be epithets to past or occasional occupations, invariably
unskilled, such as 'El Paleta' ('The Bricklayer'), 'El Nan del Fabril' ('Shorty of the textile
Solidaridad Obrera, 16 April 1932; Rafael Vidiella, Los de aver. Barcelona, 1938, p.107;
Vallmitjana, Criminalitat. pp.6-7, 26, 61
85 Vallmitjana, Criminalitat. p.8
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sector'), 'El Portuari' ('The Docker') and 'El Fuster' ('The Woodworker'). 'El Chofer'
('The Driver'), the one-time organiser of the l'Hospitalet CNT Taxi-drivers' union, earnt
his nickname due to both his former profession and his new-found role in the
'expropriation' squads. The nicknames also revealed a far from enlightened replication of
the masculinity that pervaded the 'underworld' and one anarchist, presumably
homosexual, was referred to in highly disparaging terms as 'El Chapero' ('The Queer').86
In the 1 930s there was an unmistakable overlap between the anarchists and the
'underworld'. Along with the joint struggles of'common' and 'social' prisoners in the jails,
there were a number of signs that an 'alliance' between the two was in the throes of
fruition. For instance, the December 1933 jail break from Barcelona prison included
falsias, 'expropriators' from the Confederal Defence Committee and 'common' prisoners.
This confluence was often seen in action during illegality. Antonio Gozalzo Jaque, 'an
individual of most advanced ideas', according to La Noche, robbed with Georges Albert
Dufroy, who, the police alleged, was a French 'pimp'. Similarly, Blas Zambulio, a pivotal
figure in the 'expropriations' of the l'Hospitalet Confederal Defence Committee, was
previously known to the authorities as a 'common criminal' with no 'political' motivation,
wanted for the murder of a newsagent. Also in l'Hospitalet, José David Salgado Prieto,
an 18 year old with a 'record for robbery', perpetrated armed robberies with FM
militants. Meanwhile, Alberto MartIn Ursal, a Madrid 'con man' detained in Barcelona
for burglary, moved in circles that allowed him an 'awareness of all the groups currently
dedicated to the commission of attacks and robberies' in the Catalan capital.87
The growing confluence between the anarchist underground and the illegalist
'underworld' was especially conspicuous between 1934-193 5. This was the time of the
strongest repression of the Republican era, when the CNT-FAI structures in Barcelona
were disrupted to such a degree that jobless, blacklisted and unwaged militants were
largely left to their own devices. Pushed into clandestinity, anarchists maintained contact
86 GarcIa Oliver, El eco, p.45. The examples of nicknaines are taken from the daily press throughout the
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primarily within the libertine environment provided by the bars of downtown Barcelona,
especially those in the port area of the city, the Barn Xino and El Parallel. This setting
became the theatre for the meeting of the libertarian underground and the deviant
'underworld', where blacklisted and unemployed anarchists, freed from the discipline of
factory life and unencumbered by the normal sleeping and working hours inherent to
wage labour, mixed with recidivists. The reports of police ràtzies on some of the bars of
the city, including 'La Tranquilidad', Durruti's favourite café on El Parallel, testifies to
the shared environment of the anarchists and the outlaws of Barcelona. One such report,
revealed how a series of raids on bars frequented by FIJL militants in the Barn xino led
to the arrest of 'a mixture of anarchists and robbers', some 20 'individuals of irregular
life, the majority of them young and already filed as anarchists', one of whom was
wanted for an assassination attempt on a tram boss. Indicative of the unstable, bohemian
lot of the youths, nine of them gave their place of residence as the same Barn xino
pension. Moreover, adding further grist to the mill of the bourgeois press, leads from this
raid led police to sweep a number of other bars in the Sants district, one of which was
frequented by anarchist youths and petty offenders and yielded over 300 gold watches
and a quantity of stolen radios.88
6.5. Crime Waves and Moral Panics
In 1934 employers' and shopkeepers' associations continued the pressure they
had put on the authorities since the birth of the Republic. There were vociferous pleas
for the Generalitat to confront the 'crime-wave' which the economic elites viewed as an
enormous subversive criminal plot that was on the brink of destroying the institutions of
society. Delegations from the commercial classes inundated the authorities with demands
to attack the 'underworld', a protest that was interspersed with strikes of shopkeepers
who closed their stores to business as a sign of their disgust at ongoing 'public
insecurity'. This growing self-activity of the middle-class was spearheaded by groups like
the 'Commission of Civic Action Against Robbery and Theft' ('ComisiOn de Afinnación
88 L'Opimó, 23 March 1934; La Vanguardia. 8, 11-12 August 1933, 1 February, 7 April, 27 December
1934; La Publicitat, 12 April 1934, 8-9 January 1935
346
Ciudadana contra los Atracos y Robos'), a conservative law-and-order pressure group
which advocated arming the petit bourgeoisie. The big bourgeoisie also adopted a
campaign of extra-parliamentary pressure and the funerals of employers assassinated by
the grupistas were converted into protests against the inability of the authorities to curb
'criminal terrorism'. Capitalists also began exporting capital and organising lock-outs of
workers and 'civic protests' in favour of'social concord and public order'. Following a
wave of sackings in July, in August 1934 the Federaciôn de Fabricantes de Tejidos y
Hilados, the main organisation of the Catalan textile barons, organised a one-day lock-
out in Barcelona in protest at the assassinations of its members and issued a press release
calling for 'exceptionally energetic measures' to introduce 'perfect social discipline'.
Meanwhile, the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional impugned what it saw as 'rampant
criminality' and called for a mailed fist against the lawlessness that had taken grip of the
city. The Catalan bourgeoisie described its 'constant uncertainty' and disillusionment with
the Republic, a régime that it believed was increasingly synonymous with an absence of
authority. For the Fomento, who regarded illegality as the Achilles Heel of the Republic,
1934 was a year of 'levity in penal legislation; levity in judicial action; lamentable political
concomitants with crime.. licentious delinquency.. .frequent announcements of
revolutions or, disturbances (asonadas), robberies, murder for social motives, endemic
strikes... [more] strikes, acts of sabotage, robberies; nothing was absent from the cohort
which accompanied the violent outrages'. Finally, the Fomento blamed crime for the
economic crisis and, like the 'Commission of Civic Action Against Robbery and Theft',
called for an end to the 'unarmed authority' of the Republic and the re-imposition of the
death penalty to serve as an example to criminals.
The bourgeois press played a similar tune and joined the chorus against
'scandalous robberies', lamenting that 'public security continues to be little more than a
89 La Vanguardia, 31 January, 14-16, 25-26 March 1933, 20, 22 February, 18 July, 5, 7 August 1934;
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hope'. Meanwhile, the relative approximation of the Barcelona anarchists to the criminal
fraternity was good copy for bourgeois journalists who advanced pseudo-Lombrosian
claims of the osmosis between the libertarians and the so-called 'underworld'. As the
robberies, tram attacks and acts of sabotage ceased to abate, La Vanguardia lumped all
'disorder' together in a page headed Disturbances of the peace', thereby creating the
impression that the dominant sound of the street was a raucous cacophony of destruction
and chaos. La Veu de Catalunya demanded an increase in police activity to ensure the
victory of the 'law-abiding citizenry' over the 'professional evildoers' in 'the eternal battle
between organised society and common criminality'. Harking back to its preferred image
of a mythical golden crime-free era, the Lliga, along with the landowners of the Institut
AgrIcola Català de Sant Isidre and other conservative Catalan social forces, alleged that
the Generalitat reforms of the security forces had been ineffectual. As well as mourning
the demise of the old monarchical police, the Catalan right persistently argued in favour
of the central Spanish authorities resuming control of public order to end the reigning
state of 'anarchy', while, in the Catalan parliament, the Lliga exploited the robberies to
call for new draconian measures and 'strong government'.9°
Because the Generalitat had publicly committed itself to ending illegality and win
over elements from the bourgeoisie, the Catalan authorities were wounded by the
vitriolic campaign of its detractors. Moreover, the Generalitat could not sit back and
allow the right to make political advances through the 'respectable fears' over illegality,
particularly as small shopkeepers, one of the major targets of armed robberies, remained
an important political constituency for the Republican parties. Increasingly, therefore, the
Generalitat was captivated by the law-and-order genie that had been released by the
bourgeoisie and committed itself to taking over the law-and-order mantle of the Lliga by
ending 'endemic criminality' and hitting out against 'wicked people'. During an address at
the funeral of a textile employer assassinated by the FAT, Dencàs sought to assuage the
fears of the haute bourgeoisie by promising to accelerate the war against illegality and 'to
apply the principle of authority'. Meanwhile, adorning themselves with the clothing of
La Vanguardia, 2, 28 January, 10, 27-28 March, 29 April, 7 September 1934; La Veu de Catalunva,
11 April 1934; gç, 5 January 1933
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the right, L'Opinió, Justicia Social, La Humanitat and La Publicitat vied with the ultra-
conservative La Vanguardia and La Veu de Catalunya to censure the 'plague' of
'scandalous crimes' of'unpunished robbers' and 'bandits'. Of all the Barcelona press,
L'Opinió emerged as the most forthright advocate of expanding the 'repressive factor',
warning that 'all efforts are necessary' to combat the 'criminal organisation established in
our city' that represents a 'problem of life or death'.9'
Ironically, in a year that saw the creation of the fascist Falange Espafiola and a
sharp rise in the danger of anti-Republican reaction, L'Opinió was adamant that crime
remained 'the most pressing problem and the most difficult to resolve of all those facing
the Republic today'. Paradoxically, the campaign of the Catalanistes to snuff out
illegality in the 'bulwark of the Republic' increasingly generated its own authoritarian
dynamics. While the Escamots organised drills in fascist formation, L'O pinió advocated a
fierce repression under the cover of the highly autocratic formula of an 'armed
democracy', according to which the 'urgent necessity' would be a sweeping
reorganisation of the police and a rapid response unit to wipe out 'criminal social dregs'.
In an attempt to put the 'criminal classes' where they belonged, the 'Liuhins' advocated
the construction of more concentration camps and the increased use of the Ley de Vagos
y Maleantes against the 'underworld'. Meanwhile, other elements inside the Generalitat
endorsed the establishment of a 'Catalan National Front' to protect society from what it
saw as the threat posed by the criminality of immigrant workers.92
Finally, when a series of robberies culminated in the killing of a policeman,
L'Opinió passed a new landmark on its rightward path, declaring that 'the struggle
against wrongdoers' required 'inexorable energy against those who transgress the law',
'extraordinary remedies' to 'intimidate the gangsters' and eliminate 'the cancer of
banditry'. Among the measures L'Opinió had in mind were a generalised cut in civil
liberties and tough measures against 'layabouts' who, it was maintained, were to be
91 L'Opinió, 23 July 1933, 28 March, 13 April 1934; Tierra y Libertad, 24 December 1933, 7 July 1934;
La Vanguardia, 7 August 1934; Justicia Social, 31 October, 28 November 1931, 11 November 1933; La
Huinanitat, 8 March, 8 July 1934; La Publicitat, 8 April 1934
92 L'Opinió, 6 April, 12 July 1933, 21 January, 7, 11, 13, 28-29 March, 3, 7, 13 April, 9 August 1934;
Llibertat, 5 March 1933
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'locked in a sanatorium or a reformatory and taught to work'. The tiuhins' also proposed
the suppression of specific clauses in the constitution, including a possible return of the
death penalty, in the drive towards the 'complete extinction' of'criminal groups'.93
This was typical of the sensationalist tone of the Republican press coverage of
illegality. Throughout 1933 and 1934 all the bourgeois-Republican press in Barcelona
reported appearances of a mysterious 'ghost car' (coixe-faniasma) which reputedly
spirited 'expropriators' away from empty banks in Barcelona. Lurid sexual imagery was
also very prominent in the coverage of crime in both the catholic conservative and the
laicist Republican press. The concern with sex aimed to stigmatise lawbreakers,
attributing them with a carnal appetite and a sexual prowess that was fuelled by their
illegal ways in a maimer that moral individuals could never expect to match. When two
anarchist individualist 'expropriators' were arrested the press focused less on their
illegality than on their personal lives and the 'two half-dressed young women' found by
police in their house. Sexual overtones rooted in the repressed fear of the potential
power of carnal attraction were similarly evident in press reports on the few women in
the 'expropriation' teams. Media caricatures of the women alternated between that of the
gangsters' mall who passively satisfied the carnal needs of the gang members following
an armed heist and that of the unprincipled temptress who ruthlessly exploited her
physical properties to fulfil her criminal urges. These stereotypes were given fill vent in
the celebrated case of Mercedes Vives Gascón, afaIsta who participated in a series of
pay-roll heists. Known to the bourgeois-Republican press as 'La Rubia' ('Blondie'), Vives
Gascón was portrayed as a lascivious but deadly beauty whose physical properties were
manipulated to distract unsuspecting security guards and night-watchmen.94
Illegality stimulated a recrudescence of the traditional insecurities of Catalan
capitalists about the Barn xino in official circles and the bourgeois-Republican press. In
the view of La Vanguardia, the Barn xino encapsulated 'the veritable danger of the
slums, where the disease and decay of its dark hovels create a climate favourable to the
L'Opimó, 24, 28 March, 3 April, 9 August 1934
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most vile germinations', casting forth 'legions of villains and swarms of parasites'.
Concerns about the allegedly criminogenic properties of the Barn xino highlighted the
way that the Generalitat had taken on board the law-and-order inhibitions of the old
monarchist elites. They were also emphatic that the Barn xino was a dangerous crime
zone, an 'underworld' lair, populated by the 'perishing classes'. The authorities were
alarmed that the labyrinthine streets of the 'catacombs of Barcelona', with its abundance
of'doss' and boarding houses, made it relatively easy to lead an anonymous life beyond
the reach of the police. Indicative of these fears, L'Opimó believed that many of the
'expropriators' lived in and around the Barn xino, where they spent the day strolling
around Les Rambles or drinking coffee in Placa Reial and enjoying all the freedoms
enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.95
The growing obsession of authorities that the Barn xino was Barcelona's main
centre for urban degeneration led them to ignore the abysmal housing conditions in the
area and resurrect the traditional connection between moral and corporal collapse.
Consequently, the urban poor were blamed for the high levels of illness and disease
within the 'labyrinth of infected streets' that comprised the Barn xino. The Generalitat
also uncritically accepted the anti-modernistic bourgeois fears of the fiamenco bars, cafés
cantants and clubs in the Barn xino asfoci of perversion, the breeding ground for crime
and the centre of the city's drugs and prostitution trade. Indeed, it was felt that the
inspiration for the immorality of the 'expropriators' came from the brutalising spectacles
provided by popular night-spots like 'La Criolla' and 'La Muralla' in the Barn xino and in
the bawdy theatrical and musical offerings of El Parallel. This was combined with a
wider denunciation of the cultural, social and leisure patterns of the masses by the
Republican authorities that differed little from their monarchist predecessors. This thesis
was explained by a physician close to Generalitat circles, who implied that degeneration
was linked to the deficient ethics of the inhabitants of the Barn xino and attributed the
L'Opinió, 26 March, 22 September 1933; La Publicitat, 16 August 1933, 11, 18 April 1934; k
Vanguardia, 26 April 1934, 10 November 1935; de Belimunt, Les Catacumbes, pp.73-82
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high levels of illness in the area to 'those who lead a nocturnal life in the cabarets and
other places of doubtful morality'Y
The Catalan Republicans placed responsibility for what they saw as the depravity
of the Barn xino on their favourite scapegoat: the southern Spanish immigrants. With
their usual linguistic sleight of hand, Catalanistes referred to the area in Spanish as the
'Banio Chino', inferring that its problems were quintessentially Spanish rather than
Catalan. Less subtly, the tluhIns' dubbed the Barn xino 'the Andalusian Barcelona'. Bars
in other marginalised areas that the Generalitat regarded as 'criminal haunts', such as the
Riera Blanca and Collblanc on the l'Hospitalet-Barcelona border, were also identified
with the arrival of non-Catalans. This fitted with the shared view of all the parties in the
Generalitat, including the USC, that crime was as alien to the Catalan way of life.
Emphasising the connections between immigrants and illegality, L'Opinió whined 'they
[i.e. the immigrants] contaminate us and inflict their gunmen and other criminals on us'.97
This stereotype extended to the anti-fascist refugees in Barcelona who were
regarded as 'criminal elements' by both left and right alike. For the Catholic right, these
bohemian and immoral non-believers were of 'doubtful moral conduct', the instigators of
'vandalistic acts'. Meanwhile, the well-proven xenophobia of the Republicans seized on
the presence of the 'foreign' and 'alien' anti-fascists. In a bizarre acceptance of Mussolini's
fascist justice', L'Opinió was convinced of the badness of one Italian anarchist because
he 'had been condemned to death by the Italian courts'. Meanwhile, Frederic Escofet, a
highly placed figure within the Generalitat security forces attributed lawbreaking to the
anti-fascist exiles, whom he viewed as 'the social detritus expelled from other countries
that had the sense not to allow them to return', 'international criminals' from the world
over, enticed to Barcelona by its reputation for police incompetence and laxity. In similar
tones, La Publicitat reported how the Barcelona 'underworld' had been augmented by the
émigrés, including 'over 300 Spanish anarchists from Argentina', who looked on the
96 L'Opinió, 22 September 1933, 9 August 1934; La Publicitat, 11 April 1934; Claramunt i Furest,
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Catalan capital as 'a centre of refuge' made it 'a favourite operational zone for the
international criminal world'.98
Italian anarchist éinigrés were singled out for particular derision. Coverage of the
Italians in the bourgeois-Republican dailies was of a highly salacious nature and was
often peppered with allusions to their reputed sexual prowess. Stories of Italian
anarchists detained on charges of armed robbery were frequently accompanied by
references to the 'attractive young women' whose company they allegedly kept, thereby
generating an image of playboy gangsters with a lover in every port in the
Mediterranean. It was even asserted that when the Italian libertarians were not engaging
in illegality, 'the large part of them live from women' and the drugs trade in the Placa del
Teatre, the main centre for prostitutes in 1 930s Barcelona.
The bi-partisan panics over the alleged connections between immigration and
crime complemented the allegations of the Catholic right that unstable family lives and
domestic dislocation were the harbingers of illegality. For instance, the Esquerra
excoriated the young 'undocumented' immigrant workers who descended on Catalonia.
Similarly, the pious La Veu de Catalunya believed that 'a band of youngsters between 17
and 25 years old' and a 'considerable number' of'runaway children', the majority of
whom were assumed to be non-Catalans, were a 'scourge' attracted by the reputation of
the 'dissolute life' (la mala vida) in Barcelona. These 'bohemian youth' constituted a
'constantly increasing floating population', swollen by waves of young 'hobos' (polissons)
who arrived concealed on goods trains. According to La Veu de Catalun ya, these
homeless youths 'live for the day and by night sleep wherever they can: sometimes in the
taverns of the Barn xino, sometimes in the stores around the port or in a sheltered
doorway'. It was claimed that 'hundreds' of them slept on the beaches in summer. 'They
don't work, nor have they ever thought of doing so', the Lliga daily complained; they
were undisciplined individuals who represented a 'formidable danger' to public order and
provided the 'best ingredient' for 'professional gunmen and robbers'. It was suggested
98 Barangó-SolIs, Reportaies, p107; Las Noticias, 7 March, 29 November 1931; El Mati, 6 September
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that once freed of the calming, socialising and moralising influence provided by the
family unit and unshackled from filial responsibilities, these youths were 'exploited' by
'the men of vice and crime' until they were 'predisposed towards every kind of
monstrosity'. 100
Fears of wayward youth fostered renewed concerns in the official imagination
about the interdependency of the anarchist grupos on Street gangs. The dismay of
conservative and Republican commentators alike was further heightened by the
revolutionary bohemia that permeated the Barcelona FIJL, who were widely seen by the
authorities as 'licentious', 'uncontrollable', non-conformist individuals, bent on an
'irregular life' in 'immoral establishments'. The socialists employed a similarly
conventional rubric of proletanan decency and described the anarchists as déclassé
'down-and-outs', 'a minority of adventurers of working class origin'. Joan Comorera, a
leading figure from the USC, identified anarchism as the ideology of'sub-human' and
'degenerate' individuals, 'underworld parasites', 'professional layabouts' and 'crooked
people'. Adding to the erosion of the division between criminal behaviour and social
protest, the Catalan UGT condemned the CNT for inciting the unemployed towards 'the
social goal of robbery, of storming the shops' when the working class had recourse to
'social legislation'.'°'
The tenor of the discourse of the authorities increasingly went against even the
legal activities of the labour movement. The growing preoccupation about the condition
of youth focused on excursionism, the mass hiking expeditions organised by anarchist
and communist walking clubs designed to take workers back to the fresh air of their
rural roots. According to the bourgeois-Republican press, once in the countryside,
innocent youths were 'forced to listen' to anarchist speeches, amid orgiastic scenes of
'free love'. As well as providing a morally debilitating ambience, it was asserted that the
excursionist clubs provided cover for the organisation of criminality and that bank
robbers planned their attacks during walks in the countryside, far away from the
100 Solidaridad Obrera, 28 August 1934; La Veu de Catalunya, 27 April 1934
La Publicitat, 18 April 1934; La Van guardia. 26 April 1934; Justicia Social, 1 August 1931, 29
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surveillance of the police. Similar reservations were expressed about the educational
Ateneus, which, the bourgeois-Republican press feared, were the prime cause of
corruption among youth. La Veu de Catalunya saw the union pedagogical centres as foci
of impropriety, where anarchists proselytised and 'perverted' youth, putting 'vely young
boys' and 'naïve youngsters' on a path of illegality and depravity.'02
Increasingly, therefore, the identification of the 'social' with the 'criminal' led the
Generalitat to view the CNT-FAI was little more than a criminal network engaged in a
destructive offensive against Catalonia that was compared with the Carthaginian sacking
of Rome. In an address to the Catalan Parliament, Dencàs demagogically cited a series of
pay-roll robberies as proof that the CNT-FAI was made up of'individuals who talk of
constructing a new society by snatching the wages of a humble worker', thereby echoing
Azaña's famous allegation that cenetistas were 'bandits with union cards'. The anarchists
were the 'gangsters of the labour movement', 'a criminal band' and an 'enemy rabble' of
'villains, thieves and bombers', 'born delinquents' and 'professional criminals' who had
privately established a 'Robbers' Union' (Sindicat d'atracadors) that 'sheltered behind the
name of the CNT to commit common crimes and pass them off as social acts'. In the
view of L'Opinió, whose cartoon caricatures depicted the robbers as the same
Neanderthal figures as the FM grupistas, the only thing that differentiated the anarchists
from 'common criminals' in other countries was that in Catalonia they controlled 'a press
which defends the validity of robbety and glorifies dead robbers'.'°3
These Lombro sian-type allegations reached their apogee in a series of articles by
Josep Planes, the legal correspondent with La Publicitat. Dressing up the moral panics as
investigative journalism, Planes interspersed 'respectable fears' about 'criminal anarchism'
with pseudo-anthropological digressions about the pre-industrial Italian brigands and
Andalusian bandoleros. Alleging that 'the characters who lead the various robbery gangs
are the most prestigious figures from the anarchist movement', Planes concluded that the
'expropriations' were a sui generis 'original type of criminality', 'typically Barcelonin',
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'inclined by a disposition towards crime and delinquency, which finds a justification or an
explanation for criminal instincts under the flag of anarchism'. The repressive agenda of
Planes's study were quite transparent, however, and his obsession with 'the anarchist
problem' led him to make a number of unsubstantiated allegations that Italian,
Argentinian and Gennan refugees were active in prostitution rackets and the drugs trade
in Barcelona. Meanwhile, ignoring the wider ambitions of the libertarian movement,
Planes, like Lombroso, regarded anarchism as a fundamentally criminal ideology and
claimed that 'the anarchist-robbers or the robber-anarchists of Barcelona are nothing less
than the Catalan equivalents of Al Capone...Today it is the fashion among all thieves,
pickpockets and swindlers to pass themselves off as anarchists'. Planes also attested that
the osmosis between the libertarians and the 'underworld' was so perfect that it was
impossible to deduce 'whether anarchism benefits from banditry or banditry benefits from
anarchism'.'°4
The study by Planes was bound up with the view of the Generalitat that
anarchism was the preserve of the Barcelona 'underclass' or, as the snobbish USC put it,
the 'lumpenproletarian' detritus of the city.'°' This traditionally conservative concept of
an 'underclass', which included the morally irresponsible elements within the
unemployed, was a development of the 'undeserving' or 'dangerous' dichotomy that
occupied a central place within the demonology of the Republican authorities after 1931.
It was maintained that this 'underclass' was contaminated by the brutalising experiences
of long-term unemployment and that the 'bad ways' of these lubricious individuals were
incorrigible, as proven by their wretched existence in the hovels of their ghettos and by
their craving for sensual pleasure in the immoral dens of the Barn xino.
104 La Publicitat, 6, 10-12 April 1934
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6.6. The Moral Panics Explored
The sensationalism of the bourgeois-Republican press was in part the outcome of
the growth in the number of newspaper titles during the Republic and the enhanced
competition as the leading dailies resolved to maximise their market share. This also
coincided with a period of real interest in 'organised crime' and the appearance of the
first 'crime journals' in Catalonia. These new titles, such as El Detective, focused on the
most grotesque and macabre crimes from around the world, including a far from
coincidental interest in Chicago gangsterism and the antics of Capone, Dillinger and the
legendary 'Ma' Barker-Karpis Gang.'°6
However, the real significance of the exaggerated, often fantastic moral panics,
was that they were an integral part of the initiative of the authorities to mobilise the
civilian population on the side of the state and gain popular acquiescence for official
sanctions against 'evildoers'. In this sense, the talk of a dangerous 'underclass' was an
invitation for sections of the proletariat to join the chorus of the respectable classes
against the long-term unemployed. The 'underclass', like the 'undeserving' poor, could
not just be ignored: their unproductivity made them at best a parasitic burden on the rest
of society; at worst they were a dangerous threat to the well-being of 'honest' citizens.
Moreover, the theory of a debauched and degenerate 'underclass' produced by its own
immoral ways, and not by the imperfections of society, suited middle class Republican
opinion which was largely incapable of comprehending the series of circumstances that
led from unemployment to poverty or from homelessness to illegality.
In a similar way, tales like the 'ghost car', which pointed to the growing potency
of the 'criminal classes', were instrumental in securing popular backing for new police
powers in their war against illegality, as well as reiterating the need to strengthen state
control over society. The image of the omnipotent 'expropriator' was exploited by the
Generalitat to demand respect for the security forces and construct a consensus around
an increasingly draconian vision of an autonomous Catalonia. Stories of criminal
omniscience were also exploited to alter popular perceptions of the police. Firstly, they
106 El Detective. 20, 27 December 1933. The violent death of Dillinger was widely reported in the
Catalan press, especially in L'Opinió. 27 July 1934.
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both excused police failings in the fight against 'evil-doers'. Secondly, the emphasis on
the need to ensure the victory of the forces of order over the forces of darkness
legitimated the growing number of intrusions by the authorities. For instance, in the
regular L'Opiniô section entitled 'The Robbery of the Day', minor non-violent thefts were
described sensationally as if the streets were teeming with bloodthirsty villains. Not only
did L'Opinió overstate public concerns about illegality, but the violence of the
'expropriators' was also exaggerated to legitimate police aggression. However,
suggesting the public concern with illegality was not as great as the authorities hoped,
L'OpimO issued periodic calls for more public confidence in the police and implored a
'civic reaction' in the hope that citizens would intervene and detain lawbreakers. 107
The substance of the panics of the Generalitat was a refraction of reality through
the prejudiced prism of bourgeois morality, privilege and power. In this sense, the dread
of the Ban-i xino was based on anti-modernistic fears of the consequences of
industrialisation and class struggle. The black legend of the Barn xino propagated by the
Generalitat was based on a theory of'district infection' and the zonal contagiousness of
crime, according to which existing 'crime areas' attracted deviant newcomers to the city,
leading to the establishment of criminal communities.'° 8 This view stubbornly ignored
the socio-economic context and the reality that rather than the creation of immigrants,
the Bat-ri xino was a necessary companion to the capitalist city: it was the oldest
industrial zone in the city, it had a symbiotic relationship with the port and the
development and crisis of the area was inextricably bound up with the ebb and flow of
the local economy; it was, in the view of one group of local historians, a 'permanent
testimony' to the Catalan industrialisation process. After World War One and the
expansion of new industries around the periphery of the city, the economy of the district
went into decay, tipping the balance in favour of the flourishing popular entertainments
in the Barn xino. Meanwhile, the cheap pensions, hostels and 'doss-houses', where beds
were rented by shifts to itinerant labourers, retained considerable attraction for the
'°7 L'Opimó, 26 March, 5 November 1933, 15 May, 9 August 1934
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young, single and unskilled, whose rough world of labour extended to the bars and
cabarets by night. Though they were loathed as a base for illegal activities by newcomers
to the city, these 'doss-houses', like the Barn xino itself, remained integral features of the
casualised local economy. Moreover, the strength of the irregular or 'hidden' economy,
the illegality of which was the source of so much trauma for bourgeois-Republican
moralists, was a direct result of structural unemployment and the flimsy nature of the
'official' economy. Instead of moral laxity, therefore, it was the failings of the capitalist
economy that conditioned illegality, both in the 1930s and before, as underlined by
evidence that even a short spell of unemployment was enough to force working women
into prostitution. 109
The consternation of the Generalitat also reflected the concerns of the small
shopkeepers on the other side of Les Rambles, who made up an important electoral
constituency of the Esquerra. It was these elements, berated by Montseny for embodying
'the grey and mediocre existence of the middle bourgeoisie', who were increasingly
aghast at the raucous cabarets and bars of the Barn xino and who inclined the
Generalitat towards imitations of the earlier monarchical 'decency' campaigns. The
contempt for popular leisure was further evidence of the anti-modernism of the
Generalitat. Indeed, given that the origins of Catalan cabaret within the emerging leisure
patterns of the popular classes from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards
predated the epoch of mass immigration, it was absurd to portray these establishments as
the creation of alien communities. Instead, the elitist snobbery of the Generalitat
underlined the gulf between the Catalan government and popular culture. An example of
this was the disdainful racism of the ERC towards the gypsy culture of southern Spain
which was thoroughly out of step with mass tastes, during a period that is generally
acclaimed as the golden era of flamenco, in which the genre was appreciated by Catalans
and non-Catalans	 10
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The official campaign against the sociability of the bars and cafés of the Barn
xino and El Parallel also clashed with anarchist traditions in Barcelona. At the port end
of El Parallel, near to the Barn xino, stood two bars that were highly popular with the
libertarians: the expansive 'Café Espanyol' and 'La Tranquilidad', which served as a
meeting-place for 'Nosotros' and included Durruti among its regular patrons. Managed
by an a blacklisted anarchist militant, 'La Tranquilidad' also figured in the advertisement's
section of Solidaridad Obrera and established a high profile as the 'people's café', much-
frequented by the unemployed."
By 1934 the Generalitat had eschewed much of the reformist veneer in which it
had earlier coated its policies. Faced with the accumulated neglect of previous
administrations in the Barn xino the ERC developed the 'Macia Plan' ('El Plà Macia'), a
plan for a 'new Barcelona' that promised the regeneration of the old city. The stance of
the Esquerra on the urban question is highly revealing insofar as it illuminated how the
party pursued the traditionalist goal of slum clearance in what it viewed as a 'crime area'.
Thus, while the Macia Plan' included the promise of modernity, with the construction of
Bauhaus-style tower blocks in Sant Andreu, this was to accompany the demolition of
large areas of the Barn xino. The forward-looking gloss of the Macia Plan' could not
conceal the reactionary security concerns of the Catalan Republicans, who had long
sought a 'complete sterilisation' of the Barn xino in the hope of defusing many of the
tensions that had developed during the uncontrolled development of the city.' 12 In this
way, the unwritten assumption behind the 'Macia Plan' was the desirability of relocating
'the dangerous classes' of the Barn xino away from the city centre, where they would be
more manageable for the security forces.
These same security concerns underpinned the image of Italian anarchist-
playboys, a stereotype that was geared towards fostering a climate of opinion in favour
of deportation policies. Journalistic fantasies about libertarian gigolos were highly
Interestingly, the suggestion of the ERC that the flamenco bars should be closed down was eventually
fulfilled by Franco.
Solidaridad Obrera, 6 March, 16 April, 17 May, 10 November 1932. Clients were not obliged to
consume in 'La Tranquilidad' and the unemployed were served tap water.
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discordant with the multiple tribulations that permeated the lives of the anarchist exiles,
whose illegality bore nothing like the prizes imagined in the editorial offices of the
bourgeois-Republican press. For instance, when the Rimini-born anarchist and
'celebrated robber' Alpini was shot dead by police in a gunfight on El Parallel, only 30
pesetas were on his person, a pitifi,l amount for the 'author of countless robberies'."3
The crude identification between immigrants and illegality similarly failed to
stand up to scrutiny. A cursory survey of the names of defendants in court cases shows
that members of established Catalan families in Barcelona entered the 'expropriation'
squads. Despite this, the bourgeois-Republican press continued to uphold the politically
expedient hypothesis that immigrants were importing crime into Catalonia by detailing
the birthplace of non-Catalan felons, while avoiding comment on Catalan deviants,
occasionally even Castilianising their fl4
Moral panics that equated the demise of the family and unsupervised immigrant
youths with anarchist 'disorder' were also based more in propaganda than in reality. In
fact, the examples of libertarian family dynasties in Catalonia indicates that in many cases
the very cohesion of the family structure served to transmit anarchist values from one
generation to the next. Among the anarchist intellectuals, there is the example of the
Urales family. Meanwhile, in the realms of action, there were the Cuadrado's, the
Playans's, the Sabater's, all of whom were Catalans from La Torrassa in l'Hospitalet.
Equally, Martorell, Latorre Morales, the MarIn family and Pedro and Eugenio Larrosa,
were members of the Confederal Defence Committees 'expropriation' squads in the
1930s and originated from Barcelona families with long traditions of anarchist and
syndical activity."5
" El Noticiero Universal, 16 April 1934
names like Jordi, Josep, Francesc and Cristofor and surnames like Piera, Sabater, Subirats and
Lleixà were commonplace among the expropriators: La Vanguardia, 6 April 1932, 2 lApril, 6, 23 June,
13-14, 28 December 1933, 22 Februaiy, 3 April, 19, 25 July, 5 August, 27 December 1934, 3 January,
14,31 May, 27 August 1935; LaPublicitat, 11 April, 11 May 1934; La Veude Catalunya, 3,21 April
1934; Las Noticias, 12 January 1932, 6May 1934; La Humanitat, 5 June 1933
'In Catalonia the anarchists were nearly always from known families': Garcia Oliver, El eco. pp.30,
61, 469; La Vanguardia, 8-11 August 1923, 6 April 1932, 21 April, 14, 28 December 1933, 2 January,
22 February, 7 December 1934, 8-9 January 1935; Solidaridad Obrera, 9, 24 August 1923; Las Noticias,
4 June 1931, 12 January 1932; El Mati, 4 June 1931; Foix, Los archivos, p.43; La Publicitat, 11 May
1934, 8-9 January 1935; Porcdll, La revuelta, pp. 128-129; Ferrer and Piera, a pp.130-131;
L'Opinió, 2 January 1934
361
It is a further irony that the family structure, so often associated with the stability
of the existing order, sometimes gave considerable coherence to the anarchist grupos.
For instance, it was common for brothers to picket together in the same squads. The
deep solidarity that ran through the proletarian family also provided immense stability for
some of the 'expropriation' squads, in which brothers often collaborated. The arrest of
one grupo saw the detention of three brothers, one of whom was 'quartermaster' to a
squad that included his two younger brothers. There was even a case of father and son
working together in the same 'expropriation' squad."6
The 'moral panics' obscured the intimate connections between patterns of youth
illegality and the social conditions of the Catalan proletariat. For all the moral concerns
of the Generalitat and the bourgeois-Republican press for proletarian youths, the lot of
young workers remained far from pleasant. Throughout the Republican years ill-trained
young workers continued to face the worst conditions of all the proletariat, accounting
for a disproportionate number of industrial accidents. In his memoirs Emili Salut
describes 'a tormented youth', produced by a series of repressive experiences in the
family and the factory, in a hostile urban landscape dominated by the oppressive
barracks-style architecture of the workshops, workhouses and prisons. Although the
Republicans had vowed to end child labour and provide a new deal for the young,
judicial will remained subordinate to prevailing economic laws and proletarian children
remained an integral part of the labour force. The failure to provide immediate relief to
the poorest and most disadvantaged sectors of the proletariat vitiated against any new
educational opportunities and schooling remained an unacceptable luxury for the
majority of working class families, who continued to send their youngest members out to
work in order to expand the family budget. Indeed, cognisant of the life of labour that
116 La Vanguardia. 6 January, 4 April, 3, 6, 23 June, 18 August, 31 October, 13 December 1933, 5
August, 22, 27 December 1934, 4, 9 January, 14, 31 May 1935; Las Noticias, 14-20 January, 16-17 May
1931, 6-8, 23 May 1934, 4-5 February 1936; La Humanitat. 5 June 1933; La Veu de Catalunva, 6
January 1933, 6 March 1934; La Publicitat. 1 April 1934, 4, 9 January 1935; Solidaridad Obrera, 27
August 1932, 25 April 1936; Léon-Ignaci, Los aflos, p.298
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lay ahead of their children, there is evidence that many working class parents continued
to regard education as an irrelevance."7
Rather than explain the behaviour of anarchist youth in terms of a badly
socialised childhood, many young workers gravitated towards libertarianism because of
the myriad sufferings of their formative years. Those who began a life of work but yet
retained a desire to study, were ineluctably drawn towards the proletarian Ateneus,
particularly in the poorest zones of Barcelona and l'Hospitalet, where educational
provision was in short supply and demand for places far outstripped supply. Meanwhile,
penurious and gruelling youth labour inclined many towards youth rebellion, explaining
why some paid-up union members were as young as ten years of age. For Garcia Oliver,
it was the disgust at being forced to 'clean the shit of others' in hotels that impelled him
towards a life of protest and he first joined a grupo de afinidad at the age of 17.118
The rebellion of the young was sometimes directed against the parents who
pushed them into the industrial system. It was not uncommon for children who regarded
their lot in the factories as the outcome of parental control to run away from the family.
Equally, it was not unusual for children who refused to work for a given employer to be
thrown onto the street by their parents for being shiftless. The Republican state
continued to incarcerate these 'runaway children' in municipal workhouses or children's
homes, where the emphasis was on the discipline and control of 'bad behaviour', rather
than the transmission of educational or labour skills that might prove useful in the
outside world. These institutions were brutalising and by night the internees were locked
into donnitories, where youths would sleep on mattresses on the floor. Ironically, even
during the laicist Republic the municipal children's homes were staffed by the clergy,
who maintained a repressive ambience based on the religious orthodoxy that work
provided the healthiest way for regenerating lost souls. Consequently, it was not
117 Soto Carmona, El trabaio, pp.673-675; Salut, Viveres, pp.9, 42, 45, 47, 57; Ramon Navarro.
L'educació a Catalunya durant la Generalitat. 193 1-1939. Barcelona, 1979, pp.13-94, 143-164;
Solidaridad Obrera, 23 July 1931
118 L'OpiniO, 5 July 1934; Dolors MarIn, 'Una primera aproximació a Ia vida quotidiana dels
Hospitalencs: 1920-1929. Les histories de vida corn a font histOrica', Identitats. 4-5, 1990, pp.32-35;
Ealhain, 'Crime and Punishment', pp.34-36; Ferrer and Piera, ca pp.22-25; GarcIa Oliver, El eco,
pp.24, 28
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uncommon for youth to work unpaid for 10 hours daily in the dingy workshops of the
children's homes of Barcelona, particularly the notorious Asil Durán. Although this
'therapy' was lucrative for those business interests who invested in the children's homes,
it was a form of hyper-exploitation that almost certainly exceeded that which the youths
had initially rebelled against. The homes were, therefore, despised by the youths, as was
the clergy who allegedly meted out beatings to those who dared challenge the régime,
and who was frequently accused of sexual abuse."9
Upon release from a workhouse or a children's home, youths had enormous
difficulties re-integrating themselves in everyday life, particularly as they often lacked
accommodation or a fixed address without which it they could not obtain regular
employment. The experience in these homes, therefore, often stimulated new heights of
rebellion among youths and through their harsh contact with the state a number of the
detainees became anarchists. Former detainees in the Asil Durãn included 'Marianet', the
secretary of the Barcelona Builders' union, Martorell, the Public Enemy Number One',
and 'El Nan de Sants', a 17-year old libertarian escapee and, according to La Publicitat,
the 'author of several robberies'.'20
In the same way as the Generalitat 'moral panics' about youth crime and the Barn
xino illustrated a readiness to accept the same apprehensions as previous monarchist
administrations, so too did its obfuscation of the divisions between social protest and
criminal behaviour. The erosion of this distinction had been a classical theme of
bourgeois criminologists since the advent of labour organisation. In similar vein, the
objections felt by the Generalitat towards anarchist excursionism, one of the last
activities open to the followers of the CNT-FAI for much of 1934, had little to do with
illegality. Instead, this was a thinly veiled pretext to eliminate the world-view that had
grown up around the anarchist movement and which was seen as incompatible with
autonomous Catalan
119 La Publicitat, 4 January 1935; Solidaridad Obrera, 6 December 1932, 8 August 1933
120 La Publicitat, 4 January 1935; Téllez Solá, Sabaté, p.24; La Veu de Catalunva, 27 April 1934
121 La Vanguardia, 31 March 1934; La Veu de Catalunva, 26 April 1934
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The journalism of Planes, the La Publicitat crime reporter, lent itself to this same
end and he replaced sociology with morality in order to decontextualise the origins of
urban criminality. Thereafter, by exclusively identifjing crime with the anarchist
movement, Planes generated both an inaccurate and a simplistic picture of the
'underworld'. Firstly, he ignored the fact that from at least the 1 880s even conservative
commentators recognised the existence of a 'typical' popular criminality with 'profound
roots' in the Catalan capital. Secondly, Planes omitted all mention of the criminal
behaviour of the 'respectable classes'. Thus, Planes completely ignored what he described
as 'the aristocracy of the gangsters' which, from World War One onwards, was deemed
by a wide spectrum of opinion, from the anarchists right across to the conservatives, to
be the most anti-social elements within the 'underworld'. This Toulouse and Marseilles-
based elite, which specialised in cocaine and opium smuggling, money-laundering,
counterfeiting and high-class prostitution, was also believed to occasionally mastermind
armed robberies in Barcelona. However, because these felonious 'aristocrats' had no
apparent contact with the anarchist movement they did not fit with Planes's overriding
intention to portray the libertarians as the greatest danger to law-and-order.' 22
 A final
weakness in the interpretation offered by Planes was the enormous responsibility he
placed on the so-called 'Black Hand' (ta mano negra'), a criminal organisation which he
believed had deep tentacles in the Barcelona 'underworld'. It is curious, therefore, that no
other contemporary commentators made even a passing reference to this group which,
ironically, shared the name of another phantom-like conspiracy evoked by the authorities
in Andalusia in the nineteenth century to smash the emerging organisational structures of
the anarchist movement.123
Again, it is evident that the 'crime panics' of the authorities and their supporters
obscured the real determinants of illegality. For instance, the concept of an 'underworld'
122	 Maestre, La criminalidad. p.202; Vallmitjana, Crirninalitat, parsim.; El Escándolo, 10 December
1925; Solidaridad Obrera, 15 April, 31 August 1934; La Noche, 16 November 1931; La Publicitat, 22
January 1932, 11 April 1934
123 Another possibility is that Planes was employing considerable journalistic licence and referring to
the largely USA-based Italian secret society known as the 'Black Hand', which was linked to the Sicilian
mafia. However, while the 'Black Hand' of mafiosi fame possessed an international dimension, one of
the leading historians of the mafia makes no reference to it ever establishing any activities in Barcelona:
Salvatore Francesco Romano, Historia de la mafia, Madrid, 1970, pp.239-254.
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served to ignore a number of the criminogenic aspects of bourgeois society, particularly
the way in which employers strove to exclude convicted offenders, quinizenaris and
those who had been interned without trial from the workplace. Although some bourgeois
penal reformers had long campaigned for conditions that might allow for the full
reformation of criminals, this exclusive mentality was transmitted into the Republic,
during which the bourgeois-Republican press accepted that convicted offenders, and
even some who had simply fallen under the suspicion of the police, were morally
bankrupt and unemployable. This same inquisitorial mentality resulted in cases where
those under suspicion of illegality were sacked, blacklisted and even evicted from their
flats. By dooming convicted felons and police suspects to a life sentence on the margins
of society, employers and the authorities made their own 'underclass' and created
illegality. In this sense, rather than 'underclass' culture, it was unforgiving bourgeois
social attitudes and the barriers this placed when attempting to secure work, such as the
prerequisite of a 'letter of recommendation' from a recent employer, which helps explain
high levels of recidivism. Accordingly, once an individual was either branded or merely
suspected of being a 'criminal', it was very difficult for them to attain a stable economic
position that did not arouse the need to re-offend. In these circumstances, to use police
parlance, the 'criminal' became 'hardened'.'24
Most importantly of all, however, the concept of an 'underclass' reversed the
causes of unemployment and poverty. By postulating that long-term unemployment was
caused by individual degeneracy and deviancy rather than the contradictions of the
capitalist system, concrete socio-economic problems were transformed into moral issues.
Equally, the logic of the web of official myths and misrepresentations that comprised the
'moral panics' discounted the need to cut unemployment and reduce inequality, as to do
otherwise presupposed embracing the view that illegality was of an economic, rather
than a moral basis, a starting-point which provided the basis for a critique of existing
socio-economic relations. Thus, it was preferable for the authorities to maintain that an
124 La Batalla, 23 September 1934; La Publicitat, 16 August 1933; La Van guardia, 28 January, 5
September 1934; Solidaridad Obrera, 21 September 1932, 21 September 1932; Las Noticias, 17 June, 3
November 1931; L'Opinió. 11 August 1931
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'underclass' was for its own lot because it had chosen of its own free volition to live
'underworld'.
Nevertheless, the expansion of armed illegality in 1930s Barcelona was
inseparable from the vicissitudes of the economy and, like in industrial conurbations
elsewhere, it was bound up with the expansion of the capitalist metropolis. Already in
1931 the CDE revealed that thousands of proletarians in the Catalan capital were denied
a regular existence by rising joblessness, while many thousands more were living in
considerable financial discomfort. The economic situation had deteriorated considerably
and it was the spread of unemployment that forced many workers to change their
behaviour, swelling what the authorities described as a criminal 'underworld'. However,
what the Generalitat saw as a criminal universe of scoundrels would have been
unrecogmsable to the great majority of those who inhabited it. For instance, under
examination the sinister 'undocumented' youths castigated by the Generalitat as an
'underworld' force were little more than itinerant labourers and low-paid or unemployed
workers who often did not bother to keep their documentation in order as they lacked
the money to do so. Far from confirming the official image of illegality as the preserve of
an 'underworld' of'professional' and 'hardened' villains, an extensive reading of the legal
pages of the daily press during the Republican years reveals that many 'crimes against
property' were committed by the short-term unemployed. Equally, the world of bars and
'doss houses' that petrified the authorities was not an 'underworld' of the 'professional',
full-time 'aristocrats of crime', but the preserve of young, short-term unemployed
workers, the majority of whom lacked both an established trade and a home, a situation
that led them to turn to illegality as a necessary and passing expedient during a time of
mass unemployment. Hence, these 'expropriators' were the direct product of the gross
inequalities generated by the local capitalist economy and its failure to fulfil the most
basic needs of large sectors of the workers in the city. Barcelona, therefore, was a
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criminogenic city, in which everyday life for the jobless was a daily struggle that
compelled many to steal to survive.'25
The press coverage of illegality revealed that offenders were often the fathers of
families, unable to provide for their kith because of unemployment and pressurised into
illegality by dint of their very sense of domestic and familial responsibility. In such cases,
illegality took place not because of the absence of family ties but, because capitalism
could not guarantee the stable functioning of the proletarian home. Moreover, just as the
working class family economy was based on contributions from all members, so too was
the economy of the unemployed family. Accordingly, in the same way as harsh economic
realities denied a childhood to young proletarians by forcing them into the workforce, so
the privations ofjoblessness led children, sometimes as young as ten, into illegality.
These child offenders were often not the 'runaway children' who formed the street gangs
of conservative mythology, but stable members of the family unit so revered by
bourgeois social thinkers.'26
The 'moral panics' of the Republican authorities were clearly not formulated as a
coherent or rational whole. Instead, like so much official discourse, the exclusive
purpose of the panics was to galvanise a consensus in favour of repression. The talk of a
criminal 'underworld' was predicated on the assumption that nothing positive could be
done to help the poor, it was a baseless conservative discourse designed to spread a fear
of crimes which in reality affected a minute proportion of the population. Equally, the
tirade against the 'underclass' aimed to convince individuals that however bad their lot in
life was, it could in fact be worse if they made the descent into hell with the immoral
residuum of society.
The same repressive discourse postulated that there was a coincidence between
the 'dangerous classes' of the 'underworld' and the anarchists. The view that moral
degenerates were attacking the citizenry was highly useful for the bid by the Generalitat
125 Solidaridad Obrera, 28 August 1934; Las Noticias, 16 June 1931, 2 Januaiy 1936; Communique
from the Guardia Urbana to the Mayor of l'Hospitalet, 11 March 1936 (AHLL); La Vanuardia, 15
March, 11 August 1933
126 Communiques from the Guardia Urbana to the Mayor of 1'Hosyitalet, 4 August 1934, 21 June 1936
(AHLL)
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to integrate better-off workers into a conservative anti-crime bloc and earn wider
acquiescence for increasing police powers. In this sense, the 'respectable fears'
accentuated the growing dynamics of repression and authoritarianism already at work
within the Generalitat in 1934. Moreover, this consolidated the process begun in 1931
with the promulgation of the Ley de Defensa de la Repñblica and the anti-CNT labour
legislation implemented by Largo Caballero. The Generalitat, like Largo Caballero
before, asserted that the FAT had imposed itself through terror on what saw as essentially
peaceftul Catalan workers. The conclusion was also the same: if the anarchists could be
forcibly isolated from the labour movement, normality and order would be re-introduced
in social, economic and political affairs.' 27 Thus, the allegations that anarchism was an
essentially felonious ideology reflected the burning desire of the Generalitat to introduce
a complete ban on the libertarian movement, its press and the 'spiritual bread' they
received from the Ateneus.
127 L'Opiniô, 24, 27 April 1933, 19 April 1934; Solidaridad Obrera. 1 August 1933
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Chapter 7: Class Culture and Illegality
7.1. 'Criminal Capitalism'
The schism between the authorities and the CNT-FAI over the issue of illegality
produced a major re-statement of the libertarian conception of crime and punishment by
the Catalan anarchists. Firstly, the anarchists rejected deterministic pseudo-Lombrosian
concepts such as that of the 'born criminal' and the accompanying view that the
dimensions of the jaw bone influenced the criminal passions of a given individual.
Similarly, they also countered the conservative notions of'degeneration' and 'evil' that
conditioned a considerable amount of Republican thinking on law-and-order. Solidaridad
Obrera retorted that 'there is no such thing as "good" and "bad" people, only people who
are "good" and "bad" at different times'. This view was underpinned by the libertarian
orthodoxy that social behaviour was conditioned by circumstance and context.
Coniequently, the anarchists defended the inhabitants of the Barn xino from bourgeois-
Republican allegations that they were the 'perishing classes'. Montseny celebrated the
Ban-i xino both as a centre of popular repose and for the spirit of resistance shown by
those who led 'an errant life outside the law' on its 'mean streets'. Rather than an
'underclass', Montseny lauded the 'goodness' of what she regarded as a community of
'pariahs' that had repeatedly carried the banner of freedom, for which 'the streets were
stained with so much proletarian blood'.'
The second element of the anarchist conception of illegality was that crime, in all
its manifestations, was inseparable from the capitalist system. In short, illegality was 'the
product of a pernicious social organisation' and the 'holocaust of a society that is the
patrimony of a social class that impoverishes and scoffs at the human race'. Thus,
Solidaridad Obrera maintained, 'bourgeois society is responsible for all crime' because its
distribution mechanism of'privileges for the few and persecutions and privations for the
rest establishes sharp differences in terms of material position, education and lifestyle,
which shape both professional and occasional criminality'. The anarchists explained
certain forms of illegality by the specific features of local capitalism. For instance, the
1 Solidaridad Obrera, 9 April 1933, 20 March 1934, 15 September 1935; La ReVista Blanca, 19 April
1935
question of youth illegality that so preoccupied bourgeois-Republican social thinkers was
viewed as a concomitant of sweated, low-paid child labour that 'compelled' the young to
commit crime.2
On a subjective level, the libertarians saw much crime as a reflection of the
acquisitive mentalities that were spontaneously generated by capitalist society. Not
without irony, the anarchist press argued that the desire for individual self-advancement,
an attitude that was widely encouraged by many bourgeois commentators as an antidote
to 'subversive' collectivist ideologies, paradoxically generated a climate that favoured
'crimes against property' among the poorest echelons of society. It was unlikely that even
stoical unskilled proletarians could reap any significant, long-term material rewards by
remaining within the law, nor attain the trappings of success that the supporters of
bourgeois society extolled so forcefully. These paradoxes led 'Marianet', the Builders'
Union leader, to observe that 'in a society that legalises usury and has robbery as its
basis, it is logical that there will be some who are prepared to risk their lives and commit
with audacity what others do with the protection of coercive state forces'.3
The libertarians attributed the upsurge in illegality in the 193 Os to the decline of
capitalist society. Mann Civera, one of the most original thinkers from the revolutionary
left during the 193 Os, explained the spread of crime not in moral terms, but as an
exclusive and inevitable function of the haemorrhage of an economic order based on
private property. For Civera, and his co-thinkers, illegality was a moral issue only insofar
as it affected the bourgeoisie, whose egoistic conscience accepted both the systematic
theft (appropriation) of a part of proletarian travail and the expulsion of large numbers of
operatives from work. By denying workers the chance to survive from their labour,
illegality became an increasingly realistic option for a significant section of the
proletariat, in the view of Civera.4
It followed, therefore, that much illegality was the outcome of the material needs
of newly unemployed workers. The anarchist press issued a firm defence of the short-
2 Solidaridad Obrera, 24 July, 9 September, 16 December 1932, 15 January, 25 March, 18 August 1933,
6 December 1935; Tierra y Libertad, 24 December 1935
Solidaridad Obrera, 26 April 1934
4 Qi:t, May 1932
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term unemployed who resorted to 'occasional criminality', placing the blame instead on
avaricious capitalists who provoked robbery by depriving the unemployed their rightful
place at the 'banquet of life'. This, according to the libertarians, forced a confrontation
between the 'right to life' and the rights of property but, because the 'right to life' was
stronger, and morally justifiable, illegality was a 'natural right' and a part of the 'struggle
for life' for those who lacked what was 'necessary to live'.5
Inverting the agenda of the bourgeois-Republican thinkers, the libertarians
maintained that the passing illegality of proletarians paved into insignificance alongside
the everyday felonies committed by the capitalist class. As Solidaridad Obrera explained,
'there is no case of an employer who gives his workers the full value of the wealth which
they produce'. Accordingly, in the anarchist lexicon 'commerce substitutes the word
robbery', while 'trade' was little more than a euphemism for 'trickery', 'deceit' and 'theft'.
Capitalism was, therefore, a 'criminal economy', based on 'the principle of property' and
rooted in 'speculation and robbery'. The CNT press popularised this view, maintaining
that 'the whole of society rests on exploitation' by the bourgeoisie, the 'aristocracy of
robbery', who had elevated villainy to the level of economic policy. Echoing the claims of
the CDE, Solidaridad Obrera raged against a system in which the worker who 'has
nothing and produces everything' was systematically robbed by the employers and by
'traffickers in the misery of the people' and the 'scandalous businesses of the profiteers',
such as the shopkeepers and landlords. In similar vein, Balius, a leading BarcelonafaIsta,
advised the detractors of anarchism 'to examine the bourgeois régime and they will come
to realise that existing society is a society organised by robbers. From the small
shopkeeper to the industrialist, right up to the most powerful capitalist consortiums,
there is nothing but speculation which, in plain language, means robbery'. For Balius,
capitalists, unlike the urban poor, were able to hide their crimes with their money,
because 'by paying a few pesetas, [they] can achieve comfortably what the hold-up man
attains only through great personal danger'.6
Tierra y Libertad, 26 April 1932; Solidaridad Obrera, 14 February 1935
6 Solidaridad Obrera, 22 March, 23 September, 23 November 1932, 8, 14 March, 18 April, 23 June
1933, 24 April 1934
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The libertarians scoffed at the panics of the bourgeoisie about the 'criminal
danger' to capitalist civilisation, asserting that the crimes of the unemployed were of
minimal importance alongside bourgeois pursuits like war and imperialism, both of which
were far more destructive for human life. For the anarchists, the civilisation of the
bourgeoisie was a sad anachronism, a cynical contradiction in terms, which allowed for 'a
world of the superfluous' for those 'swimming in opulence', while 'many thousands of
workers are dying of hunger' in Barcelona, along with millions the world over who faced
the famine, homelessness and unemployment. The 'criminal' nature of capitalism was
documented in the pages of Solidaridad Obrera, which reported bourgeois counter-crisis
measures, such as the destruction of unsold foodstuffs, known as 'dumping'. The
libertarians took this as a reaffirmation of the 'immorality' of a society in which the rich
allegedly spent more on dog food and perfume than workers spent on food.7
Homelessness was another 'repugnant crime' reviled by the anarchists.
Solidaridad Obrera regularly complained that alongside the few who lived in a state of
plenitude, 'thousands and thousands of hungiy, homeless people eat the filth from the
streets and sleep on park benches'. Using the same adjective employed by the bourgeois-
Republican press to describe the 'expropriations', Solidaridad Obrera spoke of the
'plague' of evictions that ravaged the unemployed. The anarchists also observed how
pious bourgeois moralists 'tell us of morality and orgamse crusades against crime' but
remained 'quiet' in the face of 'the collective crime' of capitalism, a duplicity that was to
brothel-keepers bemoaning transgressions of public mores. It was precisely this 'false'
bourgeois morality 'cemented around respect for the "nation", "property", "family",
"state", "religion" and all its derivatives' which, the libertarians believed, 'strengthens the
social chaos against which we are pitting ourselves'. The contradictions of bourgeois
morality were the object of savage derision by the anarchists. Initiatives such as the
formation of Parents Leagues' to control youths were the object of particular mockery.
Following a case where a 14 year-old worker was arbitrarily dismissed and violently
assaulted by his employer for demanding a statutory redundancy payment, Solidandad
Solidaridad Obrera, 28 August, 4 September 1932, 16, 18 April 1934, 3 December 1935; Tierra y
Libertad, 7 November, 5 December 1931, 1 July, 9 September, 30 December 1932
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Obrera published the name and address of the irascible capitalist and suggested wryly
that a proletarian 'League of Parents' should pay him a visit.8
The furore over illegality also saw a reiteration of the anarchist conception of law
in a capitalist society. Instead of talking of the law in abstract terms like the Republicans,
the anarchists spoke concretely of 'bourgeois law', which they understood as a form of
class law, with a historically specific theoretical-judicial content that regulated the limited
freedoms of capitalist society. Like everything else in the bourgeois world, therefore,
legal liberties were subordinate to the limitations imposed by economic factors and
reaffirmed the status of the proletariat as a propertyless class. Solidaridad Obrera
explained that in bourgeois society workers enjoyed only 'three freedoms':
'freedom to eat or not to eat, freedom to have heat or to have cold,
freedom to have a roof or not to have one.. .But not freedom to
touch the food, wheat, machinery [and], land that they need to live.
If they touch these they face jail or the pistols of the police'.
Meanwhile, it was alleged that capitalists and bankers, 'the real thieves and the true
racketeers of the human race', were accepted by bourgeois law as 'necessary robbers' and
were allowed to operate as 'legal thieves' specialising in 'legal crime'. This 'respectable
crime', the most shameful of all crimes in the view of the anarchists, was 'a [bourgeois]
virtue practised within the law and respected the world over' by 'the most vile of all
criminals' who 'live splendidly protected' by their lawyers. These 'pirates and modern-day
bandits spend their lives in comfortable offices' or ensconced in 'the palaces of the state
bureaucracy', and like the arms manufacturers who enriched themselves among 'rivers of
blood', they 'shy away from no measure, however odious, in the conquest of power and
money', extracting wealth from 'the sweat and blood spilt in fields, workshops, factories
and mines'. The major accessories in this 'legal robbery' were the 'murderers' and
'criminals in the pay of the state' who comprised the security forces and 'who worship
robbery on a grand scale'. Rather than end crime, therefore, the police were regarded by
the libertarians as a parasitic force that produced nothing but yet lived securely from the
taxes 'stolen' from the wages of the proletariat, the very people against whom it was
S Solidaridad Obrera. 15 January, 24 May, 24, 30 July, 2 August, 8 December 1932
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deployed to repress. Hence, the anarchists concluded, for all its repressive brutality, the
efforts of the police to end crime were misguided, because they were not directed against
the real causes of illegality, which were embedded within the veiy socio-economic
system defended by the security forces.9
Whereas the bourgeois-Republican press emphasised the illegality of the lower
classes, Solidaridad Obrera was keen to prove that criminality was not the exclusive
pursuit of the much-maligned proletarian class. With considerable investigative verve the
CNT daily assiduously reported infractions of the criminal code by those described by
the anarchists as the 'controllors' of Republican society. As well the drunken violence of
off-duty policemen already mentioned, this coverage included cases of robbery by prison
wardens, acts of embezzlement by lawyers, corruption by Generalitat politicians,
'administrative immorality' by ERC 'gangsters' in Barcelona Council and violent business
disagreements between shopkeepers. In an emotional tone that mirrored the coverage of
armed robbery in the bourgeois and Republican dailies, the CNT press gave considerable
space to so-called offences 'prejudicial to the sacred health of the people' and 'robberies
committed against the working people'. According to the anarchists, these were 'crimes'
perpetrated by the 'legion of parasites', 'blood-suckers' (chupasangres) and 'vultures'
from the commercial middle class, who the anarchists accused of 'trading in the physical
necessities of humanity' and 'picking dry the ill-fated body of the worker'. These were
matched with denunciations of 'villainous' landlords who charged 'criminal' rents and
'stole' the deposits of outgoing tenants, and stories of overcharging bar-owners who
diluted drinks and shopkeepers who meddled with food and weights. This was grist to
the anarchist mill and heightened their view that the commercial classes were essentially
criminal. Solidaridad Obrera asserted that:
'if they [the authorities] analysed the foodstuffs sold daily to the
public all these people with private guards and security doors on
their houses would go to jail.. .Every shop, warehouse [and]
workshop is a den of villainy. The robbers are the
owners... "honourable" folk and gentlemen who go to mass on
Solidaridad Obrera, 22 March, 30 July, 23 November, 7 December 1932, 8, 14 March, 1 April, 23
June, 8 August 1933; La Colmena Obrera, 30 October 1931; Tierra v Libertad. 16 September, 8
December 1932, 9 June, 25 August 1933
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Sunday morning and visit their lovers in the afternoon... [the] very
gentlemen who are outraged when a poor, needy man steals a loaf of
bread to feed his children, while they rob with weights and measures
and steal even the air and the sun of the dispossessed'.'°
Solidaridad Obrera revealed the partialities of the Republican penal system,
showing how the lucrative crimes of the privileged and the powerful frequently went
uninvestigated or received fines, while trivial working class crimes were regularly
punished with jail sentences. The widespread tax evasion of the middle classes that was
documented by the CDE in 1931 and was confirmed by fi.irther exposés in Solidaridad
Obrera provides a clear example of this pattern. Tax evasion rarely preoccupied the
authorities and while tax-cheating landlords, some of whose taxes were allegedly 13
years or more in arrears, remained at liberty, while workers were locked up for acts of
petty pilfering, such as potato or chicken theft. There was also a considerable difference
in police attitudes towards criminality and the frequent maltreatment and assault of
unemployed felons in police in custody contrasted sharply with the treatment of middle
class detainees. Punishment and jail were, therefore, seen as fates almost exclusively
reserved for the proletariat and Solidaridad Obrera maintained that hopes ofjustice in
bourgeois society were as realistic as expectations of survival inside 'a third degree
tuberculosis camp'."
The duplicitous stance of the authorities reflected fears that premature or
sustained police action against bourgeois crime and middle class fraud could undermine
business confidence and imperil what was an already weakened economy. In other
words, non-proletarian crime was effectively regarded by the authorities as a slight
imperfection of a free enterprise system which, over time, would be eradicated from
within the commercial class, without intervention from the state. In practice, this
effectively legitimated the criminal actions of the monied classes. The rare occasions
when the police did punish middle class crime concerned misdemeanours that were so
gross that they could not be ignored and where non-intervention would seriously
compromise the standing of the authorities. For instance, while food adulteration was
° Solidaridad Obrera. 15 January, 23 June, 8, 15, 27 October, 20 December 1932, 24 April, 26 August
1934, 26 November 1935; El Luchador. 7 July 1933
11 La Publicitat, 10 January 1932; Solidaridad Obrera, 4 November 1932, 1 August 1933, 6 March 1936
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often tolerated, police were forced to make an arrest after a shopkeeper mixed flour with
barium sulphate and lead carbonate and left 800 consumers bed-ridden.'2
The failure of the authorities to repress criminal shopkeepers or to protect
consumers deepened the hostility of the anarchists towards what they condemned as 'the
Republic of rich layabouts' (chupópleros) and a 'régime of murderers'. Moreover, the
tolerance of the Republican authorities and the police towards the 'crimes of the
powerful' was not viewed by the libertarians as an aberration. Instead, they averred it
was bound up with the very nature of the Republic and its favouritism of the middle
classes. This view was strengthened by the fact that like in the monarchy, police
stereotypes of offenders were based exclusively on the characteristics of the urban
working class male. Not surprisingly, the Ley de VagosyMaleantes was cited by the
anarchists as the most vivid example of the 'classist' nature of Republican law. In the
opinion of Solidaridad Obrera, the promulgation of this law meant that 'to be badly
dressed' was a crime, thereby confirming that 'all the coercive measures that surround the
penal code of monarchies and Republics are established to castigate the rebellion of the
slaves'. This was taken to reaffirm the axiom that bourgeois law, irrespective of the form
of state, was, as Tierra y Libertad expressed, the 'historic caprice of a specific class', a
device for the submission of the majority to a minority which was allowed to 'rob on a
daily basis to increase its wealth'.'3
Crime, therefore, in the opinion of the anarchists, was socially determined and
historically conditioned by the prevailing relations between social classes. It followed,
therefore, that what the law defined as 'murder' was not always a criminal offence.
Instead, the anarchists maintained that the violent killing of an individual acquired the
label of 'murder' only after the act had been interpreted and classified by a series of
socio-legal agencies. To underline the socially determined nature of crime and killing, the
libertarians invoked the historic example of the Spanish conquest of South America.
Although the carnage and cultural genocide of the 'plunderers', 'bandits' and 'slayers of
12 Solidaridad Obrera, 26 November 1935
13 Solidaridad Obrera, 2 August 1932, 26 February, 23 June 1933, 8 July, 1934; Tierra y Libertad, 16
September 1932, 7 November 1931
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natives' accounted for millions more fatalities than flying pickets or 'expropriators', the
libertarians observed the irony that the con quistadores were labelled as 'heroes' by the
upper classes and the political right and, for all their bloody slaughter, they occupied a
central place within nationalist mythology. Meanwhile, this same social process allowed
the state judiciary to treat the fatal shooting of a 'scab' by a picket during an industrial
conflict as 'murder'. By comparison, the libertarians opined with enormous justification
that the killing of a picket by a member of the security forces was most unlikely to reach
the courts, let alone be defined as 'homicide'. Hence, Solidaridad Obrera believed, for a
policeman, killing becomes 'a laudable act, in compliance with their duties'. In the same
way, just as the theft of unpaid labour was 'legal', the proletarian 'expropriators' were
branded 'illegal', as they represented a threat to the propertied core of capitalist society.'4
Lastly, the anarchists attempted to expose the contradictions of the 'pain and
violence' and 'egoistic and punitive conceptions' inherent to the 'bourgeois judicial
concept of punishment'. Rather than rehabilitating, 'state revenge' merely labelled
individuals as 'offenders' and thereby created 'criminals'. This was the retribution of a
'perverse society' that 'converted men into beasts' by criminalising and isolating offenders
in jails where they became brutalised and dehumanised and, when they left jail,
permanently marginalised. Solidaridad Obrera concluded that 'Law is the enemy of real
society' because 'nothing is solved with the jailing of the so-called common prisoners'.
According to Luigi Fabbri, one of the doyens of anarchism in the 1930s, only the
complete abolition of law and prisons and the elimination of the monopoly of property
could eliminate 'the economic causes of crime'. Only then, Fabbri reasoned, in the
stateless, libertarian society, could the 'pinnacle of true justice' be attained, as crime
would disappear through the emergence of truly stable communities capable of
regulating themselves, without the intervention of the police or other extraneous
forces.'5
' 4 Tierra y
 Libertad, 26 April 1931; Solidaridad Obrera, 23 June 1932, 7 April 1934
15 Solidaridad Obrera. 26 August, 16 September 1932, 14 March 1933, 15 April 1934; Tiempos
Nuevos, 21, 28 March 1935
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7.2. The 'Moral Economy' of the Barcelona Proletariat
The anarchist view of illegality fitted very closely with the experiences of broad
sectors of the Barcelona working class. This was particularly true for the thousands of
predominantly unskilled, badly paid or unemployed proletarians who regarded the CNT -
FAT as the best possible vehicle for their aspirations. Since World War One the collective
memory of these workers had been shaped by struggles against the shopkeepers and
landlords of Barcelona. This process was heightened by the organisational development
of the revolutionary labour organisations and campaigns like the World War One
abaratimiento, the CDE and the BOC-inspired 'Workers' Alliance Against
Unemployment', all of which were instrumental in the articulation of an exclusively
proletarian moral code, based on a distinct set of priorities to the ethical catechisms of
the bourgeois-Republican press.'6
The context of everyday life for the Barcelona proletariat broadly corresponded
to the anarchist view of small commercial sectors and the bourgeoisie as 'criminal classes'
who had submitted fundamental human needs like shelter, food and work to a ruthless
business ethic. Burdened by the legacy of a traditionally low wage economy, Barcelona's
workers also faced shopkeepers whose retail prices were widely believed to be inflated
grossly above wholesale costs. As confirmed by offical statistics, throughout the years of
the Republic the cost of living in the Catalan capital was higher than any of place in the
entire Spanish state and staple elements of the working class diet like bread, cooking oil,
potatoes and eggs were all markedly more expensive in Barcelona than in Madrid. Once
tribute had been paid to the landlords and shopkeepers many proletarians, particularly
the jobless, were forced to deal with money-lenders and pawn-brokers.'7
The voxpopuli also assimilated the reality that the Catholic, middle class 'lovers
of order' showed little Christian understanding when it came to evicting tenants from
their properties. Moreover, cases of adulterated foodstuffs and the contravention of tax
laws could only have convinced workers that the self-proclaimed 'moral classes' were
16 Solidaridad Obrera, 20 April 1933; La Batalla, 1 September, 27 October 1932; m. 10 February
1933
17 Solidaridad Obrera, 15 August 1931, 1, 20 April 1932; Tierra v Libertad, 19 July 1936
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prepared to privately flaunt the legal code which they publicly maintained was the core
of existing civilisation. For example, Pich I Pon, Barcelona's leading property owner and
the head of the COPUB who cried so loudly about the 'illegality' of the CDE rent strike
was popularly dubbed 'the leading pirate of Barcelona' because of his shady business
interests. This reputation was reinforced in 1935 Pich i Pon acquired national notoriety
in 1935 through his criminal involvement in the 'Straperlo affair', the most important
corruption scandal in the history of the Republic that was based on a scheme to import
doctored roulette wheels into Spain. Meanwhile, the Tayá brothers, the shipping
magnates and former owners of La Publicitat, one of the most sanctimonious vehicles for
the 'moral panics', were both found guilty of fraudulently acquiring lucrative government
franchises for their merchant fleets.'8
Nor were the Republican authorities immune from this same popular association
between crime and power. Although the Republic had a certain success in curbing the
'criminal excesses' of high office which were so rife during the monarchy, corruption was
never completely eradicated. In Barcelona, as well as a trickle of recurring cases of
municipal impropriety, major scandals involving Esquerra Councillors in the illegal 'sale'
of municipal administrative positions revealed the extent to which the ERC had retreated
from its anti-graft platform of April 1931. Shamefully, the few small-scale anti-
unemployment projects initiated by the Generalitat were also hindered by corruption.
Dencàs, the Generalitat Interior Minister at the forefront of the drive against armed
illegality, was accused of misappropriating between 37,000 and 110,000 pesetas during
his tenure in the Catalan government Welfare Department. Meanwhile, in l'Hospitalet,
the Catalan Republicans showed similar administrative turpitude through the illicit 'sale'
of market places. Popular bitterness towards the politicians dubbed by Solidaridad
Obrera as the 'criminal fauna living at the expense of the people' could only have been
18 Solidaridad Obrera, 23 November 1932, 3 Januaiy 1936; Iniciales, March 1932; La Voz Confederal,
25 May 1935; The Times, 28-29 October 1935; Jose Miguel Fernández Urbina, 'Los "affaires" Straperlo
y Tayá. Dos escándalos de lail Repüblica', Tiem po de Historia, 38, 1978, pp.'8-28
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enhanced by the revelations of the bumper salaries, often ten times the daily wage of a
Barcelona construction worker, paid to the new Generalitat political elite.'9
In the hungry years of recession-torn 1930s the 'respectable fears' for public
security of the crime-obsessed bourgeois-Republican press were far removed from issues
like public health, which weighed down on the lives of propertyless workers, a
hazardous context that the Republican authorities seemed to be in little hurry to alter. In
1934 Adelante, the BOC daily, described Barcelona as 'the dirtiest city in Europe', a
ragged metropolis beset with a burgeoning rodent population due to the corruption and
graft that was allegedly rife in the distribution of public cleaning contracts.
Consequently, statistically the inhabitants of the Barn xino were at greater risk from
what were reputedly 'mountains of rubbish' that formed a 'black belt of pus' in the streets
than from the 'criminal classes'. 20
As well as a rise in cases of insanity caused by the privations ofjoblessness, the
unskilled working class and the unemployed were stalked by an array of diseases,
including as cholera, meningitis, diarrhoea, rickets, acute bronchitis, pneumonia,
bronchopneumonia and enteritis, all of which were in the throes of eradication elsewhere
in Europe. Moreover, the death toll generated by the aforementioned diseases in
Barcelona eclipsed the fatalities caused by armed illegality and made coverage of
'murderous robberies' in the bourgeois-Republican press seem highly disproportionate.
Meanwhile, the long-standing deficiencies in the water supply left Barcelona workers
over 5 times more likely to contract typhoid than Madrid workers. Highlighting the
failings of the Republic, the typhoid situation actually worsened in the Catalan capital
during the 1930s, while child mortality rates remained three times higher than in northern
countries like Holland. Indeed, in 1935 a group of physicians estimated that a staggering
70% of children in the Catalan capital showed signs of tuberculosis. This illness,
described by Solidandad Obrera as the 'social scourge that decimates the proletarian
19 Tierra y Libertad. 4 July 1931, 7 October 1932; Solidaridad Obrera, 30 July, 21-23, 29 October, 20-
27 December 1932, 1, 8 January, 30 September 1933, 14 March, 5 April 1936; La Batalla, 1 September,
27 October 1932, 8 January, 8, 19, 24 February, 27 April 1933; Adelante. 28 October 1933; La Revista
Blanca, 6 July 1934; Tuñón de Lara, El movimiento obrero. p.824
20 Adelante. 10 January1934; Solidaridad Obrera, 27 February, 3-28 March, 1, 9 April, 30 June, 4 July
1931,22 March, 26 July, 25 December 1932,9 April 1933
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class', was also a continual threat for adult proletarians, a danger which one Barcelona
worker who lived through the 1930s likened to the AIDS virus today.2'
Throughout the Republic the workers' lives were also under greater threat from
the deadly housing stock in Barcelona than the pistols of'evil people'. According to
Tierra y Libertad, 50% of accommodation in the Catalan capital infringed 'the most
elemental norms of safety'. The figure was even greater in the Barn xino, where workers
of all ages were cut down by disease in overcrowded tenements. One Republican source
attributed nearly 80% of all deaths in some of the Barn xino tenements to poor housing
stock. Meanwhile, like so many other initiatives of the Catalan authorities, the planned
slum clearance of the Barn xino under the Macià Plan' floundered on budgetaiy
problems.22
The absence of radical housing reform during the Republic meant that the
'shanties' survived, with all their attendant health dangers. In MontjuIc, two young
children were crushed to death when the wall of the shanty collapsed after heavy rainfall.
When the authorities did act against the problem of the 'shanties', they resorted to a
primitive slum clearance which only aggravated social problems and augmented the
swollen army of homeless that had expanded vertiginously because of both the recession
and the support of the authorities for the landlords in the 1931 rent strike. Since then,
the landlords had continued to enjoy official protection to punish tenants. In the ghettos,
where the rate of evictions was constant throughout the Republic, the callousness of the
landlords was revealed by the eviction of sick workers, whether single or with families.
There were even instances of the sick being evicted from flats in bed. The increasingly
confident landlord class established itself as the veritable scourge of the unemployed,
maintaining detailed blacklists of former rent strikers and those tenants who had been
evicted for rent arrears due to either joblessness or illness. Meanwhile, the acceptance of
homelessness by the Republican authorities can be seen from the fact that the estimated
21 L'Opinió. 30 September 1933; Claramunt i Furest, La Lluita, PP. 193, 200-209, 215-216, 219-229;
Solidaridad Obrera. 23 July 1931; BoletIn Oficial del Ministerio de Trabajo y Prevision, 67, Februaiy
1936, pp.43-58, 183-184; Aiguader I Miré, El problema. p.6; El Luchador, 5 June 1931; Tiempos
Nuevos, 28 February 1935; Mba and Casass, Diàle gs, p.15
22 Tierra y Libertad, 2 August 1935; Claraniunt i Furest, Problemes, p.18; Solidaridad Obrera, 9 April
1933, 20March 1934; Guerradi Classe, l7October 1936
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30,000 Barcelonins who were either homeless, living in shanties or in short-term
accommodation was lower than the number of unoccupied flats in the Catalan capital, of
which there were approximately 40,000 in July 1936.23
In the proletarian moral economy, the fate of the homeless was far more emotive
than the sufferings of the victims of illegality. The life chances of the homeless were
severely curtailed on the streets and the 'order' of proletarian neighbourhoods was
frequently broken as the homeless collapsed and died of illnesses such as diphtheria,
pneumonia, tuberculosis, anaemia and consumption. This was the extreme point of a
wider problem of unemployed Barcelonins who died through malnutrition and starvation
in what the anarchists viewed as the 'society of death'. Underlining the gulf between the
Republican hierarchy and the most impoverished Barcelonins, while the Catalan political
elite attended a lavish banquet to celebrate the third anniversary of the birth of the
Republic, an unemployed worker collapsed with malnutrition and died in the streets of
Sant Andreu. 24 Meanwhile, many of those unemployed described by La Colmena Obrera
as 'deprived of the right to life', turned to the 'final salvation' of suicide as a means of
accelerating their inevitable expiration. These deaths were often accompanied by bitter
notes that attacked the inhumanity of the world and what one suicide case described as
the 'irresponsibility' of the Republican authorities towards the jobless.25
Nor was the unrelenting tragedy of proletarian existence could not be
ameliorated in the crisis-ridden hospitals of Republican Barcelona. In Hospital Clinic, the
main medical centre available to Barcelona workers was dreadfully overcrowded, with
up to 30 beds in its poorly ventilated wards. Amid widespread allegations of corruption
by the hospital administration, there were numerous high profile cases of workers going
23 Adelante, 7 January 1934; Solidaridad Obrera, 15 January, 26 July 1932, 20 April, 8 June, 7 July
1933, 4 July 1936; L'Opinió, 30 September 1933; Iniciales, January 1934; La Batalla, 5 May 1932; ka
Noticias, 2 January 1936; COPUB, Memona. ..de 1935, pp.'19, 488; Tierra y Lbertad, 30 August 1934,
18 November 1932
24 Las Noticias, 17 November, 8 December 1931; L'O pimó, 17 December 1931; Solidaridad Obrera, 2
August, 4 September 1932, 10 February, 16, 18 August 1933, 14 April, 8 July, 4 August 1934, 3
December 1935; El Luchador, 3, 10 March 1933; La Batalla, 5 January 1933; Adelante, 17 February
1934. 'The Society of Death' is the title of the first chapter in Jose Prat, La sociedad burguesa,
Barcelona, 1934
25 La Colmena Obrera, 30 October 1931; L'Opiniô, 19 August 1933; La Vanguardia, 8 December 1931,
21 February 1933; Las Noticias, 3, 11-12, 16, 28 January 1936; Communiqués from the Guardia Urbana
to the Mayor of l'Host,italet, 1 April 1936 (AHLL); Solidaridad Obrera, 21 July 1934
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without important medicines and dying while awaiting treatment. Moreover, the
authorities introduced no channels for complaints against a dismal, unsupervised health
service. Despite the legislation separating Church from state, the hospitals of Barcelona
remained under the grip of the clergy, largely because the authorities lacked the
resources to run hospitals without the voluntary services of the religious orders. As in
the monarchy, untrained nuns were often the front-line of care in the poorest of
Barcelona's hospitals, where religious dogma took precedence over the general interests
of the patients. Confrontational nuns in Hospital Clinic hit an 1 1-year old boy for reading
Solidaridad Obrera, warning him that anarchist ideas were the cause of his illness. If
atheist workers refused to pray they were sometimes expelled from hospitals,
irrespective of their condition. One non-believer who collapsed in the street after being
prematurely 'released' by nuns was refused re-admission to hospital. Meanwhile, a
cenetista in a delicate 'post-op' condition had to be moved to the clinic in the Model jail
after he was boycotted by nuns who refused to nurse him.26
The irresponsibility of the authorities and their disregard for citizens was vividly
seen in l'Hospitalet, where two years after the outbreak of bubonic plague the public
health situation was aggravated by municipal fraud. According to local Republicans,
l'Hospitalet remained 'at the mercy of rats'. Meanwhile, an apocalyptic description of a
local cenetista testified to 'a pestilent cloud, capable of killing' hanging over a city where
'dead dogs, cats and rats float in the boggy waters' and where the streets are 'the
breeding-ground of death. Here there are no authorities, nor even a health body'. Despite
the thousands of unemployed builders in l'Hospitalet, the city retained its primitive
drainage system, as well as its abysmal water and electricity supply. For all the alarm
about armed robbery, police reports in l'Hospitalet revealed that the greatest dangers to
the person in the street came from irascible stray dogs.27
26 Solidaridad Obrera, 11 April 1931, 19,29 March, 2Apr11, 24 May, 16,25 June, 22 September 1932,
15 March, 6, 16, 19, 26 August, 22 September 1933, 20 Januaiy, 27 March 1935
27 Solidaridad Obrera, 16 August 1933; Marin, 'Una primera aproximació a la vida quotidiana dels
Hospitalencs', p.30; CommuniQués from the Guardia Urbana to the Ma yor of l'Hospitalet, 1931-1936
(AHLL)
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Despite the concerns of the Republicans for the citizenry or the Christian interest
of La Vanguardia and La Veu de Catalunya in the sanctity of human existence, the lives
of proletarians in Republican Barcelona remained cheap. This was underlined by both
low wage rates and in the deadly way in which employers continued to cut corners on
safety in the workplace. Working conditions in Catalan factories and building sites,
particularly in the capital, remained abysmal and Barcelona city retained its infamous
place at the head of the league table of industrial accidents. Not only did the authorities
fail to fulfil their promise to make the bourgeoisie comply with the safety legislation but,
because of the drive of employers to offset the falling rate of profit in the recession
years, safety standards were relaxed even more and industrial accidents in Barcelona
grew by one-third during the Republic. This meant that rather than be obsessed by the
dangers of being the victim of illegality, workers would have been most timorous of
what Solidaridad Obrera termed the danger of being 'mutilated by capitalist economic
life'. After the burial of three workers killed in a factory explosion in Badalona,
Solidaridad Obrera summed up the lot of'the eternal victims of the capitalist machine'
and concluded that 'when they [i.e. the capitalists and the authorities] are not leaving us
hungry, busy jailing or cowardly murdering us, we run the constant danger of dying
violently in the workplace'. 28 That negligent employers were never charged with
manslaughter could not have been ignored by the collective conscience of the Barcelona
proletariat. In turn, this must have reinforced the anarchist affirmation that the security
forces were not motivated by the seriousness of the crime and that the gravest dangers
facing the proletariat did not even register as 'crimes' in the bourgeois criminal code.
The proletarian moral economy formed around the experience of oppression also
led to a rejection of the legitimacy of the sources of the 'respectable fears'. Since the
eruption of social and industrial conflict in Catalonia after World War One, the privately
owned press that reiterated the tales of the 'criminal danger' was popularly seen as the
'mercenary press', intimately tied to narrow economic interests and the object of
contempt for the bulk of the proletariat. Despite the veneer of autonomy and diversity,
28 Solidaridad Obrera, 17 June, 24 December 1931, 4 August 1934, 24 June 1936; Tiem pos Nuevos, 28
February 1935; Soto Carmona, El trabajo, pp.659-663; La Colmena Obrera, 9 January 1932
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all the apparently 'independent' newspapers in the Catalan capital were controlled by
capitalist economic interests. Pich i Pon owned El Dia Gráfico and La Noche, two minor
Barcelona dailies, while La Vanguardia was the property of the Godó clan, one the city's
leading textile families. Similarly, La Veu de Catalunya was the political organ of the
Lliga and an important mouthpiece of the political interests of Catalan big business. It
was commonly accepted that these associations exerted a direct impact on newspaper
content and undermined free press principles of editorial independence. This was fertile
ground for anarchist allegations that the bourgeois press was 'the great prostitute of
existing civilisation' staffed by 'hack' journalists 'on hire' to 'financial cliques'.29
The view of social reality propagated in the bourgeois press was completely
discordant with the experiences of the majority of workers. For instance, industrial
accidents were portrayed as if they were natural occurrences or passing imperfections of
the industrial system. More often than not, however, they were under-reported. j
Vanguardia and La Veu de Catalunya concentrated exclusively on the loss of human life
caused by what they suggested was the genocide that accompanied armed robbery, while
remaining conspicuously silent about fatalities in workplace accidents. The same papers
ignored the deaths of the jobless in the streets. The highly selective criterion employed
by the conservative press to assess which deaths were newsworthy had nothing to do
with the overall death toll, because the fatalities alone among the homeless in the 1 930s
far exceeded the numbers of policemen and security guards who died in anned robberies.
This same selectivity was extended to the numerous cases of jobless workers who
committed the heresy offelo de Se, whose plight was hypocritically ignored by the
bourgeois-catholic press.
The bourgeois press similarly alienated workers through its systematic and vocal
defence of the economic oligarchy and its unmitigated hostility towards labour
organisations. In the early 1920s the partialities of the bourgeois press had led CNT
printers to impose 'red censorship' on many Barcelona dailies. This threat was renewed in
the 1930s to counter bourgeois allegations against the 'criminal FM'. As far as class-
29 Solidaridad Obrera, 14 July 1932; Tierra y Libertad, 27 April 1934
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conscious workers were concerned, the deceitful traditions of the bourgeois press made
it easy for them to reject the stories of 'anarchist robbers' as the latest infamy directed
against those who dared defend working class interests. In some cases petitions signed
by hundreds of workers were sent to newspaper editors in opposition to the
denunciations of'anarcho-banditry'. The visceral scepticism of the local proletariat was
skilfuiiy encouraged by the anarchists, who reminded workers how the heroes of the
international anarchist movement like Jules Bonnot and Nestor Makhno were widely
regarded as 'bandits' in the bourgeois press. Meanwhile, Solidaridad Obrera likened the
denigration of the FM by the Barcelona press to the insults hurled on Spartacus and his
slave army by the crumbling Roman Empire.3°
The Republican newspapers were also regarded with great scepticism by
Barcelona workers. While La Publicitat laid claim to a liberal-Republican tradition from
the nineteenth century, when it embraced the cause of Emile Zola and the radical French
intelligentsia during the Dreyflis Affair', the journalistic independence of the paper was
interrupted during World War One with the take-over of the Tayá brothers, two freight
entrepreneurs and vehement opponents of trade union rights who made their fortunes
supplying the Allied war machine. Thereafter, amid widespread speculation that the
paper was funded by the British Consulate in Barcelona, La Publicitat became an
energetic defender of the cause of Anglo-French imperialism. Meanwhile, L'Opiniô and
L'Humanitat, both of which were emblematic of the 'critical' titles that emerged around
the Republican movement during the late 1920s, were, by the mid-1930s, closely
identified with ruling factions inside the Generalitat. In practice, both papers were little
more thanfora for the respective political careers of Lluhi i Vallescá and Companys.
Equally, by the 1930s, La Publicitat was effectively the organ of the ACR. In terms of
their content, while these titles covered a wide range of the political spectrum, they all
advanced a view of social reality which, either covertly or overtly, clashed with the
experiences of workers. Even in the nominally laic Republican press, suicides were given
30 Paz, Durruti, p.260; Solidaridad Obrera, 20 June, 1 August 1933, 18, 24 April, 2 August 1934; !
6 September 1935
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cursory, uncritical coverage, as if they were natural occurrences, unconnected with
unemployment and the depravation that characterised the lot of the jobless.3'
Unlike the advocates of the 'moral panics', the 'expropriators' were, broadly
speaking, inside the 'moral economy' of large sectors of the proletariat. The low wage
economy of the Catalan capital fostered an ilegalist tradition that accepted the need to
'steal to survive' and validated pilfering from the workplace. Such practices were
embodied in the popular aphorism Whoever robs a thief has a hundred years pardon'
('Quien roba a un ladrón tiene cien afios de perdón'). Indicative of the wider legitimacy of
the 'expropriators', the novelist Pio Baroja visited a number ofjailedfaIstas awaiting trial
on robbery charges. The allure of the 'expropriators' within proletarian communities can
be explained insofar as their activities largely affected distant capitalist institutions such
as banks and insurance companies. Meanwhile, even when the exponents of armed
illegality did operate inside proletarian neighbourhoods, they selected targets socially
removed from the working class and on the other side of the fault line that separated the
proletariat from the commercial middle classes. In these circumstances workers were
highly unlikely to condemn armed robberies aimed at shopkeepers and rent and debt
collectors, all of whom were regarded with immense disdain within the proletarian 'moral
economy'. Equally, since he was a shopkeeper and Councillor heavily implicated in
municipal corruption, the assassination of Gil i Gil for non-payment of'revolutionary tax'
to a FAT grupo did not arouse much sympathy among the workers of l'Hospitalet.
Similarly, the policemen, night-watchmen and private security guards who attempted to
resist the 'expropriators' were widely regarded by workers as the guarantors of bourgeois
privilege, who did nothing to protect workers from the dangers of the workplace.32
Benefiting from the residual anti-police traditions of the proletariat, it is
noticeable that the 'expropriation' squads and the unemployed illegalists enjoyed much
freedom of operation in the ghettos. Illegality, therefore, reflected the zonal segregation
31 Bueso, Recuerdos, vol.!, p.69; Fenthndez Urbina, 'Los "affaires" Straperlo y Tayá', pp. 18-33; k
Publicitat, 28 January 1932; Las Noticias, 3, 11-12, 16,28 January 1936
32 Stephen Humphries, 'Steal to Survive: The Social Crime of Working Class Children, 1890-1940',
Oral History. 9, 1, 1981, pp.24-33; Solidaridad Obrera. 9 January, 30 July 1932, 15 February 1933; La
Publicitat, 9 January 1932, 7 September 1935; Liarte, El camino, p.20 1; Tierra y Libertad, 17 October
1931
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of classes in urban Barcelona. For instance, the calls of the authorities for a 'civic
reaction' from the 'honourable citizenry' of Barcelona to apprehend 'expropriators' only
found an echo in the more economically stable districts of the city such as the Eixample
and Sarrià, where the largely middle class and bourgeois populace occasionally formed
irate mobs of citizens that set off in pursuit of robbers. Meanwhile, indicating that the
illegality that worried the authorities was of little concern to workers, the same call went
largely unheard in the ghettos, where community solidarity and a generalised
identification with the underdog meant that illegality was seen either with tacit sympathy
or, at least, with indifference. There is, moreover, evidence that in the marginal ghettos
the teams of 'expropriators' were viewed in a positive light, as they symbolised the
strength of resistance of the proletarian community and were proof that 'they' (the
authorities) could be confronted.33
7.3. 'Revolutionary Constructivism': the End of the 'Expropriations'?
The irrefrangible sectarianism of the Barcelona CNT-FAI leadership ensured that
the elitism inherent to the 'revolutionary gymnastics', and the assumption that anarchist
forces alone were sufficient to make the revolution, remained unaltered by the post-
December 1933 repression. The rejection of other revolutionary factions by the grupos
led the Barcelona Confederation to become increasingly ghettoised throughout 1934.
This was accentuated by the unyielding repression directed against the Catalan CNT by
the Generalitat. Because this campaign of harassment was disproportionate to the
barriers placed in front of other workers' groups in Catalonia and the other CNT
Regional Federations elsewhere in the Spanish state, the Catalan CNT developed
something of a persecution complex. The isolation of the Catalan CNT was most
apparent from its refusal to enter the Workers' Alliance, the BOC-inspired anti-fascist
workers' front, that included socialists, dissident communists and treintistas. Outside of
La Vanguardia. 31 March 1934, 11 August 1935; GarcIa Oliver, El eco. p.616; Porcel, La revuelta,
pp.1 18-12 1. Revealingly, the only cases I have found where workers were prepared to pursue
expropriators occurred during pay-roll heists.
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Catalonia, the Workers' Alliance also included a number of CNT Regional Federations,
most notably in Asturias, which eschewed the sectarian line of the Catalan anarchists.34
The Catalan Workers' Alliance took the initiative in the campaign against
authoritarianism in 1934, attacking local fascist groups and pressurising the Generalitat
to respond to the offensive of the Madrid government against the Autonomy Statute.35
As the year wore on, the Radical government which had ruled in Madrid since the
November 1933 elections became increasingly untenable, raising the possibility that a
new government might be formed with ministers from the quasi-fascist CEDA. It seemed
to many on the left that the CEDA was on the brink of peacefully taking power and
converting the Republic into a corporate, Catholic state. However, the elitist CNT
leadership in Barcelona could not see the wood for the trees and continued to hinder the
work of the anti-fascist alliance in Catalonia, expounding that a government led by the
CEDA could make little difference to the 'Republican fascism' that was established in
1931.36
The introspection of the Barcelona anarchist leadership must have been of
enormous solace to the Spanish right, because the boycott of the anti-fascist alliance by
the largest single proletarian organisation in Catalonia meant that the Workers' Alliance,
like its predecessor, the Workers' Alliance Against Unemployment, was effectively
doomed to failure. Nevertheless, with or without the Catalan CNT, the supporters of the
Workers' Alliance were determined to act, because the price of inactivity would have
been the accession to power of the CEDA. This culminated in the mobilisation of the
Workers' Alliances throughout Spain in October 1934 to counter an expected fascist
take-over of government. The October events were crowned by the Asturian Revolution,
34 VIctor Alba, La Alianza Obrera. Historia y análisis de una táctica de unidad, Madrid, 1978, pp.191-
200; Angeles Barrio Alonso, Anarpuismo y anarcosindicalismo en Asturias (1890-1936), Madrid, 1988,
pp.390-409; David Ruiz, Insurrección defensiva y revolución obrera: ci octubre es paflola de 1934,
Barcelona, 1988, pp.59-102; José Manuel Macarm Vera, 'La autovaloración anarquista: un principio de
anáiisis y acción. Sevilla, 1931-1936', Estudios de Historia Social, 31, 1984, pp.135-149; Adelante, 5
January-9 March 1934; Peirats, La CNT, vol.!, pp.82-88; La Revista Blanca, 3 January-16 November
1934; La Batalia, 5 May, 16 June 1934
La Batalla, January-October 1934; Jordi de Camps i Arboix, Histôria de la ilei de contractes de
conreu, Barcelona, 197!
36 Tierra v Libertad, 16 February-il October 1934; Solidaridad, 13 February-3 May 1934; Solidaridad
Obrera, 16 February-19 September 1934; Sindicalismo, 4 April 1934
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the largest revolutionary outburst in Europe since the 1871 Paris Commune, in which the
united Asturian proletariat took control of the means of production and held the army at
bay for two weeks.37
In stark contrast to the heroic contribution of the Asturian CNT to the Workers'
Alliance, the Catalan CNT-FAI leadership was completely overtaken by the march of
events and remained aloof from the October mobilisation. In Barcelona, the BOC
managed to muster its forces and successffilly imposed the first ever general strike in the
Catalan capital against the will of the anarchists, however, the CNT-FAI countermanded
the strike order of its rivals in the Workers' Alliance. Most ignominious of all was the
decision of the 'Nosotros'-dominated CNT Regional Committee to broadcast a call to the
Barcelona proletariat to return to work on military radio while the insurgents in Asturias
were struggling to hold off the Spanish army.38
In the aftermath of October, the repression was ferocious. There were 40,000
workers jailed throughout Spain, the autonomous powers of the Generalitat were
rescinded and the power of the right-wing Madrid government was bolstered as
constitutional guarantees were abrogated under the Ley de ordenpüblico. According to
the British Ambassador in Madrid, Spain presented:
'the impression of a country under a dictatorship.. .The prisons are
overflowing and provisional ones have to be found to contain the
enormous number of people who have been arrested. The arrests
often take place without any proof and only on suspicion of
complicity in the rising... Catalonia is under military control and no
vestige of popular representation remains'.
The opportunistic Radicals seemed dangerously close to allowing the quasi-fascist
CEDA the chance to form a majority government in Madrid. In the syndical terrain, the
right threatened even the most basic trade union rights and all independent syndical
organisations, whether UGT, CNT or autonomous, were effectively proscribed. With the
the Asturian events see Narcis Molins I Fabregas, UHP. La revolució proletari d'Asturies,
Barcelona, 1935; 'Ignotus' (Manuel Villar), El anarciuismo en la insurrección de Asturias (La CNT y la
FAT en octubre de 1934), Valencia, 1935; Manuel Grossi Mier, La insurrección de Asturias, (2nd
edition) Madrid, 1978.
38 Sanz, El sindicalismo y la politica, pp.258-259; Peirats, Figuras. pp.262-263; CNT, El Congreso
Confederal de Zaragoza 1936, Bilbao, 1978, pp.154-168
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diminution of syndical power employers slashed wages and set about victimising
thousands of working class militants. Again, the British Ambassador summed up the new
favourable business climate, reporting that:
'the popular masses are likely to be in a state of sullen disaffection
but at the mercy of the government for some time...Employers if all
kinds, however, seem to view the immediate future with
cheerfulness on account of the powerless condition to which labour
organisations have been reduced'.39
The Catalan bourgeoisie also welcomed the rightward drift in the political
landscape after October. Showing the limits of the Calalanisme of the propertied
classes, the representative organisations of the industrial and agrarian wings of the
Catalan economic oligarchy - the Institut AgrIcola Català de Sant Isidre and the Fomento
del Trabajo Nacional - invited the pseudo-fascistic CEDA leader Gil Robles to visit
Barcelona, where they feted this confirmed centralist. The political project of the Catalan
bourgeoisie was now transparently authoritarian. Bourgeois groups called for the death
penalty to be used against those who attempted to 'destroy Catalan wealth' and the
indefinite continuation of martial law to remove 'the black stain' of social protest 'from
our beloved Barcelona'. In an alarming search for models of social control, k
Vanguardia heaped accolades on 'the new Germany' which, in under two years had
banished all signs of strikes and lock-outs. Meanwhile, the Fomento del Trabajo
Nacional made a public call for Anguera de Sojo, by now a member of the semi-fascist
CEDA, to return to Barcelona and pick up the reins of power.4°
This post-October context prompted growing concern inside the Spanish CNT-
FAT that the movement was becoming peripheral to the march of socio-political
developments which day-by-day pointed towards confrontation. The sense of alarm was
also evident in the traditional Catalan bastion of the CNT-FAI, where voices spoke out
in favour of a new line that could allow the Confederation to break out of the repressive
39 F037 1/18597/W9526/27/4 1, F037 1/18597/W10704/27/4 1 and F037 1/1 8599/W95221325/4 1:
Reports from Sir 0. Grahame, 25 October and 6 December 1934 (PRO); Ricard Vinyes i Ribes, 'Sis
d'octubre, repressió i represaliats', L'Avenc, 30, 1980, p.52
La Vanguardia, 9-27 October, 4 November 1934; Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, Memoria.. .de 1934,
pp.5-8, 215, 218-23 1	
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circle in which it was trapped. Indeed, the CNT was veritably buckling under the white
heat of a repression that palpably exceeded all that which had been experienced since the
beginning of the Republican period. The Barcelona Builders' Union reported that the
sheer weight of the repression had produced a dominant mood of'apathy' in its ranks.4'
Many anarchists now accepted that the political situation had drastically
deteriorated since 1931, particularly with the return of the death penalty, a measure
which Solidaridad Obrera denounced as 'a step backwards that suppresses one of the
most important human conquests'. Amid bitter internal polemics, the Catalan CNT-FAI
leadership accepted the need to break with the elitist sectarianism of 'revolutionary
gymnastics' and make concessions to the growing aspiration for anti-fascist unity within
the Catalan CNT rank-and-file. Even the FIJL, which had been one of the most sectarian
components of the Catalan anarchist movement before the October rising, now spawned
a pro-unity current in the wake of Asturias. A number of the contributors to La Revista
Blanca underwent a similar conversion and its pages reflected the debate inside the
CNT-FAI over the need for greater unity of action.42
The pressure for a change in line was bound up with a growing dissatisfaction
with the 'Nosotros'. Despite the moral superiority enjoyed by 'Nosotros' in libertarian
circles, this so-called 'super-FM' showed tremendous disdain for democratic protocols
and it was common for important decisions affecting the CNT-FAI to be resolved in
assemblies of no more than six grupos de afinidad. On occasions none of the members
of 'Nosotros' attended FM assemblies but they still expected their initiatives to be
followed, which they communicated through third parties. In keeping with its militarised
nature, 'Nosotros' exerted a paternal influence overfaIstas through both its unrivalled
popularity and its largely unaccountable power base in the Catalan Confederal Defence
Committees, on which Francisco Ascaso, Jover, Durruti, Garcia Oliver, Fernández,
Sanz, Ortiz and 'Valencia' were all represented.43
41 Solidaridad Obrera, 10 November 1934
42 Solidaridad Obrera, 11 October 1934; La Batalla, 13 September 1935; La Revista Blanca, 26 April-
31 May, 14 June-19 July 1935
GarcIa Oliver, El eco, p.172
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Throughout 1934 the reaction to the autocratic control exerted by 'Nosotros'
over the other anarchist grupos de afinidad gathered pace. In July 1934 Peirats, the
secretary of the Barcelona FAT, resigned from the organisation in protest at the influence
of'Nosotros'. In the months after the Asturian Revolution this gesture was followed by
several other anarchist grupos who left the FM in disgust at both the machinations of the
'Nosotros' group within the Barcelona CNT-FAI and in dismay at the woeful
consequences of the 'revolutionary gymnastics'. Inside the FAT, Francisco Ascaso and
Sanz, both of whom had issued orders to the Catalan CNT-FAI in October, faced harsh
criticism of their decision to order a return to work. There were even calls from the 'A'
grupo de afinidad of Toryho and Peirats for the expulsion of 'Nosotros'. This was
matched with renewed demands for the introduction of grass-roots democracy in the
FAL
Although 'Nosotros' continued to enjoy mythical status amongfaistas, the
challenge to the 'anarcho-Bolshevik' line of'revolutionary gymnastics' was gathering
pace. In a curious twist, the rise of the 'Nervio' grupo de afinidad of Abad de Santillán,
the intellectual parent of trabazón and the projected fusion of a specifically anarchist
organisation with anarcho-syndicalist unions, which heralded the relative decline in
influence of'Nosotros' and the end of'revolutionaiy gymnastics' in the CNT. This shift
was underlined by the choice of Ildefonso Gonzalez as the successor to Peirats as
secretary of the Barcelona FM. An Argentinian émigré and ex-FORA activist, Gonzalez
regularly collaborated with Abad de Santillán inside 'Nervio'. The ascendancy of 'Nervio'
was finally sealed by the arrival of Abad de Santillán as editor of Tierra y Libertad,
Tiempos Nuevos and Timón, while Villar, another leading member of the group, became
editor at Solidaridad Obrera.45
From the end of 1934 until the outbreak of Civil War in 1936, 'Nervio', and Abad
de Santillán in particular, spearheaded a new concern for organisation within the CNT-.
FM. This presaged an important shift within the Catalan CNT-FAI and the recuperation
of a 'constructive' concept of the revolution that had largely been banished from the
Gutiérrez Molina, La Idea, p.77
Miró, Catalufla, pp.48-49, 51, 54, 61-62
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Confederation since the departure of the moderate anarcho-syndicalists during 1932-
1933. The conception of social transformation enunciated by Abad de Santillán was
premised on a disciplined, organised, industrial-based transition towards a classless,
stateless society, far removed from the ruralist, anti-modernist, commune-based ideals of
Puente and Urales that had influenced sectors of the FM in earlier years. Similarly, Abad
de Santillán exposed the weaknesses of the chaotic guerrilla actions of the grupos that
brought, in his view, little more that 'the sacrifice of valuable lives in precipitate actions'.
Instead, he advanced the tactical view that the revolution 'was not just a question of
force, audacity, and fearlessness, but the ripe fruit of the conscious participation of the
majority of the people in the solution of their problems'.
The manifest similarities between the perspectives of Abad de Santillán and the
'constructivist' conception of the revolution of the treinlistas opened up the possibility of
a rapprochement between the FM-dominated CNT and those anarcho-syndicalists who
had been outside the Confederation since the split of 1932-1933. This complemented the
rank-and-file sentiments in favour of proletarian unity that had flourished after Astunas.
After October 1934 many of the treintistas had revealed an interest in returning to their
'libertarian home'. Abad de Santillãn did everything within his power to make this
homecoming a reality, particularly as he, like many other Catalan anarchists, increasingly
regarded the breach betweenfaIsta and treintista as absurd. Moreover, because its ideas
were firmly rooted in anarchist orthodoxy, the 'Nervio' group was in a perfect position to
achieve the re-unification of the anarchists and the anarcho-syndicalists in the CNT,
calming the hostility of many faIstas towards the treintistas, including even the most
militant elements of the FIJL and the all-important Catalan FM, much to the chagrin of
the 'Nosotros' group, whose elitist, maximalist line was increasingly discarded.47
For the ideas of Diego Abad de Santillán see the collection of his writings edited by Antonio Elorza,
El anarguismo y la revolución en Es paña. Escritos. 1930-1938, Madrid, 1976, passim., Diego Abad de
Santillan, El organismo economico de la revolución. (2nd edition) Madrid, 1978, and the critical study,
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social', Anthropos, 138, 1992.
47 Tierra y Libertad, 24 December 1935; Preface by Pere Gabriel to Joan PeirO, Penll a la reraguarda,
(2nd edition) MatarO, 1987, p.8; Sindicalismo, 30 May, 7 August 1935; La Batalla, 19 July 1935; Abad
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The passionate calls for a rupture with the insurrectionary line of 1932-1933
carried with them a rejection of the tactic of'expropriation'. The balance finally shifted
away from the proponents of'expropriation' with the ascendancy of'Nervio' within the
CNT-FAI. The anti-ilegalist stance of the 'Nervio' group developed in the 1920s in
Buenos Aires where, from the pages of La Protesta, Abad de Santillán and his close ally,
Lopez Mango, combated the 'anarcho-banditry' of the growing numbers of Italo-
Argentinian individualists who were inspired by Di Giovanni and ScarfO. The campaign
of La Protesta also coincided with the arrival of Durruti, Francisco Ascaso and Jover in
the American sub-continent. When the Iberians left a trail of empty banks in their wake,
they too incurred the scorn of the protestislas, who damned them for undermining the
reputation of anarchism as a revolutionary creed. While Abad de Santillãn largely
overcame his tactical differences with Durruti, his hostility towards the individualists and
their violence was sealed after LOpez Mango was assassinated by Di Giovanni. It was no
surprise then, that Abad de Santillán viewed 'crime' as the 'fruit of misery and
desperation', 'a badly directed act of rebellion that does not follow an overall
revolutionary plan and was, therefore, worthy of reproach'. Although the 'constructivists'
admitted feeling 'compassion' for those who were forced to steal, they emphasised that
'robbery' was unacceptable for the 'conscious anarchist' because, in the 'immense majority
of cases', such behaviour was incompatible with the 'universal, total expropriation' and
the levelling labour of social revolution.48
The desire to curb the 'expropriations' became irresistible in the face of growing
fascist reaction. As Civera had noted with considerable prescience in 1932, illegality was
a potent agent of social disintegration that could be exploited by the authoritarian right.49
Equally, the marginalisation of the proponents of armed illegality was a vital
precondition for the re-unification of the CNT and the return of the moderate anarcho-
syndicalists. As we have seen, the treintistas were priggish to the point of prudery on the
question of illegality. At the height of the campaign of bourgeois-Republican 'moral
48 Bayer, Anarchism. passim.; Joan Llarch, La muerte, pp.57-59; Various, 'Diego Abad de Santillán: Un
anarquismo sin adjetivos', p.12, 30, 38; Nervio, July 1934; Solidaridad Obrera, 23 September 1932
Q4, May 1932
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panics', Peiró lamented the hegemony of those in the FM whose 'Al Capone-style'
conception of the revolution had transformed the CNT unions into the 'receptacle and lid
for common criminals'. Behind the propaganda, Peiró developed a critique of illegality
that had much in common with that of Abad de Santillán and the treinhista activists
maintained that 'robbery' and revolution were incompatible because 'criminals can never
be revolutionaries'. Similarly, Peiró forewarned that the egoistic activities of Stirnerist
illegalists might become a disruptive force for the revolution, leading to actions devoid
of socio-political content that would dishonour the anarchist message and weaken the
moral standing of revolutionaries. This was matched with fears that the reliance on
armed fund-raising tactics could corrupt militants and encourage activists to expropriate
for their own ends.5°
While the strategy of armed fund-raising had never enjoyed universal acceptance
among 'the libertarian family' of Barcelona, public disapproval from the anarchist ranks
was always muted by the suprema lex of the movement: the intense class and
organisational solidarity established in the dark years of the 1920s. Nevertheless, the
ascendancy of the 'Nervio' group accompanied growing pressure for an end to the
expropriations. At the June 1934 Plenum of CNT Regional Committees, the IWA, the
anarcho-syndicalist international, had already voiced its displeasure with the
'expropriation' tactic. The IWA delegate's additional request that the CNT stabilise the
internal functioning of its unions revealed a certain ignorance of the intensity of the
Generalitat repression.5'
No less important was the fact that for all the richness of the proletarian 'moral
economy' and the enduring relationship between the FM and its social constituency, the
enthusiasm for armed fund-raising tactics among many of its one-time supporters in the
CNT-FAI was waning. This was owed to a variety of factors.
Firstly, while Solidaridad Obrera doggedly stuck to the line that neither
cenehistas norfaIstas participated in acts of armed illegality on behalf of the
50 Sindicalismo, 10 November 1933; L'Opinió, 18 August 1934; Peiró, Penll. pp.xvil-xviii, xxiii;
Manent i Pesas, Records, pp.178-l&1; Pestafla, La pue aprendI. vol.2, passim.; de Lera, Pestafla, pp.205-
206
Tiempos Nuevos, 18 April 1935; PestafIa, Terronsmo, pp.100-102; Solidaridad Obrera, 29 June 1934
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orgamsation, it was evident that the constant need of the CNT-FAI leadership to issue
periodic denials was becoming tiresome. Durruti and Francisco Ascaso saw the need to
respond publicly to accusations in El Sol, the Madrid Republican daily, that they were
'professional robbers', with Durruti explaining the preference of the FM for the
'collective robbery' of social revolution. 'Marianet', the Barcelona Builders' Union leader,
also entered the propaganda fray by attacking the 'defamation' against the libertarians by
the bourgeois press. When the allegations ceased to abate, however, the Barcelona
Builders' Union issued a manifesto refuting allegations that it collected 'revolutionary tax'
from employers, because 'the Builders' Union does not employ threats with thuggery and
intimidation as one of its norms'. Nevertheless, increasing energies were devoted to
rebutting the claims of the 'mercenary press' and the counter-claims of the CNT-FAI
press that some of the perpetrators of armed robberies held in police custody were the
namesakes of Barcelona anarchist militants revealed a comical defensiveness. Growing
fears inside the CNT-FM that the 'expropriations' could damage the prestige of the
Confederation were accompanied by signs of discomfort inside FM ranks. These were
underlined by a series of articles written by Jaume Balius, a young journalist who had
gravitated towards anarchism from the fringes of radical Catalaniste. Following a
relatively balanced dismissal of the stereotypes of anarchists as 'abnormal' and 'savage' as
part of a drive by the authorities to tarnish the 'international culture' of the proletariat,
Balius launched a bloodcurdling attack on Planes and Madrid, two of the journalists at
the forefront of the press campaign. 'Your knowledge', Balius concluded, 'like your
souls, is rubbish. In the midst of the social rubbish of which the bourgeoisie is riddled,
your hearts are rubbish. Our day will come... [then] we will judge you'. On another
occasion, Durruti personally went to the La Publicitat offices in search of Planes, vowing
that when he found the 'shameless hack' (desvergonzadoplumfero) he would 'knock his
block off' (romperle la crisma) and 'do him in!' ( jromperle el alma!).52
A second reason for the change of heart of the erstwhile advocates of armed
illegality was the concern that a tactic that had been primarily regarded as a short-term
52 Solidaridad Obrera. 9 November 1932, 28 Januaiy, 17 November 1933, 18, 26 April, 4, 14 July, 9,
14-18 August 1934; Tierra y Libertad, 8 December 1933; Paz, Durruti, p.3 11
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expedient could bring discredit on the CNT-FAI. By 1934-193 5 it was clear that the
there were numerous groups of'expropriators' who were members of the CNT-FAI but
yet operated outside the control of the Confederal Defence Committees. This was
matched with a recognition in libertarian circles that the relatively unsupervised
admission of grupos de afInidad into the FM between 1931 and 1934 had allowed what
José Luis Gutiérrez Molina described as adventurers 'attracted by violent action' and
provocateurs to enter the movement. These qualms about the calibre of FAI recruits lent
succour to allegations from both treinhistas and bloquistas that a number of grupos de
afinidad were 'out of control' and made up of 'irresponsibles' and 'confidants' who were
prepared to attack and kill members of other workers' groups.53
An additional source of disquiet for the CNT-FAI leadership was the increasing
evidence of impropriety among militants. Although the anarchists did not openly wash
their dirty clothing in public, there was a steady rise in reports in the libertarian press that
referred to the expulsion offaIstas and cenetislas from the movement for 'immorality', a
libertarian euphemism for the misappropriation of funds and the abuse of the solidarity
which symbolised the hub of organisational life in the CNT-FAI. Matters worsened in
early 1934 when Josep Esplugues was expelled from the Barcelona FM for receiving
money from the Lliga in return for pursuing the abstentionist line in the December 1933
elections. Meanwhile, seasoned activists like Eroles Batlle, a grupista and leading
militant from the Barcelona textile sector, came under suspicion for embezzling CNT
funds. Months later, Gilabert, another leading BarcelonafaIsta and one-time member of
the Solidaridad Obrera editorial board, faced a lengthy investigation over corruption
charges.
The reservations of the CNT-FAI hierarchy also focused on the individualists and
former activists like Piera who, after quitting the FM, were blind to the appeal of
collective organisation and robbed for purely individualistic ends. Other individualists,
Gutiérrez Molina, La Idea, pp.65, 77; Sindicalismo, 14, 21, 30 June 1933; Tierra y Libertad, 14 April
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like Gardenyes, had been expelled from the CNT-FAI movement as they were deemed
incapable of submitting themselves to the collective discipline required for organisations,
even those of an anarchist ilk. 55 Even though the Stirnerist illegalists were often not
cenetistas orfaistas, as anarchists and part of the wider 'libertarian family', their antics
brought growing embarrassment to the CNT-FAI leadership. This unease reached its
apogee following a series of high-profile cases in which workers were killed during
robberies perpetrated by the individualists. One Stirnerist 'union of egoists' killed a UGT
waiter who refIised to hand over the cash register in the café where he worked.
Testifying to the bizarre alliances forged by the individualists, the gang included an
anarchist printer who worked for the Catalan CNT Regional Committee at the
Solidandad Obrera print shop and Charles Levesey, an English bourgeois adventurer and
the son of a factory owner. The sterility of individualist violence was witnessed again in
December 1934 when Vicente Aranda Sanchez, a twenty-year old blacklisted anarchist
linked to the individualists of Barcelona killed a young shop worker in badly bungled
robbery.56
The Aranda affair brought armed illegality to the forefront of national politics
and culminated in a death sentence for Aranda following his trial at a military court. For
the Stirnerists who wrote for Iniciales, the fate of Aranda was a cause célèbre and they
greeted his execution with a stinging attack on 'the Republic ofjailers and hangmen'.
Meanwhile, M, the influential clandestine paper of the Barcelona Local Federation of
Anarchist Groups carried a long obituary for Aranda. This was combined with a lengthy
treatise on the merits of 'expropriation' and illegality, in which j defended the right of
the jobless 'to associate with other unemployed to conquer the right to live by force'
because 'for the man stalked by hunger and privation the last remaining dignified option
is robbery', a legitimate 'form of acquiring everyday food'. This certainly remained true
for many of the poor of Barcelona and the series of'expropriations' that occurred in the
L'Opiniô, 31 March 1934; Solidaridad Obrera. 28 June 1931, 6 September 1934; La Batalla, 7 July
1932; Las Noticias, 5-6 May 1932; Porcel, La revuelta, pp.118-121
56 Ldon-Ignaci, Los aflos, p.3 14, La Van guardia, 13, 17-18 August 1933; Las Noticias, 2 July 1936;
Paz, Durruti, p.67; La Vanguardia, 30 June 1934; Las Noticias, 2 July 1936; Ealhani, 'Crime and
Punishment', pp.3 1-37; La Vanguardia, Las Noticias, La Veu de Catalunva, 18-22 December 1934
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days following Aranda's execution would suggest that the force majeur of capital
punishment failed to either intimidate the 'expropriators' or control illegality. Instead, the
enduring practice of'expropnations' was revealed by a police report published in the
press in April 1935. Besides the illegality of the unemployed, the police observed that the
'shameful industry of robbery' had the 'enormous importance of nourishing the funds of
the clandestine [CNT] unions, whose booty pays for assassinations, sabotage and new
robberies, thereby nurturing and strengthening anarchy and social revolution'. The police
also identified a stalemate situation whereby 'when a trial for robbery or an assassination
occurs, immediately new robberies are committed', thereby constituting 'an established
chain of punishable events and it is this continuity that it is vital to break'.57
This state of affairs confirmed the 'constructivist' axiom of Abad de Santillán that
the obsession with spontaneous rebellion made some anarchists far too receptive to
random violence and acts that were devoid of any constructive revolutionary content.
Epitomising the random nature of individualist violence, the father of the shop worker
killed by Aranda was a well-known Barcelona anarchist. Moreover, the embrace of
illegality also brought the danger that if the 'expropriators' became completely isolated
from the proletariat, they might become 'professional gunmen'. In some instances the
decision to devote oneself to a life with the gun may have been a positive choice or the
reflection of a pseudo-Nitzschean desire to become the armed avenger of bourgeois
injustices. In other cases, however, illegalism served as a self-justifying theory for any
individual who had lost the habits of regular employment or, quite simply found it
unpleasant, alongside which the excitement of life as an 'expropriator' seemed far
preferable. By extension, the unregulated expansion of illegalism carried the possibility
that 'common thieves' might use anarchism as a pretext for their own activities, dressing
up their deviant actions as 'anarchic'. This trend had already been observed before the
1930s.58
Imciales, November 1934; M. 8 Januaiyl935; La Vanguardia. 22-25 December 1934, 30 April
1935
58 Perez Barô, Els "Felicos" anys, p.87
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Lastly, the anarchist-individualist perspective on crime seriously overestimated
the extent to which illegal acts could foster anti-capitalist struggle. The protest value of
illegality was revealed to be severely limited and was never likely to generate a mass
campaign capable of challenging the structures of capitalist society. Indeed, it was clear
that the logic of Stirnerist individualism actually tended towards anti-worker activities.
All these factors combined to produce a consensus within the hierarchy of the
Barcelona CNT-FAI that the exponents of 'individual expropriation' were incompatible
with the wider struggle for collective revolutionary transformation. Emili Salut, a well-
informed veteran of the struggles of these years, criticised the 'pernicious influence' of
the individualists and the 'moral disorder' brought by their belief in 'complete amorality as
a norm of life'. Similarly, !Marianet condemned the 'discredit' transmitted to the CNT-
FM by the Stirnerists, who he denounced as crypto-bourgeois parvenus, whose
'individual expropriations' were 'nothing more than the transferral of wealth from one set
of hands to another, exclusively for personal benefit'. Rather than the source of
liberation, the Builders' Union leader maintained that individualism ensured the
continuation of the class system and the limited social mobility of the illegalists, who
could use their new-found wealth to elevate themselves above the rest of the workers.
Consequently, an 'abyss' separated the 'lost men' and individualists who turned their
backs on the everyday struggles of the libertarian movement which, as Marianet'
explained, were geared towards 'general, not individual well-being' and 'collective
expropriation'. Meanwhile, in a flight of romanticism, Montseny lamented that many of
the illegalists displayed little of'the intrinsic honour of the pure bandit, the good highway
robber [and] the traditional popular bandit, whose deep sense of justice led them to rob
from the rich to give to the poor'. On a more pragmatic level, Montseny expressed her
'moral pain' at the association between anarchism and criminality. Finally, Genninal
Esgleas, who had himself been very close to some of the Stirnerists, launched a stem
attack on the 'mistaken policy' of his former individualist allies, whom he accused of
'confusing rebellion with terrorism'. Reiterating what he saw as true anarchist morality,
Esgleas called for the need to 'attack' the individualists 'at root' within the Barcelona
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libertarian movement, because their acts 'have nothing to do with anarchist doctrine',
which aspires to 'the highest of human values', not 'professional banditry'.59
The decisive move of the opponents of armed illegality in the Barcelona CNT-
FM came early in the summer of 1935 at a clandestine plenum of the Local Federation
of Anarchist Groups held in Carrer Escudellers, just across from the Barn xino. At this
gathering a long discussion on the 'crime epidemic' culminated in an intervention by
Durruti in which he advocated a break with the tactic of'expropriations', whether for
individual or for collective ends. Durruti's address explained that:
'the eruption of robberies is putting our movement in great danger.
This danger does not stem from police repression and its
consequences but, from the fact that the continuation of this trend
will bring the decomposition of our organisation. This is of immense
importance because the first thing that those who dedicate
themselves to the industry of robbery do when they are caught by
the police, is show their CNT card and call the Prisoners' Support
Committee, thereby presenting the people with an inaccurate view of
our objectives'.
Although Durruti had the full support of'Nosotros', his speech was based on his
own experience while interned without trial between October 1934 and spring 1935,
during which he became aware that many of those detained for armed robbery made
appeals for assistance from the Prisoners' Support Committee, even though they were
often not members of the Confederal Defence Committees 'expropriation' teams. In some
cases, Durruti believed that it was not even certain whether the claimants were bonafide
CNT militants. Nevertheless, because they produced a CNT card, the detainees received
support from the Prisoners' Support Committee.
The main opposition to the change of policy over 'expropriations' came from
Ruano Segñndez, afaIsta and Argentinian individualist who was also a close friend of
Durruti. Ruano Segündez pilloried what he saw as Durruti's hypocrisy and his attempt to
deny others the right to adopt the very practices he had employed so enthusiastically in
the 1920s in both Barcelona and South America. However, the individualist option was
Salut, Viveres, pp.81-82; Solidaridad Obrera, 18 August 1933, 26 April, 14 July 1934; La ReViSta
Blanca, 4 January, 10 May 1935
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rejected by the majority offaIstas and, as occurred so often during the Republic, the
views of'Nosotros' prevailed.60
The resolution of the FM did not mean that there would be an immediate
cessation of armed illegality. Firstly, the rejection of 'expropriation' was qualified by the
'individual' prefix. This clearly allowed the possibility that the Confederal Defence
Committees might return to commit 'expropriations' to fund the CNT-FAI as and when
the need arose. Secondly, as seen by the attitude of individualists like Ruano Segiindez,
the tide had not turned definitively against the strategy of individual 'expropriations'.
There remained many individualists both in and around the anarchist movement who, it
must be remembered, dissented from the new stance of the FM because, in theoretical
terms at least, they accepted no other authority than their own.
The last card of the FM was to issue a formal threat to expel from its ranks any
dissident supporters of individual 'expropriation'. Although this raised the unpleasant
prospect of facing a jail term without any assistance from the Prisoners' Support
Committees, on several occasions it proved necessary for Durruti to intervene to hold
back anarchists from embarking on armed robberies. However, the FM order of spring
1935 did produce a dramatic decrease in the rate of armed expropriations and by the
beginning of 1936 the rate of armed robberies slowed down considerably, the majority of
which appeared to be the exclusive work of desperate unemployed workers. Similarly,
apart from the assassination of the executioner of Aranda, the activities of the
Confederal Defence Committees and the anarchist grupos de afinidad also abated in the
latter half of 1935.61
60 Paz, Durruti. pp.311-314
61 Paz, Durruti. p.314; Las Noticias, 1 January-18 July 1936; Comercio y Navegación, January-July
1936; Eslava, Verdugos, p.307; Abad de Santillán, Memorias, p.20!
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7.4. The Discreet Charm of the Republicans
The taming of the grupislas was inseparable from the bid of the CNT-FA1
leadership to respond to grass-roots sentiments that favoured proletarian unity in the
face of unrelenting state repression and the worsening fascist danger. While the
revolutionary forces failed to make their own revolution in October 1934, the counter-
revolutionary right also lacked sufficient power to destroy independent labour
organisations in the same way as was achieved in Italy, Germany and Austria. The
response of the united working class in Asturias was a lesson to the right, serving notice
that unlike in Italy and Germany, Spanish labour was prepared to fight the march of
fascism, and that unlike in Austria, it would not leave its fight too late. Moreover, in
contrast to the feeble convulsions produced by the 'revolutionary gymnastics' of the
anarchists, the 'Asturian Commune' unquestionably shook the economic and political
elites and remained a potent symbol for proletarian unity. Under these circumstances, it
did not seem unreasonable that the major protagonists of the 'Spanish October', the
Workers' Alliance would be the beneficiary of the groundswell of support for unity
among the working class.62
The BOC, still the most emphatic advocate of unity, championed the spirit of
Asturias and implored the UGT and the CNT to commit themselves to a projected
1National Workers' Alliance' (Alianza Obrera Nacional). This was given new urgency
after the announcement of elections for early 1936 and it was clear to many workers that
they had to transcend the divisions of the past, because a new electoral victory for a
rightist coalition headed by the CEDA carried the danger of a Hitlerian-style conquest of
democracy from within. It seemed, therefore, that the case for proletarian unity was
irrefutable.63
There were promising signs of a new post-Asturian unitarian spirit within the
Barcelona proletariat. In the textile sector, where a violent syndical recruiting war
between bloquistas, cenetistas and treintistas had been intermittent between 1933-1934,
62 j Balajia, 4 October 1934
63 BOC-FCCB, Les llicons de la insurrecció d'octubre, Barcelona, 1935, pp.26-27; L'Hora, 15 February
1935
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workers of all persuasions united to block attempts by employers to reintroduce the
Sindicatos Libres into the workplace. Yet there were definite limits to the organisational
unity of the Barcelona proletariat. Despite evidence that large sectors of the grass-roots
of the CNT-FAI in Catalonia favoured united working class action, the hatred of the
anarchists for the Workers' Alliance had not mellowed. Moreover, the prospect of
'anarchist unity' inside the Confederation and the imminent rapprochement between the
faIstas and the treintistas was exploited by the anarchist leadership to draw attention
away from its continuing sectarian attitude towards the Workers' Alhiancefr'
Nevertheless, the bulk of the working class, both in Barcelona and in Spain,
recognised that the political context demanded an alliance. Increasingly, the question
was, which sort of unity?
During late 1935 a new pole for anti-fascist unity emerged alongside the
exclusively proletarian Workers' Alliance. This was the Popular Front (Frente Popular), a
platform that effectively revived the 1931 Republican-Socialist coalition. In Catalonia,
where the political context was always more radicalised than elsewhere in the Spanish
state, the Popular Front was known as the 'Leftist Front' (Front d'Esquerres).65
Therefore, as the February 1936 elections approached, there were two rival paths to
anti-fascist unity: the exclusively proletarian Workers' Alliance, based on the 'Astunan
way' of revolutionary anti-fascism, and the multi-class, electoral alliance of the Popular
Front.
Despite the challenge of the Popular Front, the supporters of the Workers'
Alliance were confident that both the beacon of Asturias and the memoiy of the anti-
worker repression of 193 1-1933 would hand them the initiative. However, from October
1934 onwards there was a gradual, sometimes imperceptible, enhancement of the
La Batalla, 19 January, 29 November, 6 December 1935; Tiempos Nuevos. 10 January 1935;
Sindicalismo, 30 May, 7 August 1935; Solidaridad Obrera, 25 January 1936
65 Santos Julia Diaz, OrIgenes del Frente Popular en España (1934-1936). Madrid, 1979, passim.; Paul
Preston, 'The Creation of the Popular Front in Spain', in Helen Graham and Paul Preston (eds.), Th
Popular Front in Europe. London, 1987, pp.84-105; Santos Julia DIaz, 'The Origins and Nature of the
Spanish Popular Front', in Martin S. Alexander and Helen Graham (eds.), The French and Spanish
Popular Fronts. Comparative Perspectives. Cambridge, 1989, pp.24-37. The Popular Front was known
as the Front d'Esquerres in Catalonia: see Ricard Vinyes I Ribes, La Catalunya Internacional. El
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popularity of Republicanism. It is difficult to explain this by reference to either the
relevance or the coherence of Republican policies which, like in 1931-1933, remained
very confused and ambiguous. Instead, the revived fortunes of Republicanism owed to
an array of circumstantial factors, especially the persecution of the Republican leaders by
the right-wing Radical-CEDA government after October 1934. To be sure, the
incarceration and persecution of figures like Companys and Azaña bolstered their waning
credibility to such a degree that despite the anti-revolutionary repression they had
unleashed from office, many workers now saw them to be suffering alongside the
proletariat. This coincidence was ably exploited by Republican propagandists who
agitated around the highly emotive issue of the social and political prisoners from
October 1934. There were even attempts by Republicans to appropriate the symbolism
and the legacy of the Asturian Revolution.66
Most importantly of all, however, the resuscitation of the Republican option was
made possible by the position of the anarchists. Considering the anti-CNT policies
enacted by the Republican-Socialist government between 1931 and 1931, not to mention
the repression spearheaded by the Esquerra from the Generalitat, this was highly
paradoxical. Nevertheless, the contribution of the anarchists to the success of the
Popular Front can be seen in numerous ways.
Most fundamentally, it was the continuing sectarian opposition of the anarchists
to an exclusively proletarian and revolutionary alliance that facilitated the consolidation
of the cross-class, reformist Popular Front. The persistent hostility of the libertarians
towards the unity drive of the Workers' Alliance from 1933 onwards meant that the
desire for revolutionary anti-fascist unity among the Catalan masses remained largely
inchoate. This allowed the Popular Front strategy to grow in stature and tap the anti-
fascist unitarian sentiments that remained from the 'Asturian October' and, most
emotionally of all, champion the demand for the release of the prisoners.
Traditional anarchist apoliticism also played its part to the triumph of the Popular
Front option over the Workers' Alliance. When it came to the February 1936 elections
La Batalla, 25 October 1935; Vinyes I Ribes, La Catalunya Intemacional, pp.94-198
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the anarchists swallowed the revolutionary bluster of the preceding years and, despite the
common revolutionary objectives of the anarchists and the dissident communists, the
CNT-FAI shunned the offer of an insurrectionary entente with the revolutionary
communists because it was a 'political' alliance. Yet the pressure of events demanded a
political response and, like in the April 1931 elections, the anarchists and the anarcho-
syndicalists gravitated towards the petit-bourgeois Republican parties, whose Popular
Front electoral coalition seemed more attractive than a revolutionary proletarian
alliance.67
Apoliticism induced a bizarre amnesia on the libertarians that clouded the
memory of the ruthless treatment they received at the hands of the Generalitat in 1934.
By mid- 1935, La Revista Blanca, the messenger of anarchist apoliticism, attested to the
'dignity' of Companys in much the same way as the anarchists had praised Macia four
years earlier. As the elections loomed closer, it was manifest that behind the ritual
denunciations of the forthcoming 'electoral farce', the anarchists were ready to break
with their formal apoliticism in return for an amnesty and the reimposition of
constitutional liberties under a Popular Front government. There was nothing resembling
the strident anti-Republicanism and insurrectionary rhetoric that accompanied the 1933
general elections and while the CNT-FAI did not formally invite workers to vote,
throughout the electoral period paragons of anarchist virtue like Durruti and Francisco
Ascaso tirelessly reiterated the need for an immediate amnesty, a cry that was, in effect,
an invitation to vote for the Popular Front. In the view of Peirats, this stance was
'expedient' under the circumstances. Other libertarians were even more candid. Peiró, on
the eve of his return to the CNT but who was still a member of the FM, advised those
workers who normally abstained to vote 'against fascism'. Similarly, Urales, the grand
sorcerer of Iberian anarchism, went a step further, warning that it would be a 'great error'
for the CNT-FAI to deny votes to the Republicans. Meanwhile, relying on the same
67 La Batalla, 15 November, 27 December 1935, 24 January1936; Santos Julia DIaz, OrIgenes. ppl 18-
119, 207-210; Front, 7 February 1936
408
expression used by Ricardo Sanz to describe the April 1931 elections, Abad de Santillán
later recognised that the anarchists viewed the Popular Front as a 'lesser evil'.68
Therefore, just as the Popular Front was a re-run of the Republican-Socialist
coalition, like in 1931 the CNT-FAI, this time firmly under the sway of the anarchists,
repeated the electoral intervention that ensured the birth of the Republic and in February
1936 cenetista votes ensured the victory of the Popular Front. Like in 1931 there was
widespread jubilation and the new government promised it would safeguard the 'social
advances of the Republic'. The jails were opened and thousands of the workers
incarcerated after October 1934 were released. The Generalitat re-gained the powers
that had been accorded to it under the Autonomy Statute and earlier reforms were re-
implemented.
Again, just like after April 1931, the signs of the disaffection felt by Catalan
workers with the new Popular Front and Generalitat governments were not slow in
coming. In particular, there were renewed resentments at the failure of both the central
and regional governments to cut unemployment and assist the unemployed. The CNT -
FAT criticised the Popular Front for dragging its heels on its pledge to re-instate those
workers victimised after October 1934. There were other complaints that the projected
re-instatement of victimised workers was an affront to those CNT-FAI activists who had
been sacked from 1931 onwards. In response, the Confederation embarked on a series of
mobilisations to ensure that its activists were re-employed. Meanwhile, highlighting the
failure of grupismo, it was significant that the re-admission of many of those workers
victimised after the 'revolutionary gymnastics' owed to the mass syndical pressure of a
rejuvenated CNT and the new political context after February 1936.69
While the Popular Front government satisfied the CNT-FAI insofar as it abided
by certain basic democratic protocols that had been absent after the triumph of the right
in 1933, the issue of civil liberties was a serious stumbling block between the
68 La Revista Blanca. 7 June 1935, 3 January 1936; Solidaridad Obrera, 8, 17, 24 Januaiyl936; José
Peirats, Examen critico-constructivo del movimiento libertario espafiol, Mexico, 1967, pp.26-27;
'Juanel', (Juan Manuel Molina), Consideraciones, p.13; Las Noticias, 5 Februaiy 1936; Peirô cited in
Benjamin Martin, The Agony of Modernization. Labor and Industrialization in S pain, Ithaca, 1990,
p.363; Diego Abad de Santillán, Por aué perdimos Ia guerra, Buenos Aires, 1940, p.37
69 Solidaridad Obrera, 17 February-15 July 1936
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government and the Confederation. Firstly, the CNT-FAI was outraged that the Popular
Front government refused to repeal the Ley de VagosyMaleantes. To make matters
worse, the utilisation of the law against the unemployed increased after February.
Secondly, although the Popular Front had fulfilled its promise of an amnesty for the
thousands of'political' prisoners who had been jailed after October 1934, the amnesty
did not extend to those detainees that the CNT described as 'social' prisoners. The 'social'
prisoner category included many cenetistas and falsias who had been interned under the
Ley de VagosyMaleantes, as well as numerous 'expropriators' from the Confederal
Defence Committees, who were serving sentences as 'common' criminals. The CNT also
petitioned the authorities to extend the amnesty to include those unemployed workers
who were serving jail sentences for illegally 'procuring the means of subsistence'. The
CNT-FAJ backed its demands with a broad campaign for the repeal of the Ley de Vagos
y Maleantes, along with the other 'repressive laws' from the first Republican biennium,
like the Ley de orden pñblico and for a complete amnesty of all prisoners, including
those jailed for 'common crimes' and 'crimes of hunger'. The frustration of the 'common'
prisoners, and the agitation of the remaining cenelistas and faIstas in the jails, culminated
in a wave of prison uprisings throughout Spain.70
Despite the rising agitation inside the jails, the CNT-FAI was averse to
presenting the Popular Front with serious problems. It was common knowledge that the
extreme right, along with disgruntled army officers were conspiring against the
government. The anarchists decided to maintain an expectant attitude and not get
embroiled in unnecessary confrontations with the authorities. In the spring of 1936, the
CNT looked in on itself and devoted much time to the re-construction of the syndical
organisations that had received such a battering by the authorities between 1931 and
1935. Equally, the Confederation prepared to welcome back the treintistas into the
'libertarian family' and set about organising a national congress to map out its trajectory.
The months after the Popular Front victory were, therefore, largely a time of reflection
for the Catalan CNT-FAI, a sharp contrast with the impetuous maximalism and
70 Las Noticias, 5 February, 19 May 1936; Tierra y Libertad. 17 April 1936; Solidaridad Obrera, 22, 31
January, 20-22, 26 February, 3-7 March 1936; Azafla, Obras, vol.4, p.570
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grupismo that characterised the earlier period of the 'revolutionary gymnastics'. 7 ' The
grupislas were not entirely inactive, however. At the end of April a FM grupo de
afinidad assassinated the Badia brothers, Miquel and Josep, as they left their flat in the
Eixample. After the Popular Front triumph the FM had issued a public warning that any
attempt by the Generalitat to re-appoint either of the two brothers would be resisted 'as
if they were MartInez Anido and Arlegui'. However, it would be wrong to view the
assassinations as a challenge to the authority of the Generalitat. Instead, the killings of
the Badia brothers represented a classic example of a 'settling of scores' by the falstas,
who were unable to forgive the brutality of the former Barcelona Police Chief Miquel
Badia had already survived one assassination attempt and he continued to receive hand-
written death threats and suffer rancorous attacks in the CNT press. 72
7.5. An 'apolitical' revolution: Anarchism, Revolution and Civil War
The assassination of the Badia brothers was the last significant action by the
grupos de afinidad before the July pronunciamiento of the Spanish military against the
Republican government. The military rising succeeded where the 'revolutionary
gymnastics' had failed: it created the spark that lit the flame of a popular revolution and
the proletariat of Barcelona rose up to quash the attempted military take-over. Inspired
by 'Nosotros', the Confederal Defence Committees finally scored the triumph over the
military that had been so long in coming. The extent to which the minority putsches were
71 The reduced activity of the Catalan CNT in the months immediately preceding the Civil War has led
Catalan nationalist historians to talk of Catalonia as 'the oasis of peace' in the Republic. An example of
this trend is Josep Benet, 'Ara fa quaranta anys. Catalunya, oasi', Serra d'Or. May 1976, pp. 15-2 1. This
view has rightly been criticised for relativising the degree of social conflict in Catalonia in the months
preceding the Civil War, when the newly-formed POUM and its trade union federation, the FOUS,
endeavoured to take the initiative in the political and syndical spheres: Vinyes i Ribes, La Catalunya
Internacional. pp.303-335; Durgan, Dissident Communism, pp.298-333
72 La Publicitat, 5 April 1934; Balius, Octubre catalán, pp.3-4, 14-16, 29-30; Las Noticias, 8, 18, 29
March, 29-30 April, 1-8, 16, 20 May 1936; F0371/20522/W5256/62/41: Letter from C.G. King, 5 June
1936 (PRO); Garcia Oliver, El eco, p.580. According to the testimony of Ramón Liarte, Francisco
Ascaso authorised the assassinations after Badia sent signed orders to CNT-FAI leaders to 'quit
Catalonia' in 1934. Interestingly, it fell to the 'X' grupo de afinidad, which included the Ruano brothers,
the Argentinian émigré individualists, to take revenge on 'the Catalan Gering'. When news of the
deaths of the Badia brothers reached the members of 'Nosotros' in the 'Café Espanyol' on El Paral.IeI,
Francisco Ascaso quipped that they should attend the funeral: Liarte, El camino, pp.221-225. 'Nosotros'
welcomed the assassinations in terms of 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth': Sanz, El sindicalismo
y la polftjca, p.248. Although he obviously did not condone the killings, Companys reflected that the
brothers had 'asked for it': Abad de Santillan, Memorias, p.259.
411
a suitable preparation for the Street fighting in July 1936 is, however, highly debatable.
Even in the anarchist stronghold of Barcelona, the important minorities of socialists and
dissident communists, who were excluded from the elitist 'revolutionary gymnastics',
played an important part in putting down the military rising, as did Republican and
Catalaniste elements inside the security forces.73
Nevertheless, it was the CNT-FAI who emerged as the defacto masters of the
streets of Barcelona. The anarchists set about achieving much of what they had hoped
for after February. Many of the 'social prisoners' and 'common criminals' who had not
been amnestied in February were finally released, including Escolano Lopez, the
anarchist highway robber sentenced to over 100 years in jail, and the Ballanos brothers, a
pair of individualist 'expropriators'. Meanwhile, many of the foreign anarchists who had
figured among the 'expropriators' were also released, whereupon they joined the fight
against fascism in the Civil War. Others were not so lucky. Santaniaria, an Argentinian
friend of Abad de Santillán imprisoned in the Castillo de San CristObal in Pamplona as a
'common criminal', was murdered in the jail when it was taken by the military. In a
grotesque act, Tones Escartin, the ex-tos Solidarios' member, was discovered by
fascists in an asylum and executed.74
The initiative held by the CNT-FAI after the July days did not rerriain with them
for long. Although the Catalan proletariat unleashed a revolution at the base of society,
reorganising production and taking over the factories, the CNT-FAI was incapable of
leading the Catalan proletariat to the promised land. Among the CNT-FAI leaders,
GarcIa Oliver raised the call 'to go the whole way' (ir apor el todo) towards social
transformation, however, he was in a minority among his comrades, who saw him as an
advocate of'anarchist dictatorship'. 75 Instead, for the sake of unity in the war against
fascism, the libertarians opted for 'democratic collaboration' with the Republicans, just as
' Abel Paz, 19 de Julio! del '36' a Barcelona, Barcelona, 1988, pp.69-115; Manuel Cruells, La revolta
del 1936 a Barcelona, Barcelona, 1976, pp. 155-214; Bueso, Recuerdos, vol.2, pp.144-195; GarcIa
Oliver, El eco, pp.171-177
Treball, 8 August 1936; Ballano was later appointed delegate for Justice and Public Order in the
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pp.220-221
GarcIa Oliver, El eco, pp.177-191
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they had done in April 1931 and in July 1936. Hence, while the revolution took place in
many of the factories and fields of the Republican zone, the old bourgeois state
continued to exist. In opting for an alliance with the middle class Republicans the
anarchists ignored the proven democratic shortcomings of the Republicans over the
previous five years, as well as evidence that some currents of Republican opinion in
Barcelona and Madrid feared the revolutionary left far more than the mutinous army.
This was reflected in the shameful attempts of those Republicans who initially hoped to
accommodate themselves with the military rebels in the hope that some kind of a
Republican dictatorship' would emerge to extinguish the revolutionary threat of the
organised working class.
The logic of the post-July 1936 situation of'dual power' was not the outcome of
miscalculation or error by the libertarians; rather, true to its ancient Greek etymology,
anarchism was 'against power', including that of the proletariat, the very force it
proposed to liberate. In July 1936, like in April 1931 and in February 1936, the hostility
of the anarchists to a 'political' alliance with the not inconsiderable forces of
revolutionary socialists and dissident communists, meant that the initiative fell once more
to the Esquerra. Thus, the 'dual power' of July 1936 in the Republican camp was the
inexorable result of anarchist apoliticism, the immediate legacy of the obstinate rejection
by the libertarians of the genuine efforts to forge revolutionary unity in the preceding
years. Because the anarchists viewed politics in the same way as Christians regard
original sin, there was no such thing as 'good' or 'bad' politics or, 'proletarian' or
'bourgeois' politics, there were simply 'politics', which, for the libertarians, were morally
reprehensible.
The new conditions of war and revolution after July 1936 revealed the limitations
of anarchism as a highly eclectic and ill-formed ideology. Moreover, even when
anarchism was closely adhered to trade unionism, in the guise of anarcho-syndicalism,
the struggles of the proletariat were restricted to the ideological and economic spheres.
This meant that however brave or ferocious the offensive of the CNT-FAI might be,
political struggles, that is to say, struggles for state power, were ignored. The CINT
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unions, therefore, were an insufficient match in a social war against state power.
Consequently, even though successive governments and the bourgeoisie feared the
Confederal working class in the streets both during the Republic and in the Civil War,
the CNT masses posed little threat on a political level, as the architects of a rival state
power. In practical terms, therefore, the political impact of the profound revolutionary
impulses that emanated from the Catalan working class in the 1930s was significantly
muted and the CNT-FAI were capable of leading little more than sporadic guerrilla
actions against the authorities, actions that were easily dealt with by the repressive state
apparatuses. Meanwhile, once war took precedence over revolution, the conditions
existed for the enemies of the revolution in the Republican camp to reconstruct the
political power of the state and re-direct it again at the most revolutionary elements of
the Catalan proletariat.
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Conclusion
In the opinion of its creators, the Republican state and its security forces were
essentially neutral vessels that could be mobilised benignly to aid the people. Though the
Second Republic assumed the parity of rich and poor before the law, the overall
emphasis of the Republicans was on formal, not substantive equality. Hence, structural
economic inequality and class discrimination remained as before. Article 1 of the
Constitution highlighted the vague abstractions of the Republican mind, implying that
rank and privilege would not affect the legal process and completely ignoring the
material disadvantages and the daily economic compulsion that weighed down upon the
working class. Indeed, while the factory owner and the unemployed worker were now
formally equal in the eyes of the law, there the parity ended; economic laws forebode the
former from sleeping on the streets, yet virtually compelled privations on the latter
throughout the Republican years. Therefore, although formal equality before the law
represented an important development after years of monarchist absolutism, it was, in
practice, little more than a fig-leaf for continuing socio-economic inequality and the
continuing social exclusion of large sectors of the proletariat. The Republicans
apparently saw no contradiction here, nor was it felt that continuing socio-economic
inequality would undennine the chances of success of the new democratic polity.
Nevertheless, the view that formal equality could exist within a highly invidious socio-
economic system was at best mistaken, at worst a direct subterfuge. In practice, the
fiction of 'legal equality within a society based on immense disparities of power and
property meant that by reinforcing the socio-economic status quo Republican law
became another guarantor of these very inequalities.
The coincidence between the birth of the Republic and the world economic
recession meant that tremendous distance rapidly opened up between the Republicans
and the poorest sectors of the working class. The limitations of the Republic were
quickly revealed to thousands of workers in Barcelona, as were the definite limits to
which organised labour could be integrated within the structures of the new régime.
These limits narrowed considerably due to the quest for the Republic of Order' and the
readiness of the authorities to minimise the power of the most revolutionary sectors of
the labour movement. Thereafter, relations between the CNT and the Madrid authorities
turned sour when the Confederation initiated a campaign of industrial action aimed at
bettering the desperate economic situation of its members, an initiative which many
Republicans interpreted as a generalised offensive against the fledgling democracy. In the
course of these mobilisations many workers won the 44-hour week, a triumph they
regarded as a vital safeguard against growing unemployment. Howewer, this was an
innovation that the sluggish Catalan economy could not easily accept and a dialectic of
conflict was established which culminated in many capitalists turning against a bourgeois
democracy that always seemed incompatible with their long-standing penchant for
authoritarianism, both in the factory and on the national political stage.
The hope of the Esquerra to mediate between the antagonistic classes in Catalan
society and bridge the gulf between the CNT and the Madrid Republican authorities was
undermined by the absence of institutional power in the hands of the Catalanistes. The
inability of the Generalitat to act on behalf of the most downtrodden sectors of Catalan
society generated fissures within 'the people', the cross-class alliance that brought the
Republic. The disappointment with the reality of the Republic meant that a wave of
radicalisation quickly overcame the grass-roots of the Barcelona CNT, elevating the
most radical elements into the directive positions of the Confederation and promising a
conpiete rupture with the Republic. The determination of the CNT rank-and-file to
better its own material position led to spiralling clashes between Republican security
forces and union defence squads. This scuppered plans for re-negotiating the legitimacy
of the state and the authorities increasingly relied on hard methods of repression, some
of which were inherited from the monarchy, such as internment without trial, while
others, like the Ley de Defensa de la Repüblica, were home grown. Because it was
dependent on the goodwill of the Spanish state for the promulgation of autonomous
powers, the ERC was eager to prove its responsibility to Madrid and had little choice but
to accept the repressive turn of the new régime.
There was, however, a fatal contradiction between the Republican discourse of
'order' and 'legality': by outlawing a mass, labour organisation and repressing the
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desperate actions of the jobless to survive, the authorities paradoxically guarantied an
increase in the level of illegality. In response to the challenge to its authority, the
Republican authorities increasingly accepted the repressive inhibitions previously held by
their monarchical predecessors and championed the 'principle of authority'. This
culminated in the law-and-order fears articulated by the Esquerra-dominated Generalitat.
The obsession of the ERC with law-and-order was particularly significant. Often seen as
the most radical of all the Republicans factions during the 1930s, the impact of the
recession led the Esquerra to accept a reactionary social philosophy and move
rightwards, culminating in the emergence of a proto-fascist faction inside the coalition.
Even the 'LiuhIns', the left-wing of the Esquerra, showed considerable signs of
authoritarian thinking and revealed a readiness to trample on democratic protocols.
The descent into repression encouraged the continuity of long-standing anti-
police traditions within the proletariat of Barcelona, popular conventions that
complemented the activities of the syndical defence squads and the FM-dominated CNT.
The ascendancy of the FM did, nevertheless, produce a series of bitter ironies. The rise
of the FAT was bound up with their ability to tap the ground swell of frustration
generated by unemployment. However, constructive action against joblessness required
powerful unions and a united proletarian campaign for the re-incorporation of the out-
of-work in the factories. Falsino was inimical to the project of creating a credible
campaign against unemployment; it brought nothing but weakness and division to the
CNT and the labour movement as a whole, as the anarchists doggedly rejected united
front initiatives against unemployment. Any balance of the labour of the anarchists in the
1930s cannot ignore the nefarious and negative consequencesfaIsmo brought to the
Catalan CNT, particularly its rabid sectarianism and its bloody organisational rivalries
with bloquistas, treintistas and ugetistas. Devastated by splits and repeated crises by
1936 the Catalan CNT lost about half of the 300,000 members it claimed in June 1931.
However, as seen by its phoenix-like revival between 1930-193 1, the CNT had emerged
from worse crises in the past, and in May 1936 the Confederation still accounted for
about 50% of all trade unionists in Catalonia, with around 180,000 members after the re-
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unification with the treintistas. Nevertheless, the absurd revolutionary and sectarian line
of the anarchists alienated thousands of generally better-off, more stable and semi-skilled
workers from the CNT, stimulating the emergence of new syndical options within the
Catalan proletariat. Thus, by 1936 the dissident communist-led unions who germinated
into the FOUS, organised many of the syndical struggles in Catalonia before the Civil
War, where they claimed 60,000 members.' Meanwhile, there is a case for arguing that
the Catalan UGT was the main beneficiary of anarchist maximalism, attracting 18,000
new affiliates from the treintistas of Sabadell and Manresa who chose not to return to
the CNT and the 23,000 strong CADCI. This anti-anarchist feeling transformed the
Catalan UGT from a 'man-and-a-dog' union in 1931 to an organisation which claimed
100,000 members on the eve of the Civil War.2
The allure of the better-skilled, often non-inunigrant workers, for dissident
communism or socialism should not be taken as confirmation that the anarchists were
based on an essentially immigrant 'underclass'. The superficial correlation between
anarchism and immigration masks the underlying reality that the inherently fragile
industrial structure of Barcelona lent itself to aggressive and explosive conflicts which,
to a large extent, suited anarchist methods. It is also far from certain whether it is licit to
speak of the existence of an 'underclass' in the 193 Os. To be sure, many of those deemed
'underclass' were nothing more than hyper-exploited, unskilled or unemployed
proletarians. Equally, many of those dubbed 'underworld' by the hack sociologists of the
daily press, were proponents of 'occasional criminality' from the large and growing
pockets of seasonal, unskilled and poor workers who saw the need to transgress laws to
meet their most fundamental needs during the recession-torn 193 Os. The myth that these
jobless workers were part of an immoral and dangerous 'underclass' was a vital part of
the campaign of the Republican authorities to divide the working class and criminalise
the unemployed who had flooded into the CNT.
1 Front, 5 June 1936; La Batalla, 15, 22 May, 15, 26 June 1936; Durgan, Dissident Communism,
pp.298-323. With the outbreak of Civil War the FOUS hesitantly joined the UGT, to avoid
marginalisation.
2 Justicia Social-Octubre, 17 July 1936. Gabriel Sirvent puts the Catalan UGT strength at 86,000 for the
same period ('Sindicalismo y sindicatos socialistas', p.64)
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Despite their part in securing the ascendancy of the falsias, in many ways the
jobless inside the Confederation were ignored and left unorganised, largely used as
cannon-fodder for the 'revolutionary spasms' of the 'insurrectionary pendulum
movements' and the 'propaganda of the hungry' of the 'self-help' expropriations. Leaving
the jobless in a state of relative abandon was not without its dangers and on more than
one occasion the dissident communists warned that the anarchists that while 'hunger
makes revolutionaries, it also makes traitors'. 3 However, unlike in Germany or Italy, the
powerful revolutionary traditions in Catalonia meant that the out-of-work did not join a
mass, radicalised party of the far right. Instead, the unemployed were drawn to what
Ricard Vinyes i Ribes termed the 'brilliant subversive culture' of the CNT, finding a place
within the essentially self-sufficient, proletarian counter-society, a cultural universe
which united sections of the Catalan proletariat with marginal elements normally shunned
by other established political groups, including many of those on the left. 4 The coming
together of this revolutionary culture with the culture of hunger and privation of large
sections of the Catalan masses helps explain the way in which the anarchists, far more
than any other current within the labour movement, articulated the aspirations of the
unskilled and the unemployed and, as revealed by the expropriations, took the struggles
of these sectors outside the parameters of collective mobilisation. This readiness to vent
the urges, both creative and destructive, of the most downtrodden sections of the
Catalan masses, helps explain the durability and lasting appeal of the CNT-FAI in the
1930s.
The strengths of the rebel culture of the CNT must, however, be juxtaposed with
the debilitating logic of apoliticism. This aversion to politics of all creeds periodically
emasculated the numerically huge Catalan working class and reduced it to political
impotency. Consequently, the political representatives of the Catalan working class were
absent from both the Generalitat and local councils during the Republic. While the
anarchists were correct that these institutions were not capable of ushering in any
La Batalla, 6 April, 5 May 1933
4 Ricard Vinyes I Ribes, La Presència I gnorada. La Cultura Comunista a Catalunya (1840-1931),
Barcelona, 1989, p.201
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profound long-term transformation of society, they could, nevertheless, have become
platforms for genuine proletarian politics. For instance, the Municipal Council Chambers
of proletarian Barcelona were a contestable political space which, if conquered, might
have been utilised to plough vital financial resources into the depressed working class
ghettos, thereby aiding the unemployed and enhancing the pitiflil levels of housing and
sanitation, just as occurred in Vienna before the victory of fascism in 1934.
In accordance with the apolitical lodestar that guided anarchist praxis, the CNT
underwent a series of swings during the five years of the Republic, oscillating from
moderation to maximalism, before swinging back to a cautious stance in 1936.
Apoliticism rendered the enormous power of this mass movement impotent at the most
critical (political) moments. On these occasions the anarchists and the anarcho-
syndicalists inadvertently favoured exogenous political forces: the petit bourgeois
Republicans in April 1931 and the reactionary-monarchical right in November 1933,
before aiding the bourgeois-democrats once more in February and July 1936. Years later
a Catalan anarchist from this period painfully reflected that because there was not a 'fixed
position binding for every situation', the apoliticism of the CNT-FAI became 'an
opportunistic tactic'.5
Centuries earlier, with the balance of forces openly in his favour, Spartacus
renounced the opportunity to lead his slave army north into the centre of the oppressive
political power of the Roman Empire, hoping instead to flee Italy for a free haven
beyond the grasp of the repressive Roman state. By failing to besiege the nerve-centre of
the state, Spartacus allowed the beleaguered military forces of the Roman Empire to
regroup and launch a final brutal offensive against his slave army of liberation. Despite
their success in forging an enduring spirit of rebellion, the Catalan anarchists followed
the example of Spartacus by eschewing a frontal challenge to the state in July 1936. It
was this tactical error by the libertarians that provided an opportunity for their enemies
to prepare a counter-offensive which prevented them from reaching their own 'City of
Sun'.
José Peirats, Examen, pp.26-27
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